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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
One of the factors in world politics which social scientists are beginning to subject to systematic analysis is that of elite behavior in international relations. While hypotheses about elite behavior appear to be not only essential to, but also implicit in, any formulation of foreign policy, it still requires to be demonstrated whether research of this order has any operational utility. Clearly, many students in this field have not articulated their assumptions about the conduct of elite groups in foreign affairs; it is often doubted that hypotheses based upon intensive investigation of the doctrine of elites and their cultural matrices have any bearing on the analyses usually pursued in the study of international relations.
1 The Operational Code of the Politburo, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1951.
2 However, I do not want to imply that at the time these statements were made the errors of The Economist were significantly larger than, for example, those of comparable leaders of American opinion. Also, I do not want to imply that the statements from The Economist quoted below are representative, with regard to their truth value, of all the statements made on Soviet foreign policy by The Economist during that period. For the purposes of this paper, the cases where the past estimates of The Economist diverge from history and from my own present estimates are often the most useful ones.