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Practitioners' Views of International Negotiation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Gilbert R. Winham
Gilbert R. Winham
Affiliation:
Dalhousie University
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Abstract

A Checklist for Negotiators, produced during a study session on negotiation in the State Department's Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy, highlights certain changes that are occurring in the diplomatic function. First, practitioners make a distinction between the internal (or domestic) and external aspects of negotiation, which reflects a growing politicization of the diplomatic function and an increasing trend toward a mediatorial model of diplomacy. Second, practitioners emphasize managerial rather than strategic concerns, which is consistent with the large, complex problems that foreign offices are increasingly facing. Third, practitioners attach more importance to issues and substantive information than to personality or sociological variables. This is a reflection of the increasing scope, and resulting anonymity, of international diplomatic processes. These three points introduce new concerns into the theoretical literature on international negotiation.

Type
Research Notes
Information
World Politics , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , October 1979 , pp. 111 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1979

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References

1 The Senior Seminar is conducted by the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State. It is a ten-month program that has been conducted annually since 1958. It is described by the Foreign Service Institute as “the most advanced training program available to selected senior grade officials of United States Government agencies with foreign affairs responsibilities.” The 19th Seminar (1976–77) consisted of 26 members.

2 Kaufmann, , The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1960).Google Scholar

3 Simon, , Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Maying in Administrative Organization (New York: Macmillan 1945), 3.Google Scholar

4 Brown, , “The Art of Negotiation,” Foreign Service Journal, XLV (July 1968), 14–17.Google Scholar

5 The Checklist did not provide a definition of negotiation, nor was this fact discussed at the Seminar.

6 Nicolson, , Diplomacy (3rd ed.; London: Oxford University Press 1963), 2–3.Google Scholar

7 For example, see Douglas, Ann, “The Peaceful Settlement of Industrial and Inter-group Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (No. 1, 1957), 69–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Recent examples of this literature would include the following essays or edited volumes: Sawyer, Jack and Guetzkow, Harold, “Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations,” in Kelman, Herbert C., ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1966), 464–520Google Scholar; Druckman, Daniel, Human Factors in International Negotiations: Social Psychological Aspects of International Conflict (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1973)Google Scholar; Zartman, I. William, ed., The 50% Solution (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press 1976)Google Scholar; Druckman, Daniel, Negotiations: Social Psychological Aspects of International Conflict (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1977)Google Scholar; anc’ final'y the special volume (ed. by Zartman, I. William) on negotiation of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, XXI (No. 4, 1977).Google Scholar

9 The article continues, “When you are negotiating for the United States with other governments, this normally involves a whole series of preliminary negotiations inside the United States Government. … The techniques that you use in negotiating with your American colleagues within the Government, or the Congress, or indeed the public, are the same as those you use abroad.” Brown, (fn. 4), 14.Google Scholar

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11 Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1973)Google Scholar; Garthoff, Raymond, “Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT,” International Security, 1 (Spring 1977), 3–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 See Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).Google Scholar

13 For example, the assumption underlies Thomas C. Schelling's analysis of conflict. See The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press 1963).

14 For example, Deutsch, Morton and Krauss, R. M., “Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (No. 1, 1962), 52–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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18 For example, Spector, Bertram, “Negotiation as a Psychological Process,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, XXI (No. 4, 1977), 607–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 For example, Otomar Bartos, “Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of View,” Ibid., 565–80.

20 For example, Jensen, Lloyd, “Soviet-American Bargaining Behavior in the Post-War Disarmament Negotiations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, VII (No. 4, 1973), 522–41.Google Scholar

21 See, for example, Tedeschi, James, “Threats and Promises,” in Swingle, Paul, ed., The Structure of Conflict (New York: Academic Press 1970).Google Scholar

22 A notable exception is the work of Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, which is now coming to have a (deservedly) important influence on the literature in international negotiation: A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiation (New York: McGraw-Hill 1965). Another exception is the recent article by Druckman, Daniel, “Boundary Role Conflict: Negotiation as a Dual Responsiveness,” journal of Conflict Resolution, XXI (No. 4, 1977), 639–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 It should be noted that the importance of internal negotiation is probably determined by the subject of the negotiation, and by the domestic processes in the negotiating states. Thus, one would expect internal negotiation to be more important in the United States when bargaining over international trade (since Congress is involved) than over monetary affairs; generally, one would expect a more intense internal negotiation in a large, pluralist state like the United States than in a small, homogeneous country like Denmark.

24 For example, Kissinger, Henry A., in A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, and Restoration oj Peace 1812–1822 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 1957)Google Scholar, appreciates Met-ternich's skill in maximizing his position within the constraints of his ruler's wishes, as well as within the limitations imposed by the structure of domestic politics.

25 Zartman's decision-making approach is one exception to this generalization. See Zartman, I. William, “Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, XXI (No. 4, 1977), 619–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 For example, Hamner, W. Clay and Yukl, Gary, “The Effectiveness of Different Offer Strategies in Bargaining,” in Druckman, Negotiations … (in. 8), 137–60.Google Scholar

27 Bartos, Otomar, “Concession-Making in Experimental Negotiations,” in Berger, J., et al., Sociological Theories in Action (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 1966).Google Scholar

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29 Ramberg, Bennett, “Tactical Advantages of Opening Positioning Strategies: Lessons from the Seabed Arms Control Talks 1967–1970,” journal of Conflict Resolution, XXI (No. 4, 1977), 685–700.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30 See esp. Brown, (fn. 4), 15.Google Scholar

31 One senior practitioner at the Senior Seminar stated simply, “In negotiation, I'm still not prepared for the surprises.”

32 One senior practitioner commented about preparatory work: “This is the most difficult part of the whole process … it is harrowing, more than you realize, and it can be very long.”

33 Kissinger has stated tersely: “Today, reality is more complex.” Speech by Secretary of State Kissinger, Henry A., “The Future of America's Foreign Policy,” Chicago, Ill., July 6, 1976.Google Scholar However, not all negotiating situations are equally complex, and conse quently the scope for the application of strategy can also vary. It may be argued that a small state with a less complex diplomacy is more able than a large state to employ strategic calculation in negotiation. Canadian negotiators, for example, appeared to be motivated by an overall strategy in the negotiation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.

34 For a discussion of structural uncertainty, see Steinbruner, John, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974).Google Scholar

35 Sawyer, and Guetzkow, (fn. 8), 501.Google Scholar

36 See Callières, Francois de, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, trans, by Whyte, A. F. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press 1963).Google Scholar See also Nicolson (fn. 6).

37 Young, Kenneth, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists (New York: McGraw-Hill 1968).Google Scholar

38 Mushakoji, Kinhide, “The Strategies of Negotiation: An American-Japanese Comparison,” in LaPonce, Jean and Smoker, Paul, eds., Experimentation and Simulation in Political Science (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1972).Google Scholar

39 See Margaret Hermann and Nathan Kogan, “Effects of Negotiators’ Personalities on Negotiating Behavior,” in Druckman, Negotiations … (fn. 8).

40 Ibid., 247.

41 See Hopmann, P. Terrence and Walcott, Charles, “The Impact of International Conflict and Detente on Bargaining in Arms Control Negotiations: An Experimental Analysis,” International Interaction, 11 (No. 2, 1976), 189–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

42 For example, Bert Brown, “Face-Saving and Face-Restoration in Negotiation,” in Druckman, Negotiations … (fn. 8).

43 Brown, (fn. 5), 14.Google Scholar

44 Practitioners are not consistent on this point. By way of comparison, one should note the statement of Ambassador Christopher Pinto of Sri Lanka: “The potential of the individual personality at the (Law of the Sea) Conference to construct or destroy, cannot be overstated.” Speech, “The Oceans: National Interest and Global Perspective,” delivered before the Colloquium sponsored by the Canadian Group of the Trilateral Commission, Halifax, January 21, 1976.

45 See Druckman, , Human Factors … (fn. 8), 72.Google Scholar

46 Davis, Lynn and Schilling, Warner, “All You Ever Wanted to Know About MIRV and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared to Ask,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, XVII (No. 2, 1973), 207–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

47 Hoffman, Stanley, “No Choice, No Illusions,” Foreign Policy, No. 25 (Winter 1976–1977), 97–140, at 102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

48 Ibid., 131–32.

49 Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America, ed. by Bradley, Phillips (New York: Knopf 1945), 1, 234.Google Scholar

50 Personal interview.

51 Kissinger, , “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” in Kissinger, , American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York: Norton 1969), 32Google Scholar; originally published in Daedalus, Vol. 95 (Spring 1966).

52 This observation is supported by a news story on the SALT 11 negotiation, which describes the Carter Administration as caught in a three-cornered situation: “‘the man in the middle between the Russians and the Senate,’ as a White House official put it.” Smith, Hedrick, “Three-Cornered Arms Talk,” New York Times, April 14, 1979, p. 2.Google Scholar

53 Hughes, , “Carter and the Management of Contradictions,” Foreign Policy, No. 31 (Summer 1978), 34–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

54 Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., “Organizing for Global Environmental and Resource Interdependence,” Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1975), 46.Google Scholar

55 Kissinger, , “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in Kissinger (fn. 51), 95.Google Scholar

56 For a case study of the relationship between negotiators and domestic constituents, see Winham, , “Bureaucratic Politics and Canadian Trade Negotiation,” International Journal, XXXIV (Winter 1978/1979), 64–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57 Rapoport, , N-Person Game Theory: Concepts and Application (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1970).Google Scholar See esp. chap. 10, “N-Person Theory and Two-Person Theory Compared.”

58 Walton and McKersie (fn. 22); see esp. Part 11, “Dilemmas of Intraorganizational Bargaining.”

59 E.g., I. M. Destler's recent article on the Panama Treaties offers an excellent analysis of the difficulty of managing the conflicting demands of an internal and external negotiation. See “Treaty Troubles: Versailles in Reverse,” Foreign Policy, No. 33 (Winter 1978–79), 45–65.