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Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation: Comparative Responses to the Convention on Biological Diversity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Kal Raustiala
Kal Raustiala
Affiliation:
Brandeis University
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Abstract

In 1992 governments negotiated a multilateral treaty regime to manage biological diversity. Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States rejected this treaty. Yet both nations were equally at risk from biodiversity loss and equally likely to benefit from its protection. This empirical puzzle is used to explore state choice in regulatory cooperation. Epistemic community analysis helps to explain the onset of negotiations and the contours of debates over regime norms and rules. But state choices, and the regime itself, primarily reflected the regulatory politics of biodiversity management. The international commitments on biodiversity, ostensibly alike for the U.K. and the U.S., had to be implemented through their domestic regulatory structures; the result was a distinct set of domestic ramifications. Electoral incentives and especially domestic institutions influenced both industry and governmental assessments by shaping expectations about the impact of the regime in operation. As states increasingly seek to regulate internationally, domestic institutions and anticipated implementation will play ever greater roles in explaining state choice and, because powerful states are equally influenced by these dynamics, in explaining international outcomes.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 49 , Issue 4 , July 1997 , pp. 482 - 509
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1997

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References

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5 Biodiversity is distinct from the global climate change case. The U.S. arguably did provide cover for governments in Europe by effectively vitiating that regime's potentially costly emissions commitment. While the biodiversity regime would clearly benefit from U.S. participation, it is not essential. See Raustiala, Kal and Victor, David G., “Biodiversity since Rio: The Future of the Convention on Biological Diversity,” Environment 38 (May 1996)Google Scholar.

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34 David Mclntosh and John Cohressen to Bill Kristol, memo, April 14, 1992. In the words of one administration source, “The biggest thing Interior fought about was endangered species. They don't want any reference to genetic diversity.... We are battling to go even as far as U.S. law allows.” Gareth Porter, interview by author, Washington, D.C., May 4, 1995.

35 Porter (fn. 25); Russ Hoyle, “Deep-sixing Biodiversity,” Biotechnology (August 1992). While the Council played an important role in the formation of U.S. policy, its independent contribution is small. Council members reflected and amplified concerns—over IPR, land use, federalism—that stemmed from deeper sources within the structure of the U.S. political system and the particular societal interests to which the Bush administration was beholden.

36 UPI, May 30, 1992, BC cycle.

37 Ibid.

38 Lawrence Aragon, “Diversity Collides with Biotech R&D: Intellectual Property Rights Stymie United States Backing of Biological Diversity Treaty,” The Business Journal—San Jose, June 15, 1992.

39 Richard Stone, “The Biodiversity Treaty: Pandora's Box or Fair Deal?” Science, June 19, 1992; anonymous interviews, Biotechnology Industry Organization, by author, Washington, D.C., March 3, 1995.

40 Burk et al. (fn. 27).

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44 UNEP, Declaration of the United States of America, “Convention on Biological Diversity,” Na.92–8314.

45 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to Senator Mitchell, letter, August 5,1994; Secretaries Christopher, Babbit, and Esty to Senator Mitchell, reply, August 16, 1994.

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51 Haas (fn. 15).

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56 Formally, the power to conclude and ratify international treaties is invested in the Crown, without any need for participation by the Parliament. In practice, the cabinet exercises this power.

57 “Once a treaty is made, the Senate has no special authority in relation to it. The President later interprets the treaty for purposes of executing it. Congress—both houses—interprets the treaty for legislative purposes. Courts may interpret it for their purposes. The Supreme Court's interpretation of a treaty made in deciding a case or controversy is authoritative for purposes of [U.S.] law and is binding on all courts as well as on the political branches.” Henkin, Louis, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and For-eignAffairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

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74 Agribusiness interests have now become involved.

75 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Biotechnology in a GlobalEconomy, OTA-BA-494 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1991), 241.

76 Ibid.

77 U.S. Congress, OTA (fn. 75).

78 Dick Godown, quoted in Andy Coghlan, “Biodiversity Convention a ‘Lousy Deal’ Says U.S.,” New Scientist (July 4, 1992), 9.

79 Ibid.

80 Executive director, BIA, interview by author, London, June 8, 1994.

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82 Anonymous interview, U.S. government, by author, Washington, D.C., March 21, 1995.

83 See the industry view in “Administration Gets High Marks on Interpretation of Biodiversity Treaty,” Biotechnology Newswatch, December 6, 1993, p. 4.

84 Despite perceptions that U.K. biotechnology firms are already more highly regulated than American firms, the evidence is mixed. The “regulatory increment” added by the treaty provisions may be greater in the U.S. than in the U.K. if this perception is true. But a recent study by British industry and government officials found no strong evidence for this view. See United Kingdom, Department of Trade and Industry, “Report of an Ostems Missions to Investigate the Regulation, Patenting, and Public Perception of Biotechnology in the U.S.” (July 1993).

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91 Political incentives and new understandings of the danger of U.S. nonaccession, e.g., the lack of input into the biosafety talks, help account for change in the U.S. position. While U.S. industry viewed accession to the CBD more favorably over time, the Clinton administration also had pledged to pursue environmental protection vigorously.

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96 On the implementation of environmental regimes, see David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene Skolnikoff, eds., The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (Cambridge, MIT Press, forthcoming). On capital adequacy, see Kapstein, Ethan, “Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence,” International Organization 46 (Winter 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The 1988 Convention on Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics commits parties, inter alia, to monitor and regulate the production of chemical precursors and manufacturing equipment.

97 These phrases come from the recent twenty-one-volume series by the Brookings Institution entitled Integrating National Economics: Openness, Diversity, and Cohension; in particular, see Lawrence, Robert, Bressand, Albert, and Ito, Takatoshi, A Vision for the World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996)Google Scholar.

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102 Governments may intentionally use international agreements as levers to circumvent or alter domestic institutions or processes; see, e.g., Goldstein (fn. 17).