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On the International Implications of Outer Space*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Klaus Knorr
Klaus Knorr
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Extract

Though only a few years old, the Russian-American “space race” is in full swing and it is clear, even at this early stage of outer space technology, that it will present both countries with new opportunities and new dangers.

From the American viewpoint we are especially interested in these related questions: First, how will outer space activities affect the external situation within which the United States seeks to promote its security and welfare? Second, how can the United States manipulate space developments in order to improve its security and welfare? And third, how should the United States concert its space policy with other elements of its foreign, defense, and domestic policies

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , July 1960 , pp. 564 - 584
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1960

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References

1 The treatment is selective. For example, it neglects much of the current discussion of international space co-operation, a subject on which there is considerable literature; e.g., Jessup, Philip C. and Taubenfeld, Howard J., Controls for Outer Space, New York, 1959.Google Scholar

2 Thorough procedure would require that, first, we treat the present international system as being incapable of any changes except those resulting from space development (this as the only independent variable); and that, second, we run various other independent changes successively through the analysis.

3 At this point, it is difficult even to speculate about a possible fourth within twenty-five years. Neither Japan nor India is likely to have a sufficient resource base. This would leave some West European combine as a noteworthy possibility.

4 The Russians have made this point repeatedly. For example: “The American proposals on prohibiting the military use of outer space, while preserving nuclear weapons and U.S. military bases in foreign territories, in fact aim not at disarmament, but at a redistribution of armaments. … It is all too obvious that such proposals cannot win the support of the Soviet Union and other peaceful countries, which work by deeds and not words alone for disarmament that would guarantee genuine security to all countries, big and small. For it is not the space rocket as such that endangers the security of mankind, but tbe nuclear warhead which may be delivered by a space rocket, a rocket of any possible range, a military aircraft, etc. Clearly, the disarmament of outer space cannot be divorced from disarmament on Earth.”—Korovin, Y., Corresponding Member, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, “On the Neutralization and Demilitarization of Outer Space,” International Affairs (Soviet Society for the Popularization of Political and Scientific Knowledge), No. 12 (December 1959), pp. 82–83.Google Scholar

5 For reasons stated above, especially expense, the chances are slim that a smaller country will outflank the Big Two militarily by means of successful and yet cheap research and development in space technology.

6 A transitory monopoly is of course likely, in the sense that one country will be first to put a military satellite into orbit. It is improbable, however, that the initial satellites will produce substantial military effects, because their numbers are apt to be small and their performance characteristics relatively imperfect in the early stages of development.

7 Even a small increase in warning time after hostile ICBM's have been launched is of great benefit to a vulnerable deterrent force (e.g., planes on soft bases). This advantage may be precious to the United States—particularly by obviating more costly measures for shortening reaction time (e.g., airborne alert)—during a short period in the early 1960's when Soviet Russia has acquired a large force of ICBM's and the less vulnerable Minuteman and Polaris systems are not yet operational in sufficient numbers. Reconnaissance satellites are also reputed to be less subject than the Tepee to degradation by jamming. On the other hand, the reconnaissance satellite may not be operational before this phase of American vulnerability has passed, whereas Tepee will be ready in time.

8 Lt. Col. Singer, S. E., “The Military Potential of the Moon,” Air University Quarterly, XI (1959), pp. 31–53.Google Scholar

9 New York Times, December 21, 1959, p. 5.

10 Ibid., January 23, 1960. See also the statement by MrMerchant, Livingston T., Under Secretary of State, before the same committee, Washington Post, January 21, 1960.Google Scholar

11 Almond, Gabriel A., “Public Opinion and the Development of Space Technology,” Proceedings of the RAND Conference on Outer Space, to be published in the fall of 1960.Google Scholar

12 This assumption is in line with the modest proposals of the ad hoc committee of the U.N. General Assembly—a committee which was boycotted by the USSR. Cf. Jessup, and Taubenfeld, , op.cit., pp. 260ff.Google Scholar

13 I do not mean to say that the Soviet Union would be likely to take this course. Thus far, both the United States and Russia have declared repeatedly that there can be no valid claims to sovereignty in outer space. Though the governments of both countries may be temporizing in this matter, as well as playing up to sensitive public opinion, little advantage would probably accrue, at least during the next twenty-five years, to the first country that made such a claim.

14 The “Sword of Damocles” effect was pointed out by Louis Halle.