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Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution: External Influences on Postcommunist Transformations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Wade Jacoby
Wade Jacoby
Affiliation:
Brigham Young University
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Abstract

There has been a recent explosion of interest in the external influences on the political and economic transformations of postcommunist states. This article consolidates several analytical advances in this literature and distills three main functions of external actors, namely, to lengthen the time horizons ofpostcommunist politicians, to expand the circle of interested reformers, and t o deter opponents of reform. The article argues that a focus on external influences is a growth area for good conceptual work only if it addresses the union of foreign and domestic influences, rather than treating them as stylized alternative explanations. The central point is that outside actors should be considered as striving to influence the choices of existing domestic actors with whom they can be seen to form a kind of informal coalition. At bottom, outsiders do best through a combination of strategies: strengthening domestic actors already committed to their approach, winning over new domestic actors to their priorities, and preventing the unconvinced from obstructing reforms.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , July 2006 , pp. 623 - 651
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2006

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References

1 Most important here were a series of articles by Valerie Bunce. For a summary, see Bunce, , “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience,” World Politics 55 (January 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the same “domestic bias” in the broader democratization and political economy literatures, see Simmons, Beth, Dobbin, Frank, and Garrett, Geoffrey, “The International Diffusion of Liberalism,” International Organization 60 (October 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Other books that treat external influences on postcommunism and are not reviewed here include Grabbe, Heather, The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionahty in Central and Eastern Europe (London: Palgrave, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pond, Elizabeth, Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change European Style (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2006)Google Scholar; Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich, eds., The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005)Google Scholar; Goldsmith, Benjamin, Imitation in International Relations: Observational Learning, Analogies andForeign Policy in Russia and Ukraine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pridham, Geoffrey, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vachudova, Milada, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pevehouse, John, Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Skach, Cindy, Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005)Google Scholar; Jacoby, Wade, The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe (New York: Cambridge, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; DeNevers, Renee, Comrades No More: The Seeds of Change in Eastern Europe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003)Google Scholar; Ekiert, Grzegorz and Hanson, Stephen, eds., Capitalism and Democracy in Central andEastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)Google Scholar; Bastian, Sunil and Luckham, Robin, eds., Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-torn Societies (London: Zed Books, 2003)Google Scholar; Henderson, Sarah, Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003)Google Scholar; Mendelson, Sarah and Glenn, John, eds., The Power and Limit of NGOs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Quandt, Richard, The Changing Landscape in Eastern Europe: A Personal Perspective on Philanthropy and Technology Transfer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)Google Scholar; McDermott, Gerald, Embedded Politics: Industrial Networks and Institutional Change in Post Communism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Linden, Ronald, ed., Norms and Nannies: The Impact ofInternational Organizations on the Central and East European States (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002)Google Scholar; Jacoby, Wade, Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001)Google Scholar; Zielonka, Jan and Pravda, Alex, eds., Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and Transnational Factors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Valcnin, Sam, After the Rain: How the West Lost the East (Prague: Narcissus Books, 2000)Google Scholar; Ottaway, Marina and Carothers, Thomas, eds., Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000)Google Scholar; Dawisha, Karen, ed., The International Dimension of Postcommunist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997)Google Scholar; Pridham, Geoffrey, Herring, Eric, and Sanford, George, eds., Building Democracy? The International Dimension ofDemocratisation in Eastern Europe (London: Leicester University Press, 1997)Google Scholar.

3 The term “postcommunist” remains useful for the issue of external influence, in part, due to the weakness in most postcommunist societies of two “threatening” actors that play crucial roles in the general comparative literature on external influences on democracy and market transitions: the bourgeoisie and the army.

4 On the gap between adoption and implementation, see Janos, Andrew, “From Eastern Empire to Western Hegemony: East Central Europe under Two International Regimes,” East European Politics and Societies 15 (March 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on feigned compliance, see Wade Jacoby, “Priest and Penitent: The European Union as a Force in the Domestic Politics of Eastern Europe,” East European Constitutional Review (Winter-Spring 1999).

5 This essay uses “external” and “outsider” as synonyms to represent Western IOs and nation-states whose practices or policies affect postcommunist choices about institutional design. Similarly, “internal,” “domestic,” and “insider” are synonyms for postcommunist actors whose choices are affected by the policies or practices of the Western actors. “Institutions” are formal rules, laws, and state policies.

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8 The review thus leaves out the effect of these same actors on postcommunist civil society or regime type. On postcommunist civil society, cf. Phillips, Ann, Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East CentralEurope (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000)Google Scholar. On regime type, see Vachudova (fn. 2); Mark Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions” (Lecture at University of Toronto, February 16, 2005); David Cameron, “The Quality of Democracy in Postcommunist Europe” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1,2005). It also leaves out the effects of individuals; cf. Quandt (fn. 2). It leaves out the effects of international NGOs; Henderson (fn. 2). And finally it leaves out the influence of Western businesses; cf. Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits, “Capital, Labor, and the Prospects of the European Social Model in the East,” Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper, no. 58 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2004).

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10 Quoted in Rose, Richard, Learningfrom Comparative Public Policy: A Practical Guide (London: Routledge, 2005), 1Google Scholar.

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12 Cf. Vachudova (fn. 2) on “passive leverage”; Haas, Peter, ed., Knowledge, Power, andInternational Policy Coordination (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Rose (fn. 10); On “unchan-neled Bayesian updating,” see Simmons, Beth and Elkins, Zachary, “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy,” American Political Science Review 98 (February 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (fn. 1).

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14 I prefer the term minority “tradition” to “faction” because the former better connotes the historical domestic antecedents that are sometimes critical to the success of foreign-inspired reforms. Obviously, “minority” does not refer here to ethnic minorities.

15 Risse, Thomas, Ropp, Stephen, and Sikkink, Kathryn, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jacoby (fn. 2, 2001); Vachudova (fn. 2).

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20 For exceptions, see Vachudova (fn. 2); Epstein, Rachel, “Diverging Effects of Social Learning and External Incentives in Polish Central Banking and Agriculture,” in Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich, eds., The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 178–98Google Scholar.

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22 Simmons and Elkins (fn. 12), 176.

23 Ibid., 187. A similarly subtle account focused on postcommunist areas and calling explicitly for the kind of complementary approach offered here is Kopstein, Jeffrey S. and Reilly, David A., “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World,” World Politics 53 (October 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Henisz, Witold, Guillen, Mauro, and Zelner, Bennet, “The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977–1999',” American Sociological Review 70 (December 2005), 893CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 Weyland (fn. 13) quickly dismisses external pressures and subsumes most diffusion processes under “domestic initiative” before sorting out whether the domestic motives are best explained as the result of a quest for legitimacy, rational learning, or cognitive heuristics (pp. 268–73). In this approach to diffusion, external influences do sometimes reemerge, especially when domestic actors ask ios to “please impose this condition on us” (p. 273). But, as with the other diffusion approaches reviewed here, the key impetus for institutional change lies with domestic actors.

26 In fact, however, imposed sanctions have been rare in postcommunism. Between 1990 and 2000, Western powers levied sanctions against postcommunist countries only four times: the UN against Yugoslavia (1991–2001) to end Serb involvement in civil wars in Bosnia and Croatia, the U.S. against the USSR (1991) to restore Gorbachev to power, Greece against Macedonia (1994–95) to force a name change, the U.S. and the EU against Yugoslavia/Serbia (1998–2001) to destabilize Milosevic and stop aggression in Kosovo; Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism, http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctions-timeline.cfm (accessed January 10, 2006).

27 Greskovits, Béla, The PoliticalEconomy ofProtest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared (Budapest: Central European University, 1998)Google Scholar; Bockman, Johana and Eyal, Gil, “Eastern Knowledge as a Laboratory for Economic Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism,” American Journal of Sociology 108 (September 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Appel, Hilary, A New Capitalist Order: Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 See also Epstein (fn. 20); Juliet Johnson shows that postcommunist central bankers often used alliances with transnational actors to contest economic reforms against domestic rivals;Johnson, “Two-Track Diffusion and Central Bank Embeddedness: The Politics of Euro Adoption in Hungary and the Czech Republic” (Manuscript, Department of Political Science, McGill University, 2005).

29 These threats were not hollow. The IMF suspended programs in both 1990 and 1991.

30 Stone tends to ignore other areas where IMF policy advice was arguably less appropriate to post-communist settings. See Stiglitz, Joseph, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003), chap. 5Google Scholar; Treisman, Daniel, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consoli dation in Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001)Google Scholar.

31 Stone mentions the EU in passing on page 113 (for Poland) and on page 228 (for Bulgaria).

32 Vachudova (fn. 2). See also Grabbe (fn. 2); Pridham (fn. 2); Jacoby (fn. 2, 2004).

33 See also Schwellnuss, Guido, “The Adoption of Non-Discrimination and Minority Protection Rules in Romania, Hungary, and Poland,” in Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich, eds., The Europeanization of CentralandEastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 51–70Google Scholar; Mitchell A. Orenstein and Umut Ozkaleli, “European Union as a Network Actor in Roma Minority Policy” (Manuscript, Syracuse University, 2005).

34 See also Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (fn. 2).

35 Given the statutory nature of the required changes and the ineffectiveness here of the inspiration mode (only four case of voluntary success), the IOs were dependent upon a coalition approach. For membership ios, in the premembership period, IOs could inspire insiders or work with them but not go around them. Postmembership, the EU, OSCE, and CE all have recourse to the substitution mode by suspending a state's membership.

36 Moreover, ios would not necessarily need an ethnic partner as a minority tradition, but only a liberal one, so it is quite conceivable that an implicit coalition existed in other cases as well.

37 On this point, see exemplary work by Schwellnuss (fn. 33); Frank Schimmelfennig, Engert, Stefan, and Knobel, Heiko, International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)Google Scholar; Vachudova (fn. 2).

38 In different ways, the external-internal dichotomy is also exaggerated in O'Dwyer (fn. 6); Henderson, Balaton, and Lengyel (fn. 6); Crawford and Lijphart (fn. 6); Campbell (fn. 6).

39 See also Carothers, Thomas and Ottaway, Marina, eds., Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 15Google Scholar; Phillips, Ann, Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East Central Europe (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 180Google Scholar.

40 See the essays in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (fn. 2).

41 Marek, Dan and Baun, Michael, “The EU as a Regional Actor: The Case of the Czech Republic,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (December 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Glenn, John, “From Nation-States to Member States: Accession Negotiations as an Instrument of Europeanization,” Comparative European Politics 2 (April 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 On Leninist legacies, see Jowitt, Kenneth, New WorldDisorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Ekiert and Hanson (fn. 2); Bunce (fn. 1); Khakee, Anna, “Democracy and Marketization in Central and Eastern Europe: Case Closed?” East European Politics and Society 16 (May 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Crawford and Lijphart (fn. 6).

43 Wedel downplays inspiration, saying the operative principle generally was that “the donors pretend to help us, and we pretend to be helped” (p. 79).

44 For evidence that shock therapy was not the cause of Russia's hyperinflation, see Fish, M. Steven, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 139–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 Henderson (fn. 2); Sperling, Valerie, Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

46 The book was published prior to efforts to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan. On the Middle East, see Carothers and Ottaway (fn. 39).

47 Those diffusion studies that use laws on paper as proxies for real reform also are vulnerable to this form of superficiality.

48 Beissinger (fn. 8). Putin's tough stance on foreign-funded NGOs may well be a response to these events.

49 Henisz, Guillen, and Zelner (fn. 24).

50 Haas (fn. 12); Fukuyama (fn. 17); Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (fn. 1).

51 Bose (fn. 17); Ignatieff (fn. 17); Effron and O'Brien (fn. 17); Pond (fn. 2).

52 See Fukuyama (fn. 17); Henderson (fn. 2); for a similar argument in the development literature, see Calderisi, Robert, The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)Google Scholar.

53 Subsequent research is needed along three lines: (1) to further specify the kinds of divided government likely to increase time horizons, broaden their circle of allies, and deter potential veto players; (2) to test which external factors besides membership incentives can influence domestic choices; and (3) to further explore which of the three mechanisms are important in non-postcommunist settings.

54 Keck, Margaret and Sikkink, Kathryn, Activists beyond Borders (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

55 Kelley (fn. 9); Grabbe (fn. 2); Vachudova (fn. 2); Jacoby (fn. 2,2004).

56 Vreeland, James, The IMF and Economic Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 Gould, Erica, Money Talks: The International Monetary Fund, Conditionality, and Supplementary Financiers (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 Two of these books' findings overlap with strategic mechanisms identified by the two-level games literature, which investigates how national negotiators can benefit from their own domestic constraints; see Putnam, Robert, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Milner, Helen, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997)Google Scholar. First, some domestic negotiators did occasionally invite ios to “tie their hands,” as in Ukrainian and Russian negotiations with the IMF (Stone, Lending Credibility). Second, the EU did “target” populations to increase the win-set of their national negotiators in Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria in the late 1990s; Vachudova (fn. 2). There is, however, a profound difference between the coalition approach here and the two-level games literature: postcommunist states' bargaining has not really been about negotiations for new, mutually acceptable regimes like those in two-level games. Rather, the “negotiations” are really about the terms under which postcommunist states join existing regimes. When, as here, terms are largely nonnegotiable, domestic constraints are more hindrance than help.

59 For an excellent recent summary of the modest effects of external actors in the developing world, see Milner, Helen, “Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (December 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60 There is a large literature on using ios to lock-in policies. On the economic side, see McGillivray, Fiona and Smith, Alastair, “Trust and Cooperation through Agent-Specific Punishments,” International Organization 54 (Autumn 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mansfield, Edward, Milner, Helen, and Rosendorf, B. Peter, “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade,” American Political Science Review 94 (June 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On democratization, see Pevehouse (fn. 2).

61 Pevehouse (fn. 2), 204.

62 Fish (fn. 44); Hellman, Joel S., “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcom-munist Transitions,” World Politics 50 (January 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 I thank Kurt Weyland for helpful conversations on this point

64 Epstein (fn. 20); Johnson (fn. 28).

65 The term “runaway state-building” is from O'Dwyer, Conor, Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

66 Simmons and Elkins (fn. 12), 182.

67 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

68 Beyond the two-level games literature already cited, other bargaining models are complementary o t the minority traditions approach. Leonard Schoppa shows U.S. trade pressure on Japan worked best when it pushed demands in line with those of Japanese consumer groups; see Schoppa, , Bargaining withJapan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997)Google Scholar.

69 Grabbe (fn. 2).

70 For this argument in regional policy, see Marek and Baun (fn. 41).

71 Epstein (fn. 20).

72 Pevehouse (fn. 2); Hawkins, Darren, International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002)Google Scholar.

73 Pond (fn. 2), 148–50, 166–67.

74 Vachudova (fn. 2); Pridham (fn. 2).

75 Kopstein, Jeffrey, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” Washington Quarterly 29 (Spring 2006), 92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Beissinger (fn. 8).