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Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Benjamin J. Cohen
Benjamin J. Cohen
Affiliation:
University of California
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Abstract

Of all the many changes of the world economy since World War II, few have been nearly so dramatic as the resurrection of global finance. A review of five recent books suggests considerable diversity of opinion concerning both the causes and the consequences of financial globalization, leaving much room for further research. Competing historical interpretations, stressing the contrasting roles of market forces and government policies, need to be reexamined for dynamic linkages among the variables they identify. Likewise, impacts on state policy at both the macro and micro levels should be explored more systematically to understand not just whether constraints may be imposed on governments but also how and under what conditions, and what policymakers can do about them. Finally, questions are also raised about implications for the underlying paradigm conventionally used for the study of international political economy and international relations more generally.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , January 1996 , pp. 268 - 296
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1996

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References

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