Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2011
The article contends that personal networks may facilitate state-building efforts under postrevolutionary conditions. With the breakdown of formal political structures, personal networks provide an informal social structure along which information may be exchanged, resources may be allocated, and collaborative activities may be planned. To demonstrate this argument, the article returns to the case of Soviet Russia. Using newly available archival sources, the case study shows how informal personal networks intersected with formal political organizations to develop a capacity for territorial administration in the decade following the civil war. The article concludes by suggesting answers to larger questions concerning the success of Soviet state building, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet state, and the implications for comparative state-building theory.
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David Knoke has distinguished between “influence” networks, in which information is exchanged among relatively equal members, and “domination” networks, in which scarce goods are controlled in unequal relationships. See Knoke, , Political Networks: The Structural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 11–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Personal networks in postrevolutionary Soviet Russia exhibited elements of both types of networks.
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51 The central leadership refers to full and candidate members of the politburo, the main policymaking organ, and the secretariat, the organizational head of the territorial party apparatus. Regional leaders refers to individuals who worked for at least two years in a particular region during the civil war (1918–21) and/or the postwar political consolidation (1920–23).
52 A network tie is determined by two criteria: (1) evidence of a working relationship (two or more years) in at least one of three milieus (prerevolutionary underground, civil war, postwar consolidation); and/or (2) evidence of friendship or family relationship. Below are the source materials used to determine the informal ties of the regional leadership listed in Figure 1. They include personal correspondence, memoirs, and biographies; RTsKhlDNI refers to the Russian Center for the Preservation and Investigation of Documents of Recent History.
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—L. Kartvelishvili: RTsKhlDNI, f. 80, op. 29,1. 1; f. 124, op. 1, d. 835,11. 16–17.
—M. Khataevich: RTsKhlDNI, f. 124, op. 1, d. 2043,11. 2–6;
Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 6 (1963), 98–101.
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—M. Orakhelashvili: RTsKhlDNI, f. 85, op. 11, d. 28,11.1–4;
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—V. Shubrikov: Izvestiia TsKKPSS, no. 12 (1989), p. 112.
—I. Vareikis: RTsKhlDNI, f. 124, op. 1, 302,11. 1–5; Lappo, D., Iuozac Vareikis (Voronezh: Tsentral'no-chernozemone izdatel'stvo, 1989)Google Scholar.
53 Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 1 (1965), 101–4.
54 The archival sources are from the former Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, which has been renamed the Russian Center for the Preservation and Investigation of Documents of Recent History (RTsKhlDNI).
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58 For Kirov, see RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 4, d. 44,11.1–4; d. 94,11. 2–4; op. 5, d. 13,11.1–4; d. 20,1. 1; d. 25,1. 1.; op. 85, op. 11, d. 8,11. 1–7. For Kvirikeli, see RTsKhlDNI, f. 85, op. 11, d. 13,11. 3–18; d. 14,11. 1–3; d. 19,11. 1, 2; d. 34,11. 2–7. For Gikalo, see RTsKhlDNI, f. 85, op. 11, d. 28,11. l-4jd.34.il. 1–5; d. 59,11. 1,2.
59 For the coordination of military and political tasks, see RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 15, d. 57, 1.1; d. 61,1.1; d. 71,11.1,2; d. 103,1.1. For the placement of network members in positions of power, see RTsKhlDNI, f. 85, op. 15, d. 182,11. 4–9; d. 243,1.1; d. 246,11.1–5.
60 RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 22, d. 11,11. 3–7; 15,11.1–10.
61 RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), £ 80, op. 3, d. 20,11.1–8.
62 RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 24, d. 261,1.1.
63 RTsKhlDNI, (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 3, d. 15,11.1, 4; f. 80, op. 4, d. 7,11. 3–7.
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65 Pravda, June 10, 1963.
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69 See the remarks of politburo member Lazar Kaganovich delivered to the Sixteenth Party Congress in the summer of 1930. XVI s'ezd vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoipartii (b): stenograficheskii otchet (Sixteenth congress of the all-union Communist Party (b): Stenographic report) (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1935), 156Google Scholar.
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73 RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 27, d. 308,11. 5–52; f. 85, op. 1, d. 317,11. 1–17; f. 85, op. 27, d. 321,11.1–9.
74 RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 25, d. 11,11.1–14; op. 26, d. 40,11.1–5.
75 RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 12, d. 29,1.1.
76 RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 15, d. 45,1.1.
77 See, respectively, RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 10, d. 42,1.1; op. 12, d. 22,11.1,2; op. 13, d. 16, 1.1.
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81 RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 15, d. 45,1.1; op. 17, d. 58,1. 1. 82.
82 RTsKhlDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 17, d. 55,1. 1; op. 18, d. 103,11.1,2; op. 18. d. 105,1. 1.
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