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Reform and the Redefinition of the Social Contract under Gorbachev

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Janine Ludlam
Janine Ludlam
Affiliation:
Russian Area Studies at Georgetown University
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Abstract

The concept of “social contract” is useful in understanding the process of reform currently under way in the Soviet Union. The social contract “concluded” by Khrushchev and Brezhnev provided the population with economic guarantees but deprived it of any political power. Their contract was geared primarily toward less educated, blue-collar workers. During the past seventy years Soviet society has become industrialized, urbanized, and educated. Gorbachev has understood that the well-being of the Soviet economy will in the future rest on the labor and know-how of skilled and educated professionals. He must therefore conclude a new contract that will be advantageous to this sector of society in order to ensure its participation in his efforts to reform the economy.

Type
Review Articles
Information
World Politics , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , January 1991 , pp. 284 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1991

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References

1 Narodnye Deputaty SSSR: Spravochnik serii ‘Kto est kto’ [People's deputies of the USSR: Reference book of the “Who's Who” series] (Moscow: Vneshtorgizdat, 1990).

2 Hauslohner, Peter, “Gorbachev's Social Contract,” Soviet Economy 3 (January-March 1987), at 58.Google Scholar

3 Starr, S. Frederick, “The Soviet Union: A Civil Society,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1988), at 27.Google Scholar Starr argues that “much of the initiative for change has shifted from the Communist Party to society.” Because of the party's neglect or denial of social realities, Soviet society no longer perceives the Communist Party as its leader; since the party has disposed (intentionally or unintentionally) of many of its instruments of control (ideology, charismatic leader, terror), it can no longer force its subjects to follow.

4 Ruble, Blair, “Social Dimensions of Perestroyka,” Soviet Economy 3 (April-June 1987), at 176.Google Scholar

5 Manual workers, of course, still comprise the largest group in the Soviet work force. Presently, approximately 58% of the work force are blue-collar workers (of these, 10–12% are unskilled or low skilled; 44–46% are skilled physical laborers; 3–4% are highly skilled), about 38% are officials and specialists, and 1–5% are kolkhozniki (Lewin, 51). Because the economy craves labor, the authorities are always trying to pressure young people to enter educational tracks that will lead to nonprofessional jobs. The problem is that the Soviet economy, stuck in the industrial stage of development, cannot accommodate the occupational aspirations of its young students.

6 Clarke, Roger A. and Matko, Dubravko J.I., Soviet Economic Facts 1917–1081 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 44–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Hewett, , Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1988), 91.Google Scholar

8 Medvedev, , Khrushchev (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1984), 130.Google Scholar

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11 See Hough, Jerry, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, one of the most comprehensive works on the party's role in the economy.

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14 Bialer (fn. 10), 148–58.

15 Meat consumption for the entire population increased from 38 kilograms per capita (per annum) in 1964 to 57 kilograms in 1975, but leveled off after 1975. In 1965, there were 22 television sets per 1,000 people in the Soviet Union; by 1980, there were 249 per 1,000. Refrigerators: 29 per 1,000 in 1965, 252 per 1,000 in 1980. Washing machines: 59 per 1,000 in 1965, 205 per 1,000 in 1980. See Clarke and Matko (fn. 6), 24–25, 28.

16 It should be noted, however, that the growth rate of national income (national income utilized) decreased dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. Hewett (fn. 7), 57.

17 Ibid., 39.

18 Clarke and Matko (fn. 6), 40–41. Although wages rose in this period, growth rates of productivity fell; therefore the buying power of a paycheck did not greatly increase.

19 Hewett cites a similar example (m. 7), 48.

20 Hauslohner (fn. 2), 54.

21 There is still no law on bankruptcy per se, although the topic has been widely discussed in the press. The possibility of liquidating or selling unprofitable enterprises was mentioned in the Law on State Enterprises (1986), but little progress toward an actual bankruptcy law has been made.

22 Hewett (fn. 7), 207–10.

23 An enterprise's profits may be taxed up to 90%; the rate is determined by the ministry within whose jurisdiction the enterprise falls. Interest charges on capital range from o to 12%.

24 It has recently become easier for enterprise directors to lay off redundant or unproductive workers; Connor points out that directors no longer have to find alternative jobs for workers before they can release them (p. 125). Presumably such workers must fend for themselves at local job placement centers in their search for new work. See also Aslund, 82.

25 “O zemle,” Pravda, March 7, 1990, pp. 2–3.

26 Hewett (fn. 7), 3.

27 Ibid., 62–63.

28 Ibid., 52.

29 “K gumannomu demokraticheskomu sotsialismu: Programmnye zayavleniye XXIII s'ezda KPSS,” Pravda, July 15, 1990, pp. 1–3.

30 Hauslohner (fn. 2), 75.

31 Lapidus (fn. 9), 22.

32 “Trebovaniya gornyakov udovletvorny,” Sotsiatiticheskaya Industriya, July 22, 1989, pp. 1–2.

33 The strike committees in the Donets and Kuznets basins are still organized and active.

34 The right to strike, which was pushed, ironically, by the official trade unions, was conceded by the government during the miners' strikes. However, many industries that are essential to the functioning of the national economy—including mining—are not allowed to strike. So far, the miners' strike committees have not been ordered to disband; they have declared that they will strike again if the compromises that were made are not adhered to.

35 “Bespokoistvo: Tak mozhno opredeli' politicheskuyu situatsiyu v regione,” Pravda, April 28, 1990, p. 3.

36 Brzezinski (fn. 13), 167–68.

37 Hauslohner (fn. 2), 73.

38 Hill, , Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980).Google Scholar

39 Ibid., 12–13.

40 Narodnye Deputaty SSSR (fn. 1).

41 “Deputatskiy Korpus Rossii,” Pravda, March 26, 1990, p. 2. Interview with Vitaliy Vorotnikov, then Politburo member and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

42 Ibid.