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Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Further Re-Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Dennis Paranzino
Dennis Paranzino
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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Extract

In an examination of the ecological correlates of the Vietnamese insurgency, Edward Mitchell suggests the existence of some disquieting relationships between certain indicators of land tenure arrangements and insurgent activities. Briefly, he finds that the degree of control that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam exercises at the provincial level is positively associated with inequality. Areas that appear to have the most unequal land tenure arrangements are precisely those over which government control is greatest.

Type
Research Note
Information
World Politics , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , July 1972 , pp. 565 - 578
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1972

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References

1 Mitchell, Edward J., Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam, World Politics, xx (April 1968), 421–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 The essentials of this program are outlined in Slater, MacDonald, “The Broadening Base of Land Reform in South Vietnam,” Asian Survey, x (August 1970), 724–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and in Prosterman, Roy L., “Land-To-The-Tiller In South Vietnam: The Table Turns,” Asian Survey, x (August 1970), 751–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See Prosterman, ibid., 751–52, for a recounting of some favorable political and journalistic reactions to this measure.

4 Ivo, K. and Feierabend, Rosalind L., “Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948–1962: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, x (September 1966), 258–62Google Scholar; Russett, Bruce M., Trends in World Politics (New York 1965), 136–37Google Scholar; Russett, Bruce M. and others, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven 1964), 277, 319–21Google Scholar; Tanter, Raymond, “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1955–1960: Turmoil and Internal War,” Papers, Peace Research Society, iii (Philadelphia 1965), 159–83Google Scholar.

5 Russett, Bruce M., “Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics,” World Politics, xvi (April 1964), 442–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Ibid., 444. Gurr has found a positive relationship between the exclusion from economic opportunity of social groups on the basis of ascribed characteristics and political violence. See Gurr, Ted, “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indicators,” American Political Science Review, lxii (December 1968), 1104–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The Gurr measure characterized as “economic discrimination” might also be interpreted as an indicator of the distribution of wealth in society.

7 The provinces of the Central Highlands have been excluded from the Mitchell analysis. A listing of the included provinces can be found below in footnote 16.

8 We shall also report t statistics, even though we are dealing with a population and not a sample.

9 Precise definitions of the variables, the original data sources, and the data matrix can be found in Mitchell (fn. 1), 425–30. Variables found to be unimportant were per capita rice production, ethnic composition, and region.

10 The variables M and PD will be included in subsequent analyses, even though they will not be treated substantively. Criticisms of the construction of M are in Paige, Jeffrey M., “Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Re-Analysis,” World Politics, xxiii (October 1970), 24–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Samson, Robert, The Economics of Insurgency in The Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass. 1970), 231–32Google Scholar. The sign of the coefficient of M leads to the counter-intuitive conclusion that more mobility implies less GVN control. The positive sign of PD is interpreted to indicate that areas of population concentration would be “easier for a conventional army and police force to protect.” Mitchell (fn. 1), 435.

11 Mitchell, ibid., 426.

12 The instrument of expropriation for both VL and FL was the “Diem Ordinance 57.” Details concerning this ordinance can be found in Stanford Research Institute, Land Reform in Vietnam Wording Papers, i, Part 2 (Menlo Park 1968), E5–E11Google Scholar.

13 Computed from figures given in Stanford Research Institute, ibid., I, Part 2, B73. Slater (fn. 2), 729–31, suggests that the post-1968 pace of the redistribution of FL has greatly increased. The evidence for the period of concern, however, seems to con-firm Mitchell's position concerning the redistribution of this land.

14 Mitchell (fn. 1), 432; emphasis in original.

15 Mitchell, ibid., 437.

16 Misspecification and identification are concepts used in econometric work. The first case implies that relevant variables have been excluded from the model. Samson (fn. 10), 232, and Paige (fn. 10), 33–34, have suggested problems of this nature resulting from the omission of certain geographic and historical factors. Faulty identification in models of this type (reduced form) refers to situations in which the independent variables arc not truly predetermined or the dependent variable is itself a cause of one or more of the independent variables. Samson has argued that the relationships observed by Mitchell could be explained by the hypothesis that causality runs from GVN control to the land tenure variables (232). The values of the land tenure variables are not determined “independently” of the extent of GVN control. A discussion of misspecification and identification can be found in Goldberger, Arthur S., Econometric Theory (New York 1964), 194–200, 306–18Google Scholar.

17 Provincial boundaries arc for the year i960. Nordiern Coastal Lowlands: Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and Phu Yen. Southern Coastal Lowlands: Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuah. Mekong Delta: An Giang, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong, Kien Giang, Kien Hoa, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Long An, Phong Dinh, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long. Soudiern Plateau: Tay Ninh, Binh Puong, Bien Hoa, Long Khan, Phouc Tuy. Paige (fn. 10), 31.

18 Paige, ibid., passim, 28–33.

19 Przeworski, Adam and Teune, Henry, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York 1970), 60–68Google Scholar; Alker, Hayward, ‘The Long Road to International Relations Theory: Problems of Statistical Nonadditivity,” World Politics, xviii (July 1966), 623–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hazlewood, Leo and Paranzino, Dennis, “Regions, Regionalism, and Violence,” Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March 1971Google Scholar.

20 Paige (fn. 10), 31–32, suggests an economic interpretation of this indicator for one region, the Northern Coastal Lowlands.

21 Regional totals of expropriated land were computed by Paige, ibid., 30. A similar ranking of the rice regions can be obtained by aggregating hamlet-level data for the difference between net income and expenditures into regional means. See Stroup, Robert H., Rural Income and Expenditure Sample Survey of Vietnam (Agency for International Development, July 1967), 52–53Google Scholar.

22 Samson (fn. 10), 234, argues this position for the Delta. It is in all probability equally true for the other agricultural regions of Vietnam.

23 Race, Jeffrey, “How They Won,” Asian Survey, x (August 1970), 640Google Scholar; Bredo, William, “Agrarian Reform in Vietnam: Vietcong and Government of Vietnam Strategies in Conflict,” Asian Survey, x (August 1970), 739Google Scholar.

24 The best statement concerning deprivation theories of political violence is in Gurr, Ted, Why Men Rebel (Princeton 1970)Google Scholar.

25 The problem of multicollinearity is treated in Goldberger (fn. 16), 192–94, and in Johnston, J., Econometric Methods (New York 1963), 201–7Google Scholar.

26 Mitchell (fn. 1), 432. In a footnote h e suggests that there ma y be other factors distinguishing this land that could force a reinterpretation of the coefficients of these variables.

27 As it turns out, the correlation between the coefficients b 6 and b 7, in equation (4) is r = —.82.

28 For a discussion of the technique of principal components see Rummel, Rudolph, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston 1970)Google Scholar.

29 The coefficient of OOL for the mixed rubber-rice culture of the Southern Plateau is b 1. This coefficient is clearly negative in equations (4)–(6). An interpretation which would be consistent with our argument, but for which no data are available, is the speculation that in this region an individual farms if he cannot become a plantation worker. Being a plantation worker would be a superior economic opportunity. OOL in this region would then be a negative indicator of peasant wealth.

30 Zagoria, Donald S., in “The Ecology of Peasant Communism,” American Political Science Review, lxv (March 1971), 149–50Google Scholar, suggests that if landowners perform some indispensable function they need not be resented. He argues that “In regions of large-scale capitalist enterprise, on large plantations, or under any conditions where it is perfectly clear to the landless that they have neither the skills nor the capital to replace the landowner, inequities are not likely to be a source of great resentment”