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International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Helen Milner
Helen Milner
Affiliation:
Columbia University
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Abstract

Cooperation among nations has become the focus of a wide range of studies in the past decade. The recent international relations literature about cooperation has adopted a distinct approach. It has tended to focus on the systemic level of analysis. It has also used game theory as its central tool of analysis. This review evaluates this literature, arguing that these methodological choices have contributed to both the greatest strengths and the greatest weaknesses of the literature in explaining cooperation among nations.

The recent literature on international cooperation has made two general contributions. First, it has developed a concept of cooperation, which can help distinguish what behavior counts as cooperation and which has been adopted widely in thefield.Second, the literature ha* tried to illuminate the conditions under which cooperation is likely to emerge. Using game theory to model relations at the systemic level parsimoniously, scholars have developed at least six hypotheses about the circumstances that promote cooperative behavior.

The recent literature also suffers from at least two serious problems. The first problem flows from the assumptions used to generate the relatively parsimonious hypotheses. In particular, the way in which the assumption of anarchy is used causes problems. Second, and relatedly, the literature shows a remarkable neglect of domestic politics. As will be argued, this poses a serious limitation for understanding cooperation. Systemic theory simply cannot take us far enough. The international-level hypotheses depend on implicit theories about internal politics. Hypotheses about domestic influences on cooperation among states are not well developed. Although systemic theory has been touted for a variety of reasons, the biggest gains in understanding international cooperation in the future are likely to come from domestic-level theories.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , April 1992 , pp. 466 - 496
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1992

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References

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2 See Keohane (fn. 1); Oye, Kenneth A., ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986Google Scholar); Putnam and Bayne (fn. I); as well as Grieco and Haas.

3 Keohane (fn. 1), 51–52. This definition comes from Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965), 227Google Scholar.

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11 Keohane (fn. 8), 4.

12 Studies in social psychology have also advanced this hypothesis. See, e.g., Dutton, John and Walton, Richard, “Interdepartmental Conflict and Cooperation,” Human Organization 25 (1966), 217CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Marwell and Schmitt (fn. 4), 53–55.

13 Axelrod (fn. 1), 30–31; for an argument against the idea that symmetry of the payoffs matters for the outcome, see p. 17.

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15 See Haas (pp. 78–79, 182–84) for examples. Haas does not believe, however, that side-payments were the key to cooperation (see p. 188).

16 Oye (fn. 2), 18. It is unclear exactly which actors one is supposed to count: all potential cooperators, only those who negotiate, or only those who agree to cooperate in the end.

17 The principal supplier rule in GATT negotiations is an example.

18 Snidal (fn. 9), 716.

19 Iteration in different games has different effects. In a game of Chicken, it may not promote cooperation.

20 Axelrod (fn. 1) and Snidal (fn. 9) show through simulation how increasing discount rates makes the PD game more conflictual and cooperation less likely.

Robert Telser has shown (1) that even without reciprocity an agreement can be self-enforcing—that is, no outside party is needed to enforce it—”as long as each party believes himself to be better off by continuing the agreement than he would be by ending it” and (2) that this occurs when two conditions are met: the sequence of interactions has no final element and the future discount rate is low enough. See Telser, “A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements,” Journal of Business 53, no. 1 (1980), 27.

21 Keohane (fn. 1), 90.

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23 Haas claims later that this information-provision function was superseded as the primary function of the Med Plan regime (p. 185).

24 Keohane (fn. 1), 91. The idea of nesting comes from Aggarwal, Vinod, Liberal Protectionism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985Google Scholar).

25 Haas suggests as much; see chap. 8.

26 For instance, Conybeare (in Oye, fn. 2) argues that asymmetries in influence mean weaker states can be more sure of retaliation by stronger ones, thus reducing their temptation to defect. Lipson (in Oye, fn. 2) claims that asymmetry on each side allows the number oi actors to be reduced, which facilitates negotiation.

27 For further support, see Snidal (fn. 1) about k-groups; and Eichengreen, Barry, Elusive Stability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 113CrossRefGoogle Scholar–52, 271–311.

28 Schelling (fn. 6); Gowa (fn. 7).

29 Recent work in American politics also raises the issue of the credibility of promises. See, e.g., Kenneth Shepsle, “Institutional Arrangements of Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,” American Journal of Political Science 23, no. 1 (1979); and Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice,” Public Choice 37, no. 3 (1981).

30 Gowa (fn. 7); cites in fn. 14; Jervis, Robert, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics 40 (April 1988), 334CrossRefGoogle Scholar–35; Grieco.

31 Gowa (fn. 7); Jervis (fn. 30); Grieco.

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34 This is true domestically as well; with a common authority, the vulnerability of individuals varies greatly. Living in New York City and living in Princeton, New Jersey, provide different levels of security.

35 Powell, “The Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory” American Political Science Review (forthcoming).

36 Ibid., 24.

37 Snidal (fn. 9).

38 If one assumes that states are identical and have the same preference rankings, this argument fails. But such an assumption is heroic. Domestic politics are central here, too.

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40 Sociologists have been debating economists for years about this assumption for domestic society. See, e.g., Barry, Brian, Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978Google Scholar).

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42 Note how similar this is to Powell's argument.

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47 For Jervis, it is the nature of the domestic regimes that influences the concert system; for Van Evera, the misperceptions of decision makers; for Conybeare, rent seeking by domestic interests; for Oye, the domestic costs of and economic beliefs of elites about alternative macroeconomic policies; for Lipson, the domestic relationship among banks (all in Oye, fn. 2).

48 Since he does not test domestic explanations against his international one, it is difficult to support this claim.

49 Lipson (fn. 1), 10. Oye (fn. 2) also points this out (pp. 15–16).

50 One of the best recent attempts is Putnam, Robert, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

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