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Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in Western Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Wayne Sandholtz
Wayne Sandholtz
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Society at the, University of California, Irvine
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Abstract

The member states of the European community are not just liberalizing telecommunications but are cooperating extensively in the sector. Breaking with a past dominated by rigid national monopolies (the PTTs), EC states in the 1980s undertook collective action in research and development, planning future networks, setting standards, and opening markets. This article seeks to explain telecoms liberalization and cooperation in Europe. Two conditions are necessary for international collective action to emerge. The first is policy adaptation at the national level, such that governments are willing to consider alternatives to pure unilateralism. In telecommunications, technological changes induced widespread policy adaptation in EC states. This adaptation was a necessary prerequisite for European cooperation. The second necessary condition is international leadership to organize the collective action. This paper extends the analysis of international leadership by outlining the conditions under which international organizations can exercise leadership to organize collective action. The case study, focusing on three dimensions of EC telecoms reform, shows how the Commission of the EC led in organizing collective action.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , January 1993 , pp. 242 - 270
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1993

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References

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26 A brief note on some of the institutions of the European Community might be in order. The Commission is the executive arm of the Community; its members are appointed by the member state governments but do not take instructions from them. The Council (its full name is the Council of Ministers) is the body in which national governments are represented and vote. For general EC business, the foreign ministers meet and vote. But ministers with other portfolios can also constitute a Council when the subject under discussion indicates it would be appropriate. For instance, the ministers of agriculture meet and vote on agricultural questions, ministers of research handle technology questions, and so on. Most EC laws and policies must be approved by the Council of Ministers; votes of the Council carry equal authority regardless of which set of ministers is involved. The European Council is composed of the heads of state or government. It meets three times per year and deals with broad issues. Major new policies and institutions are always agreed on at this level. Meetings of the European Council are also referred to as European summits, the terminology I will use in this paper so as to avoid confusion with the Council of Ministers.

27 Interviews conducted by the author in 1987. Officials interviewed were promised anonymity. Interview notes are in the author's possession.

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35 GEC, ICL, and Plessey from Britain; Bull, CGE, and Thomson from France; AEG, Nixdorf, and Siemens from Germany; Olivetti and STET from Italy; and Philips from the Netherlands.

36 ISDN is the next step in telecoms evolution. It will constitute a digital network capable of simultaneously carrying voice, text, high-speed data, and low-quality images.

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