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Rawls’ Theory of Justice: Domestic and International Perspectives

Review products

BarryBrian, The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in A Theory of Justice by John Rawls. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973, 168 pp., $10.50.
DanielsNorman, ed., Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. New York, Basic Books, 1975, 352 pp., $15.00.
RawlsJohn, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, 607 pp., $15.00.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Robert Amdur
Robert Amdur
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Abstract

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls seeks to derive principles of justice from the agreement of rational, hypothetical individuals, each concerned to further his own interests. From a carefully defined initial situation of choice, Rawls derives two basic principles: one demanding equal liberties for all, the other permitting inequalities in wealth and authority only when they serve to maximize the expectations of those who are left worst off. This article explores the political and social implications of Rawls' theory. It is argued (1) that the theory requires a constitutional democracy, offering very strong protection to political and intellectual liberties; and (2) that it also requires a highly egalitarian distribution of wealth and income. Although Rawls does not discuss international distributive justice, there are good reasons for concluding that his distributive principles ought to apply globally.

Type
Review Articles
Information
World Politics , Volume 29 , Issue 3 , April 1977 , pp. 438 - 461
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1977

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References

1 , Berlin, “Does Political Theory Still Exist?” in Laslett, Peter and Runciman, W. G., eds., Philosophy, Politics, and Society: Second Series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1962), 1Google Scholar.

2 , Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974), 183Google Scholar.

3 It should be emphasized that this does not imply any commitment on Rawls' part to stability in unjust societies. The original contractees need not be concerned about whether persons living in actual, unjust societies will find the chosen principles reasonable, or whether the beneficiaries of unjust institutions will find themselves psychologically incapable of enduring the transition to a society based on justice.

4 , Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962)Google Scholar; Hayek, F. A., The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1960)Google Scholar; Nozick (fn. 2).

5 Prospects are measured by the index of primary goods that a person (and his immediate descendants) can expect to receive.

6 It has often been pointed out that this argument works only if one assumes that the contracting parties will not want to take risks. Rawls' point is not that rational men and women are necessarily unwilling to gamble, but rather that under the conditions of the original position the parties will feel constrained to behave in a risk-averse manner. Rawls recognizes that many people are willing to take risks in actual situations of uncertainty. But he believes that gambling is irrational when the results will have such a profound impact on the gambler's life prospects and on the prospects of his immediate descendants. For a criticism of this view, see Barry, 87–107.

7 Here and throughout his argument Rawls assumes that the problem of self-respect will be most acute for those who are worst off. He never discusses the possibility that those who are better off might suffer a loss of self-esteem when forced to make those sacrifices necessary to improve the position of the worst-off.

8 Here Rawls follows John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, especially chap. 3.

9 , Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1973). 333Google Scholar.

10 For a recent example, see Macpherson, C. B., Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1973)Google Scholar, chaps. 1–4.

11 For the classic statement of this view, see Tawney, R. H., Equality (London: Unwin Books 1964)Google Scholar.

12 On this point, see Singer, Peter, Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1973), 86–92Google Scholar.

13 It is reasonable to assume that Rawls also intends these strictures to apply to revolutionaries fighting to overthrow an unjust regime.

14 Barry (pp. 128–33) and T. M. Scanlon (Daniels, 202) discuss this question briefly. A more thorough discussion appears in Beitz, Charles R., “Justice and International Relations,” Philosophy and Public Affairs iv (Summer 1975), 360–89Google Scholar. Concerning the ethics of international redistribution, see also Lewis, John P., “Oil, Other Scarcities, and the Poor Countries,” World Politics xxvii (October 1974), 63–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Singer, Peter, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (Spring 1972), 229–43Google Scholar, and Singer, “Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument,” in Peter Brown and Henry Shue, eds., Food Policy: U.S. Responsibility in the Life and Death Choices (New York: Free Press, forthcoming); Tucker, Robert W., “A New International Order?” Commentary LIX (February 1975), 38–50Google Scholar, and , Tucker, “Egalitarianism and International Politics,” Commentary LX (September 1975), 27–40Google Scholar.

15 As a possible alternative, Beitz (fn. 14), 366–73, suggests a resource redistribution principle, based on the assumption that the natural distribution of resources, like the distribution of natural talents and abilities, is “arbitrary from a moral point of view.” This principle “would function in international society as the difference principle functions in domestic society.” Beitz believes that such a principle would be morally compelling even if states were in fact self-sufficient.

16 Rough arguments of this sort can be found in Bauer, P. T., Dissent on Development: Studies and Debates in Development Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1972)Google Scholar; Hayek (fn. 4), 46–48.

17 These assertions are found in Baran, Paul, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press 1957)Google Scholar; Kolko, Gabriel, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press 1969)Google Scholar; Frank, André Gunder, Capitalism and Under-development in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press 1967)Google Scholar, among many others.

18 If true, however, the radical claims might necessitate redistributive measures beyond those required to fulfill the difference principle.

19 Beitz (fn. 14), 386–88.

20 See Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (fn. 14), esp. 239–40.

21 Beitz (fn. 14), 388.

22 Singer, “Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument” (fn. 14).

23 Tucker, “Egalitarianism and International Politics” (fn. 14), contains a sensitive discussion of the difficulties which a system of sovereign states creates for any theory committed to global egalitarianism.

24 Tucker, “Egalitarianism and International Politics” (fn. 14), 36. For a similar observation from a source more sympathetic to egalitarian claims, see Pearson, Lester B. and others, Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development (New York: Praeger 1969), 8Google Scholar.

23 , Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1970)Google Scholar; see esp. viii-xi, 90–97.

26 , Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory,” American Political Science Review LXIX (June 1975), 594–606Google Scholar.

27 , Teitelman, “The Limits of Individualism,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69 (October 5, 1972), 545–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Schwartz, Adina, “Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods,” Ethics, Vol. 83 (July 1973), 294–307CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 , McBride, “Social Theory Sub Specie Aeternitatis: A New Perspective,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 81 (April 1972), 996Google Scholar.

29 , Miller, “Rawls and Marxism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs III (Winter 1974), 187Google Scholar.