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Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Ian Lustick
Ian Lustick
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College
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Abstract

This paper examines the consociational approach to the study of deeply divided societies and notes its weaknesses. It argues that the absence of a well-developed alternative “control” approach to the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies has resulted in the empirical overextension of consociational models. Control models, focusing on how superordinate groups manipulate subordinate groups rather than on the emergence and functioning of elite cartels, need to be developed—not only for the study of stable, deeply divided societies in which consociational models are inappropriate, but also as a means of eliminating certain theoretical problems that have been raised as criticisms of consociationalism. The paper includes a critical review of the literature that is available to guide study of control in deeply divided societies, and concludes with recommendations for the shape of an analytical framework within systematic comparison.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , April 1979 , pp. 325 - 344
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1979

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References

1 I find Esman's, Milton J. definition of “communalism” as“competitive group solidarities within the same political system based on ethnic, linguistic, racial, or religious identities” to be satisfactory for my purposes. See “The Management of Communal Conflict,” Public Policy, XXI (Winter 1973), 49.Google Scholar Because I shall make no assertions concerning the possible political implications of various modes of group identification, I shall use such terms as “ethnic” and “communal” interchangeably.

2 The phrase “terminal identity” is derived from Rupert Emerson's discussion of “terminal communities.” See From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press 1960) 95–96. The exclusion of class segmentation from the population of deeply divided societies is in a strict sense somewhat arbitrary. It constitutes, however, a useful narrowing of focus, given the theoretical tasks undertaken in this paper. For a discussion of the relevance of studies of ethnic segmentation for problems of interclass control, see Flynn, Peter, “Class, Clientelism, and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, XII (July 1974).Google Scholar See also fn. 13

3 For an in-depth discussion of the conditions under which ascriptive identities become politically important, see Kasfir, Nelson, The Shrinking Political Arena (Berkeley: University of California 1976), 28–85.Google Scholar

4 Lijphart, Arend, “Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV (March 1971), 9.Google Scholar

5 That most consociational theorists limit their hypotheses to what they call “open” or“democratic” societies is an important point; but since, as I shall argue below, the nature of consociationalism itself makes the democratic character of such regimes problematical, I prefer now to consider consociational hypotheses as bearing upon the general problem of stability in deeply divided societies.

6 Rothchild, Donald, “Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution,” World Politics, XXII (July 1970), 615.Google Scholar For a study of ethnic politics in Africa that closely follows Rothchild's advice, see Lawler, fames, “Conflict Avoidance in Africa,” Peace Research Reviews, VII (June 1976).Google Scholar

7 Daalder, Hans, “The Consociational Democracy Theme,” World Politics, XXVI (July 1974). See also Esman (fn. 1), 51.Google Scholar

8 Barry, Brian, “Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy,” British Journal of Political Science, V, part 4 (October 1975), 494.Google Scholar

9 Barry, Brian, “The Consociational Model and Its Dangers,” European Journal of Political Research, 111 (December 1975), 393–411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Barry, (fn. 8), 483–86, 500.Google Scholar

11 See fn. 23.

12 Bailey, F. G., Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics (New York: Schocken Books 1969), 135.Google Scholar

13 Suggestive here is Leo Kuper's description of the role of the central political system in white settler societies. Referring to the central political system as the basis of settler domination, Kuper remarks that “Marx's concept of the state as the executive of the ruling class exactly describes its role in independent white settler societies.” See “Some Aspects of Violent and Nonviolent Political Change in Plural Societies,” in Kuper, Leo and Smith, M. G., eds., Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1969), 186.Google Scholar See also the discussion of the “capture” of the state apparatus by a dominant segment, in Kasfir (fn. 3), 156–58.

14 See, for example, Cynthia Enloe's remarks on the failure of a Formosan nationalist movement to emerge in Taiwan. No mention is made of constraints that may exist against political activity of this sort, other than the difficulty of distinguishing native Formosans from mainland-Chinese immigrants. Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown 1973), 20–21. On this point, see also fn. 22.

15 Daalder (fn. 7), 614.

16 Quoted ibid., 615. Enloe's Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (fn. 14) and Rabushka, Alvin and Shepsle's, KennethPolitics in Plural Societies (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill 1972)Google Scholar, are based on the proposition that ethnic identity is inevitably and effectively politicized. For an extended critique of this presumption, see Kasfir (fn. 3), 28–85.

17 See, for example, Dahl, Robert, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 358.Google Scholar

18 Nordlinger, Eric, Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers No. 29 (Cambridge 1972), 10.Google Scholar

19 Barry (fn. 8), 483, 500.

20 Nordlinger (fn. 18), 13.

21 Ibid., 40.

22 Ibid., 12. One can imagine a “hybrid” political system in which stability in a deeply divided society is the result of controls exerted over each segment by an “umpire regime” with independent access to sufficient political, military, or political resources to support its stabilizing objectives. Yugoslavia might be such a case. The continued stability of such a society could not be explained within either a consociational or a control approach (as those approaches are understood in this paper). That is to say, consideration of such a society from either of these perspectives would probably result in predictions of serious instability or in a reexamination of that society's classification as “deeply divided.”

23 Israel is an example of such a case. Consociational techniques have been used to maintain political stability among Jewish political and clerical subcultures, while the absence of conflict and instability in the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel is best explained in terms of control. For an example of the need to exclude consideration of the Arab minority from consociational analysis of the Israeli political system, see Paltiel, K. Z., “The Israeli Coalition System,” Government and Opposition, X (Autumn 1975) 3397–3414.Google Scholar For analysis of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel in terms of “control,” see Lustick, , Arabs in the Jewish State: A Study in the Control of a Minority Population (Austin: University of Texas Press,Google Scholar forthcoming).

24 See, for instance, McRae, Kenneth, Consociational Democracy (Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart 1974), 300–302.Google Scholar

25 Barry, Brian argues that, in societies deeply divided along ethnic lines, consociational solutions to problems of conflict and instability are very unlikely to emerge. Barry (fn. 8), 502–5.Google Scholar

26 The suggestion of integration through control or domination is consistent with the argument of writers such as Enloe, Rabushka and Shepsle, and Walker Connor who stress the need—in a world of proliferating subnational units—to consider modes of political integration other than the democratic nation-state as legitimate.

27 Smith, M. G., “Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism,” in Pluralism in Africa (fn. 13), 418.Google Scholar

28 Kuper, “Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems,” ibid., 21.

29 Smith, “Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies,” and “Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism,” both ibid., 96 and 445, respectively.

30 See Katznelson, Ira, “Comparative Studies of Race and Ethnicity,” Comparative Politics, V (October 1972), 143.Google Scholar

31 Smith, “Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism,” and Kuper, , “Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some Aspects of Polarization and Depluralization,” both in Pluralism in Africa (fn. 13), 430Google Scholar and 473, respectively.

32 Pierre van den Berghe, “Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Exploration,” ibid., 81 n.

33 Rabushka and Shepsle (fn. 16), 90.

34 Esman (fn. 1), 56.

35 Ibid., 57.

36 Kuper, , “Political Change in White Settler Societies: The Possibility of Peaceful Democratization,” in Pluralism in Africa (fn. 13), 177–82.Google Scholar

37 Kupe, “Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some Aspects of Polarization and Depluralization,” ibid., 475.

38 Kuper, “Political Change in White Settler Societies: The Possibility of Peaceful Democratization,” ibid., 182.

39 Adam, Heribert, Modernizing Racial Domination (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971), 15.Google Scholar

40 See Cockcroft, James D. and others, eds., Dependence and Underdevelopment (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books 1972)Google Scholar, esp. chaps. 1 and 10. For an interesting critique of this material, see Wolpe, Harold, “The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case,” in Oxaal, Ivar and others, eds., Beyond the Sociology of Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975), 229–50.Google Scholar

41 Several proponents of the “internal colonialism” approach have indicated their awareness of this difficulty. See Hechter, Michael, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1975), 33n.Google Scholar, 349–50; and Johnson, Dale, “On Oppressed Classes,” in Cockcroft (fn. 40), 279n.Google Scholar

42 Wolpe (fn. 40), 244–50.