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Ethnology and the Peace of South Asia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Walker Connor
Walker Connor
Affiliation:
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
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Extract

The distribution of ethnic groups throughout South Asia constitutes the region's single most significant strategic factor. Other factors, varying in importance according to specific location and time, do, of course, interact with the ethnic factor. Thus, the topographic, political, economic, and transportation maps all contribute essential elements to our knowledge of the region. Nevertheless, the settlement pattern of distinct culture-groups, as defined by the language and dialect maps, is clearly the most critical of all tangible phenomena.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , October 1969 , pp. 51 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1969

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References

1 See Connor, Walker, “Self-Determination: The New Phase,” World Politics, xx (October 1967), 30–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 See map, pp. 52–53.

3 For an article describing the most recent concession, the creation of a new “autonomous state” within Assam, see die New York Times, September 12, 1968.

4 The interwoven history of Marxist-Leninism and ethnic nationalism is too multifaceted to be treated adequately here. However, a partial listing of milestones in this interrelation, not otherwise discussed in this article, would include: (1) Lenin's amazement that Europe's proletariat would fight along national rather than class lines during World War I; (2) his explanatory work of this development, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, in which nation-states (imperialist and colonial) had largely replaced classes as the principal vehicles of history; (3) subsequent to the publication of this work, the key tactical role assigned in propaganda to the negative aspect of African and Asian ethnic consciousness (i.e., “Don't be ruled by the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch [alien] imperialists.”); (4) Lenin's promises to Russia's minorities, prior to the revolution, that they would be granted the right to determine their future political allegiance; (5) the eventful history of “the nationality problem” within the Soviet Union and within the other multi-ethnic, Communist states such as Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia; and (6) the history of difficulties arising between Moscow and other Communist states, at least in part a reflection of clashing national interests and/or historic national sentiments (such as Romanian dislike of Slavs or traditional Chinese suspicion of Europeans).

5 See, for example, Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Baltimore), 156–57, in which the author notes that “virtually all of Mao's tactical principles are to be found in the classical Chinese writings on the subject, and above all in the maxims of Sun Tzu, the famous military writer who flourished about 500 B.C.” Schram, in turn, cites as authority General Samuel Griffith, who translated Sun Tzu.

For an example of emphasizing the importance of topography, see Girling, J. L. S., “Northeast Thailand: Tomorrow's Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, XLVI (January 1968), 393–94Google Scholar. The author feels that the lack of mountainous terrain probably precludes effective revolutionary warfare in Thailand's northeast. However, there are a number of cases in which insurgency has been efficaciously conducted in non-mountainous areas, the Mekong delta being a case in point. Mao himself noted in 1938: “Plains are of course inferior to mountains, but one must not rule out the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare or establishing some sort of base areas on the plains. That guerrilla war can be developed on the plains is proved by the extensive guerrilla war developing on the plains of Hopeh and northern and western Shantung.” in “Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War,” Mao Tse-tung, An Anthology of his Writings (New York 1962), 128Google Scholar.

6 Snow, Edgar, Red Star Over China (New York 1961), 304–05Google Scholar.

7 As General P'eng noted in the same interview with Snow: “the partisans, being inseparable from the local mass, have the advantage of superior intelligence, and the greatest use must be made of this. Ideally, every peasant should be on the partisans' intelligence staff, so that it is impossible for the enemy to take a step without the partisans knowing it.” Snow, 303. For similar comments by Mao, see Schram, 157–59.

8 The famous eight rules to be observed by all members of the revolutionary forces in their dealings with the masses are listed in Snow, 176.

9 See, for example, Ch'en, Jerome, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (New York 1967), 176Google Scholar, 190, and 195.

10 For full text, see Chih-i, Chang, The Party and the National Question. Translated by Mosley, George (Cambridge, Mass. 1966)Google Scholar, Appendix B. It was at this Congress that the Chinese Soviet Republic was proclaimed.

11 Ibid., 50–51.

12 Quoted in Schram, 196.

13 Snow, 96.

14 Lenin had addressed himself directly to the issue in “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Theses),” written in 1916. He criticized “the reactionary nature of the ideas of Renner and O. Bauer,” who contended that self-determination meant “cultural national autonomy,” and he insisted that there could be only one meaning to “self-determination, i.e., the right to free political secession.” See Lenin, V. I., The Right of Nations to Self-Determination. Selected Writings (New York 1951), 73Google Scholar. 76.

In 1921, Stalin, in an article entitled “New Features of the National Question,” sarcastically commented on the mistaken interpretation of self-determination by Kautsky, Springer, and Bauer: “When they spoke of the right of self-determination, the moving spirits of the Second International as a rule never even hinted at the right of political secession—the right of self-determination was at best interpreted to mean the right to autonomy in general.” See Stalin, Joseph, Marxism and the National Question. Selected Writings and Speeches (New York 1942), 112Google Scholar.

15 Considering all this, Mao's coupling of the independent states of Turkey and Poland with the pseudo-independent Ukraine and Caucasus, in his 1935 address to the Mongols, would appear to be a deliberate attempt to confuse independence with autonomy, and seemingly to hold out the right of secession while simultaneously laying the groundwork for the political integration he intended.

16 The only significant resistance by minorities to the passage of Mao's forces was offered by the Man-tzu in northern Szechwan Province, and diis was disorganized. It is also interesting uiat this people never afforded the CCP an opportunity to explain its policy on minorities. See Snow, 213–14, and Schram, 187–88.

17 See Snow, 282 and 350, for references to various minority peoples, from both south and north China, who were serving in the Red Army in 1936.

18 Prior to the Long March, the southern element of the CCP, of which Mao was a part, created a number of Soviets (base areas) widiin minority territory. Another leader, Chang Kuo-T'ao, later created a minority soviet in Szechwan Province, and still later (1935–1937) was to lead the attempt to create independent minority states diroughout Tibet, Sinkiang, and Kansu. See Ch'en, 195–97, and Schram, 186–87.

19 Snow, 343–44.

20 See, for example, the 1931 resolution on minorities. The key section of the document, promising self-determination, has been quoted above. Elsewhere (Point 3), it calls for the toiling masses of the nationalities to overthrow their national exploiters.

21 Tse-tung, Mao, On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism. Selected Works, Vol. I (New York 1954), 161–62Google Scholar.

22 The derogatory reference to Chang's plans to create independent nation-states in western China as “warlordism” would appear to be another illustration of the lack of sincerity underlying Mao's ostensible support at this time for secession by national groups.

23 Snow, 100.

24 The formal declaration was entitled “Decisions of the Central Committee on the Political Situation and our Tasks following the Linking-up of the First and Fourth Armies.” The section cited can be found in Chang Chih-i, 49. The issuance of this announcement is one reason for believing that there was general support for Chang Kuo-T'ao's plan to work among the minorities of western China. Another is that Chu Teh, Mao's close associate (both before and after this adventure), accompanied Chang rather than Mao. Another reason is that, prior to the Long March, Mao's southern organization had done similar work among minorities, creating a number of Soviets (base areas), at least one of which was headed by a non-Chinese. On this latter point, see Ch'en, 153–54. It is assumed that if such activity constituted “warlordism” in western China, it did so also in the southern areas.

25 The first important organization was founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1925, and, as implied by its name, Association of the Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth, did not apply to all of the peoples of Indochina. A number of localized Communist movements sprang up in the ensuing years, causing Ho to call a meeting of the leaders of the factions in January 1930, at which a united organization, called the Vietnamese Communist Party, was created. However, the Third International felt that an organization with a larger base would be necessary to challenge the French effectively, and the Vietnamese were ordered to incorporate Laos and Cambodia in the organization. Ho then insisted on this step, and in October 1930 the Party took the title, Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). In May 1941, Ho created the Viet Minh, a united front, under the effective control of the leadership of the ICP. In order to ensure the continued unity of the Viet Minh, the formal organization of the ICP was dissolved in November 1945, although it continued to function through “study groups.” By the time it was formally resurrected in March 1951 as the Workers Party (Lao Dong), the Communist Party had ostensibly become once more a party geographically limited to Vietnam. It is necessary to emphasize the word ostensibly, because the Vietnamese Communist leadership continued to dominate the Communist parties of Laos and Cambodia. For substantiation of the latter point, see Fall, Bernard, “The Pathet Lao,” in Scalapino, Robert, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia (Englewood Cliffs 1965), 178Google Scholar, passim.

26 On May 9, 1929, the Association of Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth stipulated as “a fundamental and urgent demand” … “Reconnaitre à tous les peuples: cambodgien, man, laotien, etc… . le droit de se gouverner eux-mêmes.” See Gouvernement Générale des Affaires Politiques et de la Sûreté Générale. Contributions à L'Histoire des Mouvements Politiques de L'Indochine Française. Documents. Vol. iv (1933), 56Google Scholar.

At its founding in 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party set itself ten “concrete tasks.” Number seven was “Indépendance politique du l'Indochine; reconnaissance du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes.” See Giang, Nguyen Kien, Les Grandes Dates du Parti de la Classe Ouvrière du Vietnam (Hanoi 1960), 22Google Scholar.

In 1943, a Viet Minh conference included as Point Four of its political program “the right of minorities to self-determination.” See United States Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Political Alignments of Vietnamese Nationalists, OIR Report No. 3708, October 1, 1949.

27 An interesting Party article of 1934 dealt with the question at some length. It noted that certain comrades had found fault with the party slogan, “Droit pour les Cambodgiens, Laotiens et autres nationalités de disposer d'eux-mêmes,” on the ground that it should specify the right of separation. The comrades were accused of not appreciating the total meaning and great flexibility of the slogan. Certainly, the concept of self-determination included the right of separation: “Le droit des peuples de disposer d'eux-mêmes c'est l'indépendance politique, c'est le droit de ces nations de s'arranger comme bon semblera, de décider eux-mêmes s'ils s'unissent ou non avec le pays qui les a opprimés jusqu'à la révolution.” However, it was not wise to emphasize the right of separation at this time (1934), because the unity of the Anamites, Cambodians, Laotians, and the other nationalities was necessary to assure the defeat of French imperialism. Moreover, the French would themselves employ appeals to separatism in order to divide and thereby perpetuate their rule. It was, therefore, necessary at this time to emphasize unity, not separatism. Th e article next denied that the other nationalities (i.e., other than Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian) had achieved national consciousness. Therefore, they did not qualify as nations under Stalin's definition. Th e evident but unstated implication was that, not being nations, they did not qualify for the right of nations to self-determination. See “Vers le Renforcement du Parti Communiste Chinois,” Cahiers du Bolchevisme (July 1, 1934), particularly pp. 798–99.

28 In an important party tract, called “The August Revolution,” written in 1946 by Truang Chinh, a party leader who was later to become General Secretary, it was stated in consecutive paragraphs (1) that “the principle of ‘the right of nations to self-determination’” gave Vietnam the right to total freedom from France, and (2) that attempts to form a “‘Nam Ky state,’ ‘Moi state,’ ‘Thai state,’ ‘Nung state,’ etc.” had to be rejected. “VietNam must be worthy of the name nation; that is to say, it is one and indivisible… .” “The August Revolution” was published in Hanoi in 1962, and can be found in Chinh, Truang, Primer for Revolt (New York 1963)Google Scholar. The quotations are from 62–63.

The enumeration of various states (Nam Ky, Moi, etc.) was a reference to proposals by France to subdivide the territory into a complex system of federated states and autonomous regions—a system in which ethnicity would play a major role in determining political boundaries. The motives behind these French proposals would have been less suspect had they been advanced prior to France's attempt to reassert its authority over Indochina. However, the chronology of events makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the proposals were merely an attempt to play one ethnic group against another. Nevermeless, these French proposals should have been acceptable to Ho as fully consonant with earlier promises of his party. (On France's proposals and related French activity, see Hammer, Ellen, The Struggle for Indochina [Stanford 1954]Google Scholar, particularly 162, 172.)

29 Ho proclaimed the existence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945.

30 Several earlier attempts to create base areas in ethnically Vietnamese territory had failed.

31 For the most complete account of the essential roles played by the minorities in the French-Indochina War, see McAlister, John T., “Mountain Minorities and the Viet Minh: A Key to the Indochina War” in Kunstadter, Peter (ed.), Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations (Princeton 1967), 771–844Google Scholar. See also McAlister, , “The Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” World Politics, xix (January 1967)Google Scholar, particularly 273–80.

32 From “The Resistance Will Win,” republished by Hanoi in 1960; it can be found in Truang Chinh, 116–17.

33 The promise of cultural autonomy has been echoed in the programs of the National Liberation Front. There is a curious hedging in the most recent program, however. Although the program of 1961 promised “to set up … autonomous regions or areas inhabited by minority peoples” and “to abolish … forced assimilation,” the program of 1967 limits the establishment of autonomous zones to “the areas where die minorities live concentrated and gather the required conditions.” The nature of these “required conditions” and the time and manner of “gathering” them are not specified. For the text of the 1961 program, see United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (3d. rev. ed.) (Washington 1967), 269–74Google Scholar. For the 1967 Program, see the New York Times, December 15, 6 97.

For descriptions of Hanoi's operations relative to minorities outside its borders, see Fall, Bernard, The Viet-Minh Regime (Ne w York 1956), 80Google Scholar; Warner, Dennis, The Last Confucian (New York 1963), 167Google Scholar; and Joiner, Charles, “Administration and Political Warfare in the Highlands,” Vietnam Perspectives, 1 (November 1965), 19–37Google Scholar.

34 See Joel Halpern and Peter Kunstadter, “Laos: Introduction” in Kunstadler, 244; and Bernard Fall, “The Pathet Lao” in Scalapino, 173.

35 For an account of anti-governmental violence by minority tribesmen in the northeastern area, see the Christian Science Monitor, November 22, 1968.

36 Despite much contrary evidence, Sihanouk, on a number of occasions has denied that VC forces were using Cambodia's northeast as a sanctuary. At other times, he has berated North Vietnam and the VC, not only for infiltrating the area, but for arming the minority hill-tribesmen. (See, for example, the New York Times, March 4, 1968.) In mid-1968, Sihanouk announced that his government could no longer guarantee the safety of diplomats traveling in this area and in other minority areas along Cambodia's western border. See the New York Times, June 5, 1968.

37 As in the case of the minorities within China, the “montagnards” have long-standing reasons to dislike all Vietnamese, whose traditional name for the mountain people (“Moi,” translatable as “barbarian”) is an accurate reflection of the attitude of the Vietnamese toward the tribesmen and their culture. However, the promises of cultural independence by Hanoi and the NLF have fallen on particularly fertile ground because of a policy of enforced assimilation which was inaugurated by South Vietnam's former President Diem . The policy, which was strongly resented and resisted by the tribesmen, has not been pursued by subsequent governments, which have moved increasingly toward equaling Hanoi's promises. See n. 43 below.

38 Official sanctioning of cooperation with non-Communists in national liberation movements outside China is found in an important tract by the Deputy Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities, which has been translated and distributed abroad by the Chinese Government: “When their class interests are encroached upon by the imperialists through national oppression, the national bourgeoisie and even certain patriotic kings, princes, and aristocrats of an oppressed nationality may sometimes fight against national oppression together with the broad masses of working people of their own nationality. In this struggle the proletariat should unite with them, while at the same time they must understand that the attitude of these people towards imperialist national oppression is, in the final analysis, based on their own class interests.” Chun, Liu, The National Question and Class Struggle (Peking 1966), 5–6Google Scholar. Later in the same article, Liu, although referring to the national question within China, makes clear that such an alliance is temporary and that the successful national revolution must be followed by the elimination of the exploiting classes. See below, n. 45.

39 New York Times, November 17, 1968.

40 New York Times, March 17, 1968, and March 20, 1968.

41 See n. 36 above, and the New York Times, December 8, 1968.

42 See, for example, McAlister in Kunstadter, 813. Remember also the great flexibility practiced in such matters throughout its early history by the CCP (e.g., the willingness to work with the most conservative Moslems).

43 In a highly publicized ceremony held in early 1969, a number of FULRO members formally defected, pledging allegiance to Saigon in return for promises of cultural and military autonomy. However, the absence of the movement's most important leader cast doubt upon the scale of the defection. See the New York Times of February 2, 1969.

In any event, it is very dubious that a pledge of allegiance to a Vietnamese Government signifies the overcoming of the deep animosities traditionally manifested by the “montagnard” toward all Vietnamese. (The history of failures of intermittent similar arrangements between the Kurds and the Iraqi Government is pertinent.) Such a pledge, if in fact given by large numbers, would probably indicate a “montagnard” willingness to become more neutral in the Hanoi-Saigon conflict, and to refrain from waging war against the South Vietnamese in return for ostensible freedom and subsidies. Such an arrangement, if in fact widescale, would have great significance for the Hanoi-Saigon conflict, but decidedly less significance for the longer-range relationship of “montagnard” and Vietnamese.

44 China has been the more seriously troubled to date. The government's problems with the Tibetans and with the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang have been given the most publicity, but what the Government calls “reactionary local nationalism” appears to have afflicted practically all groups. For a remarkably frank acknowledgement of broad-scale ethnic dissonance, by the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Cabinet's Commission of Nationalities, see Liu Chun, particularly 18–22. See, also, Richard Diao, Minorities and the Chinese Communist Regime” in Kunstadter, particularly pp. 198, 199.

For an official acknowledgment of ethnic discord within North Vietnam, see Nhan Dan of June 21, 1957 (JPRS/DC 198). See also Fall, 67. For additional references sec the footnote in Kunstadter, 685.

45 Opposing such a contention are the recent activities of such economically and educationally advanced groups as the Basques and Catalans of Spain, the French-speaking element of the Jura in Switzerland, the Flemish of Belgium, the Croatians and Slo-venes of Yugoslavia, etc.

46 Even the hyphenate indicated that equal status was ascribed to two states. Moreover, the granting of substantial United States assistance to Yugoslavia (over $2.25 billion) and to Poland (over $500 million) prior to the Sino-Soviet rift does not support the contention of a belief in a Communist monolith.

47 See Liu Chun, 21: “Nationalism is a bourgeois ideology.” And 12–13: “The national question can never be solved apart from revolution and class struggle… . The more thoroughly the revolution is carried out the more completely will the question be solved.”

48 Mao made explicit in 1936 that victory within the state was a necessary step, but only a step, toward world revolution: “The victory of the Chinese national liberation movement will be part of the victory of world Socialism, because to defeat imperialism in China means the destruction of one of its most powerful bases. If China wins its independence, the world revolution will progress very rapidly. If our country is subjugated by the enemy, we shall lose everything. For a people being deprived of its national freedom, the revolutionary task is not immediate Socialism, but the struggle for independence. We cannot even discuss Communism if we are robbed of a country in which to practice it.” Snow, 455. Italics added.

The following year Mao added: “The Chinese Communists are internationalists; they are in favor of the world Communist movement. But at the same time they are patriots who defend their native land… . This patriotism and internationalism are by no means in conflict, for only China's independence and liberation will make it possible to participate in the world Communist movement.” See Schram, 201.

49 In the platform of the Vietnamese Communist Party (the Workers' Party), for example, the party pledges to cooperate to bring about “an independent, free, strong and prosperous federation of the states of VietNam, Laos and Cambodia if the three people so desire.” The full text of the platform is presented in Cole, Allen, Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions (Ithaca 1956), 96–106Google Scholar.

50 See, for example, the New York Times, May 12, 1968, in which Thailand's Premier estimates the presence of 3,000 North Vietnamese agents within his country.

51 It is also difficult to harmonize an image of Ho as a nationalist, of either the ethnic or the state variety, with his willingness to collaborate with the French colonial administration in 1937 and 1938. He did so under the direction of the French CP, which, in turn, was following a course of action dictated by the Soviet Union. Ho's action was described by the Vietnamese Trotskyites as “the Popular Front of Treason.”

52 See, for example, the text of the recent programs of the National Liberation Front, New York Times, December 15, 1967. As has been earlier noted, appeals have also been directed to minorities, but here we are concerned with appeals to the ethnic Vietnamese.

53 The leaders of China, North Vietnam, and the USSR have all shown a keen cognizance of the undesirable consequences that are apt to flow from too ubiquitous a presence of distinguishable aliens. All three governments, both at home and abroad, have emphasized the need to train and to work through cadres who are themselves members of the ethnic group. Similarly, large Soviet missions abroad, such as the group of technicians at work on the Aswan Dam, live an almost isolated existence, keeping contacts with the indigenous people to a minimum.

54 Piao, Lin, Long Live the Victory of the People's War! (Peking 1965), 38Google Scholar.

55 Sihanouk has not only protested concerning the Khmers in Thailand and in Vietnam, but has also directly supported FULRO on the grounds (not totally ethnically correct) that the mountain tribesmen of Vietnam are related to the Khmers, He has been particularly incensed by attempts to assimilate Khmers. In 1965, for example, he prophesied that all such attempts would fail because of “the national sentiments of our forefathers which enabled the Khmer race to resist all attempts made to exterminate it, and to survive the genocidal tactics employed to that end by the Siamese and Anamites for a period of 500 years.” See Kunstadter, 54. This anti-assimilationist stance coupled with his often repeated disclaimer of any territorial ambitions would seem to indicate that his policy is similar to the “prickly-hedge” policy that was pursued for many years by the amirs of Afghanistan in their dealings with the British to the south. In essence, it was to keep within the adjoining state, a zone inhabited by people over whom that state could not exert effective control.

The ethnic problem has also troubled relations between Cambodia and the Communist leaders. In December 1964, a meeting between representatives of Cambodia, North Vietnam, and the NLF failed to reach agreement because of the latter's refusal to make unspecified guarantees concerning Khmers in Cochin China.