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The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: A Preliminary Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Samuel S. Kim
Samuel S. Kim
Affiliation:
Monmouth College
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After having suffered from the self-inflicted wounds of internal convulsions and diplomatic isolation during the Cultural Revolution, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has returned to the world diplomatic scene with a new, vigorous, and imaginative foreign policy. To appreciate its dimensions fully, one must recall that China's foreign policy was left largely unprotected from the disruptive spillovers of the domestic quarrels during the Cultural Revolution. The Red Guards not only sacked the British chancery in Peking, but also seized their own Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1967. By November 1967, forty-four out of forty-five ambassadors were called home for “rectification,” leaving the durable Huang Hua in Cairo as the PRC's sole representative abroad. China's trade also suffered; by the end of September 1967, Peking had been involved in disputes of varying intensity with some thirty-two nations. However, the transition from revolutionary turmoil to pragmatic reconstruction came through a series of decisions made by Mao Tse-tung and his close advisors beginning in late July 1968 and culminating at the First Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress held in April 1969, ushering in a new era in Chinese foreign policy. toward the United Nations may be characterized as one of “love me or leave me, but don't leave me alone,” evolving through the stages of naive optimism, frustration, disenchantment, anger, and lingering envy and hope, the PRC's support of the principles of the United Nations Charter had remained largely unaffected from 1945 to 1964. However, the Indonesian withdrawal on January 7, 1965, triggered off a process of negative polemics against the United Nations. Indeed, Peking's bill of complaints against the United Nations was broad and sweeping: that blind faith in the United Nations had to be stopped because the organization was by no means sacred and inviolable; that by committing sins of commission and omission, the United Nations had become an adjunct of the U.S. State Department; that the United Nations had become a channel for United States economic and cultural penetration into Asian, African, and Latin American countries; and that the United Nations in the final analysis was a paper tiger.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , April 1974 , pp. 299 - 330
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1974

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References

1 The literature on Peking's posture toward the United Nations is extremely uneven. Most studies on the subject are not only outmoded now, but they also approach the subject from the vantage point of die United States or of die United Nations. For a representative sample of writings on die subject, see the following: Bloom-field, Lincoln P., “China, the United States, and die United Nations,” International Organization, XX (Autumn 1966), 653–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chai, Winberg, “China and the United Nations: Problems of Representation and Alternatives,” Asian Survey, x (May 1970), 397–409CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ch'iu, Hungdah, “The United Nations,” in Leng, Shao-chuan and Ch'iu, Hungdah, eds., Law in Chinese Foreign Policy: Communist China and Selected Problems of International Law (New York 1972), 195–242Google Scholar; Ch'iu, Hungdah and Edwards, R. R., “Communist China's Attitude Toward die United Nations: A Legal Analysis,” The American Journal of International Law, LXII (January 1968), 20–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dai, Poelin, “Canada and the Two-China Formula at the United Nations,” Canadian Yearbook of International Law, v (1967), 217–28Google Scholar; Edwards, R. R., “The Attitude of the People's Republic of China Toward International Law and the United Nations,” Papers on China, XVII (December 1963), 235-71Google Scholar; A. M. Halpern, “China, the United Nations, and Beyond,”China Quarterly, No. 10 (April-June 1962), 72-77; McDougal, Myres S. and Goodman, Richard M., “Chinese Participation in the United Nations,” The American Journal of International Law, LX (October 1966), 671–727CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rejai, Mastafa, “Communist China and the United Nations,” Orbis, ix (Fall 1966), 823–38Google Scholar; Schick, F. B., “The Question of China in the United Nations,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, XII (October 1963), 1232–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weng, Byron S., “Communist China's Changing Attitudes Toward the United Nations,” International Organization, xx (Autumn 1966), 677–704CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and Change (New York 1972).

2 However, the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the League of Nations was very negative, as evidenced by a telegram of die Chinese Soviet Government (dated October 6, 1932) signed by Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying, and Chang Kuo-t'ao: “The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic long ago told the popular masses of the whole country diat the League of Nations is a League of Robbers by which the various imperialisms are dismembering China. The principal task of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry sent to China by the League was to prepare the dismemberment of China and the repression of all the revolutionary movements that have raised the flag of the Chinese Soviets.” Cited in Schram, Stuart R., The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York 1963), 266-67Google Scholar. In contrast, note the following statement made by Mao Tse-tung on April 24, 1945: “The Chinese Communist Party fully agrees with die proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and die decisions of die Crimea conference on the establishment of an organization to safeguard international peace and security after die war. It welcomes the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. It has appointed its own representative on China's delegation to this conference in order to express the will of the Chinese people.” Selected Worths of Mao Tse-tung (Peking 1965), III, 306-07. For numerous references to the principles of the UN Charter in the PRC's bilateral treaties in the 1950's and early 1960's, see Hsiung, James C., Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations (New York 1972), 89–90Google Scholar.

3 See the Chinese Government's statement issued on January 10, 1965 in Peking Review [hereafter cited as PR], No. 3 (January 15, 1965), 5-6, and the January 10, 1965 editorial of Jen-min Jih-pao, ibid., 7-9.

4 Ibid., 8–9.

5 The PRC's last statement on the United Nations before Indonesia's withdrawal was contained in Premier Chou En-lai's reports on the work of the government, delivered at the first session of the Third National People's Congress on December 21-22, 1964, which stated that “unless the United Nations expels the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and restores China's legitimate rights in their entirety, we will have absolutely nothing to do with the United Nations.” See PR, No. 1 (January I, 1965), 19. In contrast, Lin Piao's celebrated programmatic statement, “Long Live the Victory of People's War!” published on September 3, 1965, failed to mention the United Nations. This shows the decisive impact of Indonesia's withdrawal on the evolution of the PRC's attitude toward the United Nations.

6 These new demands were spelled out by Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi in his press conference of September 29, 1965, in Peking. See PR, No. 41 (October 8, 1965), 11-12. That these new demands were presented to rationalize the PRC's non-interest in the United Nations is indicated by Ch'en Yi's statement made at the same press conference: “During the U.S. war of aggression against Korea, the United Nations adopted a resolution naming China as an aggressor. How can China be expected to take part in an international organization which calls her an aggressor? Calling China an aggressor and then asking the aggressor to join would not the United Nations be slapping its own face?”

7 PR, No. 42 (October 15, 1965), 11.

8 PR, No. 50 (December 8, 1967), 21.

9 The return of the PRC's ambassadors began in mid-May 1969, shortly after the end of the Ninth Party Congress.

10 Peking Review, which had been suffering for many years from a paucity of statistical and empirical data, compiled and proudly presented these figures for 1971 in an annual review of events of 1971. See PR, No. 1 (January 7, 1972), 21.

11 Some American specialists argued that Peking's objective to gain its UN seat had top priority, ranking above the improvement of relations with the United States; Secretary-General U Thant observed the complementary process between Peking's strategies toward the United States and the United Nations in a statement issued on July 16, 1971, which stated: “It seems that the chances for a solution of the question of the representation of China at the next session of the General Assembly are brighter in the light of the announcements in the United States and Peking last night.” New York Times, January 24, 1972; UN Monthly Chronicle, VIII (August-September 1971), 68.

12 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1970,” Unclassified Research Study, RECS-15 (September 22, 1971), 1-2.

13 New York Times, November 7, 1971.

14 Such predictions have not been confined to the members of The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China. Even prominent scholars foretold numerous disruptive consequences of “Communist China's” participation in the United Nations system. See Bloomfield (fn. 1), passim; McDougal and Goodman (fn. 1), passim.

15 Note, for example, Bloomfield's assertion in 1966: “It should be assumed that Chinese Communists, although doubtless confined to the Headquarters district, will, like the Soviets, use any opportunity for espionage.” Bloomfield (fn. 1), 664.

16 The data on the backgrounds of the Chinese delegates are drawn from Klein, Donald W., “The Men and Institutions Behind China's Foreign Policy,” in Mac-Farquhar, Roderick, ed., Sino-American Relations, 1949–71 (New York 1972), 43–56Google Scholar; Klein, Donald W. and Clark, Anne B., Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass. 1971)Google Scholar; and Who's Who in Communist China, 1 vols. (Hong Kong 1966).

17 The composition of the members of Peking's delegation to the 26th General Assembly was as follows: 1 chairman, 1 vice chairman, 3 representatives, 5 alternative representatives, 18 secretaries, 11 attaches, 2 diplomatic couriers, 9 staff members, and 2 correspondents. There was a slight change in the composition of the PRC delegation to the 27th General Assembly because of the appointment of Hsiung Hsiang-hui as Ambassador to Mexico. The delegation was composed of Ch'iao Kuan-hua (chairman), Huang Hua (vice chairman), Ch'en Ch'u, Wang Jun-sheng, and Pi Chi-lung.

18 Donald W. Klein, cited in the New York Times, November 3, 1971.

19 After having studied China's practice of treaty compliance, one writer concluded: “Although she charged invasions of her sovereignty by Indian reconnaissance planes which flew well into Chinese airspace, the CPR is not known to have sent reconnaissance planes over the territory of any other country, not even during her disputes with India.” See Hsiung (fn. 2), 317-18.

20 On this point, see Bloomfield (fn. 1), 664: “Having survived the early years of Soviet obstructionism, the Secretariat, it may be argued, is perhaps not in real danger from the Chinese. But there will be disruption whatever happens, whether from the need to create new positions or the displacement of the 50-odd present Chinese officials that is sure to be demanded by Peking. Above all, the Chinese Communists sent to work in the U N will be charged widi a mission reflecting the fanatical world view of their masters. Th e absorption of large numbers of indoctrinated Chinese Communists can only have a disruptive and stultifying effect on the Secretariat.”

21 Shortly after the General Assembly voted the PRC in, one European ambassador in Peking was told that the Chinese would not force the issue of “Chinese” citizens on the U N Secretariat staff. See the New York Times, October 29, 1971. For the bull session conducted by Ch'en Ch'u with 17 “Chinese” interpreters in January 1972, see ibid., January 24, 1972.

22 See PR, No. 15 (April 14, 1972), 4; UN Monthly Chronicle, IX (May 1972), 51.

23 New York Times, November 3, 1971.

24 One exception occurred on May 11, 1972, when Huang Hu a sent a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, in which he attacked President Nixon's blockade and mining measures in Vietnam. However, Huang Hua's action was a response to the request by United States Ambassador Bush to the President of the Security Council that President Nixon's announcement of May 8th, which attempted to justify the new American measures, be circulated as a Security Council document. See PR, No. 20 (May 19, 1972), 7.

25 U N Doc. A/AC. 109/396. See also UN Monthly Chronicle, IX (July 1972), 36.

26 However, the PRC has asked the UN to stop the economic aid under the UNDP that goes to the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan as well as assistance extended by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to “Tibetan refugees” and “Chinese refugees” in Hong Kong and Macao. See PR, No. 31 (August 4, 1972), 18; New York Times, January 15, 1972.

27 New York. Times, April 21, 1972. See also Chien Cho-po's statement before the Economic Committee of ECOSOC in May 1972 to the same effect: PR, No. 23 (June 9, 1972), 18.

28 Bloomfield had argued: “One has only to recall the bitter Soviet attacks on both Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjold toward the end of the tenure of both to appreciate the excruciating difficulties involved in getting agreement on their successors without China—and on Mr. Thant's replacement with China, if that is the prospect for 1971.” Bloomfield (fn. I), 663; emphasis in original.

29 PR, No. 35 (September i, 1972), 9.

30 Specifically, Huang Hua cited Article 118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, which stipulated: “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” The Security Council resolution referred to was adopted on December 21, 1971, by a vote of 13 in favor, none against, and 2 abstentions (Poland and the USSR), and demanded, inter alia, that a durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict be observed between India and Pakistan. The General Assembly resolution was adopted by a vote of 104 in favor, 11 against, with 10 abstentions, and called, inter alia, upon India and Pakistan to take all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces to their respective territories. UN Security Council, Official Records, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1971, 11; UN Office of Public Information, Resolutions of the General Assembly at Its Twenty-Sixth Regular Session, 21 September-22 December 1971 (Press Release GA/4548, 28 December 1971), 1, 17-19. For numerous speeches Huang Hua made in the United Nations and elaborate legal arguments advanced by the PRC government, see PR, No. 33 (August 18, 1972), 12-13, No. 35 (September 1, 1972), 5-9, No. 40 (October 6, 1972), 29, and No. 49 (December 8, 1972), 9-12.

31 Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of May 9, 1971, reprinted in PR, No. 20 (May 14, 1971), 7. The 1971 New Year editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao flatly declared: “At no time will China ever behave like a superpower, neither today nor in die future.” PR, No. 1 (January I, 1971), 9.

32 PR, No. 47 (November 19, 1971), 8.

33 China was absent when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2847 (XXXVI), but Chinese representative Wang Jun-sheng declared in his speech before the plenary meeting of the 53rd session of ECOSOC, on July 6, 1972, that “China supports the enlargement of the membership of this council, so that more countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America can participate in its work.” See PR, No. 28 (July 14, 1972), 17. As of December 31, 1972, 46 member states had ratified the Amendment to Article 61 of the Charter. This Amendment will become effective after it has been ratified by two-thirds of the UN member states, including the Big Five. See UN Monthly Chronicle, x (January 1973), 103.

34 General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI) of December 16, 1971, and General Assembly Resolution 2992 (XXVII) of December 15, 1972.

35 For Peking's policy toward Latin America, see Ernst Halperin, “Peking and the Latin American Communists,” China Quarterly, No. 29 (January-March 1967), III-54 ; Johnson, Cecil, Communist China and Latin America, 1959–67 (New York 1970)Google Scholar, and “China and Latin America: New Ties and Tactics,” Problems of Communism, XXI (July-August 1972), 53-66.

36 PR, No. 47 (November 24, 1972), 7.

37 See below, p. 325.

* The site of the Conference has since been changed to Caracas, Venezuela.

38 In a general policy statement delivered at a special meeting of the Security Council held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on January 31, 1972, Huang Hua reiterated the five principles of China's policy toward Africa: “(1) support the African peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and to win and safe-guard national independence; (2) support the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the governments of the African countries; (3) support the desire of the African peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice; (4) support the African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultation; and (5) hold that the sovereignty of African countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarters should be opposed.” PR, No. 6 (February 11, 1972), 16-17. See also Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei's letter entitled, “China's Position on Racial Discrimination in Some Areas of Africa,” addressed to the Secretary-General on January 27, 1972, ibid., No. 5 (February 4, 1972), 14-15.

39 Security Council Resolution 308 (1972) of January 19, 1972.

40 New York Times, November 21, 1971.

41 Excerpts from the official record of Moto Goto's interview with Chou En-lai appear in the New York Times, November 9, 1971. John Stewart Service, who interviewed Chou En-lai on October 27, 1971, said to a reporter: “I have the impression that they [the Chinese] don't plan to cut any wide swathe. They probably will approach it all very moderately for the time being.” Ibid., October 29, 1971.

42 New York Times, November 17, 1971.

43 UN Monthly Chronicle, IX (June 1972), 58.

44 UN Monthly Chronicle, VIII (December 1971), 148, and IX (November 1972), 12. On numerous occasions, the PRC delegates stated that they were newcomers and had to acquaint themselves with the background of the issue under discussion before they could take a firm stand. To cite one example, PRC representative Ch'en Ch'u stated at the October 20, 1972, meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly: “The PRC did not participate in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [in the past], and it still has to acquaint itself with and study the information and issues relevant to the peaceful uses of outer space. The Chinese Government reserves its right to make comments and take action on related matters in the future.” PR, No. 43 (October 27, 1972), 4, 21.

45 Chou Hua-min's policy speech, “China's Principled Stand on Relations of International Economy and Trade,” delivered on April 20, 1972, at the third session of UNCTAD. PR, No. 17 (April 28, 1972), 12.

46 Wang Jun-sheng, July 6, 1972, Plenary Meeting of the 53rd session of ECOSOC. PR, No. 28 (July 14, 1972), 17.

47 Wang Jun-sheng went on to say: “In per capita terms, the level attained by China's productive forces is still very low. China is a comparatively poor developing country. We must learn modestly from the merits of other peoples, overcome our shortcomings and strive unremittingly for our goal.” Ibid.

48 Ibid., 15-17.

49 For comparison, see “Eight Principles for China's Aid to Foreign Countries,” PR, No. 17 (April 28, 1972), 15.

50 PR, No. 28 (July 14, 1972), 17.

51 Wang Jun-sheng also stated in his ECOSOC speech: “China's economy is still comparatively backward at present, and the support we give to the people of the world is mainly political and moral, while the material aid we can provide is yet scanty. W e are determined to change this situation in which our ability falls short of our wish, and with the advance of China's socialist construction, strive to make greater contributions to mankind.” Ibid.

52 Note the following statement in Ch'iao Kuan-hua's first major speech in the 26th session of the General Assembly: “Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, we, the Chinese people, defying the tight imperialist blockades and withstanding the terrific pressure from without, have built our country into a socialist state with initial prosperity by maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and through self-reliance.” PR, No. 47 (November 19, 1971), 6.

53 Yang Hsin and Ch'en Chien, “Chieh-lu ho p'i-p'an ti-kuo-chu-yi-cheh kuan-yü kuo-chia chu-ch'uan wen-t'i te miu-lum” [Expose and Censure the Imperialists' Fallacy Concerning the Question of State Sovereignty], Cheng-fa yen-chiu, No. 4 (November 1964), 6; cited in Ch'iu (fn. I), 197.

54 The “no-hegemony clause” in the Nixon-Chou Joint Communique reads: “Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony”; the clause in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement reads: “Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” For the complete texts of both communiques, see PR, No. 9 (March 3, 1972), 4-5, and No. 40 (October 6, 1972), 12-13. It is also interesting to note that the PRC supports the enlargement of the Common Market in Europe because it “will constitute a serious obstacle to the United States and the Soviet Union in pushing their policies for hegemony in Europe.” PR, No. 27 (July 2, 1971), 36.

55 For numerous statements on the UN's functional activities or organs, see PR, No. 17 (April 28, 1972), 12-14, No. 23 (June 9, 1972), 17-18, No. 24 (June 16, 1972), 5-6, 8, 13, No. 25 (June 23, 1972) 9-10, and No. 42 (October 20, 1972), 11-12.

56 PR, No. 33 (August 18, 1972), 13.

57 PR, No. 42 (October 20, 1972), 11.

58 PR, No. 13 (March 28, 1969), 23. For additional statements on this point, see also No. 21 (May 23, 1969), 20-22, No. 22 (May 30, 1969), 14, and Special Issue (April 28, 1969), 27.

59 See Hsiung (fn. 2), 72-88.

60 Kuo Ch'un, Lien-ho kuo [The United Nations] (Peking 1956), 15; cited in Ch'iu (fn. I), 238.

61 UN Monthly Chronicle, IX (February 1972), 21.

62 General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) of November 3, 1950.

63 Survey of China Mainland Press, No . 1412, November 16, 1956, 22.

64 Security Council Resolution 303 (1971) of December 6, 1971.

65 General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI) of December 7, 1971.

66 PR, No. 40 (October 6, 1972), 29.

67 Kuo Ch'un (fn. 60), 101.

68 Security Council Resolution 305 (1971) of December 13, 1971, and Security Council Resolution 315 (1972) of June 15, 1972. See also Table V.

69 See Hsiung (fn. 2), 103.

70 To cite a further example in support of this thesis, in 1970 (just prior to Canadian recognition of the PRC), China conducted more than three-fourths of her foreign trade with nations not having diplomatic relations with Peking.

71 The PRC presented, as an amicus curiae argument, excerpts from an article by John Gittings, “Scramble for Oil in East China Sea,” published in the British newspaper Guardian on December 18, 1970, in which Gittings argued for the sovereign rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf “to a depth of 200 metres or beyond that limit to where the depth of the waters admits of the exploitation of natural resources.” PR, No. 2 (January 8, 1971), 15-16; see also No. 1 (January 1, 1971), 22.

72 New York, Times, October 28, 1971, and October 10, 1972; UN Monthly Chronicle, IX (October 1972), 64.

73 General Assembly Resolution 3049 C (XXVII) of December 19, 1972.

74 See a declaration to this effect in PR, No. 52 (December 29, 1972), 18.

75 New York. Times, October 10, 1972.

76 According to one study, “[Nationalist] China has been the largest single debtor and has usually been responsible for over three-quarters of the total arrears.” John G. Stoessinger, “Financing the United Nations,” International Conciliation, No. 535 (November 1961), 12.

77 New York, Times, November 17, 1971.

78 See Hsiung (fn. 2), 24-25, 241, 243.

79 The 1972 New Year's Day editorial of Jen-min Jih-pao, in PR, No. I (January 7, 1972), 8-9. This editorial provides a lucid exposition of the PRC's perception of the international system today. It states, inter alia: “Never before had there been a situation in which medium and small countries were able to play such an inspiring role in the United Nations through their joint efforts, the voice of justice was able to prevail to such an extent, and the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were so isolated. The changes in the United Nations are a vivid reflection of the excellent international situation.”