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Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Lucan A. Way
Lucan A. Way
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science at Temple University

Abstract

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This article explores the sources of regime competitiveness in the post-cold war era through a structured comparison of regime trajectories in Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, for the period 1992–2004. An examination of these cases suggests the need for a fundamental rethinking of the commonly held view of the transition process—especially in countries that face relatively weak international democratizing pressures. Approaching these countries as unconsolidated autocracies rather than as simply emerging democracies draws attention to key sources of political competition that have largely been ignored in the literature on competitive regimes. Thus, competitive politics in Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine were rooted less in robust civil societies, strong democratic institutions, or leadership than in the inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate political control by preserving elite unity, controlling elections, and/or using force against opponents. Such ”pluralism by default” has been the outgrowth of the strength of anti-incumbent national identity and incumbent weakness as defined by a lack of know-how, ineffective incumbent organization, and/or the weakness of certain dimensions of state power.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , January 2005 , pp. 231 - 261
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2005

References

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53 Thus, the imprisonment of former government official Mikhail Marynich was generally tied to the official's frequent visits to Moscow and Lukashenka's fears that he was secretly negotiating with Putin on how to unseat the president.

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