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Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Jacob Viner
Jacob Viner
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Princeton University
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In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries economic thought and practice were predominantly carried on within the framework of that body of ideas which was later to be called “mercantilism.” Although there has been almost no systematic investigation of the relationship in mercantilist thought between economic and political objectives or ends in the field of foreign policy, certain stereotypes have become so prevalent that few scholars have seriously questioned or examined their validity. One of these stereotypes is that mercantilism was a “system of power,” that is, that “power” was for mercantilists the sole or overwhelmingly preponderant end of foreign policy, and that wealth, or “plenty,” was valued solely or mainly as a necessary means to attaining or retaining or exercising power. It is the purpose of this paper to examine in the light of the available evidence the validity of this interpretation of mercantilist thought and practice. Tracing the history of ideas, however, always runs to many words, and limitations of space force me to confine myself, even with respect to bibliographical references, to samples of the various types of relevant evidence. That the samples are fair ones I can only attest by my readiness in most cases to expand them indefinitely.

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Research Article
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World Politics , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , October 1948 , pp. 1 - 29
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Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1948

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References

1 I suspect, nevertheless, that it is highly questionable. The economic unification of the nation-state appears mostly to have occurred before the advent of mercantilism, as in England, or after its decay, as in France, Spain, Russia, Switzerland, Italy, the United States, or the British Dominions, if the national unification of tariffs or other significant criteria are applied. Even Colbert promoted regional as well as national self-sufficiency. As Bonn, Moritz has commented (Journal of Political Economy, LIV [1946], 474)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, “A parochialist like Gustav Schmoller naturally deduced his impressions of mercantilism from the policies of primitive Prussia.”

2 Zur Geschichte der Handelsbilanztheorie, Berlin, 1880, Ch. 2, “Die Beziehungen der Theorie der Handelsbilanz zur Theorie des politischen Gleichgewichtes.” The claim for priority is on p. 43. This chapter is a pioneer and valid demonstration of the existence of a close relationship between mercantilist balance-of-trade and balance-of-power theorizing and policy, but there is not a trace of valid demonstration in it that wealth considerations were made wholly subservient to power considerations.

3 See his Umrisse und Untersuchungen, Leipzig, 1898, especially Ch. I, “Das Merkantil-system in seiner historischen Bedeutung,” pp. 42–60; see also “Die englische Handelspolitik des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts,” in Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebrung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft, XX (1899), 1211–1241. Brie, F., Imperialistische Strömungen in der Englischen Literatur, 2nd ed., Halle, 1928, p. 68Google Scholar, characterizes English mercantilism of the eighteenth century, along Schmollerian lines, as “kaufmännisch gefärbte Imperialismus.”

4 Richelieu als merkantilistischer Wirtsckaftspolitiker und der Begriff des Staatsmerkantilismus, Jena, 1929, pp. 198ff.

5 Cf., for contradiction with the view that power was the predominant objective, The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times, Vol. II, In Modern Times, Part I, Cambridge, 1903, p. 459: “From the Revolution till the revolt of the colonies, the regulation of commerce was considered, not so much with reference to other elements of national power, or even in its bearing on revenue, but chiefly with a view to the promotion of industry.” Cf. also, The Wisdom of the Wise, Cambridge, 1906: “In the pre-scientific days the end which men of affairs kept in view, when debating economic affairs, was clearly understood; the political power of the realm was the object they put before them, …” (p.21) “We recognize [today] that the defense of the realm is essential to welfare, but we are no longer so much concerned about building up the power of the country, or so ready to engage in aggressive wars for the sake of commercial advantages, as Englishmen were in the eighteenth century.” (p. 22) The italics are mine. The contradiction the italicized words seem to indicate may not be real, since Cunningham may have had in mind that the “commercial advantages” were sought for the sake of their contribution to British power, but such exposition, ambiguous, if not contradictory, is so common in the literature that it provides of itself a justification for an article such as the present one.

6 In a review of Cunningham's, Growth of English Industry and Commerce in The Economic Journal, II (1892), 696.Google Scholar Cunningham, in a reply to Hewins and other reviewers, ibid., IV (1894), 508–16, permitted this interpretation of his position to pass without comment, although it must have been obvious to him that Hewins regarded it as a reductio ad absurdum.

7 Mercantilism, translated by Mendel Shapiro, 2 vols., London, 1935, II, 13–52.

8 Ibid., II.

9 Ibid., II, 16.

10 Ibid., 11, 47.

11 “Revisions in Economic History, V, Mercantilism,” The Economic History Review, VII (1936), 48. The foreign policy implications of the nineteenth century economics, I believe, need investigation as much as do the aims of mercantilism. Until such investigation is systematically made, comparisons with mercantilism are liable to be misleading with respect to the true position of both bodies of doctrine.

12 Mercantilism, II, 16.

13 Cf. the following passage in his famous “Mémoire au Roi sur les Finances” of 1670: “Il est certain, Sire, que Vostre Majesté … a dans son esprit et dans toute sa nature la guerre par préférence à toute autre chose … Vostre Majesté pense plus dix fois à la guerre qu'elle ne pense à ses finances.” Lettres Instructions et Mémoires de Colbert, P. Clément, ed., Paris, 1870, VII, 252. This long memoir is a plea to the king to look to his economic policy, including economic warfare, as an essential instrument for attaining his ends. Even in the case of Louis XIV, himself, it is easy to show from his writings that the prosperity of his people, while no doubt inexcusably underemphasized, was a matter of some concern to him for its own sake.

14 “Dissertation sur la question quelle des deux alliances de France ou de Hollande peut estre plus avantageuse à l'Angleterre,” March, 1669. Lettres, VI, 261. A letter of Colbert to Louis XIV in 1681 contains the following passage: “Ce qu'il y a de plus important, et sur quoi il y a plus de réflexions à faire, c'est la misére trés-grande des peuples.” Dareste de la Chavanne, C., Histoire de I'Administration en France, Paris, 1848, II, 258.Google Scholar

15 See Lipson, Ephraim, The Economic History of England, Vols. II–III, “The Age of Mercantilism,” 3rd edition, London, 1943.Google Scholar

16 Lau, Theodor Ludwig, Atifrichtiger Vorschlag, 1719Google Scholar, as reported in Focke, Walther, Die Lehrmeinungen der Kameralisten ülber den Handel, Erlangen (dissertation), 1926, p. 59.Google Scholar

17 Wealth of Nations, Cannan, ed., I, 457–58.

18 The citation from D'Aucour in the text is made from a reprint extracted from Carnandet, J., Le Trésor des Pièces Rares … de la Champagne, Paris, 1863–1866.Google Scholar D'Aucour was a tutor of Colbert's son. Palm, F. C., The Economic Policies of Richelieu, Urbana, 1920, pp. 178–79Google Scholar, quotes from an earlier Ode à … Richelieu, in much the same vein by Jean de Chapelain (1595–1624), which similarly stresses power and plenty.

19 Traicté de I'ceconomie politique [1615], Funck-Brentano, Th. ed., Paris, 1889, p. 11.Google Scholar

20 Cited from Ch. Vialart dit Paul, St., Histoire du Ministère d'Armand … Duc de Richelieu, Paris, 1650, I, 332.Google Scholar

21 Natural and Political Observations made upon the Bills of Mortality [London, 1662], Johns Hopkins University Reprint, Baltimore, 1939, p. 7.

22 The Present State of Christendom, and the Interest of England, with a Regard to France [1677], in The Harleian Miscellany, London, 1808, 1, 249.

23 As cited in Mercator, or Commerce Retrieved, No. 1, London, May 26, 1713.

24 Cited in Graham, G. S., Sea Power and British North America 1783–1820, Cambridge Mass., 1941, p. 143.Google Scholar

25 The Northern Crisis; or Impartial Reflections on the Policies of the Czar [London, 1716], as reprinted in Marx, Karl, Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, London, 1899, p. 32.Google Scholar

26 Survey of Trade, 2nd ed., London, 1719, Dedication, pp. iv–v.

27 The Fable of the Bees [6th ed., 1732], Kaye, F. B. ed., Oxford, 1924, I, 185.Google Scholar

28 Considerations on the Policy, Commerce and Circumstances of the Kingdom, London, 1771, as quoted in the preface to Graham, G. S., British Policy and Canada, 1774–1791, London, 1930.Google Scholar

29 Mémoircs du Comte de Maurepas, Paris, 1792, III, 195.

30 Wealth of Nations, Cannan ed., I, 351.

31 Mercator's Letters on Portugal and its Commerce, London, 1754, p. 5. The italics are not in the original text.

32 Heckscher refers to this as “a very characteristic passage” (Mercantilism, II, 16), but I find it difficult to cite a duplicate, whether from Bacon's writings or in the period generally. See also Heckscher, , “Revisions in Economic History, V, Mercantilism,” Economic History Review, VII (1936), 48Google Scholar : “I think Cunningham was right in stressing the famous saying of Bacon about Henry VII: ‘bowing the ancient policy of this Estate from consideration of plenty to consideration of power.’”

33 See The Works of Francis Bacon, Spedding, James, ed., London, 1858, VI, 95–96Google Scholar; 172–73. Cf. also Considerations touching a War with Spain [1624], in The Works of Francis Bacon, Philadelphia, 1852, II, 214, where he says that: “whereas wars are generally causes of poverty or consumption … this war with Spain, if it be made by sea, is like t o be a lucrative and restorative war. So that, if we go roundly on at the first, the war in continuance will find itself.” On the other hand, in his Essays or Counsels [2nd ed., 1625], Works, London, 1858, VI, 450–51, he makes what appears to be a clear-cut statement that the prestige of power (“grandeur”) is more important than plenty.

34 Barker, J. E., Rise and Decline of the Netherlands, London, 1906, p. 194.Google Scholar

35 Child, Josiah, A Treatise concerning the East India Trade, London, 1681, p. 29.Google Scholar

36 Ibid., A New Discourse of Trade, 4th ed. (ca. 1690), Preface, p. xliii.

37 Yarranton, Andrew, England's Improvement by Sea and Land, London, 1677, p. 6.Google Scholar

38 Lord Haversham in the House of Lords, November 6, 1707, Parliamentary History of England, VI, 598. Cf. also Whiston, James, A Discourse of the Decay of Trade, London, 1693, p. 3:Google Scholar

“For, since the introduction of the new artillery of powder guns, &c., and the discovery of the wealth of the Indies, &c. war is become rather an expense of money than men, and success attends those that can most and longest spend money: whence it is that prince's armies in Europe are become more proportionable to their purses than to the number of their people; so that it uncontrollably follows that a foreign trade managed to the best advantage, will make our nation so strong and rich, that we may command the trade of the world, the riches of it, and consequently the world itself… Neither will the pursuing these proposals, augment the nation's wealth and power only, but that wealth and power will also preserve our trade and religion, they mutually working for the preservation of each other…”

39 Bolingbroke, Lord, “The Idea of a Patriot King,” in Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism, London, 1752, pp. 204, 211.Google Scholar

40 Petit, a colleague of the French Foreign Minister, Choiseul, in 1762, as cited by Daubigny, E., Choiseul et la France a“Outre-Mer après le Traité de Paris, Paris, 1892, p. 176.Google Scholar

41 The Old Colonial System, 1600–1754, New York, 1912, I, 16.

42 Silberner, Edmond, La Guerre dans la Pensée Économique du XVIe au XVIIIe Siècle, Paris, 1939Google Scholar, concentrates on the search for attitudes toward war, idealizing or pacific, rather than on the motivations of foreign policy, but it presents a rich collection of extracts from the contemporary literature which in so far as it is pertinent to the present issue is, I believe, wholly confirmatory of my thesis. Cf. also, by the same author, The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought, Princeton, 1946, p. 286: “In the protectionist view, there is a reciprocal action between the economic and war: industrialization facilitates the conduct of war, and military victories increase the possibilities of industrialization and of economic prosperity. This point of view recalls that of the mercantilists: wealth increases power, and power augments wealth.” The thesis presented in the text above is also supported not only by the title but by the contents, if I understand his Italian aright, of Mazzei's, Jacopo article, “Potenza Mezzo di Ricchezza e Ricchezza Mezzo di Potenza nel Pensiero dei Mercantilist,” Rivista Internazionalt di Scienze Sociali, XLI (1933), 3–18.Google Scholar

43 “Correspondentie van Robert Dudley Graaf van Leycester,” Part II, Werken uitgiven door het Historisch Genootschap, Utrecht, 3rd Series, No. 57 (1931), pp. 239, 240.

44 The Diary of the Late George Bubb Dodington, new ed., London, 1784, pp. 344–45.

45 [Knox, William], Helps to a Right Decision, London, 1787, p. 35Google Scholar; cf. also a slightly different version in Letters Military and Political from the Italian of Count A. Algorotti, Dublin, 1784, p. 129. The hats were involved, of course, because beaver skins were the main prize of the American fur trade, and the hair from these skins was the basic raw material for the men's hats of the time.

46 Cited in Mélanges d'histoire offerts à M. Charles Bímont, Paris, 1913, p. 655.

47 The Contest in America between Great Britain and France, London, 1757, Introduction, p. xvii. Cf. also A Letter to a certain Foreign Minister, in which the grounds of the present war are truly stated, London, 1745, p. 6: “That we receive great benefits from trade, that trade is a national concern, and that we ought to resent any attempt made to lessen or to injure it, are truths well known and out of dispute, yet sure the British people are not to be treated like a company of merchants, or rather pedlars, who, if they are permitted to sell their goods, are to think themselves well off, whatever treatment they may receive in any Other respect. No, surely, the British nation has other great concerns besides their trade, and as she will never sacrifice it, so she will never endure any insult in respect to them, without resenting it as becomes a people jealous of their honour, and punctual in the performance of their engagements.”

The occasion for this outburst was a Prussian “rescript” insisting that Britain should not intervene in quarrels between German states, since they had nothing to do with British commerce.

48 The Works of Sir Francis Bacon, Philadelphia, 1852, II, 193–99.

49 The Diplomatic Correspondence of the Right Hon. Richard Hill, London, 1845, I, 479; see also II, 751.

50 Cited by Crankshaw, Edward, Russia and Britain, New York, no date (ca. 1943), pp. 45–46.Google Scholar

51 Montesquieu, , De I'Esprit des Lois, Book XX, Ch. 7.Google Scholar

52 Oeuvres Économiques et Philosophiques de F. Quesnay, Auguste Oncken, ed., Paris, 1888, p. 429. Quesnay is referring here specially to Britain's policy with respect to the trade of the colonies. Adam Smith's comment on the monopolistic aspects of this policy was more acid: “To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers.” Wealth of Nations, Cannan, ed., II, 114.

53 English Historical Review, CLIII (1924), 287. There is not space here to elaborate on this theme, but reference to one striking instance will serve to bring out the nature of the evidence available. In the 1740's, during the War of the Austrian Succession, English marine insurance companies insured French vessels against capture at sea by the British navy, and Parliament, after protracted debate, refused to make the practice illegal. Cf.: Parliamentary History (Cobbett, ed.), XII, 7–26 (for 1741); [Corbyn Morris], Essay towards Illustrating the Science of Insurance, particularly whether it be Nationally Advantageous to Insure Ships of our Enemies, London, 1747; Richmond, Admiral H. W., The Navy in the War of 1739–48, Cambridge, England, 1920, III, 248–250Google Scholar; C. Ernest Fayle, “The Deflection of Strategy by Commerce in the Eighteenth Century,” and ibid., “Economic Pressure in the War of 1739–48,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, LXVIII (1923), 281– 294, 434–446; Wright, Charles and Ernest Fayle, C., A History of Lloyds, London, 1928, pp. 80 ff.Google Scholar

54 Cited by Powicke, F. M., “The Economic Motive in Politics,” Economic History Review XVI (1946), 91.Google Scholar

55 Jal, A., Abraham Du Quesne et la Marine de son Temps, Paris, 1883, I, 470.Google Scholar

56 Parliamentary History of England, XV (1813), 1271–1272 (for December 9, 1762). For similar views as to the propriety of a country like Holland confining her foreign policy to commercial matters and to defense, without attempting to participate otherwise in Haute Politique, see the instructions prepared in 1771 by the French foreign office for the French Ambassador to Holland, , Recueil des Instructions Données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France, XXIII, Paris, 1924, 308.Google Scholar

For the comments of the Anglophile Prince of Orange in the course of his attempts to keep Holland neutral during the War of the American Revolution, which proved unsuccessful because of both pressure from France and the financial ambitions of the commercial classes in Holland, see Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau, 5th Series, Kramer, F. J. L., ed., Leyde, 1910, I, 607 ffGoogle Scholar, 618, 635 ff., 677 ff., et passim.

57 The Works of George Lord Lyttelton, G. E. Ayscough, ed., 3rd ed., London, 1776, III, 243–44.

58 An instance in point is in a despatch by Louis X IV to his ambassador in London, in 1668: “Si les Anglais voulaient se contenter d'etre les plus grand marchands de l'Europe, et me laisser pour mon partage ce que je pourrais conquérir dans une juste guerre, rien ne serait si aisé que de nous accommoder ensemble.” Cited by Picavet, C.-G., La Diplomatic Française au Temps de Louis XIV, Paris, 1930, p. 171.Google Scholar

About a century later, in 1772, George III of England, alarmed by the coalition of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to partition Poland, expressed sympathy for t he idea of an alliance between Britain and France despite their traditional enmity: “Commerce the foundation of a marine can never flourish in an absolute monarchy; therefore that branch of grandeur ought to be left to England whilst the great army kept by France gives her a natural pre-eminence on t he Continent.” (SirFortescue, John, ed., The Correspondence of King George the Third, London, 1927, II, 428–429.)Google Scholar

59 For representative contemporary evidence in support of these points, see: Mémams de Louis XIV, Jean Longnon, ed., Paris, 1927, p. 73; a proclamation of Louis XIV reprinted in Bondois, P. M., “Colbert et 1'industrie de la dentelle,” Mémoires et Documents pour Servir à I'Histoire du Commerce et de I'Industrie en France, VI (1921), 263Google Scholar; Vauban, “Description Géographique de l'Éilection de Vézeley” [1696], in de Boislisle, A., Mémoires des Intendants sur I'État des Géneralités, Paris, 1881, I, 738–49Google Scholar; Lacour-Goyet, G., L'Éducation Politique de Louis XIV, 2nd ed., Paris, 1923, pp. 341 ff.Google Scholar For reconsiderations of the traditional views by modern historians, see Jal, A., Abraham du Quesne et la Marine de son Temps, Paris, 1883, II, 352–53Google Scholar; Muret, P. (a book review), Revue d'Histoire Moderne, IV (1902–1903), 39–43Google Scholar; Hitier, J., “La Doctrine de l'Absolutisme,” Anndes de I'Université de Grenoble, XV (1903), 106–113Google Scholar, 121–31; Normand, Charles, La Bourgeoisie Française au XVIIe Siècle, 1604–1661, Paris, 1908, pp. 195Google Scholar, 279–287; Hauser, Henri, La Pensée et U Action Économique du Cardinal de Richelieu, Paris, 1944, pp. 185 ff.Google Scholar; Dun, Philip, “The Right of Taxation in the Political Theory of the French Religious Wars,” Journal of Modern History, XVII (1945), 289–303.Google Scholar

60 Frederick the Great did recognize, however, at least in principle and in his better moments, that the economic well-being of his people should be one of the major objectives of a monarch. See his “Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement et sur les Devoirs des Souverains,” of which he had printed a few copies only in 1777, Oeuvres, IX (1848), 195–210.

61 To a letter from Louis XIII in 1629 proposing closer commercial relations, Czar Michel Federowitz of Russia replied favorably, but complained about the manner in which he had been addressed: “Mais nous ne savons à quoi attribuer que notre nom, nos titres et nos qualités aient été oubliés à la lettre que vous nous avez écrit. Tous les potentats de la terre… écrivant à notre grande puissance, mettre notre nom sur les lettres et n'oublient ancun des titres et des qualités que nous possédons. Nous ne pouvons approuver votre coutume de vouloir être notre ami, et de nous dénier et ôter les titres que le Dieu tout-puissant nous a donnés et que nous possédons si justement. Que sí, à l'avenir, vous désirez vivre en bonne amitié et parfaite correspondance avec notre grande puissance, en sorte que nos royales personnes et nos empires joint ensemble donnent de la terreur á tout l'univers, il faudra que vous commandiez qu'aux lettres que vous nous récrirez à l'avenir toute la dignité de nostre grande puissance, notre nom, nos titres et nos qualités soient érits comme elles sont en cette lettre que nous vous envoyons de notre part. Nous vous ferons le semblable en écrivant tous vos titres et toutes vos qualités dans les lettres que nous vous manderons, etant le propre des amis d'augmenter plutôt réciproquement leurs titres et qualités que de les diminuer ou retrancher.” Recueil des Instructions, VIII (1890), 29.

62 de Flassan, G. de R., Histoire Générale et Raisonnée de la Diplomatie Française, 2nd ed., Paris, 1811, II, 396.Google Scholar

In 1713 Charles XII of Sweden wrote to Queen Anne demanding that England, in conformity with her treaty obligations, give him assistance in regaining his territories in the Germanic Empire. “It was not possible,” he said, “that Anne could allow her mind to be influenced by the sordid interests of trade; the protectress of the Protestant religion could not fail to support the Protestant power of the north,” as against Russia. But Russia at the time was seeking admittance into the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV, and England, alarmed at the ambitions of both monarchs, made no choice. See MrsCollyer, D'Arcy, “Notes on the Diplomatic Correspondence between England and Russia in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, New Series, XIV (1900), 146 ff.Google Scholar

63 Cromwell's Policy in its Economic Aspects,” Political Science Quarterly, XVII (1902), 46–47.Google Scholar

64 Cf. Morley, John, Oliver Cromwell, New York, 1901, p. 434Google Scholar; Jones, Guernsey, The Diplomatic Relations between Cromwell and Charles X. Gustavus of Sweden, Lincoln, Neb., 1897, pp. 34–35Google Scholar; Strong, Frank, “The Causes of Cromwell's West Indian Expedition,” American Historical Review, IV (1899), 245Google Scholar; PAshley, M., Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Republic, Oxford, 1934Google Scholar; [Slingsby Bethel], The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell [1668], in The Harleian Miscellany, London, 1810, VII, 356–57.

I have not been able to find any systematic or comprehensive study of the role of the religious factor in power politics. The following references are a fair sample of the material bearing on this which I have come across: Geley, Leon, Fancan et la Politique de Richelieu de 1617 à 1627, Paris, 1884, pp. 264–290Google Scholar; “Discours sur ce qui peut sembler estre plus expedient, & à moyenner au sujet des guerres entre l'Empereur & le Palatin,” [1621], in Recueil de Quelques Discours Politiques, no place given, 1632, pp. 314 ff; Eckhardt, C. C., The Papacy and World Affairs as Reflected in the Secularization of Politics, Chicago, 1937, p. 89Google Scholar; Rojdestvensky, S. and Lubimenko, Inna, Contribution à I'Histoire des Relations Commerciales Franco-Russes au XVIIIe Siécle, Paris, 1929, p. 4Google Scholar; Mèmoires de Noailles, Paris, 1777, I 126; Cheruel, , “Le Baron Charles D'Avangour Ambassadeur de France en Suède” 1654–1657, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, III (1889), 529Google Scholar; [Jean Rousset de Missy], The History of Cardinal Alberoni, London, 1719, p. 105; ELingelbach, W., “The Doctrine and Practice of Intervention in Europe,” Annals of the American Academy, XVI (1900), 17Google Scholar, note; “Les Principes Généraux de la Guerre,” Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand, XXVIII (Berlin, 1856), 50; Picavet, C.-G., La Diplomatic Francaise au Temps de Louis XIV, Paris, 1930, pp. 8, 160–166Google Scholar; Pagès, Georges, La Monarchic d'Ancien Régime en France, Paris, 1928, pp. 67 ff.Google Scholar

65 “International Relations between State-Controlled National Economies,” American Economic Review Supplement, XXXIV (1944), 324.

66 Mara, Karl, Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, Aveling, Eleanor Marx, ed., London, 1899, pp. 55–56.Google Scholar The italics are in the original.