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Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Howard H. Lentner
Howard H. Lentner
Affiliation:
University of New York
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Abstract

Foreign policy decision making is the result of a complex political process in which the political values and style of the chief executive play a large part. The case of Canada's decision, in 1963, to acquire nuclear weapons illustrates that external events and pressures generated by Canada's international obligations were processed through complex political interactions. The Government of Prime Minister Diefenbaker was unable to take the nuclear weapons decision because of two splits in the Cabinet, only one of which was pertinent to nuclear weapons policy. The decision was taken by Leader of the Opposition Pearson alone and in conformity with his personal values, because of his political style which commanded deference. The approach used combines historical detail with political analysis.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , October 1976 , pp. 29 - 66
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1976

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References

1 The most complete narrative of this case is in Lyon, Peyton, Canada In World Affairs, XII, 1961–1963 (Toronto:Oxford University Press 1968), 66–223Google Scholar. Pearson's own account of his decision is in chap. 3 of Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 3, 1957–1968, ed. Munro, J. A. and Inglis, A. I. (Toronto and Buffalo:University of Toronto Press 1975Google Scholar).

2 Newman, Peter C., Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto/Montreal:McClelland and Stewart Limited 1963Google Scholar). See esp. chap. 23.

3 Confidential interview, January 31, 1975.

4 Ibid. The Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence, composed of Cabinet officials of the two governments, was established as a result of conversations in Ottawa between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Diefenbaker in July 1958. Its first meeting was held in Paris on December 15, 1958.

5 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, February 20, 1959, p. 1223.

6 Interview with the Honourable Howard C. Green, August 16, 1974.

7 The events involved in this unsuccessful venture are described in Newman (fn. 2), chap. 24.

8 Interview with Green (fn. 6).

9 Confidential interview, July 29, 1974.

10 Although the American component of NORAD was ordered on alert on October 22, the Cabinet did not order a similar alert for the Canadian component until October 24. Spencer, Robert, “External Affairs and Defence,” Canadian Annual Review (1962), 129Google Scholar–30.

11 Confidential interview, June 19, 1975.

12 Interview with Green (fn. 6).

13 Confidential interview, June 19, 1975.

14 Interview with the Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, February 1, 1975.

15 Ibid.

16 Memorandum, Hellyer to Pearson; quotations are from a copy made available to the author by Mr. Hellyer.

17 “An Address to the Western Ontario North Liberal Association by the Hon. Paul T. Hellyer, M.P.” (mimeo), Walkerton, December 8, 1962, pp. 9, 11, 12–13. [Hereafter referred to as the Walkerton speech.]

18 Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14).

19 There were meetings on December 14, 19, and 20. It is not certain at which of these the matter was discussed. Dates are taken from Pearson's Appointment Book, December 1962. I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. Geoffrey Pearson for allowing me access to selected materials in his father's papers.

20 Telephone interview with Hellyer, June 19, 1975.

21 A letter from Pearson to C. M. Drury, M.P., January 2, 1963, states that Gellner's paper was prepared at Pearson's and Hellyer's request. Lester B. Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Nuclear Policy, Part 2, Volume 94, File 806.2.

22 Letter, John W. Gellner to Paul W. [sic] Hellyer, December 21, 1962, ibid.

23 Letter, Hellyer to Pearson, December 31, 1962, ibid.

24 Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14).

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid. The precise date is based on hearsay, but it is not inconsistent with other evidence. Hellyer recalls that the Honourable J. W. Pickersgill told him that Pearson had indicated to him that he had decided on New Year's Day 1963 to declare in favor of accepting nuclear weapons. Pickersgill recently stated, “I am not absolutely sure when Mr. Pearson told me of his decision . . .” and referred me to Hellyer, who “could probably establish for you the precise date on which Mr. Pearson made his decision antl he might also be able to throw some light on the question you ask about whether or not Mr. Pearson told me on New Year's Day, 1963.” Letter to author, May 28, 1975. Pearson states in his memoirs (fn. 1), Vol. 3, 71, “Over the 1962 Christmas holiday period I concluded I must make a speech in January to announce our decision.”

27 Ibid., 69–71.

28 Press conference, August 16, 1963. Pearson papers, Speeches file, Vol. 25.

29 See esp. letter from Drury to Pearson, October 31, 1962, and letter from Mitchell Sharp to Pearson, November 29, 1962. Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Nuclear Policy, Part 2, Vol. 94, File 806.2.

30 Pearson prepared an 11-page memorandum, dated February 27, 1962, in which he tried to bring together his own views on defense with “those of others who have recently given me their's on this subject. Professor Lepan of Queen's University, Professor Max Cohen of McGill, Mr. Tom Kent, Walter Gordon and Paul Hellyer.” Covering memorandum, Pearson to Lepan, February 27, 1962, ibid. In the section of the memorandum dealing with nuclear weapons, Pearson largely reviewed the positions of those advising him and did not come to any firm conclusions.

31 Marginal note, January 2, 1963, ibid.; emphasis in original.

32 Memorandum, Pickersgill to Pearson, January 3, 1963, ibid.; emphasis in original.

33 Ibid.

34 Memorandum, O'Hagan to Pearson, January 7, 1963, ibid. O'Hagan was apparently not aware of what Pearson's decision was.

35 Letter, Malone to Willis C. Armstrong, January 2, 1963; copy made available to the author by Brig. Malone.

36 Letter, Malone to author, April 18, 1975.

37 Ibid. It has been impossible to confirm Malone's version of this incident, for I was not able to find a draft of the speech. The only copy in the Pearson papers is a printed copy apparently prepared after the speech was actually delivered.

38 “An address by The Honourable Lester B. Pearson, P.C., M.P., Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada,” delivered at a luncheon meeting of the York-Scarborough Liberal Association, Toronto, Ontario, January 12, 1963. [Hereafter referred to as Scarborough speech.]

39 Spencer, Robert, “External Affairs and Defence,” Canadian Annual Review (1963), 332Google Scholar.

40 The analytical framework is laid out in Lentner, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach (Columbus, Ohio:Charles E. Merrill 1974Google Scholar).

41 Lyon (fn. 1), 138. 4

42 Interview with Green (fn. 6).

43 Confidential interview, August 26, 1974.

44 Interview with John Munro, August 27, 1974.

45 Confidential interview, January 30, 1975.

46 Spencer (fn. 39), 286–87.

47 See Lentner (fn. 40), 67–90, for an elaboration of the meaning of the terms used in this paragraph.

48 Lyon (fn. i),99.

49 Ibid., 78.

50 See Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston:Little, Brown 1971Google Scholar), for analyses of the nature and impact of bureaucratic routines.

51 American expectations were generated not simply by the public actions, but also by private assurances from Prime Minister Diefenbaker to President Kennedy in 1961 that he would prepare the Canadian public for the acceptance of nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker proceeded to do this, but he stopped when his relations with Kennedy became strained.

52 Interview with Green (fn. 6).

53 Spencer (fn. 10), 127–36; quote from p. 136.

54 Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14).

55 The story of this incident and its impact on the relations between the two men is told by Newman (fn. 2) , 264–67.

56 The most complete account of this conference is Lyon (fn. 1), 131–38, although his interpretation of its impact on Pearson is mistaken.

57 Spencer (fn. 39), 284–86.

58 Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Vol. 164, Department of National Defence, Debate Material.

59 Spencer (fn. 39), 293.

60 The fall of the Government is described in Newman (fn. 2), 369–74.

61 Spencer (fn. 39), 311–13.

62 Newman (fn. 2), 267.

63 See Allison, Graham T. and Halperin, Morton H., “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” in Tanter, Raymond and Ullman, Richard, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton:Princeton University Press 1962), 40–79Google Scholar. Also see Allison (fn. 50); Halperin, with the assistance of Clapp, Priscilla and Kanter, Arnold, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution Press 1974Google Scholar).

64 Allison, , “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 58 (September 1969Google Scholar).

65 See Krasner, Stephen D., “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland),” Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

66 See Spencer (fn. 39), 288–312.

67 Interview with Green (fn. 6).

68 Negotiations for a bilateral agreement were conducted for several months following the Cuban missile crisis. See Spencer (fn. 39), 292.

69 This statement is made in the context of a view of Canadian political culture analyzed in Lentner, “Canada and the U.S.,” a series of articles in The Toronto Daily Star, August 19, 20, 21, 1970, and in Lentner, and Lewis, Thomas J., “Revolutionary Terrorism in Democratic Society,” Freedom At Issue (May-June 1971Google Scholar).

70 See Donald Barry, “Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: The Case of Biafra,” typescript, and my forthcoming book on the role of the Prime Minister in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy.

71 See Presthus, Robert, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (Cambridge, England:At the University Press 1973Google Scholar).

72 Spencer (fn. 10), 88, 107–8, 115.

73 Ibid., 143–45.

74 November 29, 1962. Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Nuclear Policy, Part 2, Vol. 94, File 806.2.

75 Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14).

76 Barry (fn. 70), found tiiat such impressions tended to be a more important influence on ministers in the Biafra case.

77 In an interview for Inquiry, a television program on station CBOT, on January 29, 1963, in response to a question about the Gallup poll, Pearson said, “That had nothing to do with my statement [at Scarborough]. When I decided that this statement had to be made, . . . I didn't even know what the Gallup poll results were.”

78 The Conservatives had not held office since 1936, and the problems of simply becoming familiar with government operations must have been immense. As a symbol of the lack of familiarity with government, there is the fact that not a single member of the new Cabinet had ever before seen the Cabinet room.

79 Diefenbaker's intervention at Smith's first press conference is described by Eayrs, James in The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada (Toronto:University of Toronto Press 1961), 27–28Google Scholar.

80 Confidential interview, July 29, 1974.

81 Ibid.

82 Spencer (fn. 10), 132.

83 One of the strongest impressions which arises from reading the Leader of the Opposition files of the Pearson papers is the absence of any confidential information from the Government.

84 Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14).

85 Hellyer's version of events differs in detail from that of Judy LaMarsh in Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage (Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Limited 1968), 19–30. LaMarsh suggests that Hellyer's speech may have been given in collaboration with Pearson who later disavowed his association with it. Hellyer, on the contrary, says he acted independently. The Hellyer version is accepted here because it appears to be more precise and is compatible with other evidence. LaMarsh's narrative is loose and imprecise, and she is not always factually correct. For example, she writes that the Norstad press conference, which took place on January 3, happened after Pearson's Scarborough speech, which was delivered on January 12.

86 Interviews with historian John Munro, August 27, 1974, and the Honourable Walter Gordon. There is no mention of collaboration on this issue in Gordon's biography by Smith, Denis, Gentle Patriot: A Political Biography of Walter Gordon (Edmonton:Hurtig Publishers 1973Google Scholar).

87 Interview with Munro (fn. 86).

88 This is the least likely explanation. In his Scarborough speech, Mr. Pearson said, “Defence policy must be part of our foreign policy. . . .”

89 The questions used are based heavily on the work of James David Barber. See especially The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall 1972Google Scholar); also see the lengthy review of this work by George, Alexander L., “Assessing Presidential Character,” World Politics, xxvi (January 1974Google Scholar). A briefer version which explicitly poses the questions without providing answers is Barber, “Ford as the President: Some Hard Questions.” New York Times, June 22, 1974.

90 See Dexter, Lewis A., Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, 111.:Northwestern University Press 1970Google Scholar).

91 This question is a crucial one in Barber (fn. 89).

92 Newman (fn. 2), 179, and interview with Green (fn. 6).

93 Interview of Diefenbaker for The Tenth Decade (CBC Television Production Cameron Graham, Producer, 1971) by Bernard Ostrey and Cameron Graham, Roll #51, July 15, 1971, p. 2.

94 Newman (fn. 2), 187–89.

95 Interview with Green (fn. 6).

96 Interview with the Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, August 7, 1974.

97 Confidential interview, July 16, 1974.

98 Interview with Green (fn. 6) .

99 Confidential interview, January 30, 1975.

100 Interview with Green (fn. 6).

101 Diefenbaker's Government in 1963 was defeated in a Commons vote. This was only the second time in Canadian history that this had happened; see Newman (fn. 2), 374. In contrast, Pearson led a minority government for five years, and this was followed by a majority victory under Mr. Trudeau's leadership in the 1968 election. Trudeau led a minority government for two years and was returned with a majority in 1974. 102Interview for The Tenth Decade (fn. 93), Roll #65, July 17, 1971, p. 2.

103 Ibid., Roll #50, July 15, 1971, p. 5.

104 Confidential interview, July 29, 1974.

105 Interview with Diefenbaker (fn. 96).

106 Confidential interview, July 29, 1974.

107 Interview for The Tenth Decade (fn. 93), Roll #50, July 15, 1971, p. 4.

108 There may be a slight exaggeration in this characterization, although I think it is basically correct. Newman (fn. 2) , chap. 24, in a narrative of the events involved in the attempt to depose Diefenbaker, provides some evidence that conflicts with my characterization.

109 Confidential interview, August 8, 1974. 11

110 Interview with Munro (fn. 86).

111 Ibid.

112 Confidential interview, August 8, 1974.

113 Ibid.

114 Confidential interview, January 30, 1975.

115 Perhaps the unkindest version is in LaMarsh (fn. 85). A kinder account was given by Hellyer in an interview (fn. 14), where he stated that Pearson “would agree now. Then he would read a book with a glass of Scotch, and disagree tomorrow. This was a form of intellectual honesty.”

116 “Things can be done under the incentive of terror and fear that cannot be done when the fear disappears.” Pearson (fn. 1), Vol. 2, 1948–1957, p. 272. Norman Smith has written about Pearson, “Crises stimulated him. He used crises to move public and politicians to do things they would otherwise not face up to.” In “Pearson, people, and press,” International journal, xxix (Winter 1973–74), 22Google Scholar.

117 Confidential interview, January 31, 1975.

118 This is a behavioral rather than a belief category, for Pearson probably did not understand his approach to politics in this way. Ibid. For an analysis of his beliefs, see Donald Arthur Lawrence, “The Operational Code of Lester B. Pearson,” paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, June 3–6, 1974.

119 Letter, Pearson to H. R. McArthur, February 22, 1963. Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Vol. 94, File 806.2, Nuclear Policy, Part 2. The letter was prepared by David Stanley, a Toronto businessman who assisted Pearson during the 1963 election campaign.

120 For studies using this approach applied to other countries, see Hosoya, Chihiro, “Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan,” World Politics, xxvi (April 1974Google Scholar); Ørvik, Nils and associates, Departmental Decision-Making: A Research Report (Oslo:Universitetsforlaget 1972Google Scholar); the latter deals with Norway.

121 See Neustadt, Richard, “White House and Whitehall,” in Hockin, Thomas A., Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario:Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd. 1971Google Scholar), abridged from The Public Interest, 11 (1966).