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The Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Raúl L. Madrid
Raúl L. Madrid
Affiliation:
University of Texas at Austin, [email protected].
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Abstract

Latin America had long been the one region in the world without major ethnic parties, but in recent years a couple of inclusive ethnic parties have registered important electoral victories. A substantial literature maintains that ethnic parties win by mobilizing their base through exclusionary ethnic appeals, but this article argues that such appeals are unlikely to be successful in regions such as Latin America, where ethnic polarization is low and ethnic identification is fluid and multiple. In these areas, inclusive strategies are more likely to be successful. Indeed, some parties, which the author refers to as ethnopopulist parties, have won votes from diverse ethnic constituencies by moderating their discourse, forming cross-ethnic alliances, and formulating a broad populist appeal. This article focuses on the most successful ethnopopulist party to date, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia. It shows how the MAS used an inclusive ethnic appeal and classical populist strategies to fuse traditional populist constituencies—politically disenchanted urban mestizos with nationalist and statist views—to its rural, largely indigenous base. The article also examines the extent to which these arguments can account for the varying performance of other parties in the region.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 60 , Issue 3 , April 2008 , pp. 475 - 508
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2008

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References

1 I define an inclusive party as one that recruits members of various ethnic groups for the top leadership positions of the party, forms alliances with organizations that represent a diversity of ethnic groups, eschews exclusionary rhetoric, and emphasizes that it seeks to represent all members of the nation.

2 In social science parlance, the dependent variable of this study is the performance of ethnically based parties in Latin America.

3 Yashar, Deborah J., Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: Indigenous Movements and the Post-liberal Challenge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Lucero, Jose Antonio, “Arts of Unification: Political Representation and Indigenous Movements in Bolivia and Ecuador” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2002Google Scholar); Brysk, Alison, From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America (Stanford, Calif:Stanford University Press, 2000Google Scholar); Dary, Claudia, ed., La Construction de la Nation y la Representación Ciudadana en Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Ec-uadory Bolivia [The Construction of the Nation and Citizen Representation in Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia] (Guatemala City: FLACSO, 1998Google Scholar).

4 See Van Cott, Donna Lee, “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America.” Latin American Politics and Society 45 (Summer 2003CrossRefGoogle Scholar); and Van Cott, Donna Lee, From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics. New York:Cambridge University Press, 2005CrossRefGoogle Scholar); for other institutional explanations for the rise of indigenous-based parties in Latin America, see Jóhanna Kristin Birnir, “Party System Stabilization in New Democracies: The Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Volatility of Electoral Preferences” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2001); Birnir, Jóhanna Kristin“Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society,” Studies in Comparative International Development 39 (September 2004Google Scholar); Collins, Jennifer N., “Democratizing Formal Politics: Indigenous and Social Movement Political Parties in Ecuador and Bolivia, 1978–2000” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at San Diego, 2006Google Scholar); and Rice, Roberta Lynne, “From Peasant to Politicians: The Politicization of Ethnic Cleavages in Latin America” (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 2006Google Scholar).

5 See Van Cott (fn. 4, 2005); Robert Andolina, “Colonial Legacies and Plurinational Imaginaries: Indigenous Movement Politics in Ecuador and Bolivia” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1998); and Marenghi, Patricia and Alcantara, Manuel, “Los Partidos Etnicos de America del Sur: Algunos Factores que Explican Su Rendimiento,” in Puig, Salvador Martii, ed., Pueblos Indigenasy Politico en America Latina (Barcelona: Bellaterra-CIDOB, 2007Google Scholar).

6 One important exception is Mijeski and Beck's work on indigenous voting in Ecuador. See, for example, Mijeski, Kenneth J. and Beck, Scott H., “Ecuador's Indians in the 1996 and 1998 Elections: Assessing Pachakutik's Performance,” Latin Americanist 3 (Spring 2003Google Scholar); and Beck, Scott H. and Mijeski, Kenneth J., “Did Ecuador's Indians Elect the President in 2002?” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the South Eastern Council of Latin American Studies, Santo Domingo, D.R., March 4–6, 2004Google Scholar).

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12 Horowitz (fn. 10), 318.

13 Ibid., 526–30.

14 Ibid., 304.

15 I define ethnic polarization as the existence of widespread hostilities between members of different ethnic groups, resulting in relatively frequent incidents of ethnically related violence.

16 See Chandra, Kanchan, “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics,” APSA-CP 12 (Winter 2001Google Scholar); and Chandra, Kanchan, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (June 2005), 235CrossRefGoogle Scholar–52. The assumption that ethnic identities are clear, singular, and fixed may be realistic in ethnically polarized societies since ethnic conflict can harden ethnic identities and elevate certain identities to the exclusion of others, but it is less realistic in societies where ethnic polarization is low. See Evera, Stephen Van, “Primordialism Lives!” APSA-CP 12 (Winter 2001Google Scholar).

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18 Gurr, Ted Robert, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993Google Scholar); Cleary, Matthew R., “Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America,” Comparative Political Studies 33 (November 2000CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

19 Cadena, Marisol de la, Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919–1991 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000Google Scholar); Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), Interculturalismo y Globalization: Informe National de Desarrollo Humana 2004 [Interculruralism and Globalization: National Report on Human Development] (La Paz: PNUD, 2004).

20 Weyland (fn. 8).

21 Dornbuch, Rudiger and Edwards, sebastian, eds., The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

22 Van Cott, Donna Lee, “From Exclusion to Inclusion: Bolivia's 2002 Elections,” Journal of Latin American Studies 35 (November 2003), 756Google Scholar.

23 Ibid.; Van Cott (fn. 4, 2005); Stefanoni, Pablo, “Algunas reflexiones sobre el MAS-IPSP,” Temas Sodales 25 (2004Google Scholar); and author interview with Jorge Lazarte, La Paz, August 2, 2004.

24 Andolina (fn. 5); Van Cott (fn. 4,2003); Miguel Urioste, “Ninguno de los Indfgenas que Está en el Parlamento Hoy en Dia Hubiera Llegado a ese Nivel si no Era a Traves del Proceso de la Participatión Popular,” in Diego Ayo, ed., Voces Crítical de la Descentralización [Critical Voices on Decentralization] (La Paz: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004); author interview with Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, La Paz, July 16, 2004; and author interview with Gustavo Torrico, La Paz, July 22, 2004.

25 Rojas, Gonzalo, “La Election de Alcaldes en los Municipios del País en 1999–2000: Persistencia de la Coalición National,” Opiniones y Análisis 49 (March 2000Google Scholar).

26 Paco, Félix Patzi, Insurgencia y Sumisión: Movimientos Indígeno-Campesinos (1983–1998) (La Paz:Muela del Diablo, 1999), 27–34Google Scholar; Sanjinés, Javier C, Mestizaje Upside Down: Aesthetic Politics in Modern Bolivia (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004Google Scholar); Gisselquist, Rachel M., “Ethnicity, Class and Party Competition: The Bolivian Case” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 31-September 3, 2006Google Scholar); and Yashar (fn. 3).

27 The surveys have posed some variation of the following question: “Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, or indigenous?” In some cases, additional categories such as cbolo, black, or other are included. See Gonzalo Rojas and Luis Verdesoto, La Participación Popular como Reforma de la Politica: Evidencias de una Cultura Democrdtica Boliviano [Popular Participación as a Political Reform: Evidence of a Bolivian Democratic Culture] (La Paz: Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1997); Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (fn. 19); Seligson, Mitchell A., La Cultura Politica de la Democracia Boliviano [The Political Culture of Bolivian Democracy] (La Paz:Encuestas y Estudios, 1999Google Scholar); idem, La Cultura Politica de la Democracia en Bolivia: 2000 [The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia: 2000] (La Paz: Universidad Católica Boliviana, 2000Google Scholar); idem, Auditoria de la Democracia: Bolivia, 2002 [Audit of Democracy: Bolivia, 2002] (La Paz: Universidad Católica Boliviana, 2003Google Scholar). Seligson, Mitchell A., Morales, Daniel Moreno, and Blum, Vivian Schwarz, Democracy Audit: Bolivia 2004 Report (Nashville: LAPOP, 2004Google Scholar); Seligson, Mitchell A., Cordova, Abby B., Donoso, Juan Carlos, Morales, Daniel More-no, Orces, Diana, and Blum, Vivian Schwarz, Democracy Audit: Bolivia 2006 Report (Nashville: LAPOP, 2006Google Scholar).

28 The 2006 LAPOP survey included a question about indigenous identity that was modeled on a question from the 2001 census. It asked: “Do you consider yourself to belong to one of the following native or indigenous peoples? Quechua; Aymara; Guarani; Chiquitano; Mojeno; other native; none of the above.” In the 2001 census 62 percent of the population chose one of these indigenous ethno-linguistic categories, and in the 2006 LAPOP survey 71 percent of the population selected one of the indigenous categories. This question was criticized widely, however, in part because it did not include the option of serf-identifying as mestizo.

29 Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA) formulated a somewhat successful ethnopopulist appeal in the 1990s, but CONDEPA, like the Katarista parties, never developed a following or an organizational base outside of Aymara areas. Moreover, the party, like the traditional parties, was led by mestizos, and that ultimately undermined its appeal in indigenous areas. It fell apart in the wake of leadership disputes caused by the death of its charismatic founder, Carlos Palenque.

30 These parties have frequently been referred to as Indianista parties.

31 Quispe has frequently denounced whites, saying, for example, that “they want to bathe themselves in indigenous blood”; author interview with Felipe Quispe, La Paz, July 29, 2004.

32 Canessa, Andrew, “Todos Somos Indigenas: Towards a New Language of National Political Identity,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 25 (April 2006), 251Google Scholar.

33 There were some exceptions. The MRTKL, for example, recruited Filemón Escobar, a mestizo union leader, as its vice presidential candidate in 1985, and it elected Walter Reinaga, a Quechua leader, as a deputy from Potosi that same year.

34 In a few cases, the Katarista parties did establish alliances with traditional parties, such as the UDP and the MNR, but these were unequal alliances, which typically resulted in the subordination and co-optation of the indigenous parties and leaders. See Hurtado, Javier, El Katarismo (La Paz: Hisbol, 1986), 112–18Google Scholar; Ticona, Esteban, Rojas, Gonzalo, and Albó, Xavier, Votosy Wiphalas: Campesinosy Pueblos Originarios en Democracia [Votes and Wiphalas: Peasants and Native Peoples under Democracy] (La Paz: CIPCA, 1995), 121–56Google Scholar.

35 Evo Morales, “La reserve moral de la humanidad,” in Stefanoni, Pablo and Alto, Herve Do, Evo Morales de la Coca al Palacio: Una Oportunidadpara la Izquierda Indigena [Evo Morales from Coca to the Presidential Palace: An Opportunity for the Indigenous Left] (La Paz: Malatesta, 2006), 133Google Scholar.

36 Although Evo Morales is Aymara, he migrated to a Quechua-speaking area as a young man, learned Quechua, and became a leader of the Quechua-dominated coca grower unions. He thus has a certain panindigenous appeal. See Canessa (fn. 32), 250.

37 The MAS also forged alliances with indigenous groups in the Amazon. For example, it struck an alliance with the Coordinadora de Pueblos Etnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC) and allowed it to help select candidates in the department of Santa Cruz in 2002. See Van Cott (fn. 4, 2005), 91.

38 Author interview with Dionisio Nunez, La Paz, July 21, 2004.

39 Author interview with Ricardo Diaz, La Paz, August 17,2007.

40 In Bolivia, senators, prefects, and 60 of the 130 deputies are elected at the departmental level. The remaining 70 deputies are elected from uninominal districts.

41 Author interview with Leonilda Zurita, La Paz, August 20,2007; author interview with Ricardo Diaz (fn. 39).

42 The MAS has eschewed alliances with the traditional parties, however, on the grounds that those sorts of alliances might compromise its autonomy or political project.

43 According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, the MAS also substantially increased its share of the urban vote, winning the support of almost half of urban voters in 2005, as opposed to less than 20 percent in 2002.

44 According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, whites represented 7 percent of the MAS'S total vote in 2005, although this represented an increase from only 3 percent in 2002. By contrast, self-identified indigenous people represented 28 percent of the MAS'S total vote in 2005, down slightly from 33 percent in 2002.

45 Author interview with Lino Villca, La Paz, August 15, 2007.

46 Author interview with Antonio Peredo, La Paz, July 22,2004.

47 “El Evismo Ensalza a Evo en el Poder,” La Razón, August 5, 2006, www.la-razon.com/versiones/20060805%5F005624/nota_244_316940.htm (accessed August 10, 2006); “En la Eman-cipacion de los Pueblos, Evo es Sustituible,” La Razón, August 5, 2006, www.la-razon.com/ versiones/20060805%5F005624/nota_244_316937.htm (accessed August 10,2006).

48 Calderón, Fernando and Gamarra, Eduardo, Crisis y Reforma de los Partidos en Bolivia (La Paz: PNUD, 2004), 17Google Scholar.

49 A survey carried out in 2004 found that parties were the least trusted institution in Bolivia that year. See Seligson, Moreno, and Blum (fn. 27), 102.

50 Irahola, Carlos Böhrt, “Voto Presidential y Voto Uninominal en las Elecciones de 2002,” Opiniones y Análisis 58 (September 2002)Google Scholar; Ballivian, Salvador Romero, Geografi'a Electoral de Bolivia [Electoral Geography of Bolivia], 3rd ed. (La Paz: FUNDEMOS, 2003)Google Scholar; Mayorga, Rene Antonio, “Bolivia's Democracy at the Crossroads,” in Mainwaring, Scott and Hagopian, Frances, eds., The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)Google Scholar.

51 Unidad National (UN), which finished third in the 2005 elections, was also composed principally of former members of the traditional parties, especially the MIR.

52 Socialismo, Movimiento al, Programa de Gobierno: Territorio, Soberania, Vida [Program of Government: Territory, Sovereignty, and Life] (La Paz: MAS, 2002), 9Google Scholar.

53 “Bolivians Love Evo: Want Closer Ties with the U.S.,” Latin American Weekly Report, May 23, 2006, 16.

54 Romero Ballivian (fn. 50), 251.

55 Ballivian, Salvador Romero, “La Eleccion Presidencial 2002: Una Vision de Conjunto,” Opinionesy Andlisis 57 (September 2002), 191Google Scholar; Seligson et al. (fn. 27, 2006), 89–90.

56 The survey asked people to place themselves on a left-right scale of 1–10. Here, I classify people who place themselves at 1–4 as leftists, 5–6 as centrists, and 7–10 as rightists. In the 2006 LAPOP survey, 31 percent of the people who answered this question identified themselves as being on the left, 46.5 percent on the center, and 22.5 percent on the right. However, a significant percentage of the interviewees (24.5 percent) failed to respond.

57 Claure, María Teresa Zegada, “Sorpresas de la Eleccion: MNR, MAS, NFR y ADN,” Opinionesy Andlisis 57 (September 2002), 51Google Scholar; Paco, Félix Patzi, “De Movimiento Indigena al Fracaso en la Escena del Parlamento,” Temas Sociales 25 (2004)Google Scholar; Van Cott (fn. 4,2005).

58 According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, 62 percent of people who self-identified as being on the left strongly approved (8–10 on a 10 point scale) of the nationalization of the gas industry, as did 60 percent of centrists and/or rightists.

59 Ethnic ties also help explain why many people on the center and the right supported the MAS. According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, 61.4 percent of centrists and 56.8 percent of rightists who grew up speaking an indigenous language supported the MAS in 2005, as opposed to only 30.0 percent of those centrists and 14.3 percent of those rightists who did not grow up speaking an indigenous language.

60 Dow and Endersby argue that multinomial logit is superior in some aspects to multinomial probit, particularly for applications such as this, where “a voter casts a ballot for a candidate or party selected from a fixed, stable pool of alternatives”; see Dow, Jay K. and Endersby, James W., “Multi-nomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Comparison of Choice Models for Voting Research,” Electoral Studies 23 (March 2004), 108CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a contrasting view, see Alvarez, Michael R. and Nagler, Jonathan, “When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multiparty Competition,” American Journal of Political Science 42 (January 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61 None of the six other parties that competed in this election earned more than 7 percent of the vote.

62 For more information on the survey and the wording of the questions, see Seligson et al. (fn. 27, 2006).

63 In the 2006 LAPOP survey, 53 percent of voters reported casting their ballots for the MAS and 25 percent reported voting for PODEMOS. According to the official returns, the MAS received 50 percent of the total vote and PODEMOS earned 26 percent.

64 There is little evidence to suggest that the increase in votes for the MAS in 2005 is due to increased voter turnout. Voter turnout as a percentage of the estimated voting-age population actually declined between 2002 and 2005, both nationwide and in majority indigenous provinces. This decline in turnout was largely a result of the purging of the voter rolls as required by a change in Bolivian electoral laws. Data on turnout are from Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE), Resultados Elecciones Generatesy de Prefectos 2005 (La Paz: CNE, 2006).

65 King, Gary, Tomz, Michael, and Wittenberg, Jason, “Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation,” American Journal of Political Science 44 (April 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66 According to the 2002 I.APOP survey, MAS supporters in 2002 were more likely to express low levels of confidence in parties, presumably because in 2002 MAS had not yet established itself as one of the country's main parties. In 2002, 38.8 percent of MAS supporters reported having no trust in parties, as opposed to 29.2 percent of all voters.

67 The modest level of statistical significance of the indigenous identification variable is presumably the result of the fact that indigenous self-identification is correlated with other variables in the analysis, such as the Aymara and Quechua linguistic variables. The vast majority (84 percent) of people who self-identify as indigenous grew up speaking an indigenous language.

68 As the figure shows, the 95 percent confidence intervals of the estimates for self-identified indigenous people overlap with those of mestizos, so we do not have a high level of certainty that someone who self-identifies as indigenous is more likely to vote for the MAS than is someone who self-identifies as mestizo.

69 Speakers of lowlands indigenous languages may not have been significantly more likely to vote for the MAS because it may have been perceived as a party that principally represented highlands indigenous populations, reflecting ongoing Amazonian-highlands indigenous divides.

70 I view growing up speaking an indigenous language as a reasonable proxy for having indigenous roots and the cultural attachments and life experiences that go with them. It is these cultural attachments and life experiences, I assume, that draw indigenous language speakers to the MAS.

71 Cleary, Matthew R., “Explaining the Left's Resurgence,” Journal of Democracy 17 (October 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72 Petkoff, Teodoro, “Las Dos Izquierdas,” Nueva Sociedad 197 (2005)Google Scholar; Castaneda, Jorge, “Latin America's Left Turn,” Foreign Affairs 85 (May-June 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 It is true that some populist and leftist parties, such as Izquierda Democratica in Ecuador, Izqui-erda Unida in Peru, and the Union Democratica y Popular in Bolivia, have won significant levels of support among rural, indigenous voters in the past, but they have not captured this constituency to the same degree as the ethnopopulist parties. In Bolivia, only the MNR of the 1950s and 1960s rivaled the MAS in terms of its share of the vote among the rural, indigenous population.

74 Weyland (fn. 8), 13.

75 Ibid.; Conniff (fn. 8), 20; Drake (fn. 8); Kaufman, Robert R. and Stallings, Barbara, “The Political Economy of Latin American Populism,” in Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian, eds., The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

76 The stability of ethnic ties should not be exaggerated, however, particularly in regions such as Latin America, where ethnic identification is fluid. As the Ecuadorian case illustrates, indigenous voters may abandon an indigenous-based party for other parties if its appeals become exclusionary or if they believe that other populist or leftist parties have better electoral possibilities.

77 Bartolini, Stefano and Mair, Peter, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisa-tion of European Electorates 1885–1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; and Jóhanna Kristin Birnir (fn. 4, 2001). In an earlier study, I found that indigenous areas in Latin America have traditionally been more electorally volatile than nonindigenous areas, but I argued that this volatility stemmed from the failure of existing parties to represent the indigenous population adequately. Indeed, the emergence of indigenous-based parties has reduced electoral volatility to date. See Madüd, Raul, “Ethnic Cleavages and Electoral Volatility in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 38 (October 2005)Google Scholar.

78 Mijeski and Beck (fn. 6); Madrid, Raul L., “Indigenous Voters and Party System Fragmentation i n Latin America,” Electoral Studies 24 (December 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rice, Roberta and Cott, Donna Lee Van, “The Emergence and Performance of Indigenous Peoples' Parties in South America: A Subnational Statistical Analysis,” Comparative Political Studies 39 (August 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

79 Some scholars have claimed the indigenous population in Ecuador represents 30 percent or more of the population, but the 2001 census found that only 6.1- percent of the population self-identified as indigenous and only 4.6 percent reported speaking an indigenous language. The 2000 EMEDINHO survey found tha t 14.3 percent of the population either self-identified as indigenous, spoke an indigenous language, or had parents who spoke an indigenous language. See Mauricio León Guzmán, “Etnicidad y exclusión en el Ecuador: Una mirada a partir del Censo de Población de 2001,” Iconos (February 2003).

80 Van Cott (fn. 4, 2005); and Marenghi and Alcántara (fn. 5).

81 Van Cott (fn. 4, 2005).

82 Falla, Ricardo, “Rigoberta Menchú: A Shooting Star in the Electoral Sky,” Revista Envio 312 (July 2007)Google Scholar, http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3606 (accessed November 27, 2007).

83 See Yashar (fn. 3) for an illuminating analysis of why Peru has failed to develop a strong indigenous movement.

84 Andolina (fn. 5); and Collins (fn. 4).

85 Mijeski and Beck (fn. 6); Beck and Mijeski (fn. 6); and Madrid (fn. 78). 86 “Pachakutik Pierde su Fuerza Urbana.” El Comercio, December 14, 2005, www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=9962&anio=2005&mes=12&dia=14 (accessed August 5, 2007); “Pachakutik se Requesbraja por el Indigenismo,” El Comercio, December 15, 2005, www.elcomer-rio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=10072&anio=2005&rnes=125cdia=15 (accessed August 5, 2007).

87 Scott H. Beck and Kenneth J. Mijeski, “How to Lose by Winning: The Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement after the 2002 Elections” (Paper presented at the international congress of the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 15–18), 17; “La desintegracion de Pachakutik continua.” El Comercio, December 23,2005, www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=l 0889&anio=2005&mes=12&dia=23 (accessed August 5,2007).

88 Pachakutik fared even worse in the September 2007 elections for the constituent assembly, winning less than 1 percent of the national vote.

89 Rivera, Sara Báez and Zaldi'var, Victor Bretón Solo de, “El Enigma del Voto Etnico o las Tribula-ciones del Movimiento Indi'gena,” Ecuador Debate 69 (December 2006)Google Scholar.