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Canada's Interest in Foreign Aid

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

S. G. Triantis
S. G. Triantis
Affiliation:
Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto
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Extract

There is at present considerable uncertainty as to the purposes which Canada's foreign assistance program is intended to serve. This uncertainty is no doubt influencing our policies. The question of why we are giving and why we should give in the future is fundamental to practically all aspects of our aid policy—including the size, form, terms, and geographical orientation of our assistance, the choice between bilateral and multilateral channels, the administration of our aid, the public support for our assistance program, and the relations between Canada and the recipient countries.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , October 1971 , pp. 1 - 18
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1971

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References

1 In the United States, “support for foreign aid has been more widespread among the better-off, more socially and occupationally privileged, and, particularly, the college educated than among the less economically, socially, and culturally privileged. However, the reverse has been the case for social welfare, medicare, progressive taxation, and other transfers of wealth at home—the lower the income, socio-economic status, and (to a lesser degree) education, the more prevalent the approval of such programs. … Many a Johnson Democrat of relatively low income and education would have cut aid abroad and spent these funds on welfare programs at home.” A. O. Hero, Jr., “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Case of Foreign Aid,” mimeographed paper (Boston 1969), 8.

2 See Ohlin, G., Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered, O.E.C.D. (Paris 1966), 59–63Google Scholar. These polls may, of course, reflect weakness of the philanthropic motive regarding other nations, unawareness of the conditions of poverty in the underdeveloped countries, ignorance of other purposes which aid might serve, objections to using aid for such purposes, or several of these factors.

3 Education and communication, if expanded at an unduly high rate, may increase the needs of the people faster than their ability to satisfy them, or the range of choice faster than the ability to choose. The Pearson Commission found that “better health and wider education are creating greater social problems among more people.” Unless these trends are reversed, “instability may defeat the purpose of assistance.” The Globe & Mail, Toronto, April 5, 1969, p. 9Google Scholar.

4 In most underdeveloped countries, there are a few investment opportunities promising a reasonable rate of return. These attract private capital or investment by such institutions as the World Bank. In other cases, the Bank helps in creating the conditions of demand for the capital it lends. The World Bank does not give aid. Aid is requested for the vast number of projects which are not bankable.

5 They may, of course, increase consumption out of their own income.

6 “Most observers take the view that much less than the present level of aid would result if its sole support came from a simple desire to help poor people in other countries. Certainly, representatives of the people oppose aid when they can see no national interest in it, and the main support comes from exporting interests which may benefit.” Little, I.M.D. and Clifford, J. M., International Aid (London 1965), 78Google Scholar.

7 It has been suggested that it is economic decline, not merely failure to develop, that is likely to result in political instability. Little, I.M.D., Aid to Africa (New York 1964), xiGoogle Scholar. As in the case of economic growth, the outcome will probably hinge on the rates of change of the various socio-economic factors: rapid decline may lead to political instability, while gradual retrogression may not.

8 “Before the end of this century, Canadians may have to justify before the world our right to continue to occupy a disproportionate share of the world's living space.” Address to Convocation, University of Calgary, by M. F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office, Government of Canada, May 27, 1968.

9 The rapid world-wide development of education and communications tends to move the underdeveloped countries to fight against gross inequalities in the distribution of resources. While this change in their attitude will not constitute an open threat as long as it is not matched by ability to fight, a mounting feeling of injustice may in some way or another lead to, or turn into, increased ability to force the issue.

10 I am not referring to the argument that, through foreign aid, one can “buy friends.” A person's friend is someone who might do something for him in the future. In the text I refer to concessions or privileges given in exchange for the aid in a more or less pre-arranged manner and at a pre-arranged time.

11 It has been noted that “foreign assistance has been a large item in U.S.A. public expenditure for twenty years now, and development has been among the objects of aid for fifteen years. Yet, the U.S.A. appears to have earned neither new allies nor gratitude, and these were the rewards which the electorate had been led to expect from U.S.A. aid.” Little and Clifford (fn. 6), 26. Surely, the manifold influence of U.S. advisers, technical and other, leading to changes in the policies of underdeveloped countries which benefit die interests of the U.S., has been a significant dividend. Like the work of the Defense Department, the State Department, and other U.S. agencies, this cannot be spelled out to the electorate.

12 Some vocal support for foreign aid among certain groups of the Canadian public originates in their resistance to defense expenditures. Thus, while the argument that our aid potential can be increased only if defense spending is reduced enables some people to justify restrictions in our aid budget, it enables—indeed forces—others to support foreign aid strongly. If the public were given the correct argument regarding the relation between aid and defense and were presented with the full range of alternative expenditures (including domestic expenditures on health, welfare, housing, and urban and regional development), probably no political party in Canada could afford to support much foreign aid openly.

13 Development Assistance in the New Administration. Report of the President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs, Washington, D.C., October 25, 1968, pp. 12–13Google Scholar.