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Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party Under Kenji Miyamoto

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Hong N. Kim
Hong N. Kim
Affiliation:
Virginia University
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Abstract

The phenomenal growth of the Japanese Communist Party's electoral strength during a period of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity (1961–1974) clearly deviates from Benjamin's and Kautsky's “curvilinear theory” of the economic development and strength of Communist parties. Nor does it conform to Lipset's hypothesis that there exists an inverse correlation between the economic growth and the strength of Communist parties. It is my basic contention that the recent growth in the JCP's organizational strength and electoral successes should be ascribed to the overall deradicalization of the party which has taken place since 1961. The findings of this study as a whole substantiate theories en deradicalization of the Marxist movement advanced earlier by Robert Michels and more recently by Robert C. Tucker, who hypothesized that there exists an inverse correlation between the deradicalization of a revolutionary party and its “worldly success.” His findings also confirm Triska's and Finley's hypothesis that deradicalized Communist parties in the developed countries would become not significantly different from other non-Communist parties either in structure or functions.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , January 1976 , pp. 273 - 299
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1976

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References

1 Asahi Shimbun, July 9 1974, evening ed.

2 Lipset, , Political Man: The Social Bases oj Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1959), 62Google Scholar.

3 Benjamin, and Kautsky, , ”Communism and Economic Development,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (March 1968), 110CrossRefGoogle Scholar–21, esp. 117.

4 For the definition of deradicalization, see Tucker, Robert C., ”The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 61 (June 1967), 348CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Ibid.

6 Michels, , Political Parties (New York: Dover Publications 1959), 370Google Scholar–73, esp. 373.

7 Triska, Jan F. and Finley, David D., Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan 1968), 191Google Scholar.

8 Scalapino, Robert A., The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1966), 72Google Scholar. See also Koyama, Koken, Sengo Nihon Kyosanto shi (Tokyo: Yoshiga Shoten 1970), 60Google Scholar and 151. In the 1953 general elections, the JCP's votes shrank further to 650,000. See Iizuka, Shigetaro, Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyosanto (Tokyo: Ikko-sha 1973), 190Google Scholar.

9 Ibid., 44–45. Graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1931, Miyamoto joined the JCP in the same year and became a member of the party's Politburo and Secretariat in 1933.

10 In September 1950, Miyamoto organized the National Unity Committee, which was dissolved the next month. As many of Miyamoto's followers were purged by the Mainstream faction instead of being allowed to rejoin the party, Miyamoto and other leaders of the International Faction established, in December 1950, another organization, the ”JCP National Unity Conference,” to fight the leaders of the Mainstream faction. Its followers numbered approximately 10,000. For details, see Iizuka, Shigetaro, Nihon Kyosanto (Tokyo: Sekka-sha 1969), 45–50Google Scholar. See also Koyama (fn. 8), 86–129.

11 Iizuka (fn. 10), 54. See also Tawara, Kotaro, Hadaka no Nihon Kyōsantō (Tokyo: Nisshin Hodo Shuppanbu 1972), 287Google Scholar–91.

12 Shida disappeared in December 1955, after being investigated about his misuse of party funds during 1951–55. He was officially expelled from the party in 1956. See Koyama (fn. 8), 194–96.

13 Scalapino (fn. 8), 102–3.

14 Ibid., 109.

15 Ibid., 113. For a Japanese text of the party program, see sha, Asahi Shimbun, ed., Nikon Kyosanto (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha 1973), 296–310Google Scholar.

16 See Koyama (fn. 8), 303–5. Within the JCP, there were three different factions, one supporting the Chinese Communist Party, another supporting the Soviet Union, and the third supporting a position of neutrality while leaning toward Peking.

17 According to Koyama, several hundred party members left the JCP together with the pro-Soviet leaders (Shiga, Suzuki, Shigeo Kamiyama, etc.). See Koyama (fn. 8), 342–70. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 231–32.

18 An attempt to normalize the JCP's relations with Moscow was made in the early part of 1968, when Miyamoto met in Tokyo with the Soviet delegation headed by Mikhail Suslov. A joint communique was issued on February 7, 1968, pledging both parties' efforts to normalize their relations on the basis of ”autonomy, equality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other party.” The JCP demanded that Soviet leaders not support Yoshio Shiga. The JCP's relationship with Moscow deteriorated in summer of 1968, when the Japanese Communists denounced the Soviet invasion qf Czechoslovakia, calling the Soviet Union the ”aggressor.” Yoyogi-Moscow relations improved somewhat after Miyamoto's meeting with Brezhnev at Moscow in September 1971, at which both leaders reaffirmed their adherence to the principle of ”autonomy, equality, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.” However, it is not as warm as it used to be in the 1950's. See ibid., 125–31.

19 Stockwin, J. A. A., ”The Japanese Communist Party in the Sino-Soviet Dispute—From Neutrality to Alignment?” in Miller, D. B. and Rigby, T. H., eds., The Disintegrating Monolith (Canberra: Australian National University Press 1965), 142Google Scholar–43. See also Scalapino, Robert A., ”Japan,” in Sworakowski, Witold S., ed., World Communism: A Handbook 1918–1965 (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1973), 245Google Scholar; Hirotsu, Kyosuke, ”The Strategic Triangle: Japan,” in Labedz, Leopold, ed., International Communism After Khrushchev (Cambridge: MIT Press 1965), 123Google Scholar–30.

20 Iizuka (fn. 8), 116–24; Tawara (fn. ii), 242–46; Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 213–17.

21 Ibid., 218–25.

22 Ibid.; see also Langer, Paul F., Communism in Japan (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1972), 74Google Scholar. For more detailed information on Yoyogi-Peking relations from 1966 to 1973, see Staar, Richard F., ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs [hereafter referred to as Yearbook] (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1966 to 1974Google Scholar). Each volume carries a section on Japan.

23 Tawara (fn. 11), 79, 246.

24 As early as June 28–30, 1956, the Central Committee of the JCP acknowledged the possibility of a ”peaceful transition to socialism” in Japan and decided to revise the 1951 ”Thesis.” For details, see Scalapino (fn. 8), 100. See also Koyama (fn. 8), 207.

25 For a Japanese text of the party program, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 296–310.

26 Ibid., 308.

27 Scalapino (fn. 8), 113.

28 Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 251.

29 According to Hirotsu, altogether some 1,500 Japanese Communists went to China between 1953 and 1957; many of them returned home in the spring of 1958. These returnees from China came to form the nucleus of the pro-Chinese faction within the JCP. At the 8th Party Congress, the pro-Chinese faction ”monopolized the important positions at the party centre,” and ”the strength of Secretary-General Miyamoto's faction, which was said to be neutral, declined.” The pro-Chinese leaders were believed to have received abundant Chinese financial aid and to control the JCP's organization department, the financial committee, and the Akahata editorial board in the early part of the 1960's. See Hirotsu (fn. 19), 128–29; see also Stockwin (fn. 19).

30 See Fuwa, , Jinmjn teki Gikflishugi (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppan sha 1970Google Scholar). See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 153–56.

31 According to Cyril E. Black, ”in discussing the prospects for revolution in the years ahead, Soviet doctrine places almost exclusive emphasis on 'peaceful transition to socialism' which it defines as the 'transition of individual countries to socialism without an armed rising and civil war! ” (Italics in original). The Soviet conception of ”peaceful transition” is not, according to Black, necessarily peaceful in the same sense as the transfer of power in a democratic system is peaceful, ”but may involve threat of violence and readiness to use violent methods in the event of unforeseen opposition.” That is why Soviet writings distinguish the theory of ”peaceful transition” from the heresy of the ”revisionists” or ”reformists,” which denies the necessity for ”class struggle” and precludes the ”possibility of non-peaceful revolution.” For details, see ”The Anticipation of Communist Revolutions,” in Black, Cyril E. and Thornton, Thomas P., eds., Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1964), 438CrossRefGoogle Scholar–39. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, ”The Advanced Countries,” ibid., 407–9.

32 According to a resolution adopted by the nt h Party Congress, held in July, 1970, the JCP maintained that ”Under the San Francisco system [i.e., the system established by the San Francisco Peace Treaty] it continues to be a semi-occupied, semi-independent country chained to the U.S. imperialist policy of wa r and aggression. It is, as the party program puts it, a country which is ”virtually dependent, being semi-occupied by American imperialism.” See Langer, Paul, ”Th e New Posture of the CPJ,” Problems of Communism, xx (January-April 1971), 18Google Scholar. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 146–50.

33 For a detailed analysis of the problem of adaptation for the deradicalized, non-ruling Communist parties, see Greene, Thomas H., ”Non-Ruling Communist Parties and Political Adaptation,” Studies in Comparative Communism, vi (Winter 1973), 331CrossRefGoogle Scholar–61.

34 Tawara (fn. ii), 51. See also Yearbook 19J1 (fn. 22), 598.

35 For a detailed analysis of the revised party bylaws, see Iizuka (fn. 8), 162–68. For a complete text of the party rules, see Akahata, July 6, 1970.

36 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the JCP and radical extremist ”anti-Yoyogi” elements, see Tawara (fn. 11), 127–38. See also Sunada, Ichiro, ”The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren: Trends in the Japanese Student Movement,” Asian Survey, ix (June 1969), 457CrossRefGoogle Scholar–74.

37 Emmerson, John K., ”The Japanese Communist Party After Fifty Years,” Asian Survey, xii (July 1972), 571Google Scholar–72.

38 Ibid., 575.

39 For an excellent analysis of Akahata's success, see Nagada, Hisamatsu, Akahata Senryaku (Tokyo: Kodan sha 1973Google Scholar).

40 Ibid., 89–106. According to Asahi Shimbun, more than 300 full-time employees are working for Akahata at the JCP headquarters in Tokyo. In addition, there are over 12,600 local correspondents (unpaid), and about 21,000 delivery workers who render services on a voluntary basis with little or no compensation. For details, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 71–72. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 209–11.

41 According to the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs, the JCP raised 4,341 million yen (or about $12 million) in 1971. Approximately 95% of the income was generated through the sales of publications. See Totten, George O., ”The People's Parliamentary Path of the Japanese Communist Party, Part II: Local Level Tactics,” Pacific Affairs, xlvi (Fall 1973), 398Google Scholar–99. According to its report to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the JCP's income for the first half of 1972 was 2,195 million yen (or about $8 million), which exceeded the officially reported amount of the LDP's income for the same period. 74% of the reported income was generated from sales of Akahata. See Iizuka (fn. 8), 214–15.

42 Ibid., 169–76.

43 Unlike the lively conventions of the non-Communist parties, for instance, the JCP conventions are staged so as not to permit any serious debate among the delegates. Every aspect of the proceedings is tightly controlled by the party leadership, whose proposals are ritualistically endorsed by the delegates. For the highly unconventional atmosphere of the 12th Party Congress, held in November 1973, see Akasaka, Taro, ”Kumori Garasu no Kyōsantō Daikai,” Bungei Shunjii, Vol. 52 (January 1974), 184Google Scholar–88; Suzuki, Takuro, ”Kyōsantō 12-kai Daikai o Kaibō suru,” Jiyū, xvi (January 1974), 81–90Google Scholar.

44 For a summary of the JCP's most recently announced policy program, May 1974, see Mainichi Shimbun, May 21, 1974.

45 For an excellent analysis of the JCP's grassroots activities, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 97–137. See also Totten (fn. 41), 384–406; Dixon, Karl, ”The Growth of a 'Popular' Japanese Communist Party,” Pacific Affairs, xlv (Fall 1972), 387–402CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

46 Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 61–62, 74. See also Nagada (fn. 39), 26–28.

47 Of 38 Communists elected to the lower house in December 1972, 12 were lawyers, 2 were medical doctors, 6 were teachers, and 4 were leaders of Communist-controlled local businessmen's associations. The remaining 14 were either labor union leaders or party ”bureaucrats.” For the backgrounds of the 38 deputies, see ibid., 70–73. See also Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 146–47.

48 For a detailed analysis of the JCP deputies' voting record from 1967 to 1972, see Tawara (fn. 11), 63–65.

49 According to a recent opinion survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun, 19% of the people surveyed indicated a generally favorable image of the party (e.g., ”doing a good job”), while 32% of the respondents indicated unfavorable images of the JCP (e.g., ”too extreme,” ”dictatorial,” etc.). The results of the survey indicated that the image of the JCP is improving: expressions of a favorable image of the JCP increased from 15% in 1972 to 19% in 1973, while expressions of an unfavorable image decreased from 41% in 1972 to 32% in 1973. For the results of the opinion survey conducted on April 6–7, 1973, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 311–14.

50 Yearbook. '974 (fn. 22), 465.

51 Togawa, Isamu, Jimintō no Kikj (Tokyo: Gakugei Shorin 1973Google Scholar), 142–58 See also Ishii, Hajime, Jimintō yo Dokp e lku (Tokyo: Nihon Seisansei Honbu 1974Google Scholar); and sha, Yomiuri Shimbun, ed., Jiminto Kikj Kokujuku e no Teigen (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun sha 1974Google Scholar).

52 For the results of recent gubernatorial elections held in April 1975, see Asahi Shimbun, April 14, 1975. For the results of municipal elections held in the same month, see Yomiuri Shimbun, April 29, 1975.

53 Ishii (fn. 51), 9.

54 Togawa (fn. 51), 142–45. See also Shinohara, Hajime, ”Bunkyokuka suru Seiji Ishiki,” Asahi Janaru, December 22, 1972Google Scholar. For the urban voters' ”greater pessimism about political processes,” see Richardson, Bradley M., ”Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 67 (June 1973), 433CrossRefGoogle Scholar–52. esp. 441–45.

55 For an estimate by the Japanese Ministry of Construction, see Japan Times Weekly, December 7, 1974.

56 Ozawa, Terutomo, Japan's Technological Challenge to the West: Motivation and Accomplishment (Cambridge: MIT Press 1974), 23Google Scholar.

57 For an excellent analysis of the 1974 Sangiin elections, see Baerwald, Hans, ”The Tanabata House of Councillors Election in Japan,” Asian Survey, xiv (October 1974), 900–906CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 Yearbook 1971 (fn. 22), 598; see also Tawara (fn. ii), 51.

59 For the text of the resolution, see Kunimasa, Takeshige, Kakushin Rengo Seiken (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shoho 1974), 218Google Scholar–47.

60 Ibid., 219; see also Yearbook. 19J4 (fn. 22), 475.

61 Ibid.; see also Kunimasa (fn. 59), 237–38.

62 Yearbook. 1974 (fn. 22), 475.

63 Langer, Paul F., Communism in Japan (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press I 1972), 55Google Scholar. See also Kunimasa (fn. 59), 92–100.

64 Ibid., 121–35. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 90–114.

65 Kunimasa (fn. 59), 100–105; Kiuchi, Hiroshi, Kōmeitō to Sōkā Gakkai (Tokyo: Godo Shuppan sha 1974), 187–205Google Scholar.

66 For the JCP's three-stage scenario, see Iizuka (fn. 8), 84; Tawara, Kōtaro, ”Junan Rosen ni okeru Gensoku no Kakunin,” Jiyū, xvi (January 1974), 91–100Google Scholar. The deradicalization of the party notwithstanding, the JCP does not deny the fact that its ultimate goal is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship; nor does it deny its intention to strive for the realization of that goal. Thus, in spite of the JCP's moderate program for a Democratic Coalition Government, JCP leaders have made it clear that when Japan ”enters socialism,” the JCP will introduce sweeping changes, including the total nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture, abolishment of the Emperor system, and an overhaul of the existing Self-Defense Forces by way of constitutional amendments. For details of the JCP inner circle's thinking on the subject, see Koichiro Ueda and others, ”Nihon Kyosanto wa Nani o Kangaedede Iruka,” Bungei Shunju, Vol. 51 (March 1973), 92–135Google Scholar. The article is based on over nine hours of interviews with the JCP's top policy planners, conducted by the staff of Bungei Shunjū. For a critical evaluation of this article, see Tsuneari Fukuda and others, ”Rakkanteki na amarini Rakkanteki na,” ibid., 136–46.

67 For the opposition parties' critical attitudes toward the JCP on constitutional questions, see Kunimasa (fn. 59), 20–24.

68 Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 249–52; Iizuka (fn. 8), 158–61; Tawara (fn. 11), 190–92. In the autumn of 1968, a JCP delegation headed by Satomi Hakamata was dispatched to Paris and Rome for the purpose of exchanging views on the parliamentary path to revolution with Italian and French Communist leaders. See Iizuka (fn. 10), 135. In 1972, the JCP was host to an international conference of representatives of Communist parties of Western nations (France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, West Germany, and Australia). According to Miyamoto, the purpose of the conference was to ”exchange reports on the outstanding features of the situation and party struggles in the advanced capitalist countries, and to learn from each other through exchanges of experience.” Among various subjects discussed at the conference were problems of structural reform; the prospects of ”peaceful revolution,” with emphasis on the changes in the international situation since Lenin's time; and how to encourage the emergence of a socialist society out of the democratic capitalist society. For details, see Yearbook 1973 (fn. 22) 487; Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 250.

69 Michels (fn. 6), 370–73. See also Tucker, Robert C., The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: Norton 1969), 185Google Scholar–93; Leopold Labedz, ”The End of An Epoch,” International Communism After Khrushchev (fn. 19), 15. In discussing the deradicaliza-tion of the Italian Communist Party, Labedz points out, ”In time, however, the change of means may affect the ends, and tactical requirements may affect the structure of the party.”

70 For the LDP's skepticism toward the JCP's ”Program of the Democratic Coalition Government,” see Sankei Shimbun, December 2, 1973; for the apprehension of the non-Communist opposition parties toward the possibility of the JCP's usurpation of the power in the event a coalition government is formed, see Kunimasa (fn. 59), 80–108, esp. 87–88; for a critical evaluation of the JCP's ”Program of the Democratic Coalition Government” by a group of Japanese scholars, see ”Minshu Rengo Seifu Koryo Hihan,” Bungei Shunjit, Vol. 52 (June 1974), 92–145Google Scholar. According to Tawara, the JCP's electoral successes can be attributed to its ability to ”create a new community” for the uprooted urban dwellers by providing them with a new ”value system.” Since many urban voters have become uprooted from their traditional communities, and since many of them are clearly in need of a ne w community in their affluent yet alienated urban life, the parties that cater to the needs of these voters (i.e., the JCP and the Komeito) will continue to succeed in urban politics in the future. See Tawara (fn. 11), 199–212.

71 According to Tawara, the JCP's electoral successes can be attributed to its ability to “create a new community” for the uprooted urban dwellers by providing them with a new “value system.” Since many urban voters have become uprooted from their traditional communities, and since many of them are clearly in need of a new community in their affluent yet alienated urban life, the parties that cater to the needs of these voters (i.e., the JCP and the Komeito) will continue to succeed in urban politics in the future. See Tawara (fn. 11), 199–212.

72 According to Togawa, the JCP and the Komeito are getting votes from the same socioeconomic groups in the urban areas. Consequently, fierce competition and conflict between the two parties are inevitable. See Togawa (fn. 51), 149–51.

73 For a summary of the forecasts made by Japanese scholars and political commentators on this subject, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 261–64. See also Watanabe, Tsuneo, ”Jiminto Kuzureru no Hi,” Chuo Koron No. 1038 (September 1973), 324Google Scholar, and his Hokaku Renritsu Seiken ron (Tokyo: Daiyamond sha 1974), 116.