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Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Richard Ned Lebow  and
Janice Gross Stein
Richard Ned Lebow
Affiliation:
Cornell University
Janice Gross Stein
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Abstract

Deterrence theories purport to supply the auxiliary assumptions rational choice theories need to predict rational strategic behavior. They generally assume that would-be initiators are (i) instrumentally rational; (2) risk-prone gain-maximizers; (3) free of domestic constraints; and (4) able to identify themselves correctly as defenders or challengers. These assumptions are contradicted by empirical studies that indicate that risk-prone, gain-maximizing initiators are relatively uncommon; that leaders at times calculate as deterrence theories expect, but behave contrary to their predictions; and that the calculus of initiators generally depends on factors other than those identified by deterrence theories. Deductive theories of deterrence are also inadequate because they do not define their scope conditions. Nor can they accommodate deviation by initiators from processes of rational calculation. Rational deterrence theories are poorly specified theories about nonexistent decision makers operating in nonexistent environments.

Type
The Rational Deterrence Debate: A Symposium
Information
World Politics , Volume 41 , Issue 2 , January 1989 , pp. 208 - 224
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1989

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References

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2 This problem is discussed by Zagare, Frank C. in “Recent Advances in Game Theory and Political Science,” in Long, Samuel, ed., Annual Review of Political Science (Norwood, NJ:Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1986), 60–90Google Scholar, and in The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1–7Google Scholar. It is also a central theme of Arthur Stein, Dilemmas of Interdependence: The Logic of International Cooperation and Conflict, forthcoming.

3 Formal concepts of risk and uncertainty apply to the estimation of the likelihoods of given alternatives. In a “risky” choice, the probability distribution of a consequence is known, even though its occurrence is not. In an uncertain environment, by contrast, even this distribution of probabilities is unknown and no a priori estimates can be made. The formal distinction between risk and uncertainty does not capture the attributes of the environment of strategic decision making. Once leaders estimate the probability of a consequence of an option, even without adequate baseline information on which to make their judgments, they make their choice under conditions of risk.

4 In models of subjective expected utility, preferences under conditions of risk are determined by at least two separate factors: the strength of the preference for the consequences under certainty, and the attitude toward risk. See Schoemaker, Paul J. H., “The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence, and Limitations,” Journal of Economic Literature 20 (June 1982), 529Google Scholar–63, at 533.

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11 For an analysis of the conditions under which the strategy of deterrence is likely to provoke rather than prevent a use of force, see Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1976), 58–113Google Scholar, and “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics 41 (January 1989), 183–207CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ned Lebow, Richard, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981Google Scholar), and “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly,” Political Science Quarterly 98 (Fall 1983), 431CrossRefGoogle Scholar–58; Ned Lebow, Richard and Gross Stein, Janice, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues 43, No. 4 (1987), 3–71Google Scholar; and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Miscalculated Escalation: The Outbreak of War in 1967,” paper presented to the American Political Science Association, September 1988.

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13 Achen and Snidal (fn. 8), 151 and n. 24.

14 These cases are analyzed in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 9), 34–59, 203–32, and in Lebow and Stein (fn. 11).

15 Achen and Snidal (fn. 8), 152, n. 24; Tetlock, Philip E., “Testing Deterrence Theory: Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues,” Journal of Social Issues 43, No. 4 (1987), 85–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Achen and Snidal (fn. 8), 152.

17 In reviewing the predictive use of subjective expected utility models, Schoemaker (fn. 4, 538–39) argues that evidence counter to the theory can often be refuted because it is indirect. The most irrefutable evidence, which directly concerns the axioms, is discounted in the positivist tradition. Ex post facto interpretation of a decision as rational through the addition of factors not specified by the model treats the optimality of behavior as an essentially unfalsifi-able metapostulate. Consequently, ex post empirical models have limited refutation power regarding the corresponding theoretical ex ante model.

18 Mefford (fn. 7) argues persuasively: “Interpreting the uninterpreted key concepts of rational choice requires spelling out for each actor that actor's utility function, perceptions of uncertainty, and perceived set of outcomes. Because there is virtually no limit on the variety of ways that these concepts of rational choice can be mapped onto a political world, rational-choice based models of deterrence seem to suffer from much the same open-ended character ... of the case-based work. ... The number of auxiliary propositions that can be attached to the uninterpreted core of rational choice is disturbingly large. It matters which ones are chosen. And, the rational choice theorist's choice of auxiliary propositions is a legitimate target for critical examination” (emphasis in original), p. 9.

19 For a similar argument without reference to the analytical properties of the theory, see MccGwire, Michael, “Deterrence: The Problem—Not the Solution,” SAIS Review 5 (Summer-Fall 1985), 105CrossRefGoogle Scholar–24.

20 For analysis of the interaction between strategies of deterrence and reassurance in avoiding war, see Gross Stein, Janice, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Tetlock, Philip E. et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War (New York:Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar, forthcoming).

21 Jervis (fn. 11, 1989).

22 Simon (fn. 6), 295.

23 For a similar argument with respect to game theory and the analysis of cooperation, see Jervis, Robert, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics 40 (April 1988), 317CrossRefGoogle Scholar–49.

24 Lebow (fn. 9), passim.

25 Lebow and Stein (fn. 11), passim.

26 As Mefford argues (fn. 7), what is at issue is the correspondence between the essential terms in the core of rational models and the auxiliary assumptions of deterrence theory (pp. 7–10). These auxiliary assumptions are the costs of war, the probability of winning, and the probability of retaliation. Achen and Snidal ignore the necessity to test these propositions as the core of an empirical theory of deterrence.

27 Stein (fn. 11).

28 Zagare (fn. 2, 1987), 1–7.

29 Technically, Zagare's analysis is based on a different interpretation of the meaning of two-by-two games. The numbers denote rates of payoff rather than single payoffs, with players moving around within the matrix.

30 O'Neill, Barry, “Game Theory and the Study of the Deterrence of War,” in Stern, Paul C. et al., eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (New York:Oxford University Press, 1989Google Scholar). O'Neill notes: “Previous concepts had tried to draw a sharp line between rational and irrational actions based solely on the utilities of the outcomes, but recent approaches regard rational actions as interlocked with rational beliefs. ... Whether they [the players] adopt these beliefs is an empirical question, and thus the validity of an equilibrium becomes a question of social science rather than mathematical axioms. Models like this seem more realistic and reduce the isolation of game theory applications from other social sciences.”

31 See, for example, Powell, Robert, “Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD,” American Political Science Review 81 (September 1987), 717CrossRefGoogle Scholar–36, and “Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information,” American Political Science Review 82 (March 1988), 155CrossRefGoogle Scholar–78; R. Harrison Wagner, “Reputation and the Credibility of Military Threats: Rational Choice vs. Psychology,” paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1988.

32 de Weerd, Harvey, “Strategic Surprise and the Korean War,” Orbis 6 (Fall 1962), 435Google Scholar–52; George, Alexander L. and Smoke, Richard, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York:Columbia University Press, 1974), 184–234Google Scholar; Lebow (fn. 11, 1981) passim; Janice Gross Stein, “Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem,” and Richard Ned Lebow, “Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War,” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 9), 60–88, 89–124.

33 The Egyptian Minister of War, Shams al-Din Badran, estimated in May 1967 that Egyptian forces could handle military intervention on behalf of Israel by the Sixth Fleet; cited by Riad, Mahmoud, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London:Quartet Books, 1981), 23Google Scholar. Is this, in Snidal and Achen's terms, psychopathological reasoning that falls outside the scope of a “rational theory of deterrence,” or evidence of systematic miscalculation that defeats the expectations of rational deterrence theory?

34 Schoemaker (fn. 4), 548.

35 Ibid., 554.

36 For the distinction between “immediate” and “general” deterrence, see Morgan, Patrick, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, rev. ed. (Beverly Hills:Sage Publications, 1983Google Scholar).

37 Weede, , “Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (June 1983), 231CrossRefGoogle Scholar–54.

38 Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36 (July 1984), 496–526, and “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” International Studies Quarterly 32, No. 1 (1988), 29–46; Paul Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American Political Science Review 82 (June 1988), 423–44, and Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1988Google Scholar).

39 Russett (fn. 9), and Huth (fn. 38).

40 Achen and Snidal (fn. 8), 152.

41 Achen and Snidal cite Ragin's persuasive argument that contextual and holistic social and political forces are frequently blurred and averaged in a meaningless way in “variable-oriented” approaches. Ragin, as does George, urges the use of case studies to trace detailed causal sequences in different contexts. Ragin, Charles C., The Comparative Method (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1987Google Scholar).

42 Kolodziej, Edward A., “The Limits of Deterrence Theory,” Journal of Social Issues 43, No. 4 (1987), 123CrossRefGoogle Scholar–34, makes this point in the context of general deterrence.

43 See Eckstein, Harry, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W., eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–138Google Scholar, and Lijphart, Arend, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65 (September 1971), 682CrossRefGoogle Scholar–93, and “The Comparable Case-Strategy in Comparative Research,” Comparative Political Studies 8 (July 1975), 158–177CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a discussion of the importance of the analysis of “critical” cases.

44 See Lebow and Stein (fn. 11).

45 For a discussion of the advantages of “process tracing” in critical cases, see Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, October 15–16, 1982.

46 This is a line of argument that originated with Friedman, Milton, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Friedman, , Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1953), 3–43Google Scholar. It entered political science through the work of Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York:Harper & Row, 1957Google Scholar).

47 For an excellent discussion of the scientific problems of rational models, see Moe, Terry M., “On the Scientific Status of Rational Models,” Journal of Political Science 23 (February 1979), 215CrossRefGoogle Scholar–43.

48 Ibid., 226.

49 Moe makes this argument for rational models in general (ibid., 235).