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Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

John W. R. Lepingwell
John W. R. Lepingwell
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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Abstract

This paper tests the objective (professionalization) and subjective (party penetration) models of Soviet civil-military relations. The objective model is found to provide the best fit and is used to investigate further the factors leading to military participation in, and withdrawal from, the coup of August 1991. The objective model points to the importance of threats to professional autonomy and national unity, the politicization of the military, and declining regime legitimacy as the primary causal factors in the participation of the military in the coup. It also stresses the importance of military professionalism as a barrier to intervention and as a cause of military paralysis during the coup. Furthermore, the model points to the importance of democratic legitimacy in future civilian control and to the need for increased military professionalism to forestall threats to the post-Soviet regime.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 44 , Issue 4 , July 1992 , pp. 539 - 572
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1992

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References

1 Huntington, , The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80–85Google Scholar.

2 Ibid., 7–18.

3 Ibid., 54–58, 84–85.

4 Ibid., 84.

5 Ibid., 80–85, quote at 84. Eric Nordlinger bases his categorization of civilian control on Huntington's, calling them the liberal and penetration models. See Nordlinger, , Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 12–19Google Scholar.

6 David Albright has argued that Huntington's approach ignores the wide variations in the politics of communist states. Albright's alternative, a multivariable characterization of civil-military relations, is broadly consistent with the interpretation of the objective model as developed in this paper. See Albright, , “A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” World Politics 32 (July 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 The pathbreaking work in this area is Kolkowicz, , The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967)Google Scholar. See also idem, “The Military,” in Skilling, Gordon and Griffiths, Franklyn, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)Google Scholar; and idem, “The Political Role of the Soviet Military,” in Nogee, Joseph L., ed., Soviet Politics: Russia after Brezhnev (New York: Praeger, 1984)Google Scholar. Other works that implicitly or explicitly use this model include Avidar, Yosef, The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1983)Google Scholar; and Perlmutter, Amos, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977)Google Scholar. In a later work Kolko-wicz moved away from a purely subjective model and noted a degree of accommodation between the military and civilian leaderships. See Kolkowicz “Military Intervention in the Soviet Union: Scenario for Post-Hegemonial Synthesis,” and “Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems,” in Kolkowicz and Korbonski, Andrzej, eds., Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1982)Google Scholar.

8 See Kolkowicz (fn. 7, 1967), 11–35; and Huntington (fn. 1), 59–79. Other research on military sociology suggests that the military does have a distinctly different set of values from that of civilians. See Nordlinger (fn. 5), 31–61; Abrahamsson, Bengt, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972), 59–100Google Scholar.

9 Kolkowicz (fn. 7, 1967), 80–98.

10 Kolkowicz (fn. 7, 1984), 74–83.

11 Colton, , Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union: The Developmental Perspective,” Studies in Comparative Communism 11 (Autumn 1978)Google Scholar. The model is discussed and further elaborated in Colton, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union,” and Gustafson, Thane, “Conclusions: Toward a Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?” both in Colton and Gustafson, eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar. A decision-making model based on this approach may be found in Condoleezza Rice, “The Party, The Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union,” World Politics 40 (October 1987)Google Scholar.

12 Huntington (fn. 1), 83–85.

13 Rice (fn. 11), 78–81; Gustafson (fn. 11), 354–58; Bruce Parrott, “Political Change and Civil-Military Relations,” in Colton and Gustafson (fn. 11); Currie, Kenneth, The Soviet Military: An Introduction (New York: Paragon House, 1991)Google Scholar.

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16 Colton (fn. 11, 1979), 233–49.

17 Kolkowicz (fn. 7, 1967), 32; idem (fn. 7, 1982), 122–26.

18 Kolkowicz (fn. 7, 1984), 74–83.

19 See Breslauer, George, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as headers: Building Authority in Soviet Politics (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 3–14, 269–92Google Scholar.

20 Parrott (fn. 13), 75—92; Oudenaren, John Van, The Role of Shevardnadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Making of Soviet Defense and Arms Control Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1990)Google Scholar.

21 See, e.g., Lopatin, Vladimir, “Armiya i politika,” Znamya 7 (1990)Google Scholar. Arguments for and against retaining the MPA are presented in Podziruk, Viktor and Petrushenko, Nikolay, “Pered litsom realiy ili po puti otritsaniya?” Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil 7 (1990)Google Scholar.

22 Foye, Stephen, “The Soviet Armed Forces: Lead-Up to the Party Congress,” Report on the USSR 28 (1990)Google Scholar; idem, “Defense Issues at the Party Congress,” Report on the USSR 30 (1990)Google Scholar. For a breakdown of military representatives to the congress, see “Voyennyye na parts'yezde,” Krasnaya zvezda, July 5, 1990, p. 4.

23 Aleksey D. Lizichev, “Uchityvat' realii perestroyki,” Krasnaya zvezda, March 20, 1990, p. 1; idem, “Politrabota i moshch' armii,” Pravda, February 1, 1990, p. 5; Boris Gromov, “Army Officer on Separation of Military, Politics,” FBIS-SOV, April 24, 1990, pp. 74–75 (from Argumenty i Fakfy, no. 12, March 24—30, 1990); Yazov, Dimitriy T., “Perestroyka v strane, perestroyka v armii,” Pravitel'stvenniy vestnik 6 (February 1990)Google Scholar; idem, “Klyuchevaya zadacha voyennoy reformy,” Krasnaya zvezda, September 2, 1990, p. 1.

24 “Ob osnovnykh napravlenniyakh voyennoy politiki partii na sovremennom etape,” Krasnaya zvezda, July 11, 1990, pp. 3—4. Lizichev was replaced as head of the MPA by General Shlyaga just after the Twenty-eighth Congress.

25 “Voyennyye na parts'yezde” (fn. 22). See also the sources cited in fn. 22.

26 “Chto ne voshlo v gazetnyye otchety,” Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil 18 (1990), 22Google Scholar; other evidence of divergent views may be found in Smirnov, V., “The Army and Politics: Two Approaches,” Moscow News, no. 27 (1990), 6Google Scholar.

27 “Ukaz Prezidenta SSSR,” Krasnaya zvezda, September 5, 1990, p. 1; “Ob utverzhdenii obshchego polozheniya o voyenno-politicheskikh organakh,” Krasnaya zvezda, January 12, 1991, p. 1; “Voyenno-politicheskiye organy: osnovy postroyeniya, organizatii raboti i zada-chi,” Krasnaya zvezda, January 23, 1991, p. 2. The MPA was renamed the Military-Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense. The common acronym MPA will be used here.

28 Nikolay I. Shlyaga, “Na pozitsiyakh obnovleniya,” Krasnaya zvezda, September 4, 1990, pp. 1—2, for a discussion of the content of ideological work in the reformed MPA. See also Aleksandr S. Dzasokhov, “K. novomu kachestvu voyenno-ideologicheskoy raboty,” Pravda, August 31, 1990, pp. 1—2; Shlyaga, “Armiya ne mozhet byt' vne politiki,” Krasnaya zvezda, July 5, 1990, p. 1; idem, “Nachal'nik Glavpura,” Izvestiya, July 18, 1990, p. 2; idem, “Novyy status, novyye funktsii,” Krasnaya zvezda, January 16, 1991, p. 1.

29 Nikolay A. Moiseyev, “Armiya sluzhit narodu,” Krasnaya zvezda, February 6, 1991, p. 1. See also fn. 21; Shlyaga, “Politorgany: vremya radikal'nogo obnovleniya,” Krasnaya zvezda, July 20, 1990, p. 1–2; Shlyaga (fn. 28), 2.

30 In effect, the work of the MPA and the involvement of all military officers in the CPSU structure was a form of “enlisted involvement” or “coproduction” intended to block the formation of independent political formations or groups (“departicipation”). For a discussion, see Roeder, Philip G., “Modernization and Participation in the Leninist Development Strategy,” American Political Science Review 83 (September 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Note that this concept of depar-ticipation is somewhat compatible with a “weak” form of subjective control, incorporating some of the points raised in Kolkowicz (fn. 7, 1967), 80–98. Whereas Kolkowicz points to the active portion of the control function, Roeder is more concerned with the effects of co-production in relieving or attenuating pressures for participation. See Roeder, 865–66.

31 On Soviet military professionalism, see Currie (fn. 13). One study reports finding no substantial difference in the performance of military and civilian work groups. While there may be a slightly greater tendency to promote servicemen based on nonexperiential criteria, national origin rather than political orientation appears to be the main reason for this divergence. See Berbaum, Michael and Zimmerman, William, Assessing Soviet Military and Civilian Performance: An Initial Report, Soviet Interview Project Working Paper no. 40 (Urbana: University of Illinois, September 1987), 19–21Google Scholar.

32 Colton (fn. 11, 1979), 42–135; Jones, Ellen, Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 114–47Google Scholar.

33 Jones (fn. 32), 148–79.

34 This is not to imply that the MPA is monolithic. Many prominent reformers, such as Viktor Lopatin and Dmitriy Volkogonov, are former MPA officers. They were apparently in the minority, however.

35 Nordlinger (fn. 5), 53–61, quote at 58; Abrahamsson (fn. 8), 75–79; Huntington (fn. 1); Kolkowicz (fn. 7, 1967), 20–35; Horowitz, Donald L., Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 167—71Google Scholar.

36 Bialer, Seweryn, Stalin's Successors (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 57Google Scholar; Holloway, David, “War, Militarism, and the Soviet State,” in Hoffmann, Erik P. and Laird, Robbin F., eds., The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era (New York: Aldine, 1984), 374–84Google Scholar.

37 William E. Odom emphasizes this point; see Odom, “Who Controls Whom in Moscow?” Foreign Policy (Summer 1975); and idem, “The Party-Military Connection: A Critique,” in Herspring, Dale and Volgyes, Ivan, eds., Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), 32–34Google Scholar. However, he rejects the argument that this is due to the existence of a “military mind” and downplays the importance of military professionalism. On shared values, see also Colton (fn. 11, 1990), 25—29.

38 Colton argues that most Soviet military politics are bureaucratic politics; see Colton (fn. 11, 1979), 47; and idem (fn. 11, 1990), 8—9. The distinction between specific interest disagreements and basic value conflicts follows that of Bialer (fn. 36), 57. Several studies have pointed to the importance of bureaucratic politics in Soviet decision making for defense. See Andrew W. Marshall, “Bureaucratic Behavior and the Strategic Arms Competition” (Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, 1971); Warner, Edward III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1977)Google Scholar; Alexander, Arthur J., Decision-making in Soviet Weapons Procurement, Adelphi Papers 147—48 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978)Google Scholar; Herspring, Dale, The Soviet High Command, 1967–1989 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Criticism of Yeltsin peaked after his suggestion, made in the wake of the shootings at the Vilnius TV tower, that Russia should create its own army. The reaction of the military was reflected in two open letters, one signed by high-ranking military officers: “Politiche-skiye ambitsii i sud'ba otechestva: Otkrytyye pis'ma B. N. Yel'tsinu,” Krasnaya zvezda, January 18, 1991, p. 4; and “Otkrytoye pis'mo,” Krasnaya zvezda, January 19, 1991, p. 3.

40 See, e.g., Mikhail A. Moiseyev, “Yedinomy gosudarstvu: yedinnyye vooruzhennyye sily,” Krasnaya zvezda, February 23, 1991, p. 2; Albert Makashov “‘My ne sobirayemsya sdavat'sya,’ ” Krasnaya zvezda, June 21, 1990, p. 2; and Rodionov, Igor, “I Mech tupoy, i shchit dyryavyy?” Kommunist Vooruzhennykfi Sil 19 (1990)Google Scholar.

41 Even Yazov accused the U.S. of interference; see Yazov, “U.S. Funding for Soviet Groups Detailed,” FBIS-SOV, January 2, 1991, pp. 37—38 (from Sovetskaya Rossiya, December 26, 1990, p. 5).

42 Shared interests between the top military leadership and the conservative civilian leadership of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) were evident in the favorable coverage of the RCP in the military press and in the election of a number of high-ranking officers to the RCP central committee. Several military officers gave conservative speeches at the founding congress of the RCP, most notably Colonel General Makashov. See Makashov (fn. 40), 2; and Nikolay Boyko, “Armiya—chast' naroda i sluzhit emu,” Krasnaya zvezda, June 22, 1990, p. 2. Both Makashov and Boyko were elected to the RCP central committee, along with ten other servicemen; see “Voyennosluzhashchiye v rukovodyashchikh organakh Kompartii RSFSR,” Krasnaya zvezda, September 20, 1990, p. 4.

43 See Finer, Samuel E., The Man on Horseback The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall, 1962), 24–30Google Scholar; Nordlinger (fn. 5), 63–78; and Colton (fn. 11, 1979), 233–49.

44 See Meyer, Stephen M., “Civilian and Military Influence in Managing the Arms Race in the USSR,” in Art, Robert J., Davis, Vincent, and Huntington, Samuel P., eds., Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985)Google Scholar; and Rice (fn. 11), 55–81.

45 The most comprehensive analysis is Phillips, Richard Hyland, “Reasonable Sufficiency and Defensive Defense in Soviet Conventional Military Policy,” in Zimmerman, William, ed., The Changing Soviet Union and New Directions in American Security Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

46 See, e.g., “Doldad E. A. Shevardnadze,” Vestnik MID 15 (August 1988), 27–46Google Scholar; Vinogradov, M. and Belous, Viktor, “Dogovor po SNV i nasha bezopasnost',” Sovetskaya Rossiya, August 23, 1990, p. 3Google Scholar; Van Oudenaren (fn. 20); Snyder, Jack, “International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change,” World Politics 42 (October 1989), 22–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 See Shevardnadze's resignation speech, “Resignation Speech to Congress,” FBIS-SOV, December 20, 1990, pp. 11–12 (from Moscow Domestic Service, December 20, 1990). Criticism of Shevardnadze's policies is reflected in “Supreme Soviet Debates Shevardnadze Report 15 Oct,” FBIS-SOV, October 18, 1990, pp. 24–25 (from Izvestiya, October 17, 1990, pp. 1, 4); Yuriy Makarov, “Army Deputies' Criticism of Shevardnadze Viewed,” FBIS-SOV October 19, 1990, pp. 50–51 (from Izvestiya, October 18, 1990, p. 1); Stanislav Kondrashov, “Shevardnadze Move Tied to Disputes with Military,” FBIS-SOV, January 3, 1991, pp. 1—3 (from Izvestiya, January 3, 1991, p. 7).

48 V. Semenov and I. Sas, “Tverdost' pozitsii: Partiynnoy konferentsii General'nogo shtaba Voruzhennykh Sil SSSR,” Krasnaya zvezda, February 21, 1991, p. 2. See also Foye, Stephen, “The High Command Confronts 'New Political Thinking' at Home and Abroad,” Report on the USSR 2 (March 29, 1991)Google Scholar.

49 Crow, Suzanne, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: How Deep Is the Chill?” Report on the USSR 3 (March 1, 1991)Google Scholar; Clarke, Douglas, “Trouble with the Conventional Forces Treaty,” Report on the USSR 3 (April 12, 1991)Google Scholar.

50 Yazov, Dmitriy T., “Perestroyka v strane, perestroyka v armii,” Pravitel'stvenniy vestnik 6 (February 1990), 8Google Scholar; Foye (fn. 48), 25.

51 See, e.g., “Yazov Answers Viewers' Questions,” FBIS-SOV, April 1, 1991, pp. 33–34 (from Central Television, March 30, 1991). The military leadership supported plans to greatly increase the size of the MVD'S paramilitary forces; see Dmitriy T. Yazov, “Yazov Calls National Army Units ‘Unacceptable,’ ” FBIS-SOV, March 12, 1990, pp. 76–79 (from Izvestiya, March 12, 1990); S. Taranov, “Ministry of Internal Affairs Troops to Increase,” FBIS-SOV, October 26, 1989, pp. 81–82 (from Izvestiya, October 4, 1989, p. 6).

52 “Vypolnyaya Ukaz Prezidenta Desantniki pribyli na rassvete,” Krasnaya zvezda, January 10, 1991, pp. 1, 3.

53 See “Armiyu ne otdelit' ot narodov', Vstrecha Prezidenta SSSR s Deputatami-voyen-nosluzhashchimi,” Krasnaya zvezda, November 15, 1990, pp. 1–4; Yazov, “Vystupleniye min-istra oborony SSSR,” Krasnaya zvezda, November 28, 1990, p. 1.

54 Signatories included chief of the general staff Moiseyev, Army commander General Varennikov, and Navy commander Admiral Chernavin. See “Further on Emergency Rule,” FBIS-SOV, December 19, 1990, pp. 44–45 (from Agence France Presse, December 19, 1990). Yazov did not endorse the call but was sympathetic to it; Yazov, “Armiya i politika,” Krasnaya zvezda, December 20, 1990, p. 3.

55 General Varennikov, who later played a leading role in the coup attempt, was apparently responsible for the Vilnius crackdown. The official commentary on the Vilnius TV tower attack is Yazov, “Vystupleniye ministra oborony SSSR v parlamente,” Krasnaya zvezda, January 15, 1991, p. 1.

56 “Yazov Answers Viewers' Questions,” FBIS-SOV, April 1, 1991, p. 33 (from Central TV, March 30, 1991). Coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the Interior Ministry also increased with the appointment of General Boris Gromov to the post of first deputy minister of the interior. See “Deputat Boris Gromov,” Krasnaya zvezda, December 21, 1990, p. 1.

57 Mikhail Moiseyev (fn. 40), 2. See also S. F. Akhromeyev, “Akhromeyev Asserts Army's Defense of Constitution,” FBIS-SOV, November 14, 1990, pp. 56–58 (from Sovetskaya Ros-siya, November 14, 1990, p. 6); Yazov (fn. 55), 1–3.

58 Moiseyev appears to have been quite flexible on the delineation of responsibility for defense; see Moiseyev, “Voyennaya reforma: realii i perspektivy,” Krasnaya zvezda, June 12, 1991, pp. 1–2; Konstantin I. Kobets and Mikhail A. Moiseyev, “Sovmestno krepit' oboronu strany,” Krasnaya zvezda, February 20, 1991, pp. 1, 5. For a discussion of military aspects of the Union treaty, see L. Sharin, “Dlya armii etot god budet perelomnym,” Krasnaya zvezda, April 17, 1991, p. 2.

59 See Lepingwell, John W. R., “Military Deputies in the USSR Congress,” Report on the USSR 2 (May 18, 1990)Google Scholar; Foye, Stephen, “Radical Military Reform and ‘the Young Turks,’ ” Report on the USSR 2 (April 13, 1990), 8–10Google Scholar.

60 The best-known effort of these reformers has an alternative military reform plan that envisioned major cuts in, and a radical restructuring of, the Soviet military. See “Proyekt semnadtsati,” Komsomolskaya pravda, February 11, 1990, p. 1; Sturua, G., “Peripetii voyennoy reformy,” MEMO no. 7 (1990), 87—92Google Scholar. The full text of the reform proposal may be found in “O podgotovke i provedenii voyennoy reformy v SSSR,” MEMO no. 9 (1990), 117—22.

61 One leading reformer, Major Vladimir Lopatin, was expelled from, and later reinstated in, the CPSU in retaliation for his views. See Foye, Stephen, “Defense Ministry Moves to Silence Reformer,” Report on the USSR 2 (May 18, 1990)Google Scholar; S. Pashayev, “Tupiki odnogo konflikta,” Krasnaya zvezda, May 11, 1990, p. 4; “Narodnyy deputat SSSR Mayor Lopatin vosstanovlen v KPSS,” Izvestiya, May 17, 1990, p. 2; Lopatin, Vladimir, “Pravo na … muzhestvo,” Argumenty i fakfy 30 (July 28—August 3, 1990), 3Google Scholar.

62 Vladimir Arkhipov, “Rynok stavit problemy,” Krasnaya zvezda, December 8, 1990, p. 2; A. Makunin, “Voyska vozvrashchayutsya,” Krasnaya zvezda, March 3, 1990, p. 1; McMichael, Scott, “Market Relations Threaten Combat-Readiness of Soviet Armed Forces,” Report on the USSR 3 (October 18, 1991)Google Scholar.

63 Yazov, “Vysokaya otvetsvennost' ofitsera,” Krasnaya zvezda, August 19, 1990, p. 2; Mi-khail S. Gorbachev, “Ukaz Prezident SSSR” Krasnaya zvezda, September 6, 1990, p. 1; “Armiyu ne otdelit' “(fn. 53); Foye, Stephen, “Rhetoric from the Past: The First All-Army Party Conference,” Report on the USSR 3 (April 19, 1991)Google Scholar.

64 A. Davydov, “Official Discusses Aims and Tasks of Shield,” FBIS-SOV, October 31, 1989, p. 89 (from Izvestiya, October 25, 1989, p. 3); K. Shakhnovich, “New Union to Provide Social Aid to Servicemen,” FBIS-SOV, October 25, 1989, pp. 103–4 (from Moscow Domestic Service, October 21, 1989).

65 The sharpest clash over responsibility for living conditions was “Armiya nuzhdayetsya v zashchite: Ot kogo?” Komsomolskaya pravda, July 4, 1990, p. 2; and “Tak li nado ‘zashchi-shchat’ armiyu?” Krasnaya zvezda, July 12, 1990, p. 4. Shield is criticized in A. Yurkin, “Mik-rofon vse sterpit?” Krasnaya zvezda, February 13, 1990, p. 4; V. Zhitarenko, “‘Shchitu’ nuzhny novyye mechenostsy,” Krasnaya zvezda, December 23, 1990, p. 3. The military leadership tried to preempt Shield by forming its own union; see “Proyekt Ustav Federatsii profsoyuzov rabochikh i sluzhashchikh Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR,” Krasnaya zvezda, August 2, 1990, p. 2.

66 This was evident in Gorbachev's meeting with military deputies; see “Armiyu ne otde-lit' “(fn. 53).

67 This was evident in the Baltic republics. See A. Plotnikov, “Vot tak ‘fokus,’ “Krasnaya zvezda, November 28, 1990, p. 3; “Zayavlentye voyennogo soveta,” Krasnaya zvezda, December 20, 1990, p. 1.

68 See the articles by Karem Rash promoting Russian nationalism in Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal nos. 2–5, 7–8 (1989) (summarized in Mikhail Tsypkin, “Karem Rash: An Ideologue of Military Power,” Report on the USSR 2 [August 3, 1990], 8–11); Galeotti, Mark, “The Soviet Army's New Interest in Imperial Traditions,” Report on the USSR 2 (December 28, 1990)Google Scholar. For MPA approval of this direction, see Aleksey D. Lizichev, “Meroy iskrennosti,” Literaturnaya Rossiya, February 23, 1990, pp. 2–3.

69 Because the survey was conducted by the MPA, it is far more likely to overstate support for the CPSU than to understate it. “Chto pokazalo anketirovaniye,” Krasnaya zvezda, July 26, 1990, p. 4. On CPSU membership, see Nikolay I. Shlyaga, “Armiya ne mozhet byt' vne poli-tiki,” Krasnaya zvezda, July 5, 1990, p. 1. Another 15% of the most junior officers were Komsomol members, CPSU membership was relatively constant from the early 1970s, and while it dropped slightly in 1989, the trend was reversed in 1990. See Jones (fn. 32), 127; “Vooruzhennyye sily: partiynaya statistika,” Krasnaya zvezda, February 7, 1991, p. 4; “V armii reyting KPSS ochen' vysok,” Krasnaya zvezda, April 11, 1991, pp. 1–2.

70 Roughly contemporaneous polls of the civilian population indicate a much lower level of support (4–20%) for the CPSU. See “Homo Sovieticus: A Rough Sketch,” Moscow News 11 (1990), 11Google Scholar; Economist, October 20, 1990, p. 19.

71 There is little evidence of vote fraud, but Makashov's showing in the Samara district may be the exception, for he won 95% of the vote in military construction units. Nevertheless, only 24–36% of the students in the local military school voted for him. See V. Urban, “Ros-siya: vybor sdelan …,” Krasnaya zvezda, June 14, 1991, p. 1.

72 “Pro-Ryzhkov Publicity Ordered in Army District,” FBIS-SOV, June 10, 1991, p. 60 (from Komsomolskaya pravda, June 6, 1991, p. 1). Krasnaya zvezda acceded to a “reader's request” to publish Ryzhkov's full program the day before the election; see “Bol' za Rossiyu dvizhet moim vyborom,” Krasnaya zvezda, June 11, 1991, p. 2.

73 One survey supports this surmise; see P. Ishchenko, “Kto, za kogo i pochemu,” Krasnaya zvezda, May 25, 1991, p. 2. On increasing conservatism among higher-ranking officials, see Abrahamsson (fn. 8), 83, 87–92. See also Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), 236–41Google Scholar.

74 Zhirinovskiy had been calling for the imposition of emergency rule since December 1990. See Radio Liberty Daily Report, December 6, 1990.

75 “Weekly Record of Events,” Report on the USSR 3 (August 2, 1991)Google Scholar. Vyacheslav Lukashevich, “Chem chert ne shutit, poka Bog S pit,” Kraznaya zvezda, July 27, 1991, p. 1.

76 Dmitriy T. Yazov, “Novyy impul's v rabote,” Krasnaya zvezda, August 2, 1991, p. 1.

77 See Nikolay I. Shlyaga, “Koordinaty sovmestnoy raboty,” Krasnaya zvezda, August 15, 1991, p. 1; Mikhail S. Surkov, “Ukreplyat' yedinstvo partiynykh ryadov,” Krasnaya zvezda, August 7, 1991, p. 2; “Obrashcheniye,” Krasnaya zvezda, August 16, 1991, p. 1.

78 “Za ob'yedininiye sil demokratii i reform,” Izvestiya, July 2, 1991, p. 1. Rutskoi was promptly expelled from the CPSU for his role in the MDR. See Radio Liberty Daily Report, August 9, 1991.

79 See Nordlinger (fn. 5), 63–66, 92–99; Finer (fn. 43), 20–22; Horowitz (fn. 35), 149–60, 171–78; Ambler, John S., The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962 (n.p.: Ohio State University Press, 1966), 366–68Google Scholar. The importance of legitimacy in Soviet civil-military relations has also been noted by Kolkowicz (fn. 7, 1982), 118–19, 129–30; and Foye, Stephen, “The Case for a Coup: Gorbachev or the Generals?” Report on the USSR 3 (January 11, 1991)Google Scholar. Samuel Huntington incorporates the roles of regime legitimacy and stability within a broader context; see Huntington, , Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 192–263, at 216Google Scholar.

80 See Richard Lowenthal, “On ‘Established’ Communist Party Regimes,” in Hoffmann and Laird (fn. 36), 785–807; Bialer (fn. 36), 127–205; George W. Breslauer, “On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare-State Authoritarianism,” in Hoffmann and Laird, 219–45.

81 See Jeffrey W. Hahn, “Power to the Soviets?” Problems of Communism (January—February 1989); Max E. Mote, “Electing the USSR Congress of People's Deputies,” Problems of Communism (November—December 1989); Mann, Dawn and Wishnevsky, Julia, “Composition of Congress of People's Deputies,” Report on the USSR 1 (May 5, 1989)Google Scholar.

82 From March 1990 to June 1990 Gorbachev's rating as the most authoritative figure in the RSFSR dropped from 46% to 19%. His effectiveness rating declined from 3.5 to 3.1 (on a 5-point scale). Yeltsin's rating increased from 18% to 40%. Similar poll data are reported in the Economist, June 23, 1990, pp. 41–42. See Yakovenko, Igor, “Reyting,” Dialog 9 (1990), 28Google Scholar; Lebedev, Semen and Yakovenko, Igor, “Reyting,” Dialog 11 (1990), 3Google Scholar. This low popularity continued in 1991; see U.S. News and World Report, April 8, 1991, pp. 38–39.

83 Kapelyush, Ya., “S'yezd v otsenkakh izbirateley,” Ogonek 34 (August 1989), 2–3Google Scholar; Kapelyush, and Kinsbursky, , “Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR: Has It Measured Up?” Moscow News 10 (July 23–30, 1989), 10Google Scholar; “Homo Sovieticus” (fn. 70), 11.

84 “Poll Shows Diminished Public Trust in Leadership,” FBIS-SOV, June 11, 1991, p. 54 (from Interfax, June 7, 1991). In a June 1990 survey negative ratings of the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet ranged up to 39% and 60%, respectively. See Yakovenko, Igor, “Reyting,” Dialog 10 (1990), 8Google Scholar. A March 1991 poll indicated support for the Pavlov government at only 13%, with a high level (41%) of doubt that economic reform could work in the current Union framework. See U.S. News (fn. 82), 38–39.

85 Dahl, Robert A., Modern Political Analysis, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 60Google Scholar.

86 See “Tak li nado …” (fn. 65), 4; Vladislav Achalov, “Znamen ne menyaem,” Krasnaya zvezda, September 6, 1990, p. 1; I. Sidel'nikov, “… A teper' pugayut voyennym perevoro-tom,” Krasnaya zvezda, October 4, 1990, p. 2; Viktor Alksnis, “Soyuz budet sokhranen,” Krasnaya zvezda, December 31, 1990, p. 2; Moiseyev (fn. 40), 2.

87 This identification of the military with constitutional order has been termed “guardianship” by Huntington, who notes its importance in contributing to military intervention. See Huntington (fn. 79), 226–28.

88 Nordlinger (fn. 5), 93–95.

89 “Army, Church Head Popularity Poll,” FBIS-SOV, May 21, 1991, p. 46 (from Central Television, May 16, 1991); G. Andreyeva, “Reiting Armii vozrastet,” Krasnaya zvezda, December 31, 1990, p. 2. For a less enthusiastic report on public perceptions, see “Poll on Attitudes toward Military Published,” FBIS-SOV, September 17, 1990, pp. 72–73 (from Moscow News 36 [September 16–23 1990], 8–9).

90 In September and October 1990 coup rumors started to spread, despite official denials of unusual troop movements. See A. Pankratov, “A kto-to podumal—ucheniya idut …,” Komsomol'skaya Pravda, September 26, 1990, p. 1; “Kryuchkov Addresses Session on Troop Movements,” FBIS-SOV, September 25, 1990, pp. 38–39; Kevin P. O'Prey, “Anatomy of a Coup Scare,” Soviet Defense Notes (January-February 1991), 1–8.

91 New York Times, June 25, 1991; “Kryuchkov at Closed Supreme Soviet Sitting,” FBIS-SOV, June 27, 1991, pp. 23–25 (from Sovetskaya Rossiya, June 27, 1991, p. 3); “Gorbachev Addresses Supreme Soviet June 21, “FBIS-SOV, June 24, 1991, pp. 36–41 (from Radio Mayak, June 21, 1991). Two other coup plotters, Supreme Soviet chairman Lukyanov and Vice President Yanayev, were also involved in the June events, although in supporting roles.

92 At least one of these officers was reportedly slated to retire before the coup attempt. See Foye, Stephen, “Personnel Changes in the Soviet High Command,” Report on the USSR 3 (September 27, 1991)Google Scholar; idem, “Leading Plotters in the Armed Forces,” Report on the USSR 3 (September 6, 1991)Google Scholar; Galeotti, Mark, “The Role of the Security Forces,” Report on the USSR 3 (September 6, 1991)Google Scholar.

93 “Shaposhnikov Interviewed on Coup Attempt,” FBIS-SOV, August 27, 1991, pp. 56–59 (from Komsomolskaya pravda, August 27, 1991, p. 3).

94 See “Yazov Urged to Quit Committee,” FBIS-SOV, August 23, 1991, pp. 61–62 (from Komsomolskaya pravda, August 22, 1991, p. 1).

95 See Foye (fn. 92, September 27, 1991), 4–6. One of the dismissed commanders was Ma-kashov. See “Makashov's Activity during Coup Reported,” FBIS-SOV, September 5, 1991, pp. 52–53 (from Izvestiya, September 3, 1991, p. 8).

96 “General Says Half of Army Backed Coup Attempt,” FBIS-SOV, September 6, 1991, pp. 59–60 (from he Monde, September 5, 1991, p. 5). In later comments, Novozhilov appears to have backed away from this assertion. See “Far East Troop Commander on Army Problems,” FBIS-SOV, September 12, 1991, pp. 58–59 (from Der Spiegel, September 9, 1991, p. 178).

97 This pattern was observable outside the military as well. Support for the coup plotters was reportedly widespread among RSFSR territorial governments, with only 30% of the local governments declaring their support for Yeltsin. See Radio Liberty Daily Report, October 24, 1991.

98 “General Says Half of Army Backed Coup Attempt” (fn. 96), 60.

99 Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, “Shaposhnikov Interview Recounts Coup Attempt,” FBIS-SOV, September 17, 1991, pp. 28–30 (from Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 12, 1991); “Sha-poshnikov Interviewed on Coup Attempt” (fn. 93); and “Yazov's Involvement in Coup Attempt Explored,” FBIS-SOV, August 27, 1991, pp. 56–59 (from Komsomolskaya pravda, August 27, 1991, p. 3). Moiseyev has repeatedly denied that he played any role in the coup. See “Moiseyev Defends Actions during Coup,” FBIS-SOV, August 27, 1991, p. 60; “Documents Show Moiseyev Supporting Role in Coup,” FBIS-SOV, August 28, 1991, pp. 65—66 (from Izvestiya, August 24, 1991, pp. 1, 3).

100 This was the case with the Leningrad military commander; see New York Times, September 10, 1991.

101 Thus, orders to the airborne forces from the Ministry of Defense were disregarded by their commander, Grachev. See General Grachev on Activity during Coup,” FBIS-SOV, September 13, 1991, pp. 8—60 (from Izvestiya, September 5, 1991, p. 8). The planned KGB raid on Yeltsin was prevented in the same way; see “KGB Alpha Group's Action during Putsch Viewed,” FBIS-SOV, September 4, 1991, pp. 32–34 (from Rossiskaya gazeta, August 28, 1991, p. 1).

102 “General Says Half of Army Backed Coup Attempt” (fn. 96).

103 Approximately one-third of MPA personnel will be discharged, with a much higher proportion among general officers. Many will be retrained for new positions assisting commanders with personnel or will be assigned to the new combat readiness directorate. See R. Zadunayskiy, “Kontseptsiya reformy podgotovlena,” Krasnaya zvezda, October 15, 1991, p. 2; idem, “Attestatsiya byvshikh politrabotnikov vysschego zvena,” Krasnaya zvezda, October 11, 1991, p. 1.

104 “Defense Minister Shaposhnikov Gives Interview,” FBIS-SOV, September 10, 1991, pp. 39–40 (from Russian Television Network, September 9, 1991).

105 See Nordlinger (fn. 5), 63—98; Thompson, William R., The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971)Google Scholar; the cases examined in John S. Ambler (fn. 79); Furniss, Edgar S. Jr., DeGaulle and the French Army: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1964)Google Scholar; and Horowitz (fn. 35).

106 “BBC Documentary Reveals More on Coup Attempt,” FBIS-SOV, November 12, 1991, p. 19 (from Radio Mayak, November 11, 1991).

107 The KGB was responsible for military counterintelligence. See Colton (fn. 11, 1979), 225—27; Amy Knight, “The KGB'S Special Departments in the Soviet Armed Forces,” Orbis (Summer 1984); idem, “The KGB and Civil-Military Relations,” in Colton and Gustafson (fn. 11); Suvorov, Victor, The “Liberators” (New York: Berkey, 1988), 182–84Google Scholar.

108 For an overview of the formation of the CIS, see Sheehy, Ann, “Commonwealth of Independent States: An Uneasy Compromise,” RFE/RL Research Report (January 10, 1992), 1–5Google Scholar. For a discussion of military developments between the time of the coup and the formation of the CIS, see John W. R. Lepingwell, “Towards a Post-Soviet Army,” Orbis (Winter 1992).

109 “More on Yeltsin Address,” FBIS-SOV, December 12, 1991, p. 26 (from Izvestiya, December 12, 1991, p. 1).

110 Radio Liberty Daily Report, January 22, 1992.

111 See, e.g., “Yeltsin Address,” FBIS-SOV, January 21, 1992, pp. 20–23 (from Moscow TV, January 17, 1992).

112 This is what happened in the old Supreme Soviet; see Tsypkin, Mikhail, “The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet,” Report on the USSR 2 (May 11, 1990), 8–11Google Scholar. The analogous committee in the Russian Supreme Soviet is apparently faring no better; see Vladimir Lopatin, “Goskomitet RSFSR po oboronnym voprosam su-shchestvuyet tol'ko na bumage,” Krasnaya zvezda, October 18, 1991, p. 1.

113 For a report indicating that there is increasing factionalization within the military leadership, see “Lopatin Views Status of Army Reform,” FBIS-SOV, January 23, 1992, pp. 50–52 (from Nezvisimaya gazeta, January 7, 1992, p. 2).

114 “Vsearmeyskoye ofitserskoye sobraniye: strastnyy prizyv k blagorazumiyu politikov,” Krasnaya zvezda, January 21, 1992, pp. 1–3; “Poll Results Noted,” FBIS-SOV, January 21, 1992, pp. 24–25 (from Moscow TV, January 17, 1992).