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Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Peter H. Solomon Jr
Peter H. Solomon Jr
Affiliation:
University of Toronto, [email protected].
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Abstract

The establishment of constitutional review in transitional and nondemocratic regimes has drawn attention to courts in nondemocratic states. Typically, authoritarian leaders treat law and courts in an instrumental fashion and try to keep judges dependent and responsive to their desires. The three books under review reveal the sophisticated ways that this is achieved, including the development ofjudicial bureaucracies and the cultivation of apolitical judges, and how the empowerment ofjudges tends to produce power that is contingent and easily withdrawn. The leaders of established authoritarian regimes do empower judges, if only to gain legitimacy for the regime and keep its officials accountable, but sometimes at a cost to judicial independence. The mixture of independence, power, and accountability ofjudges in authoritarian states differs from what is found in democratic ones, and informal practices often determine the meaning of judicial power. These patterns have serious consequences for legal transition.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 60 , Issue 1 , October 2007 , pp. 122 - 145
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2007

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References

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27 Not surprisingly, Moustafa grounds his argument in new institutionalist theory as developed by Douglas North and Barry Weingast (see pp. 22–24). More important is his finding that Egyptian politicians seem to have embraced this logic in making policy choices. Whether the premises of in-stitutionalist literature on property rights are self-evident or conveyed to domestic authorities by representatives of international organizations or local economic advisors, this line of thought sometimes has practical impact.

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