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The Power of Positive Sanctions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

David A. Baldwin
David A. Baldwin
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College
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Extract

Political science has made valuable contributions to the progressive clarification of the concept of power since World War II. In view of the attention political scientists have traditionally lavished on the concept of power, it seems fitting that they should help clarify it. Thanks to the efforts of such men as Harold Lasswell and Robert Dahl, many political scientists today are keenly aware of the need to define power in relational terms, to distinguish power relations from power resources, to specify scope, weight, domain, and so on. There is, however, one distinction that is rarely considered by political scientists—that between positive and negative sanctions. The purpose of this paper is to clarify this distinction and show how and why it matters.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , October 1971 , pp. 19 - 38
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1971

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References

1 Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society (New Haven 1950)Google Scholar; Dahl, Robert A., “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, II (July 1957), 201–15Google Scholar. For a bibliography of the more important contributions to the literature on power see Dahl, Robert A., “Power,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XII (New York 1968), 414–15Google Scholar.

2 Although the primary focus of this discussion is political science, other social science disciplines have also underemphasized positive sanctions. The recent International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, for example, contains an index entry for “threat” but none for “promise” and an article on “punishment” but none on “reward.” See also Tedeschi, James T., “Threats and Promises,” in Swingle, Paul, ed., The Structure of Conflict (New York 1970), 155–91Google Scholar.

3 Dahl, Robert A., Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963), 51Google Scholar.

4 This group includes Easton, David, The Political System (New York 1953), 143–44Google Scholar; McFarland, Andrew S., Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems (Stanford 1969), 13–14Google Scholar; and Garvey, Gerald, “The Domain of Politics,” Western Political Quarterly, xxin (March 1970), 120–37Google Scholar. In the second edition of Modern Political Analysis, Dahl joins this group: Dahl, Robert A., Modern Political Analysis, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970), 32–33Google Scholar.

5 Parsons, Talcott, “On the Concept of Political Power,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, cvn (June 1963), 232–62Google Scholar.

6 Blau, Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York 1964)Google Scholar.

7 Ibid., 115.

8 Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by Henderson, A. M. and Parsons, Talcott, and edited with an introduction by Parsons, Talcott (New York 1947), pp. 152–57Google Scholar.

9 Dahl (fn. 3), 50–51.

10 Harsanyi, John C., “Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games,” Behavioral Science, vn (January 1962), 67–80Google Scholar. Throughout this paper, A refers to the actor exerting or attempting to exert power, and B refers to the actor over whom A is exerting or attempting to exert power.

11 Kenneth E. Boulding appears to take this position in Conflict and Defense (New York 1962), 253–58Google Scholar.

12 Dahl, “Power” (fn. 1), 414.

13 Deutsch, Karl W., The Nerves of Government (New York 1963), pp. 120–21Google Scholar; italics added.

14 Oppenheim, Felix E., Dimensions of Freedom (New York 1961), 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S., “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,” American Political Science Review, LVII (September 1963), 634Google Scholar.

16 Ibid., 636.

17 Ibid., 634.

18 Dahl, Robert A. and Lindblom, Charles E., Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York 1953), 106Google Scholar.

19 Dahl (fn. 3), 51. In the second edition of Modern Political Analysis (fn. 4), p. 32, Dahl abandons this interpretation and returns to his previous position. N o explanation is offered; nor is there any indication that Dahl recognizes the contradictory nature of Lasswell and Kaplan's discussion. The second edition of Modern Political Analysis gives even less attention to positive sanctions than the first edition—a seeming impossibility. Compare Modern Political Analysis (1963), pp. 50–51 with Modern Political Analysis (1970), pp. 32–33.

20 Cf., French, John R. P. Jr. and Raven, Bertram, “The Bases of Social Power,” in Cartwright, Dorwin, ed., Studies in Social Power (Ann Arbor 1959), 158Google Scholar.

21 The concept of the baseline is drawn from Blau (fn. 6), 116.

22 Bachrach and Baratz (fn. 15), 640–41.

23 Dahl (fn. 3), 50–51; italics added.

24 Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), 195–99Google Scholar; and Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence (New Haven 1966), 69–91Google Scholar.

25 Schelling (fn. 24), Strategy of Conflict, 196; and Arms and Influence, 70.

26 Following Harsanyi, we leave open the possibility that influence attempts may take other forms, including unconditional rewards or punishments (see fn. 10, 71).

27 Schelling (fn. 24), 134.

28 Ibid., 131–34.

29 In Arms and Influence (p. 74) Schelling apparently uses the term “assurance” in this way.

30 Cf. McNeil, Elton B., “Psychology and Aggression,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, iii (September 1959), 203Google Scholar; and Boulding, Kenneth E., “Towards a Pure Theory of Threat Systems,” American Economic Review, LIII (May 1963), 426Google Scholar.

31 Harsanyi (fn. 10), 69.

32 Cartwright, Dorwin, “Influence, Leadership, Control,” in March, James, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago 1965), 4Google Scholar.

33 Cf. Milburn, Thomas W., “What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, III (June 1959), 139Google Scholar; and Skinner, B. F., Science and Human Behavior (New York 1953), 182–93Google Scholar.

34 The asymmetry between positive and negative sanctions has been noted by Boulding (fn. 30), 428; and Parsons (fn. 5), 239.

35 Schelling (fn. 24), Strategy of Conflict, 177.

36 This assumes that other things remain equal. Two especially important assumptions are that cost varies directly with the risk of implementation and that the credibility of a threat or promise is not affected by its size. Although either of these assumptions is questionable in other contexts, they do not seem to be directly related to differentiating between positive and negative sanctions.

37 Schelling (fn. 24), Strategy of Conflict, 177.

38 Cf. Deutsch, Karl W., The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1968), 17–18Google Scholar.

39 See, for example, Boulding (fn. 30), 426.

40 Cf. Deutsch (fn. 38), 26–27.

41 Cf. Deutsch (fn. 13), 212–13; Edwards, Ward, “Utility, Subjective Probability, Their Interaction and Variance Preferences,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vi (March 1962), 42–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jervis, Robert, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics, xx (April 1968), 454–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Singer, J. David, “Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model,” American Political Science Review, LVII (June 1963), 426Google Scholar.

42 This point has been noted by Parsons, Talcott, “Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process,” in Eckstein, Harry, ed., Internal War (New York 1964), 51–53Google Scholar.

43 There is probably a tendency to overestimate the importance of threats relative to promises in underworld politics also.

44 For an example of explicit association of negative sanctions and deterrence, see Talcott Parsons (fn. 5), 239–40. Less explicit examples are Blau (fn. 6), 116–17; Snyder, Glenn H., “Deterrence and Power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, iv (June 1960), 163–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brody, Richard A., “Deterrence,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, IV (New York 1968), 130–32Google Scholar; Schelling (fn. 24). Schelling implies the association between threats and deterrence by the scant attention he gives to promises relative to threats. The association is also implied in observations such as the following: “It is a paradox of deterrence that in threatening to hurt somebody if he misbehaves, it need not make a critical difference how much it would hurt you too— if you can make him believe the threat.” (Arms and Influence, p. 36.) This is not true of attempts to deter that are based on positive sanctions. It is true of all influence attempts based on conditional use of negative sanctions—regardless of whether such attempts seek to deter or compel. Thus the paradox should be called a paradox of negative sanctions, not a paradox of deterrence. A few writers have attempted to link positive sanctions with deterrence policies: See Milburn (fn. 33), 138–45; Lieberman, E. James, “Threat and Assurance in the Conduct of Conflict,” in Fisher, Roger, ed., International Conflict and Behavioral Science (New York 1964), 110–22Google Scholar; and Frank, Jerome D., Sanity and Survival (New York 1967), 162–63Google Scholar.

45 Parsons (fn. 5), 239–40.

46 Deutsch (fn. 38), 26–27.

47 Singer (fn. 41), 429.

48 Cartwright (fn. 32), 33–34; French and Raven (fn. 20), pp. 156–57.

49 Cartwright (fn. 32), 15. On the importance of B's perceptions of A's motives see also Tedeschi (fn. 2), and Kelley, H. H., “Attribution Theory in Social Psychology,” in Levine, D., ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Lincoln 1967), 192–238Google Scholar.

50 On the “scar effect” see Cartwright (fn. 32), 35–36; French and Raven (fn. 20), 156–58; Deutsch, Morton, “Trust and Suspicion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11 (December 1958), 265–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; John R. Raser, “Learning and Affect in International Politics,” Journal of Peace Research, No. 3 (1965), 216–26; and Raven, Bertram H. and Kruglanski, Arie H., “Conflict and Power,” in Swingle, Paul, ed., The Structure of Conflict (New York 1970), 69–109Google Scholar.

51 French and Raven (fn. 20), 156–60; Dahl and Lindblom (fn. 18), 107–108.

52 Cartwright (fn. 32), 13–15.

53 No attempt to cite this vast literature will be made here. For interesting starting points and further references see Blau (fn. 6), 224–27; Froman, Lewis A. Jr. and Cohen, Michael D., “Threats and Bargaining Efficiency,” Behavioral Science, xiv (March 1969), 147–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Skinner (fn. 33), 182–93; Tedeschi (fn. 2), 162–91; Kelman, Herbert C., “Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, II (March 1958), 51–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ring, Kenneth and Kelley, Harold H., “A Comparison of Augmentation and Reduction as Modes of Influence,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXVI (February 1963), 95–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For one of the few attempts by a political scientist to comment on the asymmetrical effectiveness of positive and negative sanctions, see Sullivan, Denis G., “Towards an Inventory of Major Propositions Contained in Contemporary Textbooks in International Relations” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1963), pp. 127–40Google Scholar.

54 This paragraph draws on Dahl and Lindblom (fn. 18), 108.

55 Homans, George C., Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (London 1961), 57Google Scholar. Cf. Sullivan (fn. 53), 267–71.

56 Boulding (fn. 30), 432.

57 Dahl and Lindblom (fn. 18), 107–108; Ring and Kelley (fn. 53), 95–102; Thibaut, John W. and Kelley, Harold H., The Social Psychology of Groups (New York 1959), 105Google Scholar, 242–44. Thibaut and Kelley argue that A need not monitor B's activities at all when using positive sanctions, since B can be counted on to present evidence of compliance to A if A is using promises and not threats. This is carrying the argument too far. Consider first the possibility that B may comply with A's demands, yet fail to present A with evidence of compliance for any or all of the following reasons: (1) incompetence; (2) misperception of A's intentions and/or of the degree of his own compliance; (3) reluctance to incur the costs of gathering such evidence. Since the credibility of his future promises to C, D, E, and F is affected by the way A appears to treat B, A may not want to allow B's compliance to go unrewarded no matter how incompetent or reluctant B is to present evidence of compliance. Consider also the possibility that B may present A with falsified evidence of compliance. Without a surveillance system of his own, A will have no way of checking up on B's honesty. Although positive sanctions present A with less difficult surveillance problems, they do not do away with such problems altogether.

58 Cf. Galtung, Johan, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, xrx (April 1967), 380Google Scholar.

59 For a concurring opinion that social scientists have said little about the role of positive sanctions in politics, see Ibid., 414; and Galtung, “On the Meaning of Nonviolence,” Journal of Peace Research, No. 3 (1965), 239–42.

60 Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. I) , 75.

61 See , Harold and Sprout, Margaret, Foundations of International Politics (Princeton 1962), 141Google Scholar.

62 Harsanyi (fn. 10), 69.

63 Gaining (fn. 59), 242. Cf. Skinner (fn. 33), 345–46; and Fisher, Roger, International Conflict for Beginners (New York 1969)Google Scholar.