Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T03:05:17.543Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Deterrence Theory Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Robert Jervis
Robert Jervis
Affiliation:
Professor of Political Science at U.C.L.A.
Get access

Abstract

Because of its parsimony and power, deterrence theory is the most important American theory of international relations. Yet it has many faults. The boundaries outside of which it does not apply are not clear; it does not tell how a state can change an adversary's motives; it does not deal with the use of rewards. Current scholarship of the third wave of deterrence theory, including George and Smoke's Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, has increased our knowledge by providing empirical evidence on when and how deterrence fails. Examination of the details of decision making reveals the ways in which attempts to deter can go wrong. Recent work stresses the role of each side's intrinsic interest in an issue, and argues that earlier formulations of the theory exaggerated the importance of commitment. The third wave also introduces a larger political element by focusing attention on states' goals and the context of their behavior.

Type
Review Articles
Information
World Politics , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , January 1979 , pp. 289 - 324
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1979

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 As Schelling has noted in Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 2–18, the theory deals with the broader category of coercion, which includes compellence as well as deterrence. I have used the term “deterrence theory” because it has such wide currency.

2 In addition to George and Smoke, the main writings I have in mind are George, Alexander, Hall, David, and Simons, William, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown 1971)Google Scholar; Russett, Bruce, “The Calculus of Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, VII (June 1963), 97–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fink, Clinton, “More Calculations About Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, IX (March 1965), 54–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Morgan, Patrick, Deterrence (Beverly Hills: Sage 1977)Google Scholar; Snyder, Glenn and Diesing, Paul, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977)Google Scholar; Young, Oran R., The Politics of Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968)Google Scholar; Smoke, Richard, War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1978).Google Scholar

3 Quester, George, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New York: Wiley 1966).Google Scholar

4 The following summary draws heavily on James King's “The New Strategy” (unpublished ms.).

5 King (fn. 4) again provides the best analysis.

6 Rapoport, , “Systemic and Strategic Conflict,” in Falk, Richard and Mendlovitz, Saul, eds., The Strategy of World Order, 1 (New York: World Law Fund 1966), 281–82.Google Scholar

7 Also see the distinction between “immediate” and “general” deterrence in Morgan (fn. 2), 28–43.

8 George, , Hall, , and Simons, (fn. 2), 29.Google Scholar A better treatment is George, and Smoke, , Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 80–81, 604–10.Google Scholar

9 George, , Hall, , and Simons, (fn. 2), 101–2.Google Scholar

10 Kecskemeti, , Strategic Surrender (New York: Athenaeum 1964).Google Scholar

11 Baldwin, David A., “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics, XXIV (October 1974), 19–38Google Scholar; Rosecrance, Richard, “Reward, Punishment, and the Future,” in Rosecrance, Richard, ed., The Future of the International Strategic System (San Francisco: Chandler 1972), 175–84Google Scholar; Ernst Haas, “Multilateral Incentives for Limiting International Violence,” ibid., 151–74.

12 Kistiakowsky, George, A Scientist in the White House (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1976), 243.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 The most important exception to this generalization is Leites, Nathan, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press 1953).Google Scholar

14 Quester, George, “On the Identification of Real and Pretended Communist Military Doctrine,” Journal oj Conflict Resolution, X (June 1966), 173–79Google Scholar; Jervis, , The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 232–36.Google Scholar

15 Ellsberg, Daniel, “Theory of the Reluctant Duelist,” American Economic Review, XLVI (December 1956), 909–23.Google Scholar

16 Quoted in King (fn. 4).

17 Holsti, Ole, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1972), 7–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Holsti, and George, Alexander, “The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers,” in Cotter, Cornelius, ed., Political Science Annual, VI (In dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1975), 255–319Google Scholar; Holsti, , “Theories of Crisis Decision-Making,” in Lauren, Paul Gordon, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and Policy (New York: Free Press, forthcoming 1979).Google Scholar

18 Morgan, (fn. 2), 121.Google Scholar Of course Schelling (fn. 1) points out that it can be rational to pretend to be, or to be, irrational.

19 This example does not fit deterrence theory narrowly conceived, since the Japanese were facing not the threat of punishment, but that of military defeat. But the problem of calculation still applies in this situation.

20 Jervis, , “Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics,” in Roland Pennock, J. and Chapman, John, Coercion, NOMOS, XIV (Chicago: Aldine 1972), 272–88.Google Scholar Also see Snyder, Glenn, “‘Prisoner's Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’ Models in International Politics,” In ternational Studies Quarterly, XV (March 1971), 66–103.Google Scholar

21 Kahn, , On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960), 366.Google Scholar The source is Fay, Sidney, The Origins of the World War, 11 (New York: Macmillan 1929), 472–73.Google Scholar

22 For a preliminary discussion of these questions, see Jervis, , Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), 58–102.Google Scholar

23 Young, (fn. 2), 217–20.Google Scholar

24 Bundy, , “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs, XLVIII (October 1969), 9–12.Google Scholar

25 Morgan, (fn. 2), 101–24.Google Scholar

26 Snyder, and Diesing, (fn. 2), 489–93Google Scholar; George, , Hall, , and Simons, (fn. 2), 100–103Google Scholar, 238–44. Also see Nomikos, Eugenia and North, Robert, International Crisis (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1976), 270–71.Google Scholar

27 George, , Hall, , and Simons, (fn. 2), 56Google Scholar, 64–65, 74–75, 217.

28 For related arguments, see Morgan, (fn. 2), 54–57Google Scholar; Salmon, Trevor, “Rationality and Politics: The Case of Strategic Theory,” British Journal of International Studies, 11 (October 1976), 298–304Google Scholar; Mandel, Robert, “Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making during Crises,” World Politics, XXIX (July 1977), 610–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thies, Wallace, “Coercion and Diplomacy: Force and Foreign Policy in the Vietnam Conflict,” Ph.D. diss. (Yale University 1977)Google Scholar; Smoke (fn. 2).

29 Millet, Allan, The Politics of Intervention (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1968), 68–69Google Scholar, 73–75. 7778.

30 New York Times, January 11, 1940. I am grateful to Abraham Ben-Zvi for this citation.

31 Jervis, , Perception and Misperception (fn. 22), 70–71Google Scholar, 354–55; Schick, Jack, The Berlin Crisis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1971), 185–86.Google Scholar

32 Spanier, John, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (New York: Norton 1965), 97Google Scholar; Whiting, Allen, China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1960), 151.Google Scholar

33 Schelling, (fn. 1), 44.Google Scholar

34 Holsti, (fn. 17), 143–68Google Scholar

35 Snyder and Diesing (fn. 2).

36 Also see Poteat, George, “The Intelligence Gap: Hypotheses on the Process of Surprise,” International Studies Notes, III (Fall 1976).Google ScholarGeorge, and Smoke argue that this influence was also at work in the period preceding the Berlin blockade (pp. 128–30).Google Scholar For similar arguments in other cases, see Wohlstetter, Roberta, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,” Foreign Affairs, XLIII (July 1965), 691–707CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marder, Arthur, Operation Menace (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976), 44–45Google Scholar; and Cottam, Richard, Foreign Policy Motivation (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1977).Google Scholar

37 Jervis, (fn. 22), 356–72.Google Scholar

38 Nicolson, Harold, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart., First Lord Carnock (London: Con stable 1930), 40.Google Scholar

39 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica (forthcoming).

40 Sorensen, Theodore, Kennedy (New York: Harper 1965), 705.Google Scholar

41 Jervis, (fn. 22), 128–43.Google ScholarSnyder, Jack, in “Rationality at the Brink,” World Politics, XXX (April 1978), 345–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar, argues that statesmen avoid making tradeoffs during crises. Although generally successful, this line of reasoning is marred by the fact that several of the dimensions he considers are not actually independent of each other.

42 George, , Hall, , and Simons, (fn. 2), 112–14.Google Scholar

43 The best treatments are Anderson, Irvine Jr, The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 7933–1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975), 168–92Google Scholar; and Utley, Jonathan, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940–41,” Prologue, VIII (Spring 1978), 17–28.Google Scholar

44 This was the case with some aspects of American policy in Vietnam. See Thies (fn. 28). For a general statement, see Kennan, George, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little, Brown 1977), 3–26.Google Scholar

45 For a related distinction, see Snyder, Glenn, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1961), 30–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also see Schelling's, Thomas distinction between threats and warnings in The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960), 123–24.Google Scholar

46 Snyder (fn. 45) is one of the few second-wave theorists to recognize the importance of intrinsic interest.

47 Young, (fn. 2), 33–216Google Scholar, 387, 391; Rosen, Steven, “A Model of War and Alliance,” in Freedman, Julian, Bladen, Christopher, and Rosen, Steven, Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1970), 215–37Google Scholar, and Rosen, , “War Power and Willing ness to Suffer,” in Russett, Bruce, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage 1972), 167–83Google Scholar; Snyder, and Diesing, (fn. 2), 498Google Scholar; George, , Hall, , and Simons, (fn. 2), 215–28Google Scholar; Russett, (fn. 2), 103–5.Google Scholar Also see George, and Smoke, , Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 552–53Google Scholar, 558–61.

48 Quotes from. Bullen, Roger, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London: Athlone 1974), 13, 104Google Scholar; Mosse, W. E., The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855–71 (London: Macmillan 1963), 51Google Scholar; Foreign Relations of the US.: Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1955), 679–80.

49 Snyder, and Diesing, (fn. 2), 498–500.Google Scholar

50 Baldwin, David, “Bargaining with Airline Hijackers,” in William Zartman, I., ed., The 50% Solution (Garden City: Anchor Books 1976), 416–21.Google Scholar

51 Quoted in Hunt, Michael, Frontier Defense and the Open Door (New Haven: Yale Universty Press 1973), 221.Google Scholar

52 Of course, if decision makers believe deterrence theory and overestimate the inter-connectedness of outcomes, they will place excessive value on prevailing in disputes over issues of little intrinsic importance. This is a large part of the explanation for American policy in Vietnam.

53 Snepp, John, Decent Interval (New York: Random House 1977), 143–44Google Scholar, 149, 175–76, quote at 237–38; Emerson, J.T., The Rhineland Crisis (London: Maurice Temple Smith 1977), 242.Google Scholar For a further discussion of the interconnectedness of the international system, see Jervis, , “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Lauren (fn. 17).Google Scholar

54 Maxwell, , Rationality in Deterrence, Adelphi Paper No. 50 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies 1968), 19.Google Scholar

55 Although the effect resembles that following from defaulting on a commitment, there is an important difference. In defaulting on a commitment, the actor's reputation for fulfilling his pledges suffers. In the inference process described here, the outcome is less important than the price the actor has paid in trying to prevail. Others note this cost and the value they think the actor places on the issue at stake and expect a similar relationship to hold in the future. What may have impressed others about America's behavior in Vietnam was not that it reneged on a commitment but that it was willing to pay such a high price for an unimportant interest. (Of course, others may also believe that the American experience in Vietnam reduced its willingness to pay such a price in the future.) Interestingly enough, Kissinger once argued that “continued U.S. credibility, worldwide, hinges on whether we make an effort [in Vietnam] rather than on an actual success or failure” (Snepp, , fn. 53, 306).Google Scholar But this remark was in service of an attempt to persuade Congress to provide aid for Vietnam in the last months of the war.

56 Kahn, (fn. 21), 532.Google Scholar The importance of keeping means and ends in proper alignment is stressed by Brodie, Bernard, War and Poliltics (New York: Macmillan 1973)Google Scholar; see esp. chap. 1. Also see George, and Smoke, , Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 556–57Google Scholar

57 George, , Hall, , and Simons, (fn. 2), 15.Google Scholar

58 Brodie, Bernard, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966)Google Scholar, passim.

59 Brodie, (fn. 56), 380Google Scholar (emphases in original); Rosecrance, Richard, Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered, Adelphi Paper No. 116 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies 1975), 35–36.Google Scholar

60 Brodie, Bernard, ed., The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace 1946), 52.Google Scholar