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Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

George Tsebelis  and
Eduardo Alemán
Eduardo Alemán
Affiliation:
University of Houston
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Abstract

Ten Latin American presidents have a power that has not received the study that it deserves: the ability to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills. These “amendatory observations” return to Congress for afinalround of voting. Sometimes the presidential version of the bill becomes the default alternative automatically and may require qualified majorities to be overturned. The authors analyze veto procedures in eighteen Latin American countries and argue that amendatory veto power significantly increases presidential weight in legislative decision making.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , April 2005 , pp. 396 - 420
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2005

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References

1 Hammond, Thomas H. and Miller, Gary J., “The Core of the Constitution,” American Political Science Review 81 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cameron, Charles M., Veto Bargaining (New York: Cambridge University Press 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krehbiel, Keith, Pivotal Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cameron, Charles M. and McCarty, Nolan, “Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining,” Annual Review of Political Science 7 (June 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 McCarty, Nolan and Poole, Keith T., Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11, no. 2 (1995)Google Scholar. Spitzer, Robert J., The Presidential Veto: Touchstone of the American Presidency (Albany: SUNY Press 1988)Google Scholar.

3 Shugart, Matthew S. and Carey, John M., Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Metcalf, Lee Kendall, Measuring Presidential Power, Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 5 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Tsebehs, George, The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter, American Political Science Review 88, no. 1 (1994)Google Scholar.

5 Londregan argues: “Subject only to the proposal germaneness constraint, the president's veto powers enable him to present proposals in the form of ‘observations,’ which must be considered under a closed rule. Thus, even in policy areas not reserved by the Constitution for presidential initiatives, the president can make ‘take it or leave it’ offers to Congress.” See Londregan, John B., Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), 98–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 See, for instance, Shugart and Carey (fn. 3); Shugart, Matthew S. and Haggard, Stephan, “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems,” in Haggard, Stephan and McCubbins, Mathew D., eds., Presidents, Parliaments and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press 2001)Google Scholar; Payne, Mark J., , Daniel Zovatto G., Florez, Fernando Carrillo, and Zavala, Andres Allamand, Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 2002)Google Scholar. These works classify presidents according to their constitutional prerogatives, but none give any weight to the power to make amendatory observations.

7 Jones, Mark P., Legislative Behavior and Executive-Legislative Relations in Latin America, Latin America Research Review 37, no. 3 (2002)Google Scholar.

8 Tsebelis (fn. 4).

9 For Guatemala, see constitutional articles 178 and 179; for the Dominican Republic, see constitutional articles 41 and 42; for Honduras, see constitutional articles 216–18.

10 In Guatemala the president has fifteen days to return a vetoed bill and Congress (unicameral) has thirty days to reach an override vote with two-thirds of the total membership. In Honduras the president has ten days to return a vetoed bill and Congress (unicameral) can override with two-thirds of votes (no deadline specified). The Honduran president cannot veto the budget bill. The Dominican Republic's president has eight or three days to return vetoed bills, depending on the urgency given by the chamber, and a two-thirds vote of the membership of each chamber is required to override the executive veto.

11 For Colombia, see constitutional articles 165–69 and the internal rules of Congress spelled out in Law 5 of 1992 articles 197–200; for Paraguay, see constitutional articles 205–209; for Panama, see constitutional articles 162–165 and the internal rules of the Legislative Assembly articles 205 and 206.

12 In Colombia the president has up to twenty days to exercise his veto, in Paraguay twelve days, and in Panama thirty days. The Colombian Congress meets to discuss only the objected portions.

13 For Argentina, see constitutional articles 80–83; for Brazil, see constitutional article 66; and Marcelo Lessas Bastos, “Considerações sobre o Veto Presidencial aos Projetos de Lei,” Working Paper Series (Faculdade de Dereito de Campos, Brazil, August 2000).

14 The veto has to be exercised within ten days of congressional passage in Argentina and within fifteen days in Brazil.

15 For Nicaragua, see constitutional articles 142 and 143 and the internal rules of the National Assembly spelled out in Law 122 of 1991 article 58; for Venezuela, see constitutional article 214; for Peru, see constitutional article 108 and the internal rules of Congress articles 79 and 80; and for El Salvador, see constitutional article 137.

16 The presidents of Peru and Nicaragua have fifteen days after a bill has passed to exercise a veto; the president of Venezuela has ten days and the president of El Salvador has eight days.

17 For Bolivia, see constitutional articles 76–78; for Costa Rica, see constitutional articles 126–28 and the internal rules of the Legislative Assembly articles 181–83; for Mexico, see constitutional article 72; and see Eric Magar and Jeffrey Weldon, “The Paradox of the Veto in Mexico (1917–1997)” (Paper prepared for presentation at the 23rd International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C., September 6–8,2001).

18 All three countries give the president ten days to issue a veto and none impose a congressional deadline. The Costa Rican president cannot veto the budget.

19 For Chile, see constitutional articles 70 and 117, the Organic Constitutional Law of Congress of 1990 articles 32–36, the internal rules for the Chamber of Deputies articles 167–72 and for the Senate articles 187 and 188, and personal communication with Carlos Carmona and Patricio Navia.

20 For Uruguay, see constitutional articles 137–40, and personal communication with Juan Andres Moraes; for Ecuador, see constitutional articles 152 and 153, and personal communication with An-dres Mejia Acosta.

21 Both presidents have ten days to veto legislation passed by Congress.

22 Shugart and Carey (fn. 3), 136.

23 Shugart and Haggard (fn. 6).

24 Shugart and Carey (fn. 3); Shugart and Haggard (fn. 6); Payne et al. (fn. 6).

25 As noted before. Congress needs a vote of ≥ 3/5 of members of each chamber in a joint session (fifty-fine deputies and eighteen senators) to override a presidential observation.

26 During the debate, the opposition Frente Amplio expressed further support for other five presidential changes not discussed in committee (114,185, 319, 354, and 546–47).

27 Newspaper El Mundo, San Salvador, October 18, and November 8,2002.

28 For instance, former comptroller and PCN leader Cruz Zepeda was forced to step down as head of the NAO on 1989 amid accusations of corruption.

29 The composition of the National Assembly at this time was as follows: ARENA 28 deputies, PCN 16 deputies, CDU 5 deputies, PDC 5 deputies, and FMLN 31 deputies. The president belongs to the ARENA party, which has a minority of members. An informal coalition between the rightist ARENA and PCN and the Christian Democrats of the PDC has led to mutually agreed upon rotating directive for the Assembly.

30 Newspaper El Diario de Hoy, San Salvador, September 28, 2002.

31 Newspaper ha Prensa Grdfica, San Salvador, October 19,2002.

32 Trade bloc that includes Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay.

33 The economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, lashed out at legislators for overriding these changes, accusing them of falling prey to the lobby of industrialists and Argentine pharmaceuticals (that is, UTA and CILFA).