Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-29T08:48:13.821Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Ratification Premium

Hawks, Doves, and Arms Control

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 August 2018

Sarah E. Kreps ,
Elizabeth N. Saunders  and
Kenneth A. Schultz

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

This article examines the effect of leaders’ foreign policy preferences on their ability to pursue and ratify arms control agreements. Does it take a “Nixon to go to China,” with hawks more effective than doves, when it comes to the domestic politics of treaty ratification? The authors observe that the theoretical logic correctly identifies an asymmetry between hawkish and dovish presidents, with the latter facing a credibility gap in advocating arms reductions. Although existing accounts assume leaders are captives of their type, the authors argue that dovish executives can overcome their credibility gap by obtaining the endorsement of informed legislators. These executives do so by paying a ratification premium, usually in the form of increased defense effort in areas not covered by the treaty. As a result, doves do not necessarily face a lower rate of success at the ratification stage; their disadvantage manifests itself primarily in the higher premium needed to obtain the same level of support as hawkish executives. The article demonstrates this argument through a formal model and tests the implications with paired comparisons of major arms control treaties in the Cold War and post–Cold War periods. The argument helps to resolve the Nixon-to-China theoretical debate. It shows that dovish leaders are not necessarily captives of their type because they can deploy side payments to achieve their policy goals. It also explains important puzzling features of the arms control record.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 70 , Issue 4 , October 2018 , pp. 479 - 514
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2018 

Footnotes

*

The authors would like to thank Neil Couch, Sarah Croco, Charlie Glaser, James Goodby, Brendan Green, James Lebovic, James Lindsay, Andrew Little, Austin Long, Michael McFaul, Franklin Miller, Amy Nelson, Janne Nolan, Gary Samore, Anne Sartori, Caitlin Talmadge, James Wilson, Jane Vaynman, and participants in presentations at Cornell Law School, the University of Virginia, the Stanton Nuclear Security Conference, and ISA 2016 for feedback on this research. They are also grateful to Caroline Andridge, Neil Chitrao, Vanes Ibric, and Brian Radzinsky for valuable research assistance; to Sara Mitchell, Brittany Paris, and Charles Stokely for archival assistance at the Jimmy Carter Library; and to the Stanton Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations for research fellowship support.

Archival data are available at Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz 2018a.

References

Arms Control Association. 2010. “The Case for New START Builds; Skeptics Miss the Mark.” Issue Briefs 1, no. 45 (December 16). At https://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/RespondingtoNewSTARTCritics, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Baker, Peter. 2010a. “GOP Opposition Dims Hope for Arms Treaty With Russia.” New York Times, November 16: A1.Google Scholar
Baker, Peter. 2010b. “GOP Senators Detail Objections to Arms Treaty.” New York Times, November 24: A22.Google Scholar
Baker, Peter. 2010c. “On Arms Treaty, White House Seeks a Republican's Ear.” New York Times, November 25: A8.Google Scholar
Baker, Peter. 2010d. “Impassioned Senate Debate on Arms Treaty.” New York Times, December 16: A8.Google Scholar
Baker, Peter. 2010e. “Obama's Gamble on Arms Pact Pays Off.” New York Times, December 22: A6.Google Scholar
Baker, Peter. 2010f. “Senate Passes Arms Control Treaty with Russia, 71–26.” New York Times, December 22. At https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/world/europe/23treaty.html, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Boese, Wade. 2002. “Senate Reviews U.S.–Russian Nuclear Reductions Treaty.” Arms Control Today 32, no. 7: 13. At https://www.jstor.org/stable/23626553, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Caldwell, Dan. 1991. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press.Google Scholar
Cameron, James. 2018. The Double Game: The Demise of America's First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Carter, Jimmy. 1979a. “Interview with the President: Remarks and a Questionand–Answer Session with Editors and News Directors.” The American Presidency Project, July 27. At http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32667, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Carter, Jimmy. 1979b. “United States Defense Policy Remarks to Members of the Business Council.” The American Presidency Project, December 12. At http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31820, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Caverley, Jonathan D. 2014. Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Clare, Joe. 2014. “Hawks, Doves, and International Cooperation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 7: 1311–37. doi:10.1177/0022002713498705.Google Scholar
Collina, Tom Z. 2011. “Senate Approves New Start.” Arms Control Today 41, no. 1. At http://www.jstor.org/stable/23629167, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Cukierman, Alex, and Tommasi, Mariano. 1998. “When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?” American Economic Review 88, no. 1: 180–97. At http://www.jstor.org/stable/116824, accessed July 2, 2018.Google Scholar
Dao, James. 2003. “Senate Approves US–Russian Treaty to Cut Nuclear Arsenals.” New York Times, March 7: A7.Google Scholar
Facts on File World News Digest. 1979. “Carter Opposes Arms Tie to SALT.” August 10.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 2018. “Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy.” International Organization 72, no. 3: 523–59. doi: 10.1017/S0020818318000115.Google Scholar
Flores–Macías, Gustavo A., and Kreps, Sarah E.. 2013. “Political Parties at War: A Study of American War Finance, 1789–2010.” American Political Science Review 107, no. 4: 833–48. doi: 10.1017/S0003055413000476.Google Scholar
Fordham, Benjamin. 1998. “Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1994.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 4: 418–39. doi: 10.1177/0022002798042004002.Google Scholar
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972. Eds. David C., Geyer, Howland, Nina D., and Kent, Sieg. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972. Ed. Erin Mahan. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972. Ed. M. Todd, Bennett. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980. 2013. Ed. Erin Mahan. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Gailey, Phil. 1979. “Nunn May Be Key in Senate's SALT Debate.” Washington Star, April 27: A1.Google Scholar
Galen, Justin. 1979. “Curing the Nunn Illusion: Striking a Bargain for SALT.” Armed Forces Journal International 5, (October): 1–5.Google Scholar
Garthoff, Raymond L. 1994. Detente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
Gavin, Francis J. 2012. Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Glad, Betty. 2009. An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Goemans, Hein, and Spaniel, William. 2016. “Multimethod Research: A Case for Formal Theory.” Security Studies 25, no. 1: 25–33. doi: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1134176.Google Scholar
Golby, James T. 2011. “Duty, Honor … Party? Ideology, Institutions, and the Use of Military Force.” Ph.D. diss., Stanford University.Google Scholar
Goodby, James E. 2006. At the Borderline of Armageddon: How American Presidents Managed the Atom Bomb. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Howell, William G., and Pevehouse, Jon C.. 2007. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Kaiser, Robert. 1979a. “Nunn Ties Vote on SALT to More Defense Spending.” Washington Post, July 26: A1.Google Scholar
Kaiser, Robert. 1979b. “SALT Prospects Enhanced by Hearings, Both Sides Feel.” Washington Post. August 3: A1.Google Scholar
Kertzer, Joshua D., Brooks, Deborah Jordan, and Brooks, Stephen G.. 2017. “Do Partisan Types Stop at the Water's Edge?” Manuscript. Harvard University and Dartmouth College.Google Scholar
Kissinger, Henry. 1979. White House Years. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company.Google Scholar
Kissinger, Henry, Shultz, George, James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, and Colin Powell. 2010. “Why New START Deserves GOP Support.” Washington Post. December 2: A25.Google Scholar
Koch, Michael T., and Sullivan, Patricia. 2010. “Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Partisanship, Approval, and the Duration of Major Power Democratic Military Interventions.” Journal of Politics 72, no. 3: 616–29. doi: 10.1017/s0022381610000058.Google Scholar
Kohut, Andrew. 2010. “Mixed Views on Tax Cuts, Support for START and Allowing Gays to Serve Openly.” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. December 7. At http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp–content/uploads/sites/5/legacy–pdf/681.pdf, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. “Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?” American Political Science Review 84, no. 1: 149–63. doi: 10.2307/1963634.Google Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1992. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Kreps, Sarah E. 2018a. Taxing Wars: The American Way of War Finance and the Decline of Democracy. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kreps, Sarah E. 2018b. “The Institutional Design of Arms Control Agreements.” Foreign Policy Analysis 14, no. 1: 127–47. doi: 10.1093/fpa/orw045.Google Scholar
Kreps, Sarah E., Saunders, Elizabeth N., and Schultz, Kenneth A.. 2018a. “Data for: The Ratification Premium: Hawks, Doves, and Arms Control.” Qualitative Data Repository. QDR Main Collection, V1. doi: 10.5064/F6KMEDVB.Google Scholar
Kreps, Sarah E., Saunders, Elizabeth N., and Schultz, Kenneth A.. 2018b. Supplementary material for “The Ratification Premium: Hawks, Doves, and Arms Control.” doi: 10.1017/S0043887118000102.Google Scholar
Kristensen, Hans M. 2010. “New START Treaty Has New Counting.” Federation of American Scientists. March 29. At https://fas.org/blogs/security/2010/03/newstart/, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Kristensen, Hans M. 2014. “How Presidents Arm and Disarm.” Federation of American Scientists. October 15. At https://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/10/stockpilereductions/, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Kucia, Christine. 2003. “Senate Endorses Nuclear Reductions Treaty; Duma Delays.” Arms Control Today 33, no. 3: 30–31. At http://www.jstor.org/stable/23626950, accessed July 6, 2018.Google Scholar
Lebo, Matthew J., and O’Geen, Andrew J.. 2011. “The President's Role in the Partisan Congressional Arena.” Journal of Politics 73, no. 3: 718–34. doi: 10.1017/s0022381611000417.Google Scholar
Lebovic, James H. 2013. Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Lee, Carrie A. 2017. “Electoral Politics, Party Polarization, and Arms Control: New START in Historical Perspective.” Manuscript. US Air War College.Google Scholar
Lee, Jesse. 2010. “The Case for New START from the Joint Chiefs: ‘We Need It Badly.’” The White House Blog post, December 16. At https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/12/16/case–new–start–joint–chiefs–we–need–it–badly, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Lewis, Jeff, McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2016. “Weekly Update of ‘Common Space’ DW–NOMINATE Scores: Joint House and Senate Scaling.” December 20. At http://k7moa.com/Weekly_Constant_Space_DW–NOMINATE_Scores.htm, accessed April 19, 2018.Google Scholar
Lynn–Jones, Sean M. 1987. “Lulling and Stimulating Effects of Arms Control.” In Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass, eds., Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.Google Scholar
Mattes, Michaela, and Weeks, Jessica L. P.. Forthcoming. “Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach.” American Journal of Political Science.Google Scholar
Mayer, Frederick W. 1992. “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side–Payments.” International Organization 46, no. 4: 793–818. doi: 10.1017/S0020818300033257.Google Scholar
Miller, Steven E. 1984. “Politics over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control.” International Security 8, no. 4: 67–90. doi: 10.2307/2538563.Google Scholar
Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Milner, Helen V., and Tingley, Dustin. 2015. Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Mini, John D. 2010. “Forced Conversion: Civil–Military Relations and National Security Policy in the Carter Administration, 1977–1981.” Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina.Google Scholar
New York Times. 2013 “Throwing Money at Nukes.” May 26: A16. Newhouse, John. 1989. Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon–Brassey’s.Google Scholar
Nichols, Bill. 2002. “US to Keep 2,400 Nukes in Reserve Despite Treaty.” USA Today. July 10: 10.Google Scholar
Nincic, Miroslav. 1988. “The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites.” World Politics 40, no. 4 ( July): 452–75. doi: 10.2307/2010314.Google Scholar
Peake, Jeffrey S. 2014. “The Obama Administration's Use of Executive Agreements: Business As Usual or Presidential Unilateralism?” doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2445535.Google Scholar
Pifer, Steven. 2013. “SORT vs New Start: Why the Administration Is Leery of a Treaty.” Upfront (blog). Brookings Institution. March 15. At https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up–front/2013/03/15/sort–vs–new–start–why–the–administration–is–leery–of–a–treaty/, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Pincus, Walter. 2009. “US Ahead of Moscow Treaty Schedule in Reducing Its Arsenal.” Washington Post. February 13: A3.Google Scholar
Platt, Alan. 1991. “The Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty.” In Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell, eds., The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification. New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press.Google Scholar
Poole, Keith T., and Rosenthal, Howard. 2007. Ideology & Congress. 2nd rev. ed. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two–Level Games.” International Organization 42, no. 3: 427–60. doi: 10.1017/S0020818300027697.Google Scholar
Ray, Bruce A. 1980. “The Responsiveness of the U.S. Congressional Armed Services Committees to their Parent Bodies.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 5, no. 4: 501–15. At www.jstor.org/stable/439571, accessed July 6, 2018.Google Scholar
Sagan, Scott D. 2014. “Two Renaissances in Nuclear Security Studies: Introduction.” H–Diplo/ISSF Forum on What We Talk about When We Talk about Nuclear Weapons, Forum No. 2: 2–10. At http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF–Forum–2.pdf, accessed July 6, 2018.Google Scholar
Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2015. “War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the Politics of Using Force.” Security Studies 24, no. 3: 466–501. doi: 10.1080/09636412.2015.1070618.Google Scholar
Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2018. “Leaders, Advisers, and the Political Origins of Elite Support for War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. doi: 10.1177/0022002718785670.Google Scholar
Saunders, Elizabeth N., and Wolford, Scott. 2018. “Elites, Voters, and Democracies at War.” Manuscript. Georgetown University and University of Texas at Austin.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. “The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?” International Organization 59, no. 1: 1–38. doi: 10.1017/S0020818305050071.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2017. “Perils of Polarization for U.S. Foreign Policy.” Washington Quarterly 40, no. 4: 7–28. doi: 10.1080/0163660X.2017.1406705.Google Scholar
Senate Executive Reports. 2004. Quoted in Senator John Warner letter to Senators Joseph Biden and Jesse Helms, October 21, 2002, in United States Congressional Serial Set, no. 14818: 11.Google Scholar
Sheridan, Mary Beth, and Pincus, Walter. 2010. “Kyl Statement Deals Serious Setback to Obama's Push for START.” Washington Post. November 17: A3.Google Scholar
Smith, Gerard. 1985. Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.Google Scholar
Talbott, Strobe. 1979. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. New York, N.Y.: Harper Collins.Google Scholar
Tarar, Ahmer. 2005. “Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3: 383–407. doi: 10.1177/0022002705276567.Google Scholar
Vaynman, Jane E. 2014. “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University.Google Scholar
US Senate. 2002. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction: The Moscow Treaty, Senate Hearing 107–622, Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. Statement of John Kerry. July 9. At https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG–107shrg81339/pdf/CHRG–107shrg81339.pdf, accessed April 18, 2018.Google Scholar
US Senate. 2010a. The New Start and the Implications for National Security, Senate Hearing 111–897, Before the Committee on Armed Services. 111th Cong., 2nd Sess. Statement of Senator John McCain. June 17. At https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG–111shrg65071/html/CHRG–111shrg65071.htm, accessed April 18, 2018.Google Scholar
US Senate. 2010b. Implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Senate Hearing 111–897, Before the Committee on Armed Services. 111th Cong., 2nd Sess. Statement of Keith Payne. July 27. At https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG–111shrg65071/html/CHRG–111shrg65071.htm, accessed April 18, 2018.Google Scholar
White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 2010. “Fact Sheet: An Enduring Commitment to the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent.” November 17. At https://www.whitehouse.gov/the–press–office/2010/11/17/fact–sheet–enduring–commitment–us–nuclear–deterrent, accessed April 17, 2018.Google Scholar
Wilson, George C., and Pincus, Walter. 1979. “Embarrassment of Riches for the Pentagon.” Washington Post. August 3: A1.Google Scholar
Woolf, Amy. 2011. “Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.” Congressional Research Service, no. RL31448. At https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31448.pdf, accessed June 5, 2018.Google Scholar
Yarhi–Milo, Keren. 2014. Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Kreps et al. supplementary material

Kreps et al. supplementary material 1

Download Kreps et al. supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 170.8 KB
Supplementary material: File

Kreps et al. supplementary material

Kreps et al. supplementary material 2

Download Kreps et al. supplementary material(File)
File 18.7 KB