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Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2011
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Identity struggles are once again a salient problem in world politics. This article aims to throw light on the sources, dynamics, and consequences of identity formation and mobilization. It makes two theoretical arguments. First, because collective memory is both a seemingly factual narrative and a normative assessment of the past, it shapes a group's intersubjective conceptions of strategic feasibility and political legitimacy. This is why collective identity is above all an expression of normative realism: a group's declaration to itself and to others about what it can or cannot do; what it will or will not do. Second, at critical junctures competing actors assert or contest the normative realism underlying collective identity. They do this through rhetorical politics, deploying their powers of persuasion in order to engage the constitutive elements of the group's shared identity. In practical terms, rhetorical politics is structured by a dominant frame: a historically shaped discursive formation that does two things. It articulates in readily accessible ways the fundamental notions a group holds about itself in the world and allows or disallows specific strategies of persuasion on the basis of their presumptive realism and normative sway. Within this frame, rhetorical politics engenders a collective field of imaginable possibilities: a restricted array of plausible scenarios about how the world can or cannot be changed and how the future ought to look. Though circumscribed, this field is vulnerable to endogenous shifts, precisely because actors' rhetorical struggles introduce conflicts over the descriptive and prescriptive limits of what is “realistically” possible. Such conflicts may in fact produce a new dominant rhetorical frame and profoundly influence a nation's political and economic development. Two contrasting cases from Latin America offer empirical support for these arguments. The article shows that the sharp developmental divergence between Costa Rica and Nicaragua can be properly understood only through close analytical scrutiny of the different rhetorical frames, fields of imaginable possibilities, and collective identities that rose to prominence at critical points in these countries' colonial and postcolonial histories.
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References
1 A third approach, instrumentalism, concentrates less on identity formation and more on the rational incentives that motivate political entrepreneurs to mobilize their “primordial” constituencies. In this article the role of political leaders is also emphasized (although I explore the popular dimension of identity formation elsewhere, in Cruz, “World Making in the Tropics: The Politics of Fate and Possibility” [Book manuscript]). But leaders' mobilizational motivations and capabilities, as well as rationality itself, are treated here as embedded in the broader political-cultural conditions shared by their respective groups. A more detailed discussion on this point follows in the text below, with reference to David Laitin's work.
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29 These explanations, it should be noted, bear scant analytical relation to sophisticated national-character arguments. Alex Inkeles, for example, posits that national character refers to “the mode or modes of distribution of personality variants within a given society.” The national-character explanations articulated by Costa Rican and Nicaraguan scholars, in contrast, merely echo and reinforce dominant mythologies that are part and parcel of intersubjective realisms established through long-forgotten contestations. And yet, analytically unrelated as they are, both Inkeles's argument and the homegrown national-character explanations eclipse intersubjective dynamics and contestation processes. Inkeles treats national character as the collective expression of individuals' personality, and he assumes an interrelation among modal personality, institutional structures, cultural patterns, and the actions of nation-states. By taking a cumulative rather than an intersubjective perspective, Inkeles fore-closes the possibility of a group dynamic independent of its members' personality makeup. By removing the element of struggle, he reduces individuals and macrostructures to unproblematic reflections of one another. But while Inkeless reductionism helps explain the declining influence of national-character explanations, the simplifications by Costa Rican and Nicaraguan scholars hint at some of the ways in which different rhetorical frames became entrenched in our two cases. Inkeles, , National Character: A Psycho-Social Perspective (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997)Google Scholar.
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For illustrations of how the colonial historical record, taken prima facie, shapes the historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Ayón, Tomás, Historia de Nicaragua desde los tiempos mas remotos hasta año 1852 (History of Nicaragua from the most remote times until the year 1852) (Managua: Tipografía de el centro-Americano, 1889)Google Scholar; Gámez, José Dolores, Historia de Nicaragua desde los tiempos prehistoricos hasta 1860 (History of Nicaragua from prehistoric times until 1860) (Managua: Tipografía del país, 1889)Google Scholar; Almán Bolaños (fn. 32); Coronel Urtecho (fn. 32). See also Urtecho's, José Coronel introduction to Ernesto Cardenal, El Estrecho Dudoso (The doubtful strait) (Mexico and Buenos Aires: Ediciones Carlos Lohlé, 1972)Google Scholar.
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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 481–85.
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90 Elections were first held for deputies and for the top executive positions of chief and vice chief of state soon after Nicaragua was “pacified” in 1825 through the diplomatic intervention of Manuel José Arce (with the backing of his Salvadoran troops). Significantly, one of the terms of the peace agreement was the exile of the popular caudillo Cleto Ordoñez, whose extraordinary eloquence was considered a destabilizing force.
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100 Put another way, the late development of the Nicaraguan coffee economy was rooted in political-institutional factors. One seemingly compelling alternative possibility—that late development of the coffee economy was due to structural factors like preexisting landholding patterns—is challenged by recent scholarly research. Large tracts of indigenous ejido (communal) holdings, for example, did not obstruct the early spread of coffee production in Nicaragua. To the contrary, as Charlip (fn. 99) has shown, ejidal lands allowed for the ubiquitous subsistence economy that sustained the coffee economy's seasonal labor force (pp. 2–5).
101 Cruz (fn. 1).
102 See, for example, “Manifiesto de S.E. el Presidente D. Fernando Guzmán a los Pueblos de la Republica,” (n.p.: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1867).
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104 This was the hope that led liberal intellectuals at the close of the nineteenth century to rally around José Santos Zelaya. And this too was the hope that in the 1930s led modernizing intellectuals, even some who later became renowned critics of the Somoza regime, like Pablo Antonio Cuadra, initially to support Anastasio Somoza García.
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