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The Organization of the Communist Camp

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Zbigniew K. Brzezinski
Zbigniew K. Brzezinski
Affiliation:
Russian Institute of Columbia University
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The Communist camp is composed of twelve states: the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, Mongolia. Jointly, the Communist-ruled states account for about 38 per cent of the world's population, 24.2 per cent of the world's area, and approximately one-third of the world's industrial output. During Stalin's lifetime the Communist bloc operated essentially through a relatively simple subordination of the various units to the dictator's will, generally expressed by indirect methods of police and party control. This somewhat informal organization reflected in part the old dictator's specific political style; in part it was a function of the relatively immature stage of the bloc's development. As a result, the “maturation” of the bloc coincided with the difficult post-Stalin period of transition within the USSR and was marked by major upheavals and tensions. By 1958-1959, however, the crisis had subsided, and a new and more complex image of the bloc became apparent. While the Soviet Union continued to exercise leadership, acknowledged at the November 1957 conference of the Communist parties and buttressed by Soviet international and technological prestige, the camp had developed more elaborate mechanisms and processes of cohesion that also contributed to its unity. Some of them dated back to the Stalinist days, but were now infused with new vitality. Others emerged during the post-Stalin phase.

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Research Article
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World Politics , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , January 1961 , pp. 175 - 209
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1961

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References

1 The article takes it for granted that the bloc depends on Soviet power for its unity, that Soviet primacy and military dominance are essential to its survival, and that a common ideology helps to maintain a sense of mutual purpose. It also takes for granted the fact that strains exist within the camp and that forces are at work which challenge its unity. With all these as given, the study seeks to describe and discuss the structure of the camp's unity, which is essential if common purposes and policies are to be positively articulated and executed.

2 Izvestia, January 29, 1956.

3 Izvestia, May 27, 1958.

4 This does not, however, exclude a certain division of labor in dealing with the outside world: e.g., the Polish initiative in the form of the Rapacki Plan; the East German scheme for a Baltic Peace Zone; the Rumanian-Bulgarian plan for a Balkan treaty, etc.

5 China since 1956; North Korea since 1957; North Vietnam and Mongolia since 1958. See the excellent treatment, “The Role of the Comecon,” East Europe (New York), VIII, No. 11 (November 1959), pp. 3–11, which describes more fully the operations and organization of CEMA.

6 See Nagy, Imre, On Communism, New York, 1957, p. 189Google Scholar, for a concise statement of the essentially negative role of CEMA.

7 For a description of the CEMA organization and a discussion of its operation, see East Europe, VI, No. 11 (November 1957), and IX, No. 4 (April 1960). See also Voprosy vneshnei politiki stran sotsialisticheskogo lageriia, Moscow, 1958, pp. 21–23 (hereafter cited as Voprosy vneshnei politiki). The December 1959 CEMA meeting took the important formal step of adopting a Charter and a Convention on Competence, Privileges, and Immunities, which was said to contain “provisions that are generally accepted in international practice.” For fuller treatment, see Vneshanaia torgovlia (Moscow), No. 2 (February 1960).

8 Although ostensibly an international organization open to other nations, CEMA operations are shrouded in secrecy. On a recent trip to the bloc, this writer was denied permission to visit its Moscow offices, while Sofia officials even denied the existence of a CEMA commission in Sofia. For a list of these commissions, see East Europe, IX, No. 4 (April 1960), p. 4. For a somewhat more recent treatment, see Tygodnik Powszechny (Krakow), February 28, 1960. For an interesting account of the operations of one such commission, see Pramov, I., “For some results of co-operation in the field of rural economy between the countries participating in the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance,” Mezhdunarodnyi Sel'skokhoziaistvennyi Zhurnal (Sofia), No. 4 (1958).Google Scholar

9 This is openly admitted by Communist commentators—e.g., Kaigl, V., “Co-operation with the countries of the socialist camp is one of the main conditions for the completion of socialist building of the CSR,” Nova Mysl (Prague), June 1958Google Scholar, who says: “Apart from political and ideological aspects, economic shortcomings helped to a considerable degree in the upsurge of bourgeois nationalism and revisionism in the fall of 1956. Following these experiences, the Communist and worker's parties in the member states of the Council drew the only right conclusion, namely, to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp through increased economic unity, and through a higher standard of its planning. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance decided at its eighth planning session in June 1957 to work out co-ordinated, long-term plans for the development of national economies of the member states covering the period until 1975. The foundation of this co-ordination is to be the mutually heightened approved specialization of the individual countries which would make them into a truly homogeneous, economic unit” (italics added).

10 See my study, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, chap. 12.

11 E.g., a multilateral payment scheme was set up in 1959, plans were developed for statistical analyses of national incomes, the problem of pricing was tackled, etc. For more detailed treatment, see Zauberman, A., “Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects,” Problems of Communism (July-August 1959)Google Scholar; Mendershausen, H., “Terms of Trade Between the Soviet Union and Smaller Communist Countries, 1955–1957,” Review of Economics and Statistics, XLI, No. 2 (May 1959), pp. 106–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hoeffding, O., Recent Efforts Toward Coordinated Economic Planning in the Soviet Bloc, The RAND Corporation, 1959Google Scholar; and Zyzniewski, S. J., “Economic Perspectives in Eastern Europe,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI, No. 2 (June 1960), pp. 201–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar That the problem of pricing has been a source of major difficulty in interbloc planning has been openly admitted by Communist economists. See, for instance, Cizkovsky, M., “A New Stage in the Cooperation Between the Countries of the Socialist Camp,” Rude Pravo (Prague), March 5, 1959Google Scholar; or Ciernansky, V., “Prices in Trading with Foreign Countries,” Predvoj (Prague), June 11, 1959Google Scholar; or Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 2 (1960), for a discussion of the prevailing pricing system within the bloc. The most recent CEMA venture is a huge oil pipeline, linking the oilfields of the middle Volga basin to Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, , and Hungary, . Construction began in the summer of 1960 and is to be finished in 1963.Google Scholar

12 Pravda, March 27, 1959. Presumably a further step in that direction would involve the co-ordination of investment policies of the member states. See Gomulka's criticisms of CEMA's failure to do so in Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), June 21, 1960.

13 Izvestia, August 19, 1948. For a recent discussion, see Cattell, David T., “The Politics of the Danube Commission under Soviet Control.” American Slavic and East European Review, XIX, No. 3 (October 1960), pp. 380–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Svet Sovietu (Prague), No. 24 (1959).

15 Pravda, January 8, 1955.

16 The agreements are listed in R. Slusser and Triska, J., A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917–1917, Stanford, 1959, pp. 326–27.Google Scholar For fuller treatment, see Modelski, George, Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc, New York, 1959.Google Scholar

17 Svanev, V., “Science and Technology in the Multi-national Family of Scientists,” Pravda (Bratislava), January 10, 1959.Google Scholar

18 For a fuller discussion, see Wandycz, P. S., “The Soviet System of Alliances in East Central Europe,” Journal of Central European Affairs, XVI, No. 2 (July 1956), pp. 177–84Google Scholar; Korovin, E., Nerushimaia druzhba narodov SSSR i narodno-demokraticheskikh stran, Moscow, 1955Google Scholar; Voprosy vneshnei politiki, op.cit.,: and Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op.cit., for listings with dates.

19 Czechoslovakia also concluded such a treaty with Outer Mongolia on April 9, 1957. I am indebted to Dr. Tao-tai Hsia of the Library of Congress for the information about China. Chinese sources include Chung hua jen min kung ho kuo t'iao yueh chi (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking), Vols. I-VIII, 1949–1959; Jen min shou ts'e (Peking), 1955–1959.

20 See Pravda, November 19, 1956; ibid., December 18, 1956.

21 Izvestia, March 14, 1957.

22 Ibid., May 28, 1957.

23 Ibid., April 17, 1957.

24 For extended treatment, see Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op.cit.,

25 See Pravda, October 31, 1956.

26 See Mendershausen, op.cit.,; Hoeffding, op.cit.,; Zauberman, op.cit.,; Wszelaki, J., Communist Economic Strategy: The Role of East Central Europe, Washington, D.C., 1959.Google Scholar For some figures concerning Soviet credit in the crisis period of 1956–1957, see Choluj, M., “Soviet Credit Aid to Socialist Countries,” Predvoj (Prague), November 7, 1957Google Scholar, in which the figure of 5,776 million rubles is cited as being granted to Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union between December 1955 and February 1957, 58 per cent of which went to Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Vneshnaia torgovlia has also provided some data.

27 See Radulescu, G., “Ten Years of Comecon Activity,” Rominia Libera, April 29, 1959Google Scholar, for partial list of long-term Rumanian agreements; Izvestia, November 20, 1955, for aspects of Soviet-Mongolian agreements of 1950–1954 and 1955–1957. See also Slusser and Triska, op.cit., for list of Soviet trade agreements; and Dolina, J., “Poland's Foreign Trade Agreements,” Polish Review (New York), Autumn 1956Google Scholar and Winter-Spring 1958, for the most complete listing, including brief statements of major provisions.

28 E.g., the Czech-Polish agreement for 1961–1965, signed May 17, 1958; see Rude Pravo, May 15, 1958. For Soviet-Czech agreements, see Pravda, January 15, 1957, and October 16, 1958; and Izvestia, March 7, 1959.

29 A good example of this dependence was provided by the panic caused in these capitals by the recent and unconfirmed report to the effect that the Soviet Union would severely cut down its delivery of raw materials to Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia in 1965 (see New YorK Times, April 4, 1960, for a report from Warsaw that at the February 1960 CEMA meeting, the Soviet Union indicated that it no longer wished to deliver unprocessed raw materials).

30 For statistics, see Ivanov, N. I., Razvitie ekonomicheskikh sviazei evropeiskikh stran narodnoi demokratii, Moscow, 1959Google Scholar (hereafter cited as Razvitie).

31 For instance, when the vice-president of the Rumanian Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries contributed a commemorative article to a Polish newspaper on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Rumanian-Polish cultural relations, everything he cited dated back to the pre-1939 period (Livezeau, O., “Ten Years of Co-operation,” Zycie Warszawy, February 28, 1958Google Scholar; see also Nagy, Imre, op.cit., p. 240).Google Scholar

32 Mongolia, agreement of February 27, 1946.

33 At the same time the Soviet Union hastened to return to some of the European Communist-ruled states a portion of the art treasures which it had seized in the course of various hostilities. For instance, on June 12, 1956, Pravda announced that the Soviet government was returning to Rumania art treasures held in the USSR since World War I; on July 8, 1956, Izvestia announced the return of Polish art treasures, seized by the USSR during World War II. Insofar as cultural co-operation agreements are concerned, they were signed in the following sequence: with Rumania—April 7, 1956; East Germany—April 26; Bulgaria—April 28; Albania—May 3; Hungary—June 28; Poland—June 30; China—July 5; North Korea—September 5; Czechoslovakia—January 12, 1957; North Vietnam—February 15, 1957; also a renewal of the ten-year agreement with Mongolia on April 24, 1956.

34 See London, Kurt L., “The ‘Socialist Commonwealth of Nations,’” Orbis, III, No. 4 (Winter 1960), pp. 424–42Google Scholar, for a detailed analytical treatment of the origins of the new term and of its broader implications.

35 A recent Soviet volume devoted to the foreign policy of the bloc (Voprosy vneshnei politiki, op.cit.,) states: “A form of developing and tightening the unity of the socialist nations, in addition to concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements, are the meetings and the consultations between the leaders of the socialist countries” (p. 9).

36 In the period November 1957-March 1960 there appear to have been no less than ten multilateral meetings attended either by the first secretaries and/or Politburo members of the ruling parties, not counting the two more restricted top-level muli-lateral meetings in January 1957 (the five-party meeting in Budapest, and the Soviet-Chinese-Hungarian meeting in Moscow).

37 A full text of the vigorous statement by a Chinese observer, significantly ignored by the Soviet and East European press, is contained in East Europe, IX, No. 3 (March 1960).

38 This communication takes the form either of reiteration of certain key and meaningful formulas or of ostentatious omission of certain key concepts. Thus, for instance, the repetition of the formula “proletarian internationalism” as the basic principle guiding relations between the Communist states was directed against the Poles' emphasis on the need to respect their own road to socialism; similarly, the insistence on hailing Soviet leadership was meant to combat the concept of full equality of Communist states. Repeated attacks on revisionism (and silence on dogmatism) were directed against those parties and party members who were pressing for anti-Stalinist reforms. Similarly, attacks on dogmatism were often aimed at the USSR and, in 1959–1960, at China. The recent Chinese emphasis on the innately aggressive character of imperialism, as shown by Lenin, is a form of subtle pressure against those Communist leaders who are willing to concede that war is not inevitable even while capitalism still exists. Finally, exaggerated praise for the policies of one party can be a form of pressure against another; e.g., praise of China can be directed at the USSR, or praise of Bulgaria for rapidly collectivizing can be aimed at Poland, etc.

39 Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), November 30, 1957.

40 “In the process of the rise of the new systems and the deep revolutionary changes in social relations, there have been many difficulties, unresolved problems, and downright mistakes in the mutual relations among the socialist countries—violations and errors which demeaned the principle of equality in the relations among the socialist states” (from the October 30, 1956, declaration by the government of the USSR).

41 See Slusser and Triska, op.cit.,

42 On the basis of recent listings, nine out of eleven Soviet ambassadors to Communist-ruled states appear to have been former senior party functionaries. During Stalin's lifetime, they appeared to come primarily from among the technical-police groups that staffed Molotov's Foreign Ministry.

43 E.g., in 1957, the USSR sent out 1,116 such delegations; in the first half of 1958, 587. In the same periods, Czechoslovakia sent out 503 and 250; Poland 472 and 263, etc. More than half of these, however, were technical and sports groups. See Ivanov, Razvitie, op.cit., pp. 112–13, for data on exchanges of specialists.

44 For instance, the head of the Polish parliamentary delegation to Rumania emphasized in his account of the meetings with Rumanian parliamentarians the fact that the Rumanians expressed great interest in the ratio of governmental decrees to legislative acts in post-1956 Poland. When he told them that for 76 parliamentary acts passed in Poland in 1958, there was only one governmental decree, the Rumanians admitted that in their case the ratio was almost reversed, but said they were also struggling for a change (Zycie Warszawy, October 16, 1958).

45 Lidova Demokracie (Prague), January 7, 1959; Rude Pravo (Prague), February 10, 1959; for the most complete treatment, East Europe, VIII, No. 7 (July 1959).

46 For Sino-Soviet student exchanges, see Kapitsa, M. S., Sovetsko-Kitaiskie otnosheniia, Moscow, 1958, p. 379.Google Scholar However, the Soviet Union is not actively engaged in sending its students abroad; in 1958 there were, for instance, 1,040 Czechoslovak students in the USSR and only 124 Soviet students in the CSR (Svobodne Slovo, Prague, July 19, 1958). Similarly, in Poland the largest number of foreign students from within the bloc came from the Asian countries (Zycie Warszawy, October 8, 1958).

47 For instance, see Kowalski, J., “At the International Conference of Historians of the Communist Movement,” Nowe Drogi (Warsaw), January 1958Google Scholar, for an account of the three conferences held for party historians of the bloc.

48 Mozhaev, G. A., Mezhdunarodnye Kulturnye Sviazi SSSR, Moscow, 1959.Google Scholar

49 This theme is often repeated by Khrushchev. See also Varga, E., “The Capitalism of the 20th Century,” Kommunist, No. 17 (November 1959)Google Scholar, and particularly his prognosis for the next ten to fifteen years. Probably the most elaborate and sophisticated development of the expected international and political consequences of the growth of a “socialist world market” is contained in Lychowski, T., Stosunki Ekonomiczne Miedzy Krajami o Roznych Ustrojach, Warsaw, 1957, pp. 590–605Google Scholar, where he argues that the existence of such a market will profoundly alter the present pattern of relations between the industrialized Western nations and the developing nations.

50 Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, Moscow, 1959, especially pp. 672–74.

51 To this writer, Kuusinen's volume is the most important Soviet attempt to define Communist ideology since Stalin's statement of 1952. Clearly meant to be a guide to international communism on all political-ideological aspects, including such matters as patterns of the socialist revolution, the issue of war, and the nature of a Communist society, the volume is particularly striking in its de-emphasis of the Chinese experience. While primarily relying on Marx-Engels-Lenin for doctrinal citations, it cites Mao Tse-tung only twice in the course of 750 pages; Khrushchev, by way of contrast, is cited sixteen times, but Stalin also only twice.

52 E.g., Ivanov, N. I., Razvitie Ekonomiki Stran Narodnoi Demokratii, Moscow, 1958Google Scholar; Kozik, A. K., ed., Ekonomicheskoie sotrudnichestvo i vzaimopomoshch mezhdu Sovietskim Soiuzom I Evropeiskimi Stranami Narodnoi Demokratii, Moscow, 1958Google Scholar; Ivanov, Razvitie, op.cit.; Voprosy vneshnei politiki, op.cit.; Sodruzhestvo Stran Sotsializma, Moscow, 1958; Butenko, O., Osnovnye cherty sovremennogo revizionizma, Moscow, 1959Google Scholar; Protiv sovremennogo revizionizma, Moscow, 1959; Bytakov, D. D., ed., Finansy Stran Narodnoi Demokratii, Moscow, 1959.Google Scholar In addition to these general works, there is an increasing number of books dealing with specific problems of individual Communist states—e.g., Zhamin, V., Sel'skoe khoziaistvo Kitaia, Moscow, 1959Google Scholar; Problemy novoi sistemy planirovaniia i finansirovaniia cheskoslovatskoi promyshlennosti, Moscow, 1959; and many others. This reawakened interest in the “problematics” of bloc affairs harks back to the 1946–1949 period, during which time there were many active discussions and publications pertaining particularly to the question of the nature of “People's Democracy” and its relationship to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Such centers as the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, or the Institute of International Relations, seem to be particularly interested.

53 E.g., Butenko, op.cit., or Protiv sovremennogo revizionizma, op.cit.,

54 Its lead article was contributed by M. B. Mitin, member of the Academy of Sciences and of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in the past a Soviet delegate to the Bulgarian and Hungarian Party congresses and, last but not least, in 1955 the editor of the Cominform journal, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy. A more recent example is the recently published volume, Obshche zakpnomernosti perekhoda k Sotsializmu i osobennosti ikh proiavleniia v raznykh stranakh, Moscow, 1960.

55 Literature of this broader sort has also been making its appearance in the satellite states, although perhaps even more timidly. One may cite, for example, Mezinarodni delba prace v socialisticke svetove soustave, Prague, 1958; Tsonkov, G., Obshchoto i spetsifichnoto v razvitieto na sotsialisticheskata revoliutsiia, Sofia, 1959Google Scholar; or the more general work by T. Lychowski cited in note 49.

56 As one highly placed East European Communist said to the writer: “You have your mad dogs of capitalism [paraphrasing a Stalinist statement]—namely, Adenauer; we have our mad dogs of communism—the East Germans and the Czechs.”

57 For a recent treatment of Sino-Soviet differences, see Zagoria, D., “Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” Problems of Communism (May-June 1960).Google Scholar For the argument that the Sino-Soviet alliance involves a dynamic relationship of “divergent unity,” see this writer's “The Pattern and Limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” ibid. (September-October 1960). For a discussion of the problematics of ideological “relativization” and then “erosion,” see my “Communist Ideology and International Affairs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV, No. 3 (September 1960), pp. 266–91.

58 The fullest and most recent Soviet ideological statement, the thick volume Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma, Moscow, 1959, edited by O. V. Kuusinen, speaks of economic co-operation among Communist countries (not just “socialist”) as preliminary to the eventual emergence of a single global “Commonwealth” (pp. 749–51). It is interesting to note that the new “socialist” constitution of Czechoslovakia (which is said to be no longer a People's Democracy) states in chapter I, article I, that “The Czechoslovak Republic belongs to the world socialist system …” as a matter of constitutional law.