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Economic Rights and Distributive Justice in Developing Societies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Charles R. Beitz
Charles R. Beitz
Affiliation:
Swarthmore College
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Abstract

This essay seeks to answer an important question of normative political theory concerning the developing countries: What claims to economic benefits are people justified in pressing against governments that are preoccupied with the development of their economies? Two alternative principles of distributive justice—the principle of maximizing growth and the principle of minimizing poverty—are examined with special reference to the circumstances of developing societies. An attempt is made to bring intergenerational considerations systematically to bear on the problem of economic rights in the present. It is concluded that there is an absolute minimum level of welfare to which everyone is entitled, and that this level is usefully conceived in terms of “basic needs.”

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , April 1981 , pp. 321 - 346
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1981

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References

1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. II(I), in Brownlie, Ian, ed., Basic Documents in International Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 155.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., arts. 6 and 7, 153–54.

3 Ibid., art. 9, 154.

4 Feinberg, Joel, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1973), 95, 66.Google Scholar

5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (fn. 1), art. 2(1), 152.

6 For similar views, see Shue, Henry, Basic Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)Google Scholar, chap. 4; Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)Google Scholar, chap. 8.

7 See part III of Beitz, , Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).Google Scholar

8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, in Brownlie (fn. 1), 145.

9 I have tried to develop an argument to this effect in “Democracy in Developing Societies,” in Brown, Peter G. and Shue, Henry, eds., Boundaries (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).Google Scholar

10 Thus, the present discussion helps to answer a question left open in Political Theory and International Relations (fn. 7), part II.

11 This is only a cursory account of a view that has been elaborated at great length in a very extensive literature. For a seminal discussion of the relation of growth and capital formation, see Arthur Lewis, W., A Theory of Economic Growth (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965 [1955])Google Scholar, chap. 5. There is a more recent discussion in McKinnen, Ronald I., Money and Capital in Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1973), esp. 123–29.Google Scholar For a summary and criticism of the orthodox position, see Cline, William R., The Potential Effects of Income Redistribution on Economic Growth (New York: Praeger, 1972), 9–13Google Scholar and throughout.

12 On the theory of the dual economy, see Arthur Lewis, W., “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” The Manchester School, XXII (May 1954), 139–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Lewis's reconsiderations in “Reflections on Unlimited Labor,” in DiMarco, Luis Eugenio, ed., International Economics and Development (New York: Academic Press, 1972), 75–96.Google Scholar There is a more recent discussion in Jorgenson, Dale W., “Surplus Agricultural Labour and the Development of a Dual Economy,” Oxford Economic Papers, n.s. XIX (November 1967), 288–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A brief but important discussion of the distributive effects of the dual economy is in Kuznets, Simon, “Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: VIII. Distribution of Income by Size,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, XI (January 1963), 45–58Google Scholar; compare Myrdal, Gunnar, Economic Theory and the Under-developed Regions (London: Duckworth, 1957), 23–38.Google Scholar

13 This is the well-known thesis of Kuznets, Simon, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” American Economic Review, XLV (March 1955), 1–28.Google Scholar The application of this thesis to the developing countries is based on the supposition that economic growth in poor countries will produce long-run distributive consequences analogous to those observed in Europe and North America in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, as Kuznets himself recognizes (pp. 25–26), it is not clear whether the analogy holds. For a further discussion, see Hewlett, Sylvia Ann, The Cruel Dilemmas of Development (New York: Basic Books, 1980)Google Scholar, chap. 2.

14 The principle of maximizing growth should be distinguished from a more familiar principle to which it is structurally similar: the principle of utility. The latter requires maximization of social utility, but on the usual interpretation social utility is not equated with national wealth. Rather, it is some function of individual utilities, where these refer to an interpersonally comparable hedonic quality such as pleasure or happiness. We need not discuss the well-known philosophical difficulties of utilitarianism here, but we must recognize that the maximization of growth is not in any straightforward sense a utilitarian principle; there is no reason to assume that maximizing income or wealth will necessarily result in the maximum aggregate pleasure or happiness, even in the long run. This point is emphasized in a quite different context in Posner, Richard, “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory,” Journal of Legal Studies, VIII (January 1978), 103–40.Google Scholar Posner argues that wealth maximization is preferable to utility maximization as a normative standard. His argument is criticized in Kronman, Anthony T., “Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle,” Journal of Legal Studies, IX (March 1980), 227–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Paukert, Felix, “Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development: A Survey of Evidence,” International Labour Review, Vol. 168 (August-September 1973), 116–22Google Scholar; Adelman, Irma and Morris, Cynthia Taft, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973), 160, 179.Google Scholar The existence of some counterexamples to this generalization suggests that it would be incorrect to conclude that higher rates of growth inevitably produce greater income inequalities. See Cline (fn. 11), 9–20; Ahluwalia, Montek S., “Income Inequality,” in Chenery, Hollis and others, Redistribution with Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 11–16Google Scholar; Lai, Deepak, “Distribution and Development: A Review Article,” World Development, IV (September 1976), 728–29.Google Scholar There is a summary and review of several simulation studies that support this view in Cline, William R., “Distribution and Development,” Journal of Development Economics, 1 (February 1975), 378–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; but see Adelman, Irma, Geier, Marsha, and Morris, Cynthia Taft, “Instruments and Goals in Economic Development,” American Economic Review, Vol. 59 (May 1969), 416–21.Google Scholar

16 Adelman and Morris (fn. 15), 179; but see Lal (fn. 15), 729.

17 There is an interesting discussion of these problems in Hirschman, Albert O., “The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87 (November 1973), 544–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 For discussions from different points of view, see Bell, C.L.G., “The Political Framework,” in Chenery (fn. 15), 52–72Google Scholar; Adelman, and Morris, (fn. 15), 170Google Scholar; Fagen, Richard R., “Equity in the South in the Context of North-South Relations,” in Fishlow, Albert and others, Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 163–214Google Scholar; and Hewlett (fn. 13).

19 For example, in Goulet, Denis, “Development for What?,” Comparative Political Studies, 1 (July 1968), 304–05CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Seers, Dudley, “The Meaning of Development,” International Development Review, XI (December 1969), 2Google Scholar; Haq, Mahbub ul, “Employment in the 1970's: A New Perspective,” International Development Review, XIII (December 1971), 9–11Google Scholar; Amin, Samir, “Growth is not Development,” Development Forum, 1 (April 1973).Google Scholar

20 There is a more detailed discussion of the concept of urgency in Scanlon, T. M., “Preference and Urgency,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72 (November 6, 1975), 660–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also, see the discussion of “essential interests” in Fishkin, James S., Tyranny and Legitimacy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), chap. 4.Google Scholar

21 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 151.Google Scholar

22 The principle reads: “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. …” Ibid., 302.

23 The objection has often been brought against Rawls's difference principle. For example, see Arrow, K. J., “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of Justice,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70 (May 10, 1973), 251Google Scholar, and Harsanyi, John C., “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?” American Political Science Review, Vol. 69 (June 1975), 596–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a discussion anticipating this objection, see Rawls, (fn. 21), 157–58.Google Scholar

24 It can be argued that Rawls's own theory takes account of this objection because of the importance it attaches to self-respect. See, for example, Scanlon, T. M., “Rawls' Theory of Justice,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 121 (May 1973), 1064.CrossRefGoogle Scholar However, this defense of Rawls's view does not consider his assertion that certain forms of envy, the psychological premise on which the link between inequality and the denial of self-respect might be based, are unjustifiable (Rawls [fn. 21], 143, 530–49). Whether envy is or is not a moral sentiment—and the extent to which it should be taken into account in the argument for equality—is likely to depend more on particular features of particular cultures than Rawls admits.

25 Compare Daniels, Norman, “Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty,” in Daniels, , ed., Reading Rawls (New York: Basic Books, 1975), esp. 256–58.Google Scholar

26 This simple point has been overlooked all too often. A notable exception is W. Arthur Lewis's essay, “Is Economic Growth Desirable?” reprinted in Lewis (fn. 11).

27 Cline, (fn. 15), 370Google Scholar; see also Haq, (fn. 19), 12.Google Scholar

28 See, for example, Frances Stewart and Paul Streeten, “Conflicts between Output and Employment Objectives,” reprinted in Jolly, Richard and others, eds., Third World Employment: Problems and Strategy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 367–84.Google Scholar

20 See Adelman, and Morris, (fn. 15), 170Google Scholar; also Fagen (fn. 18).

30 For a discussion, see Ahluwalia, Montek S. and Chenery, Hollis B., “The Economic Framework,” in Chenery (fn. 15), 47.Google Scholar

31 Here I follow Rawls (fn. 21), 292.

32 The main sources are Sen, A. K., “On Optimising the Rate of Saving,” Economic Journal, Vol. 71 (September 1961), 479–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Rawls, (fn. 21), 284–93.Google Scholar For criticisms of Rawls's position by philosophers, see Clayton Hubin, D., “Justice and Future Generations,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, VI (Fall 1976), 70–83Google Scholar, and English, Jane, “Justice Between Generations,” Philosophical Studies, XXXI (February 1977), 123–31.Google Scholar For criticism by an economist, see Solow, Robert M., “Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources,” mimeo, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 103 (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 1973).Google Scholar Also see the more recent sources cited in fns. 37–40 below.

33 This approach is taken by Ramsey, F. P., “A Mathematical Theory of Saving,” Economic Journal, XXXVIII (December 1928), 543–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and by Sen (fn. 32).

34 Ibid., 483–86, 491.

35 For a discussion, see Sen, A. K., Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970), 89–117.Google Scholar

36 Rawls, (fn. 21), 128–29, 287–88.Google Scholar

37 For the last point, see Barry, Brian, “Justice Between Generations,” in Hacker, P.M.S. and Raz, J., eds., Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 279–80.Google Scholar

38 Rawls considers this approach to the savings problem, but apparently rejects it, for reasons that are not clear to me. Rawls, (fn. 21), 139, 291–92.Google Scholar For the variant, see Barry, Brian, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 131 and 131Google Scholar, n.2; English (fn. 32), 98–101.

39 Barry, Brian, “Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations,” in Sikora, R. I. and Barry, Brian, eds., Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), 242–44.Google Scholar

40 Gregory Kavka, “The Futurity Problem,” in Sikora, and Barry, (fn. 39), 189–90Google Scholar; Barry, (fn. 37), 274–75.Google Scholar

41 See Hart's, H.L.A. discussion of “The Minimum Content of Natural Law” in The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 190–93.Google Scholar

42 Rawls, (fn. 21), 290.Google Scholar

43 The most influential discussion of basic needs in development policy is International Labour Office, Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1977).Google Scholar See also Hansen, Roger D., Beyond the North-South Stalemate (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979)Google Scholar, chap. 8. In identifying urgent interests as basic needs, I do not mean to endorse the so-called “basic needs approach” to development. As explained, for example, in the I.L.O. study just cited, this approach not only recognizes the urgency of the basic needs themselves, but also incorporates specific strategies for satisfying them. Obviously, how best to satisfy basic needs is a separate question from whether their satisfaction should take priority among the several aims of development policy. Although my argument supports an affirmative answer to the latter question as a matter of political theory, nothing definite follows about the former question.

44 Paul Streeten has argued that there can be no human right to the satisfaction of basic needs since “the fact that its implementation involves costs must make it non-categorical and, therefore, not a right” (“Basic Needs and Human Rights,” World Development, VIII [February 1980], no). He relies on an implausible conception of rights according to which the only genuine rights are those whose satisfaction is cost less. The conception is implausible because the satisfaction of nearly all rights involves both real and opportunity costs, as is obvious in connection with such rights as those to free speech and free assembly, which Streeten himself regards as genuine human rights. He also argues that there cannot be a right to the satisfaction of basic needs because “such a right would not take into account the scarcity of available resources and the necessity of interpersonal and intertemporal choices” (ibid., III). I believe that the formulation in the text above escapes the latter objection.