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Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Thomas A. Baylis
Thomas A. Baylis
Affiliation:
University of Texas
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Abstract

Open conflict between presidents and prime ministers has become a familiar phenomenon throughout East Central Europe since the fall of communism. While individual personalities and the particular constellations of issues in each country have helped shape individual conflicts, this article seeks to account for them in more fundamental structural terms and to place them in the context of current debates over the relative virtues of presidentialism and parliamentarism. There is a discrepancy between the prestige and popularity of presidents and their modest formal powers; prime ministers, by contrast, enjoy considerable formal power but only limited legitimacy. Since the distribution of authority in newly constituted democracies is ambiguous and fluid, with no established conventions and understandings defining precisely the boundaries among key institutions, presidents seek to utilize the ambiguity to convert their assets of prestige into “real” power over policy, while prime ministers resist what they see as incursions into their areas of responsibility. The article explores the strengths and weaknesses of each side, the terrain of struggle, the tactics employed, the political outcomes to date, and the implications for political consolidation and the future distribution of executive authority in the region's states.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , April 1996 , pp. 297 - 323
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1996

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References

1 Translated in FBIS-Eastern Europe, February 28, 1994, pp. 14—15.

2 Warsaw Radio Zet interview, February 25, 1994, trans, in FBIS-Eastern Europe, March 2, 1994, p. 23. Miller was responding not to the statement above but to Walesa's remark that he would soon begin the process of “file-checking and decommunization.”

3 In their seminal article, James G. March and johan Olsen do not cite any studies of the executive per se (apart from references to “administrative capacity” and to “the state”) in their list of examples of the growing scholarly interest in political institutions; see March, and Olsen, , “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984), 734–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See, however, Rose, Richard and Suleiman, Ezra N., eds., Presidents and Prime Ministers (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980)Google Scholar; Jones, G. W., ed., West European Prime Ministers (London: Frank Cass, 1991)Google Scholar; Blondel, Jean and Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, eds., Cabinets in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Baylis, Thomas A., Governing by Committee: Collegial Leadership in Advanced Societies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).Google Scholar

4 See Lijphart, Arend, ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Linz, Juan and Valenzuela, Arturo, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Shugart, Matthew Soberg and Carey, John M., Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 See Giovanni Sartori, “Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism,” in Linz and Valenzuela (fn. 4), 106–18; he also uses the term “semi-parliamentarism.” And see Shugart and Carey (fn. 4), 23–25 and passim, who distinguish between “premier-presidential” and “president-parliamentary” regimes.

6 See Sartori (fn. 5), 109–10. Kanzlerdemokratie, a term originally used to refer to the German parliamentary system under Adenauer, does not to my mind accurately characterize the German system today. See Arend Lijphart, “Presidential and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations,” in Linz and Valenzuela (fn. 4), 94–95; Baylis (fn. 3), 72–79.

7 As has often been noted, the power of the French president depends heavily on his supporters' controlling a parliamentary majority. Walesa has little parliamentary backing; Iliescu's party is the largest in the Romanian parliament, but the Vacaroiu government has had to rely on the support of small nationalist parties to remain on power. One expert on Romania, Vladimir Tismaneanu, earlier pronounced himself simply unable to determine whether the country has presidential or parliamentary rule. Cited in Woodrow Wilson Center East European Studies Meeting Report, September-October 1993, 3. Professor Tismaneanu has since informed me, however, that he now believes Romania has shifted decisively toward presidential dominance.

8 Weaver and Rockman observe that “policymaking structures and processes in parliamentary systems can vary tremendously across countries and over time. Indeed, comparing parliamentary systems and the American separation-of-powers system is less a matter of comparing apples and oranges than of comparing apples with all other fruits.” Weaver, R. Kent and Rockman, Bert A., “Assessing the Effects of Institutions,” in Weaver, and Rockman, , eds., Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), 19.Google Scholar

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10 The classic statement of this division of executive labor is Bagehot's distinction between the “dignified” and “efficient” parts of the English Constitution. See Bagehot, Walter, The English Constitution (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), 4.Google Scholar The assumption of complementarity, however, breaks down if the two executives do not have a common understanding of the boundary between the two parts.

11 See Stehle, Hansjakob, “Nervenkrieg um die Macht,” Die Zeit, January 13, 1994, p. 4.Google Scholar The scandals implicated at least two former prime ministers along with many other politicians who were charged with bribery and criminal ties.

12 See Perger, Werner A., “Wer ist der Schönste im Land?” Die Zeit, December 17, 1993, p. 5.Google Scholar

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14 See Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in Linz and Valenzuela (fn. 4), 6–8.

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21 “Increasingly his personal role-model seemed to be Marshal Józef Pilsudski.… ‘Really we should start by singing “We, the First Brigade,”’ I heard Walesa tell the first meeting of the newly elected Solidarity-opposition parliamentarians, referring to the stirring marching song of Pilsudski's Legions in the First World War.” Ash, Timothy Garton, The Magic Lantern (New York: Random House, 1990), 34–35.Google Scholar

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23 In some instances prime ministers are little more than first among equals in what amounts to committee forms of governance. In such cases—the Mazowiecki government in Poland, for example—the “president vs. prime minister” rivalry is really a “president vs. government” one. See Baylis (fn. 3).

24 High rates of government turnover seem to be typical of nearly all new democracies; see Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 265–68.Google Scholar

25 A similar provision, however, failed to save the Suchocka government in Poland.

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27 Slovakia's Meciar, whose Movement for a Democratic Slovakia suffered critical defections prior to his fall in March 1994, has devised a novel method of impeding future departures: MDS candidates in the September 1994 elections were required to sign an agreement promising to pay the party 5 million Slovak crowns if they left it before the following elections. “Topics,” Transition, March 15, 1995, p. 31.

28 A somewhat similar comparison of the positions of president and prime minister has been suggested for France, with the important difference that the French president seems to have enjoyed greater “political resources” (as opposed to the prime minister's “administrative and institutional resources”) from the outset, owing to his parliamentary majority. See Robert Elgie and Howard Machin, “France: The Limits to Prime-Ministerial Government in a Semi-presidential System,” in Jones (fn. 3), 62–78.

29 In Walesa's case, this assertion applies to Olszewski's successor, Hanna Suchocka, but not to Pawlak's successor, Jozef Oleksy.

30 Bill Lomax, “Hungary,” in Whitefield (fn. 26), 87. Lomax notes that the agreement was made by Antall and Goncz “over the heads” of the leadership of their parties.

31 See Pehe, Jiri, “A Leader in Political Stability and Economic Growth,” Transition, January 30, 1995, pp. 29–30.Google Scholar

32 Western presidents have provided something of a model by seeking to identify themselves with popular hostility to what they see as the excessive influence of parties—France's de Gaulle and, more recently, Germany's von Weizsäcker and Austria's Klestil are examples.

33 “Kovac Gives ‘State of Republic’ Speech,” FBIS-Eastern Europe, March 10, 1994, pp. 6, 8.

34 “The relation between Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus … recalls Walter Bagehot's classic commentary on the difference between the British monarch and the PM: the former is the object of public affect and reverence, while the latter is a cool technocrat, performing a multitude of operations that few ordinary citizens completely understand.” Holmes, Stephen, “A Forum on Presidential Powers,” East European Constitutional Review 2–3 (Fall 1993-Winter 1994), 36.Google Scholar

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36 See Pataki, Judith, “Power Struggle over Broadcasting in Hungary,” RFE/RL Research Report, March 12, 1993, pp. 16–20.Google Scholar

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40 Another factor, which has also been used to explain the electoral misfortunes of many former dissidents, may be the resentments of those elites and ordinary citizens—the great majority—who did not resist communist rule. Andrew Nagorski quotes the Czech dissident Václav Malý: “Many people had collaborated in some way. People don't like to see people who struggled against the communists. It's a covert pleasure to push them out of politics.” Nagorski, , The Birth of Freedom (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 125.Google Scholar

41 See, however, the diversity of Western cabinet-parliament relationships described in Laver, Michael and Shepsle, Kenneth A., Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).Google Scholar On East European parliaments, see Remington, Thomas F., ed., Parliaments in Transition (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).Google Scholar

42 See Ganev, Venelin, “Bulgaria II,” in “Survey of Presidential Powers: Formal and Informal,” East European Constitutional Review 2–3 (Fall 1993-Winter 1994), 64.Google Scholar

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44 The complicated dispute also involved the question of control over the Defense Ministry and the armed forces. See the account in Michta, Andrew A., “The Presidential-Parliamentary System,” in Starr, Richard F., ed., Transition to Democracy in Poland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 62–69.Google Scholar

45 See Vinton (fn. 20), 22; Michta (fn. 44), 74.

46 See Osiatynski, Wiktor, “Poland's Constitutional Ordeal,” East European Constitutional Review 3 (Spring 1994), 29—38.Google Scholar After a “truce” was negotiated in April 1994, Walesa's representative returned to the commission. In June 1995 the Polish media reported that the commission had decided to reduce the number of votes needed to override a presidential veto to 50% plus one, but otherwise to retain many of the presidential powers granted by the “Little Constitution.” OMRI Daily Digest (electronic version), June 19, 1995.

47 Katarina Mathernova, “Czecho?Slovakia: Constitutional Developments,” in Howard (fn. 20), 73–75.

48 Pehe, Jiri, “Czechoslovakia: Toward Dissolution,” RFE/RL Research Report, January 1, 1993, p. 87Google Scholar; Kohler, Berthold, “Der Freiheitsheld verliert an Glanz,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 16, 1993.Google Scholar

49 Vinton, Louisa, “Correcting Pilsudski: Walesa's Nonparty Bloc to Support Reform,” RFE/RL Research Report, September 3, 1993, pp. 1–9.Google Scholar

50 Nagorski (fn. 40), 107.

51 “Mieczyslaw Wachowski: Eminence Gris,” Transition, January 30, 1995, p. 45. Walesa dismissed Wachowski in August 1995 as presidential elections approached.

52 Taras (fn. 39), 180.

53 See Obrman, Jan, “President Havel's Diminishing Influence,” RFE/RL Research Report, March 13, 1992, p. 20.Google Scholar

54 Jonathan Eyal, “Romania,” in Whitefield (fn. 26), 132. “Most of those appointed to the staff,” Eyal claims, “were old Securitate officers or communist party ideologues, and not one came from the opposition."

55 Richard Crampton, “Bulgaria,” in Whitefield (fn. 26), 20.

56 Engelbrekt, Kjell, “The Fall of Bulgaria's First Noncommunist Government,” RFE/RL Research Report, November 13, 1992, p. 5.Google Scholar

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59 See Fisher, Sharon, “Prime Minister and President Grapple for Power,” Transition, June 30, 1995, pp. 38–43.Google Scholar

60 See David M. Olson, “The Sundered State: Federalism and Parliament in Czechoslovakia,” in Remington (fn. 41), 102–3.

61 An unsuccessful effort in 1990 to move Klaus out of the government by making him head of the state bank was rumored to have been “engineered by the president's office.” Glenny, Misha, The Rebirth of History (London: Penguin, 1993), 36.Google Scholar

62 Grolig, Erich, “Vaclav Klaus ist sich seiner Reformsache sicher,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, May 11, 1991.Google Scholar

63 See Laber, Jeri, “Witch Hunt in Prague,” New York Review of Booh, April 23, 1992, pp. 5–8Google Scholar; Janyska, Petr, “Imperfect but Right,” East European Reporter, January—February 1992, pp. 59—60Google Scholar; Kavan, Jan, “Imperfect and Wrong,” East European Reporter, January-February 1992, p. 61Google Scholar; Nagorski (fn. 40), 76–91; Rosenberg, Tina, The Haunted Land (New York: Random House, 1995), 67–121.Google Scholar The law bars various groups from high-ranking positions in government, state enterprises, and universities for five years; these include hundreds of thousands of former communist officials, members of the People's Militia, and secret police officials and those listed in their files as collaborators.

64 See “Klaus on ‘Dissection’ of Differences with Havel,” Rude Pravo, February 15, 1994, trans, in FBIS-Eastern Europe, February 17, 1994, pp. 4–5.

65 Veis, Jaroslav, “King Klaus,” East European Reporter, October 1992, p. 12.Google Scholar

66 Rude Pravo, May 19, 1994, trans, in FBIS-Eastern Europe, May 23, 1994, p. 7.

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68 See Sabbat-Swidlicka, Anna, “Pawlak to Head Poland's ‘Postcommunist’ Government,” RFE/RL Research Report, October 29, 1993, pp. 24–32Google Scholar; idem, “Pawlak Builds Up Peasant Power,” RFE/RL Research Report, June 17, 1994, pp. 13–20.

69 Cited in Perlez, Jane, “In Poland, It's Still Solidarity vs. the Communists,” New York Times, January 8, 1995, p. 4.Google Scholar

70 Perlez, Jane, “Walesa's Foes Nominate New Premier,” New York Times, February 8, 1995, p. A7Google Scholar; see also Vinton, Louisa, “Velvet Restoration,” Transition, January 30, 1995, pp. 42–44.Google Scholar

71 Engelbrecht, Kjell, “Bulgaria's Political Stalemate,” RFE/RL Research Report, June 24, 1994, p. 23.Google Scholar

42 Stepan, Alfred and Skach, Cindy, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism,” World Politics 46 (October 1993), 19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

73 See Shugart and Carey (fn. 4), 43–49.

74 In a survey conducted in October—November 1991, 54.5% of Poles surveyed agreed that “a strong leader can do more for the country than all laws, debates, and consultations,” but only 21.8% said that the president rather than the Sejm “should decide about the most important matters in Poland.” (Another 21% answered the latter question “don't know.”) Jasiewicz, Krzysztof, “Polish Politics on the Eve of the 1993 Elections,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26 (December 1993), 409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

75 RFE/RL News Briefs, April 18–22, 1994, pp. 9–10; OMRI Daily Digest (electronic version), February 7, 1995.

76 “Polls on Popularity of Politicians, Parties,” Poznan WPROST, January 8, 1995, trans, in FBIS Eastern Europe, January 6, 1995, p. 18. See also Perlez, Jane, “From His High Pedestal, Walesa Has a Great Fall,” New York Times, July 6, 1994, p. A5.Google Scholar

77 Sabbat-Swidlicka (fn. 68, 1993), 24–25. Walesa's remark, it should be stressed, was made after Yeltsin's dissolution of the Russian parliament but before the latter's armed resistance and the storming of the parliament building. He has, however, also been quoted by a Polish weekly as saying: “When the time comes to introduce a dictatorship, the people will force me to accept this role and I shall not refuse. Most likely that is where we are heading.” Perlez (fn. 76), A5.

78 See the interesting comments of Vinton, Louisa, “Walesa and the Elections,” Report on Eastern Europe, November 1, 1991, pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

79 “Many Poles seemed to expect that, once elected, Walesa would miraculously turn from a roughedged electrician and union leader to a dignified statesman, with noble manners, speaking flawless Polish. This transformation of course could not take place, and the symbolic function of the Presidency seemed undermined by Walesa's slips of tongue and custom.” Krzysztof Jasiewicz,” ‘My Name Is President’: Lech Walesa and the Future of Presidentialism in Poland,” in Ray Taras, ed., The Presidency in Post-Communist States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). After the completion of this article, Walesa's popular standing recovered somewhat, but he was nevertheless defeated in the November 1995 presidential elections by the postcommunist leader Aleksander Kwasniewski.

80 Jasiewicz (fn.79).

81 On Russia, see two articles in East European Constitutional Review (Fall 1993—Winter 1994): Edward W. Walker, “Politics of Blame and Presidential Powers in Russia's New Constitution,” 116—19; and Stephen Holmes, “Superpresidentialism and Its Problems,” 123–26.

82 “Consolidation” is a term that is difficult to operationalize; too rigorous a set of requirements (e.g., the “two turnover test”) is apt to disqualify even some long-established democratic systems, such as those of Japan and Italy. My own definition would emphasize in particular Huntington's “institutionalization,” including the establishment of a relatively stable party system, and the broad acceptance of democratic values, e.g., tolerance of opposition, civil liberties, participation. See Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)Google Scholar; Huntington (fn. 24), 208ff.; Palma, Giuseppe Di, To Craft Democracies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 138ff.Google Scholar

83 Jean Blondel, “Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World,” in Lijphart (fn. 4), 170–72.

84 “Whatever the case's merits, the demagogic means that Walesa used to achieve his ends became themselves a degradation of democracy. They loosed a squalor into Polish public life that persisted and proliferated.” Brown, J. F., Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe after Communism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), 71.Google Scholar

85 It is noteworthy that Meciar himself has expressed interest in the Slovak presidency, and Alexander Kwaśnieski, head of the dominant SLD in the current Polish coalition, chose to run for president rather than become prime minister.