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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
THE year 1960 saw the first major open break in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Beginning with the Hongqi (Red Flag) articles of April 1 and 15, and receiving a quietus only after the November conference of 81 Communist parties in Moscow, the divergent views of the two Communist partners were laid bare to public view. Western observers have been virtually overwhelmed by this windfall of fascinating material, and speculation as to its meaning has been rampant.
1 Donald Zagoria's article, “Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” in the May-June 1960 issue of Problems of Communism gives a good summary of the background of the dispute.
2 Chao-li, Yu, “Imperialism—Source of War in Modern Times—and the Path of the People's Struggle for Peace,” Hongqi (Peking), April 1, 1960Google Scholar : also in Peking Review, No. 15 (April 12, 1960), pp. 18ff.
3 Ibid., p. 22.
4 Ting-yi, Lu, “Unite Under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner,” speech of April 22, 1960, reprinted in Long Live Leninism, Peking, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, p. 105.Google Scholar
5 Ibid., pp. 101–2.
6 Hsi-huei, Hu, “Lenin's Theory on Peace and War,” Renmin Ribao (Peking), April 25, 1960Google Scholar; also in Joint Publications Research Service (New York), No. 3369 (June 6, 1960), p. 4.
7 Ting-yi, Lu, op.cit., p. 98.Google Scholar
8 Explicit recognition of this fact is to be found in the Moscow Declaration (see below). The CPSU undoubtedly remains the “most equal” in this arrangement, but the Chinese Party implicitly enjoys an “equality” second only to that of the CPSU and much greater than any non-Russian party has had since the earliest days of the Comintern.
9 Speech at the Conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Oceania, reprinted in For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!, December 30, 1949, p. 2.
10 For instance, at the Chinese Tenth Anniversary celebrations in October 1959, Moscow-oriented speakers invariably deleted the words “Latin America” from the Chinese formula, “Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”
11 McVey's, Ruth valuable study, The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asia Uprisings (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958)Google Scholar, points out, however, a number of factors which cast serious doubt on a direct connection between the conference and the uprisings. It seems probable that secret discussions among various Communist delegates had some effect on the course of events during succeeding months in Southeast Asia, but not as directly as has previously been believed. For a general coverage, see Dai, Shen-yu, Peking, Moscow, and the Communist Parties of Colonial Asia, Cambridge, Mass., 1954.Google Scholar
12 Cf. “Long Live Leninism,” Hongqi, April 16, 1960, reprinted in the booklet of the same name, op.cit., esp. p. 46. The strictures on “bourgeois parliamentary systems” delivered there are directly applicable to a situation of the Kerala type.
13 This does not imply that Chou is in disagreement with the new policy. It seems likely, however, that the Peking government thought it wise to disassociate him from the harder line, much as the Russians shifted foreign ministers to symbolize foreign policy changes before the Second World War. Should Chou at some future time reassume the post of foreign minister, it would quite possibly be an indication that a softer line was being introduced, for although Chou has participated publicly in foreign policy matters in the last two years, he has generally been associated with a relatively conciliatory posture.
14 This instrumentality is especially important to China, whose diplomatic contacts are much more limited than those of the Russians.
15 Reported in the Christian Science Monitor, December 17 and 18, 1959. Some of Kaznacheyev's interpretations may be faulty in detail, but the over-all picture which he gives appears trustworthy.
16 Wynn, Wilton in the Washington Evening Star, August 6, 1959.Google Scholar
17 A corresponding fate has befallen such erstwhile supporters of China as the India-China Friendship Association and the Bombay tabloid Blitz, which now find the USSR more congenial to their “right-wing” outlook. It might not be exaggerated to suggest that such figures as Ulbricht, Hoxha, Gus Hall, and even Molotov find themselves in a position similar to Ranadive's. This does not imply that the Chinese and the Stalinists hold identical positions, nor even that their “left-ness” consists of the same factors. But seen from the “right” viewpoint of Khrushchev, they must appear very close together, just as from the “left” viewpoint of China, Khrushchev comes very close to Titoism. Certainly Enver Hoxha seems to have found Chinese militancy congenial in his attempt to force a stronger anti-Yugoslav line on Khrushchev. Even after the Moscow meeting, the special relationship between Tirana and Peking seems to have continued undiminished, as evidenced by exchanges of visits and unprecedentedly large economic aid given to Albania in the face of China's own foreign exchange shortage.
18 Contrast, for example, these two commentaries on the Bucharest meeting: “Those who do not take into account the aspirations of the peoples for peace may slip down the path of sectarianism and isolate themselves from the broad masses” (Pravda editorial, June 28, 1960). “In no case is it permissible to discard the fundamental theoretical positions of Marxism-Leninism on the pretext of combating dogmatism or to substitute revisionism for Marxism-Leninism” (Renmin Ribao editorial, June 29, 1960).
19 At least not according to Edward Crankshaw's articles in the Observer (London), which were variously reprinted—e.g., in the Washington Post, February 12, 1961, and New YorK Herald Tribune, February 19, 1961. The text of the Moscow communiqué was printed in the New York Times, December 7, 1960.
20 Khrushchev's, speech on the conference (Kommunist, No. 1, January 1961)Google Scholar gives the heaviest possible emphasis to the prospects of avoiding the horrors of nuclear war. The Chinese commentaries brush off these features, while continuing to emphasize the struggle against imperialism and favorable prospects for local uprisings. E.g., Communiqué of the 9th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in Peking Review, No. 4 (January 27, 1961); Chao-li, Yu, “New Situation in the People's Struggle Throughout the World,” Hongqi, No. 1, January 1961Google Scholar (JPRS, No. 8003, April 3, 1961); and especially the editorial in Renmin Ribao, January 22, 1961, which smugly states: “We are particularly glad that the fundamental principles and revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism, in which the Chinese Communists and Communists in other countries have for many years persisted, are clearly reflected in the Moscow statement” (Peking Review, loc.cit.).