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The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Morton A. Kaplan
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Extract

Over the past decade traditionalists have launched a series of attacks on scientific approaches to international politics. Most of the arguments employed against the scientific approach stem from those used earlier by E. H. Carr in The Twenty Years’ Crisis. The general arguments that have been employed include these among others: that politics involves purpose in a way that physical science does not; that scientific knowledge is applicable to facts, but understanding, wisdom, or intuition are required for areas where human purpose is involved; that those pursuing scientific models tend to mistake their models for reality; that scientific method requires high precision and measurement and therefore is incapable of coping with the most important elements of international politics; and that the practitioners of scientific method can never be sure that they have not left something out of their model.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , October 1966 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1966

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References

1 2nd ed. (London 1956).

2 Ibid., 3-4.

3 Ross Ashby, W., Design for a Brain (New York 1952), 80 ffGoogle Scholar.

4 Ibid., 99.

5 The Computer and the Brain (New Haven 1958), 50.

6 Ibid., 90-92.

7 Organon: Posterior Analytics, Topica, Loeb Classical Library (London 1960), 33–55Google Scholar.

8 The phenomenon referred to has been discussed in a more corrigible sense by psychologists. Psychologists have discovered that the unconscious biases of investigators may determine the responses of those being investigated. The very fact that this has occurred, however, has been discovered by further scientific investigation in which controls have been added for the biases of the givers of the tests. Where the entire macrostructure of politics changes, controlled experiments in this exact sense cannot be carried on. The two situations are different in practice rather than in principle; however, it is this last phenomenon to which the discussion above has reference.

9 The assertion that my System and Process in International Politics (New York 1957)Google Scholar attempts a completely deductive theory has been made both by Hedley Bull and by Stanley Hoffmann. Hoffmann apparently quotes System and Process to this effect (“The Long Road to Theory,” World Politics, xi [April 1959], 357Google Scholar). And Bull, apparently relying upon Hoffmann, then uses the admitted fact that not all assertions of the models are rigorously deduced as a disproof of the claims made for the models (“International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,” World Politics, XVIII [April 1966], 366-67Google Scholar, 371-72). Yet the first page of the preface—the page from which Hoffmann takes his quotations—which contains the paragraph describing what an ideal deductive theory would look like, includes as the last line of that paragraph the following sentence: “If ‘theory’ is interpreted in this strict sense, this book does not contain a theory.” It then goes on to say, “If some of the requirements for a theory are loosened; if systematic completeness is not required; if proof of logical consistency is not required; if unambiguous interpretation of terms and laboratory methods of confirmation are not required; then this book is, or at least contains, a theory. This theory may be viewed as an initial or introductory theory of international politics.” This qualification is repeated in the conclusion (pp. 245-46): “A complete and systematic statement of these assumptions has not been offered. One reason for this gap lies in the belief of the author that international politics, and social science generally, is so poorly developed that the construction of a precise deductive system would be more constrictive and misleading than enlightening, that, at this stage of development, some ambiguity is a good thing.” I did believe, however, that the ambiguity could be reduced and that more disciplined reasoning and scientific method could be introduced into the study of international politics. That was what System and Process tried to do.

10 It was long known that certain poisons produced death. It was not known, however, how they did so. Eventually chemists learned that when certain poisons entered the blood stream, they combined with the oxygen in the blood and thereby deprived vital organs of the oxygen necessary for life. Although the end result of the poisoning was long known, the chemical explanation contributes to knowledge. Under some circumstances it has important utility. For instance, if one knows the mechanism involved, it may be easier to find the antidote.

11 System and Process, xvii-xviii.

12 Burns, Arthur Lee, “From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis,” World Politics, ix [July 1957], 494–529CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 The problem of confirmation of systems models is explored in greater depth in Kaplan, “Some Problems of International Systems Research,” in International Political Communities (New York 1966), 497–502Google Scholar.

14 Pp. 361-77.

15 “Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics,” American Political Science Review, LIV [March 1960], 34–57Google Scholar. See also Deutsch and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton 1957)Google Scholar; , Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York 1953)Google Scholar; and , Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City 1954)Google Scholar.

16 Haas, Ernst, “The Challenge of Regionalism,” International Organization, xn [Autumn 1958], 440-58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 For a responsible discussion of Deutsch's categories and techniques, see Retzlaff, Ralph H., “The Use of Aggregate Data in Comparative Political Analysis,” Journal of Politics, xxvii [November 1965], 797–817CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Russett, Bruce M., Trends in World Politics (New York 1965)Google Scholar.

19 Zaninovich, Martin George, An Empirical Theory of State Response: The Sino-Soviet Case (Stanford 1964)Google Scholar, mimeographed.

20 Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960)Google Scholar.

21 Hoffmann, Stanley, The State of War (New York 1965), 205Google Scholar.

22 Ibid., 206.

23 “Polycentrism and Western Policy,” Foreign Affairs, XLII (January 1964), 178Google Scholar.