Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-29T09:12:12.943Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Morton H. Halperin
Morton H. Halperin
Affiliation:
Research Fellow of the Harvard Center for International Affairs
Get access

Extract

Despite the extensive government apparatus for policy-making on problems of national security, the American President in the postwar period has, from time to time, appointed groups of private citizens to investigate particular problems and report to the National Security Council. Some of these groups have performed their task without the public's ever becoming aware of their existence; others have in one way or another come to public attention. Among the latter are those which have become known under the names of their chairmen: Finletter, Gray, Paley, Sarnoff, Gaither, Draper, Boechenstein, and Killian. President Truman made use of such groups, and the variety of tasks for which they were appointed grew steadily during the Eisenhower Administration.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , April 1961 , pp. 360 - 384
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1961

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The first such Presidential Commission was appointed by President Truman in January 1948 to make a general survey of foreign intelligence activities (see U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, Organizational History of the National Security Council, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 10).Google Scholar

2 See the following articles by former NSC staff members reprinted in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Selected Materials, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1960Google Scholar (cited hereinafter as Selected Materials): Souers, Sidney W., “Policy Formation for National Security,” p. 32Google Scholar; Cutler, Robert, “The Development of the National Security Council,” p. 58Google Scholar; and Gray, Gordon, “Role of the National Security Council in the Formation of National Policy,” p. 65.Google Scholar

3 See the articles by Bowie, Cutler, and Gray in ibid.

4 See the articles by Kissinger, Nitze, and Jackson in ibid.

5 New York Times, December 21, 1957, p. 8:4; Roberts', Chalmers M. article in the Washington Post and Times Herald, December 20, 1957Google Scholar, reprinted in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XV (December 27, 1957), pp. 1328–30, and in the Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1958, p. 858 (Roberts citations hereinafter refer to the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report).

6 The membership of the Gaither Committee and its advisory panel was released by the White House and printed in the Congressional Record, loc.cit.

7 A part of this staff was supplied by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). See IDA Annual Report II, March 18, 1958, pp. 6–7.

8 Also serving as advisors to the panel were Albert C. Hill, General James McCormack, and Edward P. Oliver of The RAND Corporation.

9 The only leak regarding the Gaither study had come in August when Stewart Alsop reported that the President had asked Gaither to study the possibility of employing new technological means of defense against atomic attack. He noted that the Committee was attracting “top level” talents, but he warned that “it remains to be seen whether anything solid comes of Gaither's assignment, in the present national mood of complacency” (New York Herald Tribune, August 26, 1957, p. 12:7).

10 Interview with Gaither, New York Times, December 25, 1957Google Scholar, p. 24:6.

11 Ibid., p. 24:5.

12 Ibid., December 21, 1957, p. 8:4.

13 Press release by Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty, ibid., December 22, 1957. p..4:1.

14 The other members of the advisory panel were Admiral Robert C. Carney, General James H. Doolittle, James B. Fisk, General John E. Hull, Mervin J. Kelly, and James R. Killian.

15 Testimony of Dr. James R. Perkins in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, Part II, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 293 (cited hereinafter as Jackson Hearings, Part II).

16 Roberts, , loc.cit., p. 1328.Google Scholar

17 testimony, Perkins, Jackson Hearings, Part II, p. 294.Google Scholar

18 The text of the Gaither Report has not been made public. This account relies entirely on published sources. It draws heavily on Roberts' article (see note 5 above), about which Senator Clark declared on the Senate floor: “The importance of the article arises from the fact that it is well known by many Members of this body, including myself, that this newspaper account accurately and clearly states the major findings and conclusions of the Gaither Report” (Congressional Record, loc.cit. p. 859). The information in the Roberts article has been supplemented and checked with news and news analysis articles in the New York Times and Herald Tribune, as well as columns by Arthur Krock, James Reston, Drew Pearson, and Stewart Alsop, and various magazine articles. In addition, speeches by members of the Committee and its Advisory Panel after the Gaither Report was presented, and their testimony at the Jackson Hearings, provided confirmation of the major points made in the Report.

19 Cf. testimony by Sprague, Robert, Jackson Hearings, Part I, p. 50.Google Scholar

20 Roberts, , loc.cit., p. 1329.Google Scholar

21 The Committee's proposals on strategic vulnerability were heavily influenced by a classified RAND report prepared under the direction of Albert Wohlstetter. For a discussion of the RAND report, see Kraft, Joseph, “RAND: Arsenal for Ideas,” Harper's, CCXXI (July 1960), pp. 71–73.Google Scholar

22 Alsop, , New York Herald Tribune, November 25, 1957Google Scholar, p. 18:7, and ibid., November 23, 1957, p. 1:8; Witze, Claude, “Classified Report Says Soviets Can Neutralize SAC by 1960,” Aviation Week, LXVII (December 2, 1957), p. 28.Google Scholar

23 Such a program would presumably include dispersal of SAC, some planes in the air, and a ready alert for the rest of the command.

24 Pearson, Drew, “Gaither Report Release Sought,” Washington Post and Times Herald, December 18, 1957Google Scholar, D, p. 11:5.

25 Cf. the testimony by Sprague, Baxter, and Perkins in Jackson Hearings, passim.

26 For an unclassified but well-informed discussion of the problem of maintaining a stable strategic balance, see Wohlstetter, Albert, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (January 1959), pp. 211–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 “Leak—and a Flood,” Newsweek L (December 30, 1957), p. 14; New York Times, November 23, 1957, p. 8:3; New York Herald Tribune, November 23, 1957, p. 1:8.

28 Krock, , New York Times, December 22, 1957Google Scholar, IV, p. 3:2.

29 The Committee's analysis of the civil defense problem reflected the influence of Herman Kahn of The RAND Corporation. The alternative civil defense proposals sketched here are elaborated in Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense, RAND, R-322-RC, July 1, 1958.

30 That the Gaither Report included proposals on defense reorganization was indicated by Defense Secretary McElroy (New York Times, January 22, 1958, p. 15:4). The proposals were spelled out by Foster in a speech before the Student Conference on United States Affairs (SCUSA), IX, printed in Proceedings of the Conference, West Point, N.Y., 1957, p. 9.

31 Cutler testimony in Jackson Hearings, Part IV, p. 594.

32 New York Times, December 21, 1957, p. 8:4.

33 Murphy, Charles J. V., “The White House Since Sputnik,” Fortune, LVII (January 1958), p. 230.Google Scholar

34 Roberts, , loc.cit., p. 1328Google Scholar; Newsweek, L (December 30, 1957), p. 14.

35 Roberts, , loc.cit., p. 1328.Google Scholar

36 Some of the Committee members, including Gaither, returned to their civilian jobs and took no part in the campaign discussed below.

37 Sprague testimony, Jackson Hearings, Part I, pp. 49–51.

38 Murphy, , op.cit., p. 230Google Scholar; Cutler testimony, Jackson Hearings, Part IV, p. 594.

39 Reprinted in New York Times, November 8, 1957, p. 10.

40 Ibid., p. 10:3, 8.

41 Reprinted in ibid., November 14, 1957, p. 14.

42 Ibid., p. 14:6.

43 Ibid., p. 14:2.

44 Ibid.

45 In considering the reaction of Executive agencies, it should be kept in mind that the Administration placed very tight restrictions on access to the Report. For example, NATO Supreme Commander General Lauris Norstad did not see it (New York Herald Tribune, January 8, 1958, p. 2:2).

46 The recommendations of the Gaither Committee were broken down into groups. The agencies concerned prepared papers on these proposals and they were discussed at a series of NSC meetings. See Cutler testimony, Jackson Hearings, Part IV, p. 594.Google Scholar

47 Cf. General Taylor, Maxwell, The Uncertain Trumpet, New York, 1959Google Scholar, passim. Taylor, in discussing policy papers drafted for the NSC while he was Army Chief of Staff, makes it clear that most of the strategic concepts and recommendations of the Gaimer Report were discussed frequently by the Joint Chiefs and the NSC before and after the Gaither Report was presented, although he does not mention the Report itself.

48 New York Times, December 21, 1957, p. 8:3. This phenomenon clearly needs greater study. The strait jacket which has confined the military chiefs, preventing them from admitting extensive weakness even while pressing for more funds, has surely been an important restraint on the flow of information to the White House and to Congress. A comparison of the statements to Congress made by Army Chiefs of Staff on, for example, the adequacy of our capability for limited war and the statements they make after retiring indicates vividly the reality of this phenomenon. (I am indebted to Paul Hammond and Louis Kushnick for bringing this point to my attention.)

49 Nitze, Paul H., “Organization for National Policy Planning in the United States,” Selected Materials, p. 168 (italics added).Google Scholar

50 Cf. Dulles' testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, New York Times, January 10, 1958Google Scholar, p. 1:5.

51 For an excellent discussion of the kinds of problems that President Eisenhower would have faced in seeking to impose the recommendations of the Gaither Report on the operating agencies, see Neustadt, Richard, Presidential Power, New York, 1960Google Scholar, passim.

52 New York Times, December 11, 1957, p. 8:6; New York Herald Tribune, December 11, 1957, p. 1:3.

53 New York Times, December 12, 1957, p. II:I.

54 Krock, ibid., December 13, 1957, p. 26:5.

55 This feeling that the President constituted the key to the problem was reflected in a report by Samuel Lubell on a field trip made soon after Sputnik II. Lubell reported that “one thing I found especially striking was how closely the public's reactions corresponded to the explanatory ‘line’ which was coming from the White House. Relatively few persons repeated the criticisms which were being printed in newspaper editorials or were being made by members of Congress or by scientists. In talking about sputnik, most people tended to paraphrase what Eisenhower himself had said. … The public generally tended to follow the President's lead. In no community did I find any tendency on the part of the public to look for leadership to anyone else—to their newspapers or radio commentators, to Congressmen or to men of science. Nor, with some exceptions, could people be said to be in advance of the President, or to be demanding more action than he was.” (Lubell, Samuel, “Sputnik and American Public Opinion,” Columbia University Forum, I, Winter 1957, p. 18.)Google Scholar

56 Jackson Hearings, Part I, p. 55 (italics added).

57 Ibid.

58 Ultimately no committee was set up reflecting the view expressed by Sprague. A leak to the press about the gathering and its purpose made further action by the group more complicated and, in addition, embarrassed the Vice-President.

59 Not all of the Gaither Committee joined in this effort. Gaither, for example, told a news conference that “a report like this to the Security Council and to the President is never made public. If all or part of it is made public, it would be an exception, and the first time such a thing was ever done.” (New York Herald Tribune, December 25, 1957, p. 3:1.)

60 New York Times, November 8, 1957, p. 10:8.

61 Ibid., November 9, 1957, p. 11:6.

62 New York Herald Tribune, November 23, 1957, p. 1:8.

63 See note 5 above.

64 The leaks apparently came both from within the Administration and from members of the Gaither Committee.

65 New York Herald Tribune, December 13, 1957, p. 1:3; Washington Post and Times Herald, December 21, 1957, p. 1:6.

66 Congressional Record, loc.cit., p. 858.

67 New York Times, December 23, 1957, p. 6:4.

68 Zinner, Paul, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958, New York, 1959, p. 2.Google Scholar

69 Portions of the budget message relating to national security are printed in ibid., pp. 15–23.

70 Congressional Record, loc.cit., p. 860.

71 Ibid.

72 See, for example, the editorials in the New York Times, December 13, 1957, p. 26:2; New York Herald Tribune, December 23, 1957, p. 16:1; and Washington Post and Times Herald, December 30, 1957, p. 14:1.

73 In his column in the New York Times on December 20, 1957 (p. 26:5), Arthur Krock inferred from what he knew about the Gaither Report that it recommended a “first strike” strategy and speculated that this was why the Report was being kept secret. Two days later he was able to write that “it is authoritatively stated that this point was not included in the report” (ibid., IV, p. 3:2). The Communists sought to exploit this and other distortions of the Gaither Report. On December 26, Moscow and Peking broadcasts monitored in London charged that the “authors of the report are proponents of a limited war which would be fought with all types of modern nuclear weapons” (New York Times, December 27, 1957, p. 4:5). Then Soviet Premier Bulganin in a note to President Eisenhower on March 7, 1958, wrote that “the American press has been discussing for the past few weeks the idea of ‘preventive war’ against the U.S.S.R. which, according to such well-known American commentators as Hanson Baldwin, Arthur Krock and Drew Pearson, was advanced in a secret report to the National Council of Security [sic] by the so-called Gaither Committee” (ibid., March 8, 1958, p. 2:8).

74 Ibid., January 23, 1958, p. 10:4.

75 This was not an unimportant consideration. It undoubtedly heavily influenced the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, who argued against the release of the Report. Cf. Cutler, Robert, “Organization at the Policy Level,” General Electric Defense Quarterly, II (January-March 1959), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar For a general discussion of this problem, see Rourke, Francis E., “Administrative Secrecy: A Congressional Dilemma,” American Political Science Review, LIV (September 1960), pp. 691–93.Google Scholar

76 New York Times, January 16, 1958, p. 14:6.

77 Ibid., December 22, 1957, p. 4:1.

78 Ibid., January 22, 1958, p. 10:5.

79 Krock, ibid., December 22, 1957, IV, p. 3:1.

80 Ibid., December 29, 1957, p. 1:3.

81 Jackson Hearings, Part I, p. 56.

82 For a similar model spelled out, see Hilsman, Roger, “The Foreign Policy Consensus: An Interim Research Report,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, III (December 1959), pp. 361–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I am indebted to H. Bradford Westerfield for the model used here.

83 The term “pro-spending cluster” is not meant to imply that its members favored spending for its own sake. While some people supporting the Gaither proposals were willing to back any plan for larger government spending, others (notably Sprague) were reluctant to endorse any spending programs; most of this cluster supported the Gaither proposals without being influenced by the spending implications.

84 NSC 68 provides some interesting parallels to the Gaither Report and suggests the role it might have played if Sputnik had led to an Administration decision to increase the defense budget substantially. NSC 68 was drafted by a joint State Department-Defense Department committee, but it was, like the Gaither Report, prepared without considering domestic economic or political factors and without regard to the budget level set by the President. It included a complete review of the national security situation and called for a large increase in defense spending—providing a blueprint for the use of the funds. The Report was presented to the NSC just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. It was initialed by President Truman just after the war started and served as the government's rationale for the expanded defense effort. It enabled the Administration to assert that spending was being guided by a long-range plan drafted prior to the war. See Paul Hammond, “NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament,” to be published in a volume sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University.

85 For example, in the Rockefeller Brothers study on defense problems, whose recommendations closely parallel those of the Gaither Report; see Special Studies Report II, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, International Security: The Military Aspect, Garden City, N.Y., 1958Google Scholar (reprinted in Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports, Garden City, N.Y., 1961, pp. 93–155).

86 Cf. Huntington, Samuel P., “Strategic Planning and the Political Process,” Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (January 1960), pp. 285–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

87 Some of its proposals were adopted in the 1958 reorganization of the Defense Department.