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Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Amy Gurowitz
Amy Gurowitz
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
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Abstract

In recent years immigrant rights have increasingly been examined in an international context. An important theme in these discussions has been the question of whether, and if so how, states are constrained in developing immigrant and immigration policies. Some scholars argue that states are constrained by international human rights standards, while others, skeptical of this position, focus on a wide range of arguments at the domestic level of analysis. The skeptics are right that those asserting the impact of international human rights standards on immigrant policy have not demonstrated their importance domestically. International norms and standards do not diffuse automatically or consistently across states, and there has been too little detailed process tracing to illustrate the mechanisms of norm diffusion and therefore to move beyond correlation. To do so requires attention to the domestic actors who mobilize international norms and to the specific domestic circumstances in which they operate. This article examines a hard case by studying the impact of international human rights standards on policies toward Koreans and more recent migrant workers in Japan. In this case international norms matter. But they do not matter in a mysterious or automatic way. Domestic actors use international norms in context-specific environments to back up and make arguments for which they have few domestic resources. This is not a story of international versus domestic politics, nor is it a story about a paralyzed state. State actors are actively involved in the process of integrating international standards domestically, and the author examines how those standards work their way into the political process.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 51 , Issue 3 , April 1999 , pp. 413 - 445
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1999

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References

1 For example, between 1980 and 1995 International Organization and World Politics published only two articles on immigration. Since 1995 they have published four: Haus, Leah, “U.S. Immigration Policy and Labor,” International Organization 49 (Spring 1995)Google Scholar; Joppke, Christian, “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration,” World Politics 50 (January 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Messina, Anthony M., “The Not So Silent Revolution: Postwar Migration to Western Europe,” World Politics 49 (October 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Money, Jeannette, “The Political Geography of Immigration Control,” International Organization 51 (Autumn 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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3 Jacobson, David, Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 9Google Scholar. See also Sassen, Saskia, Losing Control? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)Google Scholar. On the impact of international norms more generally, see the contributions to Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)Google Scholar.

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5 Joppke (fn. 1), 281–87; and Hollifield (fn. 4), 222.

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8 Messina (fn. 1), 147.

9 It should be stressed that Soysal does look at difference across states, which in fact makes up the bulk of the book. The point is that those differences are in the policies themselves and are seen as resulting from domestic structures. They are not differences in how states react to international norms or in how they incorporate them, and they do not account for change across time. For another examination of the role of domestic structures in the diffusion of norms, see Jeffrey Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Institutions: Identity Politics in Post-Cold War Europe” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995).

10 Joppke (fn. 1), 269.

11 Ibid. On the need for process tracing, see Finnemore, Martha, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Instirutionalism,” International Organization 50 (Spring 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Jeffrey Checkel argues that constructivists in general have failed to sufficiently examine agency, the causal mechanisms by which norms have domestic effects, and why norms diffuse differently. See Checkel, , “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50 (January 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Joppke (fa. 1), 286.

13 This article is part of a larger project examining the impact of international human rights norms on immigrant policy in Germany, Japan, Canada, and Malaysia. In this project I argue that we can understand variation in the impact of international norms only by examining how those norms are mobilized by domestic actors and how their impact is mediated by specific state histories and identities. While the amount of detailed process that can be discussed in this article is limited by space, more detail can be found in this larger project. Gurowitz, , “Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the State” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1999)Google Scholar.

14 Soysal (fn. 2), 41. Important international agreements include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two UN Human Rights Covenants, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

15 See, for example, article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

16 Two of the most important international documents for migrant workers are International Labor Organization Convention 143 and the Council of Europe Convention on Migrant Workers. The recent UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families has had little impact, as very few states have ratified it.

17 Finnemore makes a similar argument when she states that nonwhite and non-Christian states can now make claims that they previously could not because they were not viewed as legitimate actors. See Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Katzenstein (fn. 3).

18 The media first picked up the issue of migrant rights in the mid-1980s, when they began reporting on undocumented, often female, migrants. By 1988 they were reporting more widely on a variety of migrant issues. See Masami Sekine, “Guest Worker Policies in Japan,” Migration (September 1991), 54; and Selby, Marilyn, “Human Rights and Undocumented Immigrant Workers in Japan,” Stanford Journal of International Law 26 no. 1 (1989), 354Google Scholar.

19 This article offers no theory regarding when state versus nonstate actors will mobilize international norms. In the cases examined in my larger project, differences depended on which government offices were involved in immigrant issues. One avenue to answer the question of when state versus nonstate actors will be involved lies in the work of a number of authors who have begun examining the interaction between transnational variables and domestic structures. Checlcel, for example, argues that a state's domestic structure shapes who the agents of normative change will be (societal pressure or elite learning) and what the likelihood of norm institutionalization will be. For a related study, see Risse-Kappen's examination of two variables that help determine the impact of transnational movements: the degree to which an issue-area is institutionalized internationally and a state's domestic structure. See Checkel (fn. 9); and Risse-Kappen, Thomas, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction,” in Risse-Kappen, , ed., Bringing Transnationalism Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 Martin, David A., “Effects of International Law on Migration Policy and Practice: The Uses of Hypocrisy,” International Migration Review 23 no. 2 (1989), 552CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Ibid., 554.

22 One reviewer made this argument with regard to court cases.

23 On the building of Japanese nationhood, see especially Gluck, Carol, Japan's Modern Myths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985)Google Scholar. On the importance of the ideal of homogeneity in the context of immigration, see Sellek, Yoko, “Niiieijin: The Phenomenon of Return Migration,” in Weiner, Michael, ed., Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity (London: Routledge, 1997)Google Scholar; and Millie Creighton, “Soto Others and Uchi Others: Imaging Racial Diversity, Imagining Homogeneous Japan,” in Weiner.

24 Weiner, Myron, “Opposing Visions: Migration and Citizenship Policies in Japan and the United States,” in Weiner, Myron and Hanami, Tadashi, eds., Temporary Workers or Future Citizens (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 Sellek (fn. 23), 201.

26 Japanese imperialism mirrored Western imperialism in its “civilizing” mission and its use of unequal treaties and other policies used by the West in Japan. The Sino-Japanese War, out of which the Japanese received Taiwan, is said to have put Japan on the imperialist map.

27 Creighton (fn. 23), 213.

28 The Burakumin are of the same lineage as other Japanese but are a minority group because of their historic status as outcasts.

29 For example, in response to a UN call for the elimination of discrimination against minorities, the government stated that there were no minorities in Japan and therefore no discrimination. Creighton (fn. 23), 227.

30 I discuss Japan's international identity at length in my dissertation; Gurowitz (fn. 13). See also Katzenstein, Peter J., Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996)Google Scholar; Calder, Kent E., “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics 40 (July 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Duus, Peter, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), 255Google Scholar; Inogichi, Takashi, Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), 65Google Scholar; and Tamamoto, Masaru, “The Ideology of Nothingness: A Meditation on Japanese National Identity,” World PolicyJournal 11 (Winter 1994), 96Google Scholar.

31 This description draws on Peter Katzenstein's conceptualization of Japan as a Hobbesian state. It is also related to Duus's reference to Japan as the “reluctant giant” and to Takashi Inoguchi's application of David Lake's term “supporter” to describe Japan's position in the international system. See Katzenstein (fn. 30); Duus (fn. 30), 255; Inoguchi (fn. 30), 65. Karel van Wolferen, in a chapter title, refers to Japan as being “in the world but not of it.” Wolferen, Van, The Enigma of Japanese Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989)Google Scholar, chap. 16.

32 Katzenstein points out that this external pressure, or gaiatsu, has become institutionalized such that domestic actors may exploit foreign pressure to sell unpopular policies at home. See Katzenstein (fn. 30), 38.

33 Two examples of the impact of international standards should be noted. First, Frank Upham argues that during the mid-1970s, under the impetus of the UN Declaration of the UN Decade for Women, the Japanese government committed itself to ending gender discrimination by 1985, and in 1980 the government signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Second, in 1957 Japan's workers' delegate appealed to the ILO for support in a conflict between the government and two unions. This began a long debate between the Japanese government, the unions, and the ILO over issues involving union membership. In 1965 the Diet ratified ILO convention 87 and changed its laws to comply with that convention. Ehud Harari argues that union leaders internationalized their demands because they believed that there was a good chance that government officials would respond to international pressure because the government was increasingly aware of the disparity between its laws and those of other industrialized countries and because it was increasingly sensitive to international criticism as it was trying to enhance its prestige abroad. , Harari, The Politics of Labor Legislation in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)Google Scholar, esp. 174; and Upham, Frank K., Law and Social Change in PostwarJapan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987)Google Scholar, esp. 148–51.

34 Research for this project is based on interviews conducted in early 1997, as well as on secondary sources. The section on Koreans necessarily relies more on secondary sources, backed up by interviews. The next section, based more on primary data, includes more detail about the role of international norms.

35 There was very little migration during the first decade. Between 1920 and 1930 the Korean population in Japan increased tenfold, then threefold by 1940, and then doubled again by the end of the war. Forced migration began in 1939. See Lee, Changsoo and Vos, George De, Koreans in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 35Google Scholar, 52. There were also Taiwanese immigrants, but because their numbers are quite small, I focus on Koreans here. However, the discussion and changes reviewed generally apply to both groups.

36 Lee and De Vos (fn. 35), 51.

37 Ibid., 77.

38 Because citizenship is based on jus sanguinis, and until 1985 only on patrilineal consanguinity, children born to denationalized Korean-Japanese are not Japanese citizens either. Interestingly, the Nationality Law of 1950 was made even more restrictive than the 1899 law had been, denying automatic acquisition of citizenship for certain categories of people such as spouses of Japanese citizens. See Lee and De Vos (fn. 35), 152.

39 International Commission of Jurists, “Japan's Denationalisation of the Korean Minority,” Review 29 (December 1982), 29–30Google Scholar.

40 Shoichi, Koseki, “Japanizing the Constitution,” Japan Quarterly 35, no. 3 (1988), 235Google Scholar.

41 Ibid., 234—40; and Lansing, Paul and Domeyer, Tamra, “Japan's Attempt at Internationalization and Its Lack of Sensitivity to Minority Issues,” California Western International Law Journal 22, no. 1 (1991–1992), 140Google Scholar.

42 Lee and De Vos (fn. 35), 147.

43 Ibid., 148.

44 Yasuhiko, Saito, “Japan and Human Rights Covenants,” Human Rights Law Journal 2, no. 1–2 (1981), 88–90Google Scholar.

45 Quoted in Yasuhiko (fn. 44), 89–91. Yasuhiko was the chair for NGO meetings making these arguments to the government.

46 Yasuhiko (fn. 44), 94.

47 Gerrit Gong notes that the terms modernization, Westernization, and civilization were all used during the Gong, Meiji era., The Standard of Civilization in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 164Google Scholar.

48 Passin, Herbert, “Overview: The Internationalization of Japan—Some Reflections,” in Mannari, Hiroshi and Befu, Harumi, eds., The Challenge of Japan's Internationalization (Hyogo, Japan: Kwansei Gakuin University, 1983), 20Google Scholar. On internationalization, see also Hook, Glenn D. and Weiner, Michael A., eds., The Internationalization of Japan (London: Routledge, 1992)Google Scholar; and Mannari and Befu.

49 Passin (fn. 48), 21. See also Sadako Ogata, “Interdependence and Internationalization,” in Hook and Weiner (fn. 48), 64. It should be noted though that internationalization does not refer only to Westernization. There have historically been strong counterarguments in Japan for Asianization, and today Japan is trying to become more integrated into the Asian region. I am grateful to Saori Katada for stressing this point.

50 Weiner (fn. 24), 9. Weiner argues that internationalization did not mean the incorporation of foreigners into Japanese society. While this was clearly not the intent, I argue that the idea of a closed, ethnically homogeneous society has been called into question by the idea of internationalization and that the two issues are now intimately linked in domestic debates.

51 Glenn D. Hook and Michael A. Weiner, “Introduction,” in Hook and Weiner (fn. 48), 1.

52 Ogata (fn. 49), 64.

53 Yasutomo, Dennis T., “The Politicization of Japan's Post-Cold War Multilateral Diplomacy,” in Curtis, Gerald L., ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 330Google Scholar.

54 Vogel, Ezra F., “Pax Nipponica,” Foreign Affairs 64 (Spring 1986), 756CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and author interview with Haruka Okumura, Human Rights Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, February 10,1997.

55 While I will address only UN human rights issues here, Japan has also been actively seeking a seat on the UN Security Council and has been engaged in much debate over participation in international peacekeeping missions.

56 Yasuhiro Ueki, “Japan's UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism,” in Curtis (fn. 53), 347.

57 CERD is one of the most widely ratified human rights conventions in the world. Japan ratified it only after the U.S. did, something not lost on human rights observers in Japan. Author interview at the International Movement against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (iMADR), Tokyo, February 11,1997.

58 Another way that Japan has enhanced participation is to increase its profile with officials in high positions like Sadako Ogata, head of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Yasushi Akashi, head of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and Hiroshi Nakajima, head of the World Health Organization.

59 The best sources documenting the arguments made in courts on behalf of Koreans citing international agreements are Iwasawa, Yuji. “Legal Treatment of Koreans in Japan: The Impact of International Human Rights Law on Japanese Law,” Human Rights Quarterly 8 no. 2 (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and idem, “The Impact of International Law on Japanese Law: Revolution or Accommodation” (SJD diss., University of Virginia, 1996), 128Google Scholar. Iwasawa is widely recognized as the leading expert in this area. Much information found in Iwasawa's work was confirmed in interviews with other lawyers in Japan and is reiterated in other sources. See, for example, George, Hicks, Japan's Hidden Apartheid: The Korean Minority and the Japanese (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997); and Jo, Yung-Hwan, “Japan,” in Sigler, Jay A., ed., International Handbook on Race and Racism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

60 Iwasawa (fn. 59,1996), 146, fn. 68.

61 Annual naturalization rates are extremely low, less than 1 percent of the Korean population.

62 Quoted in Iwasawa (fn. 59,1996), 130.

63 Ibid., 129.

64 Ibid., 116.

65 Hicks and Jo both also cite the importance of the Refugee Convention in making Koreans eligible for social security by removing the nationality requirements from the law. Hicks (fn. 59), 56; and Jo (fn. 59), 146.

66 Hicks (fn. 59), 57; and Jo (fn. 59), 136.

67 Certain protections such as livelihood protection apply to Koreans, but not to short-term migrants or illegal aliens. See Iwasawa (fn. 59,1996), 156.

68 Han Chong-sok was the first to refuse to be fingerprinted and to go to court over the issue. On his case, see Hicks (fn. 59), 96.

69 Iwasawa (fn. 59,1996), 143–44.

70 For example, the Choren, a Korean organization affiliated with North Korea, was able to get an amendment to the ordinance on the Acquisition of Property for Foreign Nationals that allowed Koreans who had been Japanese nationals as of September 2,1945, and had since resided in Japan continuously, to not be included as foreign nationals under the ordinance. The Choren was disbanded by the government before the Korean War but was replaced by the Soren, or Chongryun, which worked to try to block Diet bills that would adversely affect Koreans. See Hicks (fn. 59), 30–34.

71 Cornelius, Wayne A., “Japan: The Illusion of Immigration Control,” in Cornelius, Wayne A., Martin, Philip L., and Hollifield, James F., eds., Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 382Google Scholar; and Yasushi Iguchi, “Japan” (Paper presented at the Conference on International Migration and Labor Markets in Asia, Tokyo, January 30–31,1997), 25. This number does not include permanent legal residents such as Koreans. The estimate has such a wide range because it refers to both official and unofficial figures. Illegal workers are primarily those overstaying visas. It is estimated that in May 1997 there were 285,000 illegal workers in Japan. “Japan: Chinese and Integration,” Migrant News 4 no. 5 (1997)Google Scholar.

72 Sekine (fn. 18), 52.

73 Sellek (fn. 23), 182.

74 Shimada, Haruo, Japan's “Guest Workers,” trans. Northridge, Roger (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 62Google Scholar; and Katherine Tegtmeyer Pak, “Immigration Politics in Japan: Differences in Issue Articulation across Levels of Government and Society” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago 1995), 14. As Pak points out, this does not address the fact that skilled professionals are generally equated with whites.

75 Pak (fn. 74), 14.

76 Sellek (fn. 23), 187–88.

77 Ibid., 189.

78 Cornelius (fn. 71), 398.

79 Ibid., 399. Shimada argues that changes to the training programs have been very significant, although not in the numbers. He argues that the programs are very future looking and that no other country has them. Author interview with Haruo Shimada, Keio University, Tokyo, February 12,1997.

80 Sekine (fn. 18), 60.

81 Ibid. These sentiments are found throughout the literature and were confirmed in my interviews.

82 Oka, Takashi, Prying Open the Door: Foreign Workers inJapan (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 4Google Scholar.

83 For a detailed description of union positions, see Komai, Hiroshi, Migrant Workers in Japan (London: Kegan Paul International, 1995), 215-16Google Scholar. According to Komai, Rengo, the umbrella organization for trade unions, is against accepting unskilled workers, although their think tank in 1990 showed some tendency toward openness as an alternative to increased numbers of illegal workers. Yasushi Iguchi, of Kwansei Gakuin University, says that Rengo intends to make immigrant rights a new issue; author interview, February 14,1997. While it appears that, as in other states, unions may shift toward equal rights for migrants, they are not yet a major player in Japanese debates. The National Federation of Construction Workers' Unions is strongly opposed to the acceptance of foreign labor, as are the shipbuilding and engineering unions. The National Confederation of Trade Unions has favored acceptance of foreign workers with restrictions on numbers as has the National Machinery and Metal Workers' Union.

84 Sekine (fn. 18), 66; and Komai (fn. 83), 212–14.

85 Author interview with Mr. Nikai, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, February 7,1997.

86 Sellek (fn. 23,1997), 186.

87 Kunio Nishimura, “Helping Hands,” Look Japan (April 1992), 4.

88 See Constitution, Article 98 (2). Yuji Iwasawa, “The Domestic Impact of Acts of International Organizations Relating to Human Rights” (Paper presented at the Second Trilateral Symposium, Atlanta, March 24–26,1996), 2.

89 Author interviews with Yuji Iwasawa, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, February 17, 1997, and Yasushi Higashizawa, attorney, Tokyo, February 18, 1997. On universalism versus uniqueness, see Katzenstein (fn. 30), 177; and Katzenstein, Peter J. and Tsujinaka, Yutaka, Defending theJapanese State: Structures, Norms and the Political Responses to Terrorism and Violent Social Protest in the 1970s and 1980s (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University), 1991Google Scholar.

90 Information on the role of law in Japan and on current trends was gathered from author interviews with Yuichi Kaido, attorney, Tokyo, February 15,1997; Higashizawa, Tokyo, February 18,1997; Susumu Yamagami, director of Adjudication Division, Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Tokyo, February 16,1997; Iwasawa, Tokyo, February 17,1997; and IMADR, Tokyo, February 11,1997. Information was also drawn from Iwasawa (fnn. 59, 88). In an interesting aside, Tadashi Hanami points out that law student interest in international law has increased dramatically over the last fifteen years. Author interview with Tadashi Hanami, Sophia University, Tokyo, February 14,1997.

91 See Iwasawa (fn. 88). Repeta, in a similar argument, points out that the most effective enforcement of the ICCPR is likely to be produced not through litigation but through pressure for reform exerted on government agencies and the legislature. See Repeta, Lawrence, “The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Human Rights Law in Japan,” Law in Japan 20 no. 1 (1987), 4Google Scholar.

92 Author interview with Higashizawa, Tokyo, February 18,1997; and Iwasawa (fn. 88), 12.

93 Author interview with Higashizawa, Tokyo, February 18,1997.

94 Japanese Federation of Bar Associations, Utilizing International Human Rights Covenants in the Courtroom (Hotei ni ikaso kokusaijinken kinyuko) (Japanese Federation of Bar Associations, 1996)Google Scholar.

95 Author interview with Higashizawa, Tokyo, February 18,1997.

96 Author interview with Kaido, Tokyo, February 15,1997.

97 Migrant News (fn. 71). The idea that foreign pressure is responsible for this was widely expressed in my interviews with government officials.

98 There are now one hundred ethnic publications in fifteen different languages. “Japan's New Immigration Law,” Migrant News 4 no. 6 (1997), 26Google Scholar.

99 According the Ministry of Health and Welfare, over twenty thousand marriages between Japanese men and foreign women have taken place since 1995. “Japan's New Immigration Law” (fn. 98).

100 Iguchi (fn. 71), 6.

101 Author interviews with Iguchi, Tokyo, February 14,1997; and Higashizawa, Tokyo, February 18, 1997.

102 Iwasawa (fn. 88), 13.

103 “Japan Copes with Illegal Foreigners,” Migrant News 3 no. 12 (1996)Google Scholar. Higashizawa discussed another case of a Filipino overstayer who had a child with a Japanese national. They planned to marry, but he died. The woman and child stayed in Japan but were not allowed to join the insurance plan because of an initial MOHW ruling that only foreigners legally resident for a year or more were eligible for the national health plan. In late 1995 the Tokyo District Court rejected the woman's claim saying that it was at the discretion of the government whether to include foreigners in the plan and that the court therefore could not overrule the government. Higashizawa argues that the attorneys on the case did not place a high enough priority on the ICCPR and ICESCR. Author interview with Higashizawa, Tokyo, February 18,1997.

104 Hanami, Tadashi, “Japanese Policies on the Rights and Benefits Granted to Foreign Workers, Residents, Refugees and Illegals,” in Weiner, Myron and Hanami, Tadashi, eds., Temporary Workers or Future Citizens (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 233Google Scholar.

105 Author interview with Higashizawa, Tokyo, February 18,1997.

106 Pak (fn. 74), 21.

107 Migrant News (fn. 102).

108 Pak (fn. 74), 22.

109 Hanami (fn. 104), 234.

110 Author interview with Iguchi, Tokyo, February 14,1997. This occurred after a Kawasaki court in 1994 decided that employment of foreigners in local government was not a constitutional issue.

111 Hook and Weiner (fn. 51), 2.

112 Shimada (fn. 74), 202.

113 Ibid., viii. Sellek and Weiner also refer to this as a “litmus test.” Yoko Sellek and Michael A. Weiner, “Migrant Workers: The Japanese Case in International Perspective,” in Hook and Weiner (fn. 48), 205.

114 Author interview with Shimada, Tokyo, February 17,1997. Many interviewees also spoke of the impact of international-minded young people.

115 Author interview, with Tesuo Yamazaki, Tokyo Immigration Bureau, Tokyo, February 12,1997. The Tokyo Immigration Bureau is part of the Ministry ofJustice.

116 Hanami, Tadashi, “Discrimination in the U.S. and Japan: From a Legal Viewpoint,” Journal of American and Canadian Studies 8 (Autumn 1991)Google Scholar.

117 Ibid., 2–4. Patrick Ireland has pointed out to me that, in addition to these accusations of racism, the Japanese are being “Goldhagened” by the recent focus on their wartime activities and treatment of “comfort women.” There is little doubt that this type of criticism makes people in the government increasingly sensitive.

118 Hanami (fn. 116), 5.

119 Pak (fn. 74), 22.

120 Selby (fn. 18), 362. There is pressure on Japan from other Asian states to open labor markets. But there is not a significant degree of corresponding pressure regarding the treatment of migrant workers once in Japan.

121 Sekine (fn. 18), 68.

122 Author interview with Yamagami, Tokyo, February 16,1997.

123 “Japan: Unemployment and Foreign Workers,” Migrant News 3 no. 2 (1996)Google Scholar.

124 Freeman (fn. 7).