Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T03:39:14.107Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Decision Process, Choice, and Consequences: Israel's Deep-Penetration Bombing in Egypt, 1970

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Avi Shlaim  and
Raymond Tanter
Avi Shlaim
Affiliation:
University of Reading (England)
Raymond Tanter
Affiliation:
The University of Michigan, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Get access

Abstract

Weapons systems have a great impact on national security decision making. In particular, the use of air power for political coercion or “compellence” is a tempting option when a nation has overwhelming aerial capabilities relative to an opponent. Israel's decision to launch air attacks deep within Egypt during the 1970 War of Attrition suggests that coercive bombing may not yield expected benefits and effect unanticipated costs. The decision process that produced the bombing choice was characterized by inadequate search for alternatives; conservative revision of opinion; faulty evaluation of consequences in terms of likelihood, benefits, and costs; a failure to consider value trade-offs between military and political dimensions; and overestimation of the probability of preferred outcomes, coupled with underestimation of the likelihood of undesirable outcomes.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , July 1978 , pp. 483 - 516
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The literature available in English includes Khalidi, Ahmed S., “The War of Attrition,” Journal of Palestine Studies, III, No. I (1973)Google Scholar; O'Ballance, Edgar, The Electronic War in the Middle East 1968–70 (London: Faber 1974)Google Scholar; Whetten, Lawrence L., The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press 1974)Google Scholar; and Luttwak, Edward and Horowitz, Dan, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane 1975).Google Scholar

2 See the autobiography of Weizman, , On Eagles' Wings (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1976), 271.Google Scholar

3 Shiff, Zeev, Knafayim me'al Suez: Sipuro shel cheil ha'avir bemilhemet ha-hatashah [Wings Over Suez: The Story of the Air Force in the War of Attrition] (Haifa: Shikmona 1970), 44–46.Google Scholar

4 Dayan, Moshe, Story of My Life (London: Weidenfcld and Nicolson 1976), 366.Google Scholar

5 “Ups and Down's in Dayan's Defence Strategy,” New Middle East, No. 18 (March 1970).Google Scholar

6 Quoted in Arieh Avneri, Milhemet ha-hatashah [The War of Attrition] (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Madim, n.d.), 104.

7 Weizman (fn. 2), 274.

8 Shiff (fn. 3), 190.

9 Weizman (fn. 2), 275–76.

10 Shiff (fn. 3), 190.

11 Quoted in Avneri (fn. 6), 215. This and all following translations from the Hebrew are by the authors.

12 Jackson, Robert, The Israeli Air Force Story (London: Tom Stacey 1970)Google Scholar; O'Ballance (fn. I), chap. 6; Bentley, John, “Inside Israel's Air Force,” Flight International, March 19 and April 23, 1970Google Scholar; Haaretz, January 20, 1970.

13 Khalidi (fn. I).

14 Raviv, Brigadier Yehoshua, “Bitahon Yisrael ba-shana ha-shlishit le-milhemet sheshet ha-yamim” [Israel's Security in the Third Year After the Six-Day War], Ma'arachot, No. 204 (January 1970)Google Scholar. On the importance of casualty levels and air superiority, see Kemp, Geoffrey, “Israel and Egypt: Military Force Posture 1967–1972,” in Horton, F. B.Rogerson, A. C., and Warner, E. L., eds., Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1973).Google Scholar

15 Quoted in Mordechai Naor, Ha-milhamah le'ahar ha-milhamah [The War after the War] (Published by the Ministry of Defence, n.d.), 101.

16 Whetten (fn. I), 89.

17 Weizman (fn. 2), 285.

18 On the role of the military in general, see Perlmutter, Amos, Military and Politics in Israel: Nation Building and Role Expansion (London: Frank Cass 1969)Google Scholar; and Brecher, Michael, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (London: Oxford University Press 1972), 134–37.Google Scholar

19 Interview in Davar Hashavua (the weekly supplement of Davar), October 18, 1974.

20 Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, January 16, 1970.

21 Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1968–69 (New York: McGraw Hill 1968)Google Scholar; Luttwak and Horowitz (fn. I), 322; Cottrell, Alvin J., “The Role of Air Power in the Military Balance of the Middle East—The Function of the Phantom,” New Middle East, No. 19 (April 1970)Google Scholar; Brown, Neville, “The Real Capabilities of Soviet and U.S. Weapons in the Middle East and How the Two Sides Use Them—New Approach to Assessing the Aerial Power Balance,“ New Middle East, No. 20 (May 1970).Google Scholar

22 “Fateful Decisions—The Bombing Deep Inside Egypt in 1970,” radio discussion broadcast on Shidurei Yisrael on January 28, 1976, with Zeev Shiff, Dan Horowitz, and Michael Handel as participants. The above point was made by Dan Horowitz.

23 Haaretz, March 10, 1970.

24 Dayan (fn. 4), 366.

25 Kimche, Jon, Palestine or Israel (London: Seeker and Warburg 1973), 287–88.Google Scholar

26 Weizman (fn. 2), 280.

27 Ibid., 283.

28 Maariv, May 6, 1973.

29 Evron, Yair, The Middle East: Nations, Super-Powers and Wars (London: Elek 1973)Google Scholar, III; Sniff (fn. 3), 192; Margalit, Dan, Sheder mehabayit halavan [Message from the White House] (Tel Aviv: Otpaz 1971), 40–42Google Scholar; Kapeliouk, Amron, “On Overthrowing Nasser,” New Outlook, XIII (February 1970)Google Scholar; Feron, James, New York Times, January 18, 1970Google Scholar; International Herald Tribune, January 29, 1970; Fontaine, André, Le Monde, March 4, 1970.Google Scholar

30 Haaretz, June 23, 1970. The minister was Ezer Weizman.

31 Shiff, Zeev and Haber, Eitan, Lexicon le-bitahon Israel [Israel, Army and Defence: A Dictionary] (Zmora: Bitan, Modan 1976), 175.Google Scholar

32 Interview with Eban, reported by Milstein, Uri, Davar Hashavua, October 18, 1974.Google Scholar

33 Margalit (fn. 29), 37. Rabin himself has remained reticent on the subject, but apparently still maintains that he did not misjudge the American position and that his evaluation was based on indications of approval given to him from the highest levels of the American Administration. See Team of Senior Journalists, Hayoresh [The In-heritor] (Peleg, n.d. but probably 1975), 45. According to another source, Rabin's modus operandi was to mention to high-ranking American officials the possibility of an attack; if they did not explicitly oppose the plan, Rabin would conclude that he had their tacit approval. The same source suggests that in this particular instance the C.I.A.. like Rabin, believed that the bombing and demonstration of Egypt's helplessness would bring about the downfall of Nasser and his regime and the rise to power of pro-American elements. See Haolam Hazeh, September 3, 1975.

34 Shiff and Haber (fn. 31), 175.

35 Davar Hashavua, October 18, 1974; Haolam Hazeh, September 3, 1975.

36 Margalit (fn. 29), 39.

37 Ibid., 50–57.

38 Davar Hashavua, October 18, 1974.

39 Haaretz, July 24, 1970. The interviewer was Amos Elon.

40 Evron (fn. 29), 114.

41 Hayoresh (fn. 33), m; Haolam Hazeh, September 3, 1975.

42 On the concept of value integration, see Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), 29–31.Google Scholar

43 Quoted in Margalit (fn. 29), 43.

44 Strategic Survey 1970 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies 1971), 46.Google Scholar From January 7, 1970, to April 13, 1970, Israel launched 20 deep-penetration raids within Egypt, 8 of which were within 30 kilometers of Cairo. The targets included military camps, supply bases, ammunition dumps, radar stations, and surface-to-air missile sites. See Dishon, Daniel, ed., Middle East Record 1969–1970, V (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press 1977)Google Scholar, Table 1.

45 Weizman, in Foreword to ShiflF (fn. 3), 14.

46 See, for example, Haaretz, January 23, 1970, and the International Herald Tribune, January 29, 1970.

47 Le Monde, January 15, 1970; translated by the authors. Two weeks later, however, Dayan stated that the raids had a triple purpose: first, to oblige the Egyptians to respect the cease-fire; second, to prevent them from preparing for another war; and third, “to weaken the Egyptian regime by showing the Egyptian masses that their leaders are deceiving them as to the real situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict.” Le Monde, January 30, 1970; English trans, from Khadduri, Walid, ed., International Documents on Palestine: 1970 (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies 1973), 24.Google Scholar

48 Davar, January 16, 1970. Mrs. Meir made the same points in subsequent statements reported in Le Monde, January 18–19, 1970.

49 See her long interview with Feron, James in the New York Times, February 8, 1970:Google Scholar “Mrs. Meir Says Air Raids Show Nasser Is a Failure.”

50 Ibid.; also Meir's, Mrs. speech in the Knesset, Divrei ha-Knesset [Proceedings of the Knesset], February 17, 1970.Google Scholar Dayan conveyed the same message in an address to the Foreign Press Association, International Herald Tribune, January 29, 1970; so did Eban in an interview in Le Monde, February 25, 1970. For a theoretical explication of compellance, see Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966)Google Scholar, and Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960).Google Scholar

51 Margalit (fn. 29), 61–64; The Guardian, February 12, 1970; International Herald Tribune, February 14, 1970.

52 Le Monde, February 27, 1970.

53 International Herald Tribune, February 14, 1970.

54 Divrei ha-Knesset, February 17, 1970.

55 International Herald Tribune, January 15 and 29, 1970; The Guardian, 31 January 1970; The Times, February 10, 1970; U.S. News and World Report, February 16, 1970.

56 Heradstveit, Daniel, Arab and Israeli Elite Perceptions (New York: Humanities Press 1974), 34.Google Scholar

57 Heikal, , The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins 1975), 83–88.Google Scholar

58 Strategic Survey 1970 (fn. 44), 46.

59 These letters were not officially published, but they were reported fully in the Soviet and Western press: Pravda, February 13 and 17, 1970; Izvestia, February 4 and 12, 1970; The Times, February 5, 1970; Le Monde, February 7, 1970; International Herald Tribune, February 4 and 14, 1970; New York Times, February 5, 13, and 26, 1970. Unofficial texts were published in Arab Report and Record, March 1–15, 1970, pp. 167–68.

60 Foreign Policy for the 1970's. A Report to the Congress by Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States, February 18, 1970, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 62 (March 9, 1970), 303–5.Google Scholar

61 Haaretz, August 21, 1970.

62 Jerusalem Post, February I, 1970; The Guardian, February 2, 1970; Margalit (fn. 29), 50.

63 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 62 (March 2, 1970), 226.Google Scholar

64 Margalit (fn. 29), 65–66.

65 Haaretz, April 16, 1970.

66 Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 62 (February 16, 1970), 173–74.Google Scholar

67 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 62 (April 13, 1970), 477–84.Google Scholar See also Brecher, Michael, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press 1974), 486Google Scholar; and Quandt, William B., “The Middle East Conflict in U.S. Strategy 1970–71,” Journal of Palestine Studies, I (August 1971).Google Scholar

68 Margalit (fn. 29), 75–76.

69 The Guardian, May 21, 1970; Arab Report and Record, May 16–31, 1970.

70 Quandt (fn. 67).

71 See in particular Jervis, Robert, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics, XX (April 1968)Google Scholar, as well as Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976).Google Scholar

72 Kissinger, , “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” Daedalus, Vol. 95 (Spring 1966).Google Scholar

73 International Herald Tribune, April I, 1970. See also Allon's radio interview of March 28, 1970, the English text of which appeared in New Middle East, No. 20 (May 1970).

74 Time (European edition), Vol. 95 (April 6, 1970), 39.Google Scholar

75 Bamachaneh, April 14, 1970. See also Haaretz, April 15 and 17, 1970; Handel, Michael I., Israel's Political-Military Doctrine, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs (Cambridge 1973), 53–54Google Scholar; Horowitz, Dan, “The Israeli Concept of National Security and the Prospects of Peace in the Middle East,” in Sheffer, Gabriel, ed., Dynamics of a Conflict: A Re-examination of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Humanities Press 1975), 239–40.Google Scholar

76 Griffith, William W., The Soviet-American Confrontation, 1970, HI: The Great Powers and the Middle East in 1970, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, C/70–17 (Cambridge 1970), 5.Google Scholar

77 Interview with Milstein, Uri in Davar Hashavua, September 20, 1974.Google Scholar

78 Davar, April 7, 1970.

79 Margalit (fn. 29), 103–05; and Sniff (fn. 3), 214.

80 Haaretz, April 26 and 30, 1970; The Times, May 12, 1970.

81 Sniff (fn. 3), 218.

82 Bar-Lev made this point in interviews published in Maariv, May 6, 1973, and Davar Hashavua, September 20, 1974.

83 Bar-Zohar, Michael, Ben-Gurion: A Political Biography (Tel Aviv: Am Oved 1977), II, 873.Google Scholar

84 Statement issued by the Government of Israel on U.S.S.R. Military Assistance to the U.A.R., Jerusalem Post, April 30, 1970.

85 Maariv, April 29, 1970; Haaretz, April 30, 1970.

86 New York Times, May 16, 1970.

87 Maariv, May 8, 1970. An English translation of the text of Dayan's speech appeared in New Middle East, No. 21 (June 1970). In a radio interview on May 9, Dayan was even more explicit: “We shall strictly maintain our ability to stand fast on the ceasefire line,” he said. “We shall not permit the installation of anti-aircraft systems, antiaircraft guns, SA-3 missiles, and so forth, because this will lead to a situation in which we shall not be able to hold the Canal line with soldiers, strongholds and so forth. Therefore, if the Russians decide to intervene … if they attack us there, we shall defend ourselves and our pilots will fire back.” BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3376/A/5, A/6, A/7, A/8, and A/9. In a speech to the Knesset, Mrs. Meir reiterated the warning that the IDF would fight the Russians if they tried to advance surface-to-air missile batteries to the vicinity of the cease-fire line. Divrei ha-Knesset, May 26, 1970.

88 Strategic Survey 1970 (fn. 44), 48. See also Policy Background: Russian Military Intervention—The Third Phase: Soviet Manned SAM-IH's into Suez Canal Battle Zone (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Israel, July 7, 1970).Google Scholar

89 Jerusalem Post, July 16, 1972.

90 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, La Politique Sovietique au Moyen-Orient 1955–1975 (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques 1975), 209.Google Scholar

91 Weizman (fn. 2), 275, 381–84: also see his interview in Maariv, November 2, 1973.

92 Heikal (fn. 57), 165.

93 Evron (fn. 29), 116.

94 Interview with Bar-Lev in Davar Hashavua, September 20, 1974; Allon, Yigal, “The Soviet Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in Confino, M. and Shamir, S., eds., The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press 1973), 152Google Scholar; Luttwak and Horowitz (fn. I), 323.

95 Haaretz, June 23, 1970.

96 Margalit (fn. 29), 104.

96 Yedi'ot Aharonot, November 9, 1973.

98 Haaretz, June 30, 1974.

99 Ra'anan, , “The USSR and the Middle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision-Making Process,” Orbis, XVII (Fall 1973).Google Scholar

100 Griffith (fn. 76), 6; Freedman, Robert O., Soviet Policy Towards the Middle East since 1970 (New York: Praeger 1975), 26–27Google Scholar; Insight Team of the Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (rev. ed., London: Andre Deutsch 1975), 33–37.Google Scholar

101 Evron (fn. 29), III.

102 Quoted in Brecher (fn. 67), 514; trans, by Brecher, from Yedi'ot Aharonot, April 26, 1970.Google Scholar

103 von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books 1968), 405.Google Scholar