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Peace and War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Robert W. Tucker
Robert W. Tucker
Affiliation:
The Johns Hopkins University
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In the preface to Paix et Guerre entre les nations Raymond Aron writes that: “Mon but est de comprendre la logique implicite des relations entre collectivités politiquement organisées.” As an effort to comprehend the implicit logic of state relations, Paix et Guerre is clearly one of the most ambitious works to appear in recent years. In terms of sheer scope, it has few—if indeed, any—serious competitors among general treatises on international relations. Moreover, in terms of substantive accomplishments, it is in many respects one of the most impressive works to appear in a long time. It is impressive if only because of the critical function it performs. Few theories of significance directly or indirectly relating to “l'institution belliqueuse” escape Aron's attention and criticism.1Paix et Guerre is impressive for the way in which it seeks to encompass and to organize the disparate materials making up the study of international relations and, in particular, for the manner in which it attempts to comprehend certain behavior— diplomatic-strategic action—from diverse points of view. It is equally impressive for its awareness that the progress of a discipline generally and the utility of comparative study particularly depend on drawing clear and precise distinctions and devising useful classifications. Finally, Paix et Guerre is impressive for the perceptiveness with which it analyzes contemporary international politics. Aron's chapters on the diplomacy and strategy of the nuclear age—“le monde fini”—form a model of political analysis. Not the least of its virtues is the modesty of the conclusions drawn and the disavowal of oracular pretensions. The same modesty characterizes Aron's theoretical endeavors. If a pervasive skepticism is applied to the theories of others, and particularly to “les grandes hypotheses,” Aron is almost as skeptical of his own efforts to lay bare “les conditions des choix historiques.” In large measure, Paix et Guerre is a sustained and often brilliant effort to demonstrate the limits of our present knowledge. That effort performs a much needed service.

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Review Articles
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World Politics , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , January 1965 , pp. 310 - 333
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Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1965

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References

1 Thus there are critical appreciations of such diverse thinkers as Thucydides, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau, Hegel, Kant, Clausewitz, Proudhon, Treitschke, Lenin, Bergsen, Spengler, and Toynbee. In addition, the recent American literature receives special attention. The realists are dealt with, as well as a number of systems and game theorists.

2 “Disons, provisoirement, que les relations internationales sont les relations entre unités politiques, ce dernier concept couvrant les cités grecques, l'empire romain ou égyptien aussi bien que les monarchies européennes, les républiques bourgeoises ou les démocraties populaires” (p. 17). [“Let us say provisionally that international relations are the relations among political entities, the latter concept covering the Greek city-states, the Roman or the Egyptian empire, as well as European monarchies, bourgeois republics or popular democracies.”] It is clear that the decisive characteristic of these “unités politiques” is their possession of “le monopole de la violence légitime.” Cf. Aron's essay, “A propos de la théorie politique,” Revue Française de Science Politique, XII (1962), 24–25.Google Scholar

3 Cf. Aron, Raymond, “Conflict and War from the Viewpoint of Historical Sociology,” in The Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions (Paris 1957), 186.Google Scholar

4 [“Two men, and two only, act not as members but wholly as representatives of the collectives to which they belong: the ambassador in the exercise of his functions is the political entity in the name of which he speaks; the soldier on the battlefield is the political entity in the name of which he kills his fellow man.”]

5 Given this distinctive concern, the study of international relations must obviously comprise as well those factors—social and material—which determine (affect) foreign policy in the sense defined above. The study of international relations may therefore be defined in terms of its distinctive, or specific, concern as well as in terms of the various factors which determine the conduct forming the center of interest of the discipline. It is clear, however, that without identification of the center of interest, the specific focus, of the discipline there would be no way of determining, even grossly, where the discipline begins or ends.

Aron draws no distinction between “international relations” and “international politics.” Many writers, however, insist upon making such a distinction, the basis for the distinction presumably being that the study of international politics deals with state actions which have “political” objectives, whereas the study of international relations deals with state action which may or may not have political objectives. This distinction is evidently based on the view that an action can be characterized as “political” in character only if the objective of the action is the maintenance or the increase of power (or, at least, the demonstration of power) vis-a-vis other states. Even if this view is accepted, one cannot be sure of its practical utility. The international economic policy of a state may have as its sole objective to secure the best possible terms of trade. On the above view, such a policy would have to be considered unpolitical. But if the policy affects—as it clearly will affect—the power potential of die state, are we still to regard it as outside the proper purview of international politics because its objective was presumably not of a “political” character? On the other hand, if a political action is one which in some way affects the power potential of a state, hence its capacity to control the behavior of others (i.e., to exercise power), then there will be very few state actions that cannot be characterized as “political.”

6 [“… in the shadow of war, or, to use a more precise expression, the relations among states comprise in their very essence the alternative of war and peace.”]

7 [“… the right to make justice for itself and to be the sole master of the decision to fight or not to fight.”]

8 Indeed, we know that for certain periods and for certain states the expectation of violence is as great, if not greater, in domestic politics.

9 We need not take up the issue whether the nature of politics within a domestic society undergoes a qualitative change once the use of force by dissident groups no longer constitutes a meaningful possibility. Even where organized domestic violence remains a meaningful possibility, the significance given to it by the parties differs from the significance given to war by states. At any rate, Aron regards the issue as premature. “A l'intérieur des nations les plus anciennement constitutés—telle la nation française—aucun groupe social, aucun parti politique n'a définitivement renoncé à l'emploi de la force pour défendre ses revenus ou son idéal” (p. 630). [“Even in the oldest nations—e.g., the French nation—no social group or political party has irrevocably renounced the employment of force to defend its material interests or its ideal.”]

10 [“The theory of international relations posits a variety of autonomous centers of decision and consequently of the risk of war, and from this risk it deduces the necessity of calculating the means.”]

11 Thus: “Le calcul des forces, auquel le diplomate idéal ne peut se soustraire, n'est ni le premier ni le dernier mot de la conduite diplomatico-stratégique. Les amitiés et inimitiés a un moment donné ne résultent pas toutes du rapport de forces: le diplomate s'efforce de maintenir un équilibre, mais certaines amitiés ou inimitiés lui sont donnees comme irreductible. s… Non seulement les objectifs historiques des unités politiques ne sont pas deductibles du rapport de forces, mais les objectifs ultimes des unités sont légitimement équivoques. Sécurité, puissance, gloire, idée, sont des objectifs essentiellement hétérogènes que l'on ne ramenèrait à un terme unique qu'en faussant la signification humaine de l'action diplomatico-stratégique. Si la rivalité des Etats est comparable à un jeu, ce qui est ‘en jeu’ ne saurait être désigné par un concept unique, valable pour toutes les civilisations et toutes les époques” (p. 100). [“The calculation of forces, which die ideal diplomat cannot avoid, is neither the first nor the last word of diplomatic strategic conduct. Friendships and enmities of a given moment are not entirely the result of relationship of forces: the diplomat tries to maintain an equilibrium, but some friendships or animosities are irreducible givens. … Not only are the historic objectives of political entities not deducible from the relationship of forces, but the ultimate objectives of the entities are understandably equivocal. Security, power, glory, idea, are essentially heterogeneous objectives which cannot be reduced to a common denominator without falsifying the human significance of diplomatic strategic action. If the rivalry of States is comparable to a game, what is ‘at stake’ cannot be designated by one concept valid for all civilizations and for all eras.”]

12 It is true that the ultimate ends of economic action as well, whether for the individual or for the collective, are no more determined by the “immanent end” of this activity (the maximization of resources) than are the ultimate ends of diplomaticstrategic action, which cannot rely on a concept equivalent to that of value or utility in economic theory. But if the ultimate “indétermination d'activité économique” appears no different from the ultimate indeterminacy of political conduct, there is still a very considerable difference between the two types of activities, and the theories analyzing these activities, at the level below that of ultimate ends. Money not only provides a rigorous standard of measure in the case of economic activity; it also provides the possibility of substituting for the chaos of individual preferences a relatively clear objective, i.e., the maximization of monetary resources. To this extent, economic theory may dispense with ultimate ends and consider only the necessary means as the common objective of individuals. “Quand il s'agit de la conduite d'un individu, l'économiste n'a pas d'autre définition de l'intérêt que l'échelle des préférences, variable d'individu à individu, ou la maximisation de l'ophéhmité mesurée par les quantités monétaires” (p. 98). [“When it is a question of individual conduct, the economist has no other definition of interest than the scale of preferences, varying from individual to individual, or the maximization of satisfaction as measured by monetary units.”] The existence of a relatively determined objective, together with strictly defined rules and a high degree of interdependence of variables, permit the homo oeconomicus of theory to resemble rather closely the concrete economic actor. They also make possible a definition of rational conduct, though when one passes from the individual to the collective, and from a consideration of the individual's interest to that of the collective's interest, this possibility becomes much less clear.

13 [“If diplomatic conduct is never determined by the relationship of forces alone, if power is not the stake of diplomacy, as utility is that of the economy, then the conclusion is legitimate that there is no general theory of international relations comparable to the general theory of economics.”]

14 In a final critical note, Aron considers the applicability of game theory to diplomatic-strategic conduct. The principal difficulties in applying game theory must be found, he writes, in the indeterminacy of the stakes and the limits of the game. “Pour qu'il y ait un jeu au sens rigoureux du terme, pour qu'une solution mathématique définissant la conduite rationnelle soit possible, il faut qu'il y ait un début et une fin, un nombre fini de démarches par chacun des joueurs, un résultat, susceptible d'une évaluation, cardinale ou ordinale, pour chacun des joueurs. Aucune de ces conditions n'est, à proprement parler, remplie dans le champ des relations internationales” (pp. 756–57). [“In order for there to be a game in the rigorous sense of the term, in order for a mathematical solution defining rational conduct to be possible, there must be a beginning and an end and, for each actor, a finite number of plays and a measurable result susceptible of evaluation. None of these conditions is, strictly speaking, fulfilled in the field of international relations.”]

15 The distinction between theory and sociology is, of course, a distinction between two types or conceptions of theory. They are, Aron observes, not contradictory but complementary: “le schématisme rationnel et les propositions sociologiques constitutent les moments successifs dans l'élaboration conceptuelle d'un univers social” (p. 16). [“The rational schematization and the sociological propositions constitute successive moments in the conceptual elaboration of die social universe.”] It must be emphasized, though, that Aron's “le schematisme rationnel” is not a rational scheme of diplomaticstrategic conduct in the sense that it is deduced in abstract manner from a given hypothesis or limited set of hypotheses. It is instead a rational schematization drawn from history, a rationalization or ordering of history. Thus Aron's concepts and types are drawn from a systematic and comparative study of concrete phenomena, as is clear, for example, in his analysis of the objectives of foreign policy. Whereas theory, in this latter sense, “suggère d'elle-même l'émunération des phénomènes-effets, des déterminés,” the sociologist “est invité à rechercher les phénomènes-causes, les déterminants” (p. 184).

16 [“… to disengage the original characteristics of strategy and diplomacy in the thermonuclear age … to present a description, illuminated by previous study of concepts and of determinants, of a concrete conjuncture.”]

17 [“… the essence of interstate relations raises two praxiological problems that I will call the Machiavellian and the Kantian: that of legitimate means and that of universal peace.”]

18 Meinecke, Friedrich, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its History, trans, by Scott, Douglas (New Haven 1957), 1.Google Scholar

19 It is, of course, the besetting sin of those who argue that force has lost its utility that they insist upon evaluating the significance of military power largely in terms of its virtually uncontrolled use. The conclusion of the argument therefore appears foreordained. But alter the assumption on which the argument proceeds—consider the functions served by military power so long as it is not overtly employed or employed only with restraint—and precisely the opposite conclusion may be drawn.

20 Thus: “… il est difficile de condamner, moralement ou historiquement, l'initiative du recours à la force pour deux raisons: cette initiative peut être le seul moyen de prevenir une attaque, à échéance mortelle; aucun tribunal, jugeant en équité, n'est en mesure de dire quels changements pacifiques s'imposent et d'imposer le respect de ces décisions” (p. 571). [“… it is difficult to condemn morally or historically the initial recourse to force for two reasons: this initiative may be the only means of preventing a possibly mortal attack; no tribunal, judging in equity, is in a position to say what peaceful changes are imperative and to guarantee the acceptance of these decisions.”] There is, however, the other side of the coin. Those who argue for the increasing restriction on the recourse to force need not reject Aron's argument. They may simply maintain that the circumstances marking the use of force in international society imply that on the whole force is more apt to lead to injustice than to justice and for this reason the initiation of force ought to be generally condemned. If this argument is not compelling, it is not easily refuted. At any rate, Aron gives less than adequate attention to it.

21 [“I do not dissimulate the risks of this means, but there is no ethical judgment possible without taking into account historical circumstances. All acts of war today being destructive, a brutal action which would bring a quick capitulation of an aggressor might conceivably be justified.”] Elsewhere, Aron declares: “… le jugement éthique sur les conduites diplomatico-stratégiques n'est pas séparable du jugement historique sur les buts des acteurs et les conséquences de leur succès ou de leur échec” (p. 592). [“… ethical judgment on diplomatic strategic conduct is inseparable from historical judgment on the aims of the actors and the consequences of their success or failure.”]

22 [“The law of nations is naturally founded on this principle: that the several nations should try, in peace, to do each other the most good, and, in war, the least harm, without injuring their true interests.”]

23 “… is to act in accordance with the particular contingency and the concrete givens, not to be enslaved by logic or by passive obedience to a norm or pseudonorm; it is to prefer the limitation of violence to the punishment of the allegedly guilty or to a supposedly absolute justice; it is to set for oneself concrete and accessible objectives which conform to the secular law of international relations rather than limitless goals which are apt to be devoid of all significance. …”

24 Thus: “La seule morale qui dépasse la morale du combat et la morale de la loi est ce que j'appellerai la morale de la sagesse qui s'efforce non seulement de considérer chaque cas en ses particularités concretès, mais aussi de ne méconnaitre aucun des arguments de principe et d'opportunité, de n'oublier ni le rapport des forces ni les volontés des peuples” (p. 596). [“The only morality superior to the morality of combat and to the morality of law is what I should call the morality of wisdom, which attempts to consider each case on its concrete merits, without ignoring any of the arguments of principle and of opportunity, or forgetting either the relationship of forces or the desires of peoples.”] Aron declares that if this morality does not resolve the antinomies of diplomatic-strategic action, it does require the statesman to find in each case the most acceptable compromise (“… elle s'efforce de trouver en chaque cas le compromis le plus acceptable"). This contention amounts either to a rather empty truism—the most acceptable solution to a conflict is obviously that solution which best satisfies the aspirations of the contestants—or to the altogether problematic view that an acceptable compromise is always possible, if only by splitting differences down the middle. There is no reason to assume that Aron accepts the latter view.

25 [“Does thermonuclear war pose for the moralist a problem different in nature from that posed by the so-called conventional wars?”]

26 Nor is there any novelty in the contention that it is not the state as such, or even an alliance of states, in the defense of which any and all means must be employed, but those values the state serves to protect. This contention has always formed part and parcel of the argument of necessity or reason of state. But what is its practical significance so long as the state remains the indispensable institution for the protection of these values? Might the state not just as well be the end of action? The insistent appeal to individual and to cultural values does not essentially alter the nature of the justification men invoke today in threatening force as compared with the past. Besides, the attempt to reduce the state to a mere means has always had, and continues to have, an ideological ring, even when employed by democratic statesmen.

27 [“The power of nuclear weapons is such that by changing the scale of destruction, it also possibly changes the moral nature of war.”] Even in this statement, however, there is the qualifying word “possibly.” Is this point reached only when thermonuclear war can result in the extermination of humanity, or at least in the extermination of the belligerents? Is a thermonuclear war which falls short of these extreme limits one the moral nature of which may retain a continuity with the past? Aron is less than clear in this respect, though the implication of his discussion is to insist on a continuity—however tenuous—with the past.

28 [“The monstrous threat of annihilating cities or of killing millions of innocent human beings … is not morally justified except when it constitutes a supreme threat, with everyone trying to create such conditions that it will never have to be carried out.”]

29 [“There is no need to recall the wholesale killing of six million Jews to conclude that, for a people and a culture, the cost of subservience can be higher than the cost of war, even of an atomic war."]

30 Must we conclude that technology has made men worse? The answer will evidently depend upon what we mean by “worse.” If we mean a conscious and deliberate rejection of pity, it may be argued that men are no worse today than in an earlier era. Thus Aron declares: “La grande guerre serait plus terrible qu'à toute autre époque non parce que les hommes sont pires, mais parce qu'ils sont plus savants” (p. 767). [“The great war would be more terrible than any previous war, not because men are worse, but because they know more.”] On the other hand, if moral judgment is based on the objective consequences of behavior rather than on the conscious rejection of pity, or a personal inclination to kill, we may conclude that men are worse—or may be worse— precisely because they do “know more.”

31 Nor, we must add, is the failure to resolve the political and moral issues posed by nuclear weapons necessarily a mark of their complexity, any more than the successful resolution of scientific problems is necessarily a mark of their simplicity. However congenial the assumption that equates the apparently insoluble with the complex, it rests at bottom on a confusion of understanding and will. The failure to resolve satisfactorily political and moral issues may only indicate that these issues, though they may be encompassed by man's reason, are nonetheless impossible to resolve by his will.

32 Or, if not the “national conscience,” the conscience of another group that remains less than universal. “La dévalorisation des unités nationales, sur laquelle quelques observateurs mettent l'accent, ne marque pas un affaiblissement de la conscience tribale au profit de la conscience humaine, mais un affaiblissement d'une sorte de conscience tribale au profit d'une autre sorte” (p. 739). [“The devaluation of national entities, which several observers emphasize, does not imply a weakening of the tribal conscience in favor of a human conscience, but a weakening of one kind of tribal conscience in favor of another.”] Even so, the events of recent years indicate that it is still the “national conscience,” rather than the conscience of a larger grouping, that remains predominant.

33 “La misère des masses indiennes ne compromet pas le biên-etre de l'Européen ou de l'Américain moyen. Le bien-être de l'un n'est pas la cause de la misère de l'autre” (p. 734). [“The misery of the Indian masses does not result from the well-being of me average European or American. The well-being of the one is not the cause of the misery of the other.”]

34 Whatever position one may take with respect to the “right” that states presently possess to make justice for themselves, it is at least essential to distinguish between their right in law to employ force and their retention of the means to employ force. If the Charter and antecedent instruments have restricted the former, they certainly have not restricted the latter. Aron believes, or rather he simply decrees, that the law has succeeded in doing neither. This position must be questioned, despite the admitted uncertainty that attends the Charter's provisions respecting the use of force.

36 See, e.g., Clark, Grenville and Sohn, Louis B., World Peace Through World Law, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).Google Scholar

36 [“The way of a planetary federation is the same as that of peace through law.”]

37 [“… will remain a futile aspiration of men of good will as long as there is not developed, among the members of the world society, relations comparable to those which bind the members—individuals or groups—of each national society: consciousness of community, consent to a form of government, legal and political, monopoly of armed force.”]

38 [“… a change of scale within history, the nature of which remains the same.”]

39 [“… a wager on the conversion of mankind.”]

40 [“… insists on the imperfection of all social orders, avows the impossibility of knowing the future, condemns the vain pretension of drafting the blueprint for an ideal society.”]