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Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucasus

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Kathleen Collins
Kathleen Collins
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, [email protected].
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Abstract

Two major questions are seldom addressed in the literature on Islamism and opposition social movements more generally: (1) what explains the relative success or failure of Islamist groups in mobilizing a social base and (2) what role do Islamist ideas play in attracting support. Islamist movements vary significantly in their origins, leadership, ideas, and strategies. In answering these important questions, this article offers three main propositions: that under certain conditions, Islamism can emerge as a powerful idea that generates social appeal; that to be successful, Islamist organizations must develop a local Islamist ideology that suits the local social base, rather than tie themselves to a global Islamist agenda,; and that in authoritarian contexts, especially where open mobilization is forbidden, inclusive informal social networks are an essential mechanism for spreading Islamist ideas and protecting group members. Nonetheless, there are limitations to an Islamist movements ability to grow and bring about political change. The article contributes to an understanding of Islamism and, more broadly, to an understanding of why and how opposition movements emerge and mobilize under authoritarian regimes. The article develops these propositions in a comparative examination of three Islamist groups active in the Central Asian and south Caucasus regions of the former Soviet Union (FSU): Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT), the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP), and the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA).

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 60 , Issue 1 , October 2007 , pp. 64 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2007

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References

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31 Berman, Sheri, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006CrossRefGoogle Scholar), 10; Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 27), 26; Sikkink (fn. 27), 145.

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37 Wickham(fn.2).

38 Gerges (fn. 4) similarly argues that there is great diversity among jihadist groups (p. 31).

39 In a similar vein, Gerges (fn. 4) finds that al-Qaeda had difficulty convincing national jihadists to adopt a global agenda (pp. 29–34).

40 Keck and Sikkink (fn. 27), 119; Berman (fn. 30), 25. On networks as pathways of diffusion, see Tarrow (fn. 20), 104. On terrorist networks, see Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004CrossRefGoogle Scholar). On Islamic networks, see Clark, Janine, ”Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism,” Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 8 (2004), 941CrossRefGoogle Scholar–68.

41 Lyall (fn. 5).

42 Diane Singerman, ”The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements,” in Wiktorowicz (fn. 2), 149; Varshney, Ashutosh, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 39–52Google Scholar; Collins, Kathleen, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in CentralAsia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 23–53Google Scholar.

43 Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971Google Scholar); Granovetter, Mark, ”The Strength ofWeak Ties,” AmericanJournal of Sociology 78 (May 1973CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

44 On the Aksy protest, see Radnitz, Scott, ”Networks, Localism, and Mobilization in Aksy, Kyr-gyzstan,” CentralAsia Survey 24 (December 2005Google Scholar).

45 Khamidov, Alisher, ”Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Challenges for Central Asian Security,” Brookings paper (May 2002Google Scholar); and Babajanov, Bakhtiyor, “Oreligiozno-politicheskoifartii bizb ut-takhrir” (Manuscript, Tashkent, January 2003Google Scholar).

46 Author interview with members, branch of Ezgulik, Namangan, Uzbekistan, January 2003.

47 Wilson, Andrew, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005Google Scholar).

48 Author interview with HT spokesman, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, August 2004.

49 Estimates are based on independent sources with an on-the-ground presence and knowledge of regions, neighborhoods, and villages where HT has activists and significant support. Similar assessments come from ICG (fn. 18), 17; journalists in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan; author interview with Alisher Sobirov, MP (committee on religious extremism and terrorism), Kyrgyzstan, January 2003; Rashid, Ahmed, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven:Yale University Press, 2002), 131Google Scholar; Gulnoza Saidzaimova, ”Central Asia: Hizb ut-Tahrir's Calls for Islamic State Find Support,” RFE/RI., January 17,2006; and Farangis Najibullah, ”Central Asia: Hizb ut-Tahrir Gains Support from Women,” RFE/RL, July 11, 2007. For example, journalists in Osh and Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, and Soghd, Tajikistan, pointed out areas in those regions where several thousand subscribe to HT.

50 Baran, Zeyno, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Washington, D.C.: Nixon Center, 2004), 78Google Scholar.

51 Author interviews with Mikhail Ardzinov, director, Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU), Tashkent, Uzbekistan, January 2003; and Abdusalim Ergashev, IHROU, Andi-jan, Uzbekistan, January 2003, and Freedom House representatives, Tashkent, January 2003.

52 Eurasia Insight, ”Religious Discontent Evident in the Ferghana Valley,” January 17, 2007, (ac-cessedJanuary 2007); Najibullah (fn. 49); ICG (fn. 18), 23; author interview with Rajab Mirzo, journalist, Tajikistan, August 2005.

53 Alisher Khamidov and Alisher Saipov, ”Antiterrorism Crackdown Fuels Discontent in Kyrgyz-stan,” August 8,2006 (accessed January 2007).

54 Analysts agree on HT'S sustained growth: Alisher Khamidov (fn. 45); Naumkin, Vitaly, Radical Islam in CentralAsia (Lanham:Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 194Google Scholar; and Khalid, Adeeb, Islam after Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007Google Scholar), 161.

55 Author, Kyrgyzstan survey, 2006. Kyrgyzstan has a population of over five million.

56 Kurbonali Mukhabbanov, ”Re/igiozno-oppozitsionnye gruppy v Tadjikistane: Hizb ut-Tabrir,” in OSCE (fn. 15), 83–84.

57 Marat, Erica, The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After (Jamestown Foundation, 2006), 117Google Scholar–19 (accessed May 2006).

58 Mukhabbanov (fn. 56), 75–76; Muhiddin Kabiri, ”Islamskii radikalizm:faktory vozniknoveniia,” in OSCE (fn. 15), 126; Saniya Sagnaeva, ”Re/igiozno-oppozitsionnyegruppy v Kyrgyzstane: Hizb ut-Tabnr,” in OSCE (fn. 15); and Bakhtior Babadjanov,” Rehgiozno-oppozitsionnyegruppy v Uzbekistane” in OSCE (fn. 15).

59 Author interview with Ergashev (fn. 51).

60 Author interview with HT spokesman (fn. 48); ICG (fn.18), 19.

61 Author interview with Sevara, HT member, Osh, October 2007.

62 Author interview with HT spokesman (fn. 48).

63 In interviews with journalists across the region, most agreed that HT operated with little funding; substantial resources were not necessary to fund its propaganda activities.

64 www.hizbuttahnr.org (accessed March 2003).

65 ut-Tahrir, Hizb, The Methodology ofHizb ut-Tahrirfor Change (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1999), 24–25Google Scholar.

66 Freedom House, Nations in Transit, World Bank, and Polity scores all rate the Central Asian regimes as highly corrupt and generally more repressive of civil and political liberties since 1992.

67 Author interview with journalist, Karshi newspaper, March 2005.

68 Author interview with HT members, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, August 2004.

69 In Kyrgyzstan, for example, 86 percent of those 18–24 and 89.6 percent of those 25–34 claim to be a ”strong” or ”moderate believer”; 17.4 percent of the total sample claim to have become more religious in the past five years. Author, Kyrgyzstan survey (2006). A strong majority of focus group participants were also interested in religious education.

70 Gulnoza Saidazimova, ”Hizb ut-Tahrir's Calls for Islamic State Find Support,”January 17,2006 (accessed January 2006).

71 Author interview with HT women members, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, August 2004.

72 Author interview with Erkin, HT member, Ak-Artu, Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan, October 2007.

73 Author interview with U.S. government official/trial observer, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, July 2004. Although we must be extremely circumspect of statements made under pressure in Uzbek courts, most international observers generally believe HT members freely declare their devotion to its cause.

74 Author interview with OSCE trial observer, Tashkent, January 2003.

75 Author interview with Freedom House representatives, Tashkent, November 2004; Bishkek, August 12,2004.

76 Author interview with Ravshana Makhtamova, Khujand, Tajikistan, January 10, 2003.

77 Ibid.

78 HT leaflets, Uzbekistan, 2003.

79 HT leaflet, ”7000 Muslims Languishing in Uzbek Prisons,” December 30,2002.; this information is referenced at www.muslimuzbekistan.net.

80 Author, Kyrgyzstan survey, 2006. Another 48.9 percent were uncertain (”don't know”), while .5 percent ”disagreed” and 7.5 percent ”completely disagreed.”

81 ICG, Asia Briefing no. 38, ”Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising,” May 25, 2005; Human Rights Watch, ”Bullets Were Falling Like Rain,” hrw.Org/reports/2005/Uzbekistan0605/2 (accessed January 2006).

82 HT leaflet, Uzbekistan, ”How the Butcher of Andijan Executed His Plan,” www.hizbuttahrir.org (accessed December 2005).

83 Author interview with Osh journalist, June 2, 2005; the journalist shared leaflet content for January-March 2005.

84 Gulnoza Saidzaimova, ”Kyrgyzstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir Rallies in South, Urges Election Boycott,” www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/2/2FF7FDEF-DAE8–4323–8F61–346A404F3EE9.html (accessed April 2005).

85 In Kyrgyzstan, 94.1 percent replied that corruption was a ”very serious” or ”serious” problem. Author, Kyrgyzstan survey.

86 Author interview with Dastan, independent journalist, Jalalabad, August 2004. Akaev was overthrown in March 2005.

87 Taqiuddin Al-Nabhani, The Khalifa, www.hizbuttahrir.org.

88 Author interview with Ravshana Mahtamova, Khujand, January 10, 2003.

89 Only 13.7 percent of Kyrgyzstani respondents rated the Palestinian jihad as ”just.” Author, Kyr-gyzstan survey.

90 HT leaflet, ”Karimov's decisions are another group of weapons to trample on the Muslim population ofUzbekistan,” October 4,2002. In Kyrgyzstan, 27.6 percent of respondents reported a ”negative” or ”very negative” opinion ofJews. Author, Kyrgyzstan survey.

91 HT leaflet, Uzbekistan, October 2002.

92 42.4 percent reported a negative view of Christian missionaries. Author, Kyrgyzstan survey.

93 Participants in forty-nine FGDs were asked about value change since 1991. In forty-eight (98 percent) of those groups participants were very concerned about negative social changes and moral decline. In one group (2 percent) participants expressed neutral to favorable views.

94 OSCE, unpublished memo, courtesy of OSCE representative, Dushanbe, July 2002.

95 Khalid (fn. 54).

96 Author interview with HT spokesman (fn. 48).

97 Author interview with Tursunbai Bakir uluu, Kyrgyzstan's parliamentary ombudsman, Bishkek, January 2003, who is quoting an HT activist.

98 Author interview with HT member, Shukrat, Osh, October 2007.

99 Author interview, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, June 2005.

100 ”Lying Is the Weapon of the Tyrant of Uzbekistan,” HT leaflet, May 14, 2005.

101 Author interview with Omurzak Mamayusupov, head of State Committee on Religious Affairs, Kyrgyzstan, August 2004.

102 For example, Daniel Kimmage, ”Kyrgyz Police Stop Hizb ut-Tahrir Printing Press,” RFE/RL, 8/2/2007.

103 Communications with local experts and journalists, Osh, Jalalabad, Tashkent, and Dushanbe, 2002–4.

104 ICG (fn.18), 20. HT members interviewed also responded that a personal connection or davatchx had introduced them to HT.

105 Author interview with HT members, Jalalabad, August 2004; Naumkin (fn. 54), 147; Rashid (fn. 49), 127–28.

106 Author interview with Alexander Rahmanov, Bureau on Human Rights and Law, Khujand, January 2003. Conversations with Kyrgyz journalists, 2002–5.

107 ICG (fn. 18), 23; author interview with HT spokesman (fn. 48); author interview with Freedom House representative, Tashkent, November 2004.

108 While only 10.5 percent in Kyrgyzstan believe that ”Muslims should live in a caliphate,” 28.1 percent supported some form of ”sharia” and 15.6 percent supported ”Islamic democracy.” Author, Kyrgyzstan survey.

109 ICG (fn. 18), 18.

110 Author interview with Seid Abdullo Nuri, chairman of the IRP, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, August 14,2002.

111 ”Tajikistan Votes 2005,” www.RFERL.org (accessed August 2006).

112 Olimova, Saodat, ”Political Islam and Conflict in Tajikistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus (1999), 5Google Scholar, www.ca-c.org (accessed June 2002); Rotar, Igor, ”Under the Green Banner: Islamic Radicals in Russia and the Former Soviet Union,” Religion, State and Society 30, no. 2 (2002CrossRefGoogle Scholar), 123; Bushkov, V. and Mikul'sky, D., Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v tadzhikistane [The History of the Civil War in Tajiki-stan] (Moscow:AN, 1996), 110Google Scholar.

113 Naumkin (fn. 54), 224–25.

114 Olimova (fn. 15), 95–96. The national survey was carried out by Sharq center (N = 1000).

115 Author interview with Vadim Nazarov, OSCE, Dushanbe, August 16, 2004. RFE'S Web site cites the IRP claim of twenty thousand.

116 Author interviews with Muhiddin Kabiri, IRP deputy chairman, Dushanbe, March 2001 and January 2003.

117 The OSCE deemed the election better butflawed.A fully free election may have resulted in more votes for the IRP, but it would likely have been a small minority. A 1999 survey showed only 5 percent support for the IRP; Olimova (fn. 110), 6.

118 Naumkin(fn. 54), 209.

119 Turajonzoda, Akbar, ”Religion: The Pillar of Society,” in Sagdeevand, RoaldEisenhower, Susan, eds., Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change (Chevy Chase, Md.: CPSS Press, 1995), 269Google Scholar.

120 Barnett Rubin, ”Radical Islam in Central Asia,” ASIP, May 7, 2003, www.asiasource.org/asip/ rubinxfrn (accessed July 2007).

121 Naumkin(fn. 54), 215.

122 Olimova (fn. 110), 4.

123 Ibid., 7.

124 Author interview with Kabiri, 2003 (fn. 116); author interview with Seid Ibrahim Muham-madnazar, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, August 2005.

125 Author interview with Kabiri, 2003 (fn. 116); Khalid (fn. 54), 187.

126 Author interview with Kabiri, 2003 (fn. 116); author interview with Muhhamadzazar (fn. 124).

127 ”Party Leader Denies Aim to Create Islamic State in Tajikistan,” Tojikiston, Dushanbe, BBC, June 30, 2005Google Scholar.

128 Author interview with Kabiri, 2001 (fn. 116); author interview with Muhammednazar (fn. 124).

129 Author interview with Muhammednazar (fn. 124).

130 Olimova (fn. 110), 7.

131 Author interview with Kabiri, 2001 (fn. 116).

132 Unlike the IRP, the three secular democratic parties competing did not pass the 5 percent threshold. Republic of Tajikistan Parliamentary Elections: Election Observation Mission Final Report (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, May 2005), 21Google Scholar.

133 Author interview with Nuri (fn. 110); author interview with Kabiri, 2003 (fn. 116).

134 Interviw with Rajab Mirzo, journalist, Dushanbe, August 15,2002; Rotar (fn. 112).

135 Author interview with IRP activist, Soghd, Tajikistan, January 2003.

136 Balci, Bayram, ”Between Sunnism and Shiism: Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” CentralAsian Survey 23 (June 2004), 208Google Scholar.

137 Cornell, Svante, ”The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan” (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2006), 60Google Scholar.

138 Aliyeva, Jahan, ”Religion Emerges as an Issue for Some Parliamentary Candidates in Azerbaijan,” November 2,2005, www.eurasianet.org (accessed November 2005Google Scholar).

139 Yunusov, Arif, Islam in Azerbaijan (Baku: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2004), 185Google Scholar; Motika, Raoul, ”Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 115 (July—September 2001), 6Google Scholar.

140 Communications with journalists and U.S. embassy officials, Baku, June 2005, May 2007.

141 Author interviews with Rafiq Aliev, head of state committee on religious affairs, Baku, Azerbaijan, January 2005, and Robin Seaward, OSCE representative, Baku, January 2006.

142 Communication with member of Azeri human rights NGO, Baku, January 2006.

143 Balci (fn. 136), 214–15.

144 Author, Azerbaijan survey, 2006.

145 Author interview with group of IPA activists, Ganja, Azerbaijan, June 2005.

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.

149 Trendaz, July 26, 2007, www.trendaz.com/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=9633548dang =EN (accessed July 2007).

150 Author interview with IPA activists (fn. 145).

151 ”Polls Show Azerbaijan as a Tolerant Country,” Zerkalo, Baku, BBC, February 12, 2005, 12Google Scholar.

152 Rotar(fn. 112), 119.

153 Communication with activist, human rights NGO, Baku, August 2005.

154 ”Azerbaijan Islamic Party Vows to Expand Anti-Israeli Demonstrations,” www.rferl.org/ newsline/2006/08/070806.asp; and author communication with Nariman Qasimoglu, Islamic scholar and vice-chairman for religious affairs, Popular Front, Baku, Azerbaijan, January 2006.

155 Author interview with Rovshan, activist in the religious organization, Ahli Beit, Ganja, August 2005; author interview with IPA activists (fn. 145).

156 Author interview with NGO member/human rights worker, Khachmaz, Azerbaijan, August 2005.

157 On ideas and the Civil Rights Act, see Lieberman, Robert, ”Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (December 2002), 709CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

158 Lyall (fn. 5), 382–88.

159 Kuran, Timur, ”Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” World Politics 44 (October 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

160 Bunce and Wolchik (fn. 5), 14–15.

161 Ibid., 283–304.

162 Tucker (fn. 5), 23.

163 Wiktorowicz (fn. 2); Wickham (fn. 2).

164 Lyall (fn. 5) refers to this as a problem of ”organizational culture” (p. 382).

165 ICG (fn. 16).

166 On societal views about religion and politics, see Kathleen Collins, ”Islamic Revivalism and Societal Views on Democracy and Political Islam in Central Asia” (Paper presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities Convention, New York, March 23–25,2006).