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Soviet Behavior in Regional Conflicts: Old Questions, New Strategies, and Important Lessons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Richard K. Herrmann
Richard K. Herrmann
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
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Abstract

Regional conflicts have played a major role in American interpretations of Soviet foreign policy. They have affected judgments about Soviet intentions and have served as a barometer of Moscow's competitiveness. This study looks at the change in Soviet policy under Gorbachev. It proposes a strategic framework for the analysis of Soviet behavior and then examines Moscow's actions in terms of military support, active involvement, and the terms for peace. Special attention is paid to Soviet behavior in Southwest Asia. The study finds that Soviet behavior changed but in ways that were more subtle than often realized. Moscow pulled back having achieved partial success through compromise more often than it retreated in defeat. The shift to a strategy of detente had numerous causes, but a simple American peace-through-strength explanation that stresses external constraints and Soviet internal weakness is inadequate. Such explanations underestimate the importance of changing perceptions of threat and mistakenly affirm a deterrence conception of reciprocity (i.e., that force begets restraint). The evidence in regional conflicts suggests that a spiral model of reciprocity (i.e., that escalation begets escalation) is more apt.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , April 1992 , pp. 432 - 465
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1992

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References

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6 Iraqi military imports increased in constant 1976 dollars from $73 million in 1970 to $187 million in 1972, to $790 million in 1973, to $825 million in 1976, and to $1,043 million in 1977. From 1973 to 1977 the Soviet Union provided 70% of Iraqi imports. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968–1977 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, October 1979), 132–33, 156.

7 Iranian military imports in constant 1976 U.S. dollars in 1970 were $234 million, over four times Iraqi imports; they then rose in 1972 to $701 million, dipped in 1973 to $663 million, only to nearly double in 1974 to $1,126 million and nearly double again to $2,000 million in 1976 and climb still higher in 1977 to $2,275 million, over twice Iraqi imports. From 1973 to 1977 the U.S. provided 77% of Iranian imports. See ACDA (fn. 6), 132–33, 156.

8 See Herrmann (fn. 4), 98–101; and Rubinstein, Alvin, “Air Support for the Arab East,” in Kaplan, Stephen, ed., Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 468–518Google Scholar.

9 The two sets use different aggregations and different methods for handling inflation. They also tend to group countries by region, making specific bilateral data hard to determine. Both sets were affected by the 1984 decision of the intelligence community to reevaluate the costs of spare parts and support material that Moscow was sending to the Third World. These recalculations had a major impact on totals, ratios, and substantive conclusions. For instance, in data from the Congressional Research Service for the overlapping years 1981, 1982, and 1983, where both the old and new accounting evaluations systems were in place, the ratio of NATO over WTO deliveries changed from 1.52 to .88, 1.30 to .79, and 1.66 to .91, respectively.

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18 In studies that concentrate only on cases of Soviet action, it is difficult to distinguish the conditions that lead to action from those that do not. See Porter, Bruce, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984CrossRefGoogle Scholar); and Menon, Rajan, Soviet Power and the Third World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

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21 Francis Fukuyama reached a similar conclusion, finding that all cases in the 1970s were “critically dependent” on the existence of local opportunities or challenges and that the Soviet Union has not had much propensity to risk confrontation with the United States. See Fukuyama, , Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World, Rand no. 3337-USDP (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1986), 63–64Google Scholar.

22 The peace-through-strength perspective sees Soviet policy stymied briefly in the early 1970s and then very aggressive in the late 1970s, coterminous with a decline in American will. In the mid-1980s, after the United States had regained its self-confidence, Moscow is seen as cutting its losses in the Third World and pulling back from regional conflicts. See, e.g., Wallander, Celeste A., “Third World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought: Does the 'New Thinking' Grow Prematurely Grey?” World Politics 42 (October 1989CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Fukuyama (fn. 21); and MacFarlane, Neil, “The USSR and the Third World: Continuity and Change under Gorbachev,” Harriman Institute Forum 1 (March 1988Google Scholar).

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25 See Herrmann (fn. 4), 142–54.

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27 See Brezhnev, Leonid, “Interview,” Pravda, January 13, 1980, p. 1Google Scholar (FBIS-SOV-January 14, 1980, Al—6). Even after the withdrawal some Soviet observers still emphasized the threat posed by the United States and Pakistan. See, e.g., Tsagolov, Kim Makedonovich, “Not Everything Is So Simple,” SSHA: Ekpnomika, Politika, Ideologiya 6 (June 1989Google Scholar) (JPRS-USA-89–013, 17—21). Others argued that the intervention had been based on false assumptions and Soviet credibility concerns. See Trofimenko, Genrikh A., “With an Inexperienced Hand,” SSHA 6 (June 1989Google Scholar) (JPRS-USA-89–013, 22–27); and Vladimir Lukin, “The Lessons of Afghanistan: Sources of Bloody Games,” SSHA 7 (July 1989) (JPRS-USA-89–014, pp. 7–9). Alek-sandr Bovin, a critic of the intervention, admits that he was persuaded by the prevailing cold war thinking in 1979. See Bovin, “Experience in Self-Criticism,” SSHA 7 (July 1989) (JPRS-USA-89–014, 11—14). Pavel Demchenko, who was the Party's leading voice on Afghanistan in the 1980s, claims he never found Brezhnev's argument about an American threat in Kabul credible. He leaves no doubt, however, that this is what motivated Brezhnev. See Dem-chenko, “How This Began in Afghanistan,” Ekho Planety 46 (November 1980).

28 On Soviet options, see Herrmann, Richard, “The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and Policy, 1946–1988,” in Keddie, Nikki and Gasiorowski, Mark, eds., Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990Google Scholar).

29 See Ul'yanovskiy, Rostislav, “Iranskaya Revolutsiya i ee Osobennosti” (The Iranian Revolution and its peculiarities), Kommunist 10 (July 1982Google Scholar); Agayev, Semen, “Zigzagi Iranskoy Revolyutsii” (The zigzags of the Iranian Revolution), Voprosy istorii 1 (1985Google Scholar); and R. Ul'yanovskiy, “Sud'by Iranskoi Revolutsii” (Evolution of the Iranian Revolution), Kommunist 8 (May 1985).

30 See Kislov, Alex and Zimenkov, Rudolf, The U.S.A. and the Islamic World (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1984Google Scholar); and Igor Belyayev, “Islam and Politics,” Literaturnaya Gazeta, May 13, 1987, p. 13, and May 20, 1987, p. 12 (both in FBISSOV-87–1B).

31 At the Geneva summit in November 1985 Gorbachev connected Soviet withdrawal to an American guarantee of a political settlement. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John White-head officially agreed in December that the U.S. would act as a guarantor; New York Times, December 14, 1985, p. 1. In January 1986 the Afghan regime announced a timetable for Soviet withdrawal; New York Times, January 1, 1986, p. 1. It was in March 1986 that the Reagan administration decided to provide Stinger missiles to the Afghan mujahideen; New York Times, March 30, 1986, p. 3. According to Selig Harrison, U.S. aid levels in 1986 and 1987 increased from the $120 million in 1984 and the $250 million in 1985 to $470 million in 1986 and $630 million in 1987. See Harrison, , “Inside the Afghan Talks,” Foreign Policy 72 (Fall 1988Google Scholar). See also Galster, Steven, “Rivalry and Reconciliation in Afghanistan: What Prospects for the Accords?” Third World Quarterly 10 (October 1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar); and Rubin, Barnett, “Afghanistan: The Next Round,” Obis (Winter 1989Google Scholar).

32 See Duncan, W. Raymond and Ekedahl, Carolyn McGiffert, Moscow and the Third World under Gorbachev (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 93–114Google Scholar.

33 Moscow completed its withdrawal on February 15, 1989. Eduard Shevardnadze visited Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran between February 21 and 27. In Egypt he met with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens and the PLO'S Yasir Arafat. See FBISSOV-89–33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.

34 See Thornton, Thomas P., “The New Phase in U.S.-Pakistani Relations,” Foreign Affairs 68 (Summer 1989CrossRefGoogle Scholar). See also Cohen, Stephen, “U.S.-Pakistani Security Relations,” in Rose, Leo and Husain, Noor, eds., United States-Pakistan Forum: Relations with the Major Powers (La-hore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 1987Google Scholar); and Kizilbash, Hamid, “Anti-Americanism in Pakistan,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 497 (May 1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

35 Gorbachev invited Rafsanjani to Moscow in 1988. At the end of the year Khomeini wrote to Gorbachev. See “Message from Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini to Mikhail Gorbachev,” Tehran Domestic Service, January 8, 1989 (FBIS-NES-89–005, pp. 57–59); and editorial, “Gorbachev's Message: A Tactful Maneuver,” Tehran Times, February 27, 1989, p. 2 (FBIS-NES-89–042, p. 63).

36 See John Lorentz, “Anatomy of an Entanglement Afghanistan and Iran” (Paper presented to Conference on the Afghan Legacy, University of Texas, Austin, October 19—20, 1989).

37 See Khamenei, Ayatollah, “Message to Pilgrims,” Tehran Domestic Service, July 6, 1989Google Scholar (FBIS-NES-89–129, pp. 51–54); and Rafsanjani, Hashemi, “News Conference,” Tehran Television, June 8, 1989Google Scholar) (FBIS-NES-89–111, pp. 31–40).

38 See Herrmann, Richard, “The Soviet Decision to Withdraw from Afghanistan: Changing Strategic and Regional Images,” in Jervis, Robert and Snyder, Jack, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Superpower Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991Google Scholar).

39 ”Declaration of the Principles of Relations between the USSR and Iran,” TASS, June 22, 1989) (FB1S-SOV-89–119, pp. 23–24); “Joint Communique,” Pravda, June 24, 1989, p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-80–121, pp. 19–20). See also Hashemi-Rafsanjani, “Friday Sermon,” Tehran Domestic Service, June 30, 1989 (FBIS-NES-89–133, pp. 63–67).

40 See John Lorentz, “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Its Impact on Soviet-Iranian Relations” (Paper presented to the Conference on Soviet and American Relations with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, Columbus, Ohio, May 5–6, 1990).

41 Mikhail Gorbachev, “Speech at the U.N.,” Pravda, December 8, 1988, pp. 1,2 (FBIS-SOV-88–236, pp. 11–19). See also Georgiy Mirskiy, “UN Speech: Boost for Quest and Action: Sensible Approach. On Deideologization of Interstate Relations,” Pravda, January 25, 1989, p. 4 (FBISSOV-89–016, pp. 18–20); and Nodari Simoniya, “Principle of Freedom of Choice,” Pravda, January 18, 1989, p. 4 (FBIS-SOV-89–017, pp. 15–17).

42 Yevgeni Primakov, “USSR Policy on Regional Conflicts,” International Affairs (Moscow) 6 (1988); Andrey Kolosovskiy, “Regional Conflicts and Global Security,” Mirovaya Ekpno-mika iMezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 6 (June 1988) (JPRS-UWE-88–011, pp. 14–20); and Alek-sey Vasilyev, “There Will Not Be Any Losers If Realism Prevails in Approach to Regional Conflicts,” hvestiya, February 4, 1989, p. 6 (FBISSOV-89–026, pp. 10–12).

43 For this evolution, see Kremenyuk, Viktor A., “Regional Structure of U.S. Foreign Policy,” SSHA: Ekpnomikfl, Politico, Ideologiya 5 (May 1974Google Scholar) (JPRS 62191); idem, “The Developing Countries and the United States: The Struggle Intensifies,” SSHA 2 (February 1981) (JPRS 77724); idem, “The Same Old Scenario: Interventionism,” SSHA 5 (May 1981) (JPRS 78649); and idem, “Soviet-American Relations and Regional Conflicts,” Aziya i Africa Sego-dnya 3 (March 1989Google Scholar) (JPRS-UIA-89–014, pp. 42–46). For traditional Soviet military ideas on escalation and Third World conflicts, see Katz, Mark, The Third World in Soviet Military Thoughts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982Google Scholar).

44 Washington Post, September 23, 1980, p. A21.

45 See Herrmann (fn. 28), 80–81.

44 Demchenko, Pavel, “Who Is Fueling the Conflicts?” Pravda, October 18, 1980, p. 5Google Scholar (FBIS-SOV-October 20, 1980, pp. A2–3); S. Kondrashov, “An 'External Force' over the Persian Gulf,” Izvestiya, November 4, 1980, p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-November 10, 1980, pp. A3–5); and Igor Belyayev, “Surrounding the Iranian-Iraqi Conflict,” Literatumaya Gazeta, October 1, 1980, p. 9 (FBISSOV-October 2, 1980, pp. A2–3).

47 See Kislov, Alex, “Washington and the Iraqi-Iran Conflict,” SSHA: Ekpnomika, Politico, Ideologiya 1 (January 1981Google Scholar) {JPRS 77507, pp. 28–33); M. Ponomarev, “Washington Plays with Fire,” Krasnaya Zvezda, October 5, 1980, p. 3 (FBISSOV-October 8, 1980, pp. Al-3); and idem, “Who Is Taking Advantage of the Conflict?” Krasnaya Zvezda, October 26, 1980, p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-October 30, 1980, pp. Hl-3).

48 Washington Post, October 1, 1980, p. A15.

49 See Demchenko, Pavel, “Senseless War,” Pravda, October 7, 1982, p. 5Google Scholar (FBIS-SOV-October 8, 1982, p. H7).

50 See Leonid Brezhnev, “Speech to India's Parliament,” TASS, December 10, 1980 (FBIS-SOV-80–240, pp. D5–8).

51 On reflagging, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 1987—1988 (London: IISS, 1988), 127Google Scholar–32, and 75. See also Gary Sick, “Slouching toward Settlement: The Internationalization of the Iran-Iraq War, 1987—1988,” in Keddie and Gasio-rowski (fn. 28), 219–45.

52 See Gorbachev, Mikhail, “Speech to the Indian Parliament,” TASS, November 22, 1986Google Scholar (FBIS-SOV-86–229, pp. D6–12); and idem, “Speech at the U.N.,” Pravda, December 8, 1988, p. 1 (FBISSOV-88–236, pp. 11–19).

53 New York Times, September 19, 1990, p. 10; Washington Post, September 16, 1990, p. 25, and September 18, 1990, p. 21.

54 See Primakov, “The Inside Story of Moscow's Quest for a Deal,” Time, March 4, 1991, pp. 40–48; and “Interview with Yevgeni Primakov,” Paris Europe Number One, April 28, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91–083, pp. 9–15).

55 New York Times, December 19, 1990, p. 16.

56 See V. Afanasyev, “Bloodshed Could Have Been Avoided,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, January 18, 1991, p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-91–013, pp. 11–12); Ye Shchekatikhin, “Protracted Downpour,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, February 2, 1991, p. 5 (FBISSOV-91–025, pp. 32–33); and Vitaliy Kobysh, “A Special Kind of War,” hvestiya, January 22, 1991, p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-91–015, pp. 12–14).

57 See Bradsher, Henry, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, 2d ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985), 210Google Scholar–17, 227–37, 240–48; and Demchenko (fn. 27).

58 On the multidimensional Soviet strategy, see Herrmann, Richard, “The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing Inferences about Perceptions,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar). For a Soviet appraisal that “reconciliation” meant co-optation, see Andrey Kolosov, “Perosmysleniye Politiki v 'Tret'yem mire' “(Rethinking policy in the Third World), Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn 4 (April 1990).

59 The British made an effort in February 1980, and the French in January 1981; the UN named Perez de Cuellar as special envoy on Afghan matters in February 1981, and the European Community made a proposal in July 1981, which Moscow promptly rejected, as it had the others. In late 1982 and in 1983 and early 1984 Geneva talks and UN mediation were active but ineffectual.

60 See Bradsher (fn. 57), 268–69, 285–91. When Karmal seemed to drag his feet, he was replaced by Najibullah in May 1986. Najib concentrated on “broadening” the regime's base. Najib, “Consolidating the Revolution,” Pravda, May 16, 1986, p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-86–098, pp. Dl-2).

61 See, e.g., U.S. State Department, Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet Occupation, Special report no. 173 (December 1987); and idem, Afghanistan: Soviet Occupation and Withdrawal, Special report no. 179 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, December 1988).

62 See, e.g., Yuri Gankovskiy, “A Lesson Worth Learning: War in Afghanistan through a Historian's Eyes,” Izvestiya, May 5, 1989, p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-89–089).

63 Gorbachev, Mikhail, “Speech in Vladivostok,” Moscow TV, July 28, 1986Google Scholar (FBIS-SOV-86–145, pp. Rl-20, 18–19).

64 See Eduard Shevardnadze, “Consolidation of the CPSU under Multiparty Conditions,” Literaturnaya Gazeta, April 18, 1990, pp. 1, 9 (FBIS-SOV-90–081, pp. 5–11).

65 Washington Post, July 16, 1989, p. Al, and November 24, 1989, p. 45; New York Times, October 10, 1989, p. 1, November 26, 1989, p. 16, and December 17, 1989, p. 26.

66 See Rubin, Barnett, “The Fragmentation of Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1989–1990CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

67 Moscow began to talk directly to the mujahideen in November 1988. New York Times, November 28, 1988, p. 1. For the Soviet election plan, see E. Shevardnadze, “Afghanistan: The Difficult Road to Peace,” Izvestiya, February 15, 1990, p. 5 (FBIS-SOV-90–032).

68 New York Times, September 14, 1991, p. 1; and TASS, September 13, 1991 (FBIS-SOV-91–178, p. 3).

69 On critical cases, see George, Alexander, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparisons,” in Lauren, Paul, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979Google Scholar).

70 See Klinghoffer, Arthur J., The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Foreign Policy in the Third World (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980Google Scholar); Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962–1976) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), 241Google Scholar–81.

71 See Barber, James and Barratt, John, South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945–1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 247–327Google Scholar.

72 See McFaul, Michael, “Rethinking the 'Reagan Doctrine' in Angola,” International Security 14 (Winter 1989–1990CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

73 New York Times, December 13, 1990, p. A5.

74 See Duncan and Ekedahl (fn. 32), 154–57.

75 See Stoecker, Salty, “Clients and Commitments: Soviet-Vietnamese Relations, 1978—1988,” Rand Note N-2737-A (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, December 1989Google Scholar).

76 New York Times, October 24, 1991, p. 1.

77 Ibid., A7.

78 See Kremenyuk, Viktor, “Uregulirovanie Regional'nykh Konfliktov: Kontury Obshchego Podkhoda” (Teamwork with U.S. key to local conflicts), SSHA: Ekpnomilfa, Politico, Ideobgiya 8 (August 1990Google Scholar).

79 For a discussion of this, see N. Topuridze's interview with Major Tsagolov, General K., “The Politicians Lost the War,” Argumenty i Fakfy 39 (September 30-October 6, 1989Google Scholar); and Drobot, Galin, “Regional Conflicts: Their Sources and the Prospects for Bloc Uncoupling,” Nauchnyy Kommunizm 2 (February 1990Google Scholar) (JPRS-UIA-90–007, pp. 14–19, 17).

80 See Shevardnadze, E., “Interview: Persuasion through Truth,” Ogonek 11 (March 14—17, 1990Google Scholar); and idem, “Consolidation of the CPSU under Multiparty Conditions,” Literaturnaya Gazeta, April 18, 1990, pp. 1Google Scholar, 9 (FBIS-SOV-90–081, pp. 5–11). See also Mirskiy, Georgiy, “Avtoritarizm i Vlast' Voyennykh v 'Tret'yem Mire'” (Authoritarianism and the power of the military in the “Third World”) Mirovaya FMpnomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 7 (July 1989Google Scholar).

81 On imperial images, see Cottam, Richard, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 62–70Google Scholar; and Herr-mann (fn. 58).

82 See Kolosov (fn. 58).

83 On the rejection of cold war concepts applied to regional conflicts, see Volskiy, D., “We and the 'Third World' through the Prism of Modern Thinking,” Izvestiya, December 22, 1988, p. 5Google Scholar (FBISSOV-88–247, pp. 8–10); Simoniya, Nodari, “Mnogoobraziye mira i Format-sionnoye Razvitiye Chelovechestva” (Diversity of the world and the formation of mankind), Kommunist 16 (November 1989Google Scholar); Mirskiy (fn. 41); and Kolosovskiy (fn. 42).

84 For some of the most interesting contributions to the discussion, see Malashenko, Igor Y., “Interesy Strany: Mnimye i Real'nye” (The interests of the country: Imaginary and real), Kommunist 13 (September 1989Google Scholar); Blagovolin, Sergey Y., “Geopoliticheskiye Aspekty Oboron-itel'noy Dostatochnosti” (Geopolitical aspects of defense sufficiency), Kommunist 4 (March 1990Google Scholar); Kunadze, G., “Dostatochnosti Voyennogo Potentsiala SSSR” (The defensive sufficiency of the USSR's military potential), Mirovaya Ekpnomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 10 (October 1989Google Scholar); and Drobot (fn. 79).

85 See Heider, Fritz, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: John Wiley, 1958CrossRefGoogle Scholar); and Jones, Edward et al., eds., Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1971Google Scholar).

86 Secretary of State Baker, for instance, argued that “while recognizing that Moscow's policies are informed by a new sense of realism, we should also understand that our policies have contributed to that sense of realism. Where we have not raised the costs of adventure or aggression, we see little evidence of change. “Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” New York Times, January 18, 1989, p. 10. Fukuyama (fn. 21), 3—4, argues that when the United States accepts detente, Moscow exploits opportunities in the Third World. When Washington is more confrontational, Moscow is more cautious. See also Stephen Sestanovich, “Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline,” Problems of Communism (January—February 1988); and Wallander (fn. 22), 53.

87 See William Wohlforth, “Bias and Learning in Soviet Perspectives on the Balance of Power: Metamorphoses of the Correlation-of-Forces Model” (Paper presented at the 12th annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Tel Aviv, Israel, June 18–23, 1989).

88 See Aleksandrov, M., “World in Transition: German Unification and an All-German Home,” Literaturnaya Rossiya 11 (March 16, 1990Google Scholar) (JPRS-UIA-90–007, pp. 3–6); and Akhromeyev, Marshal S., “Open Letter to V. A. Korotich,” Krasnaya Zvezda, April 8, 1990, pp. 2Google Scholar, 4 (FBISSOV-90–074, pp. 70–75).

89 See Kolosov (fn. 58).

90 On the preservation of military assets, see Katz, Mark, Gorbachev's Military Policy in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1989Google Scholar).

91 See Sherman, Steven, Judd, Charles, and Park, Bernadette, “Social Cognition,” Annual Review of Psychology 40 (1989CrossRefGoogle Scholar); and Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 344Google Scholar—49. See also Klayman, Joshua and Ha, Young-Won, “Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing,” Psychological Review 94, no. 2 (1987CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

92 Golan (fn. 13), 24–25, argues that “not only has there been no significant change in the 1970s, but the changes within the 1970s were not entirely consistent…, [WJhere the theory, the rhetoric, and the behavior coincide, beginning in the early 1980s, if not earlier, is their generally pragmatic, relatively cautious tactical approach to national liberation movements.” Rubinstein (fn. 2), 49—51, makes a parallel point about continuity, although he differs with Golan on basic interpretative judgments.

93 See Izyumov, Alexei and Kortunov, Andrei, “The Soviet Union in the Changing World,” International Affairs (Moscow) 8 (August 1988Google Scholar); and Blagovolin, Sergey, “Voyennaya Moshch': Skol'ko, Kakaya, Zachem?” (Military power: How much, what kind, and for what?), Mirovaya Hkpnomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 8 (August 1989Google Scholar).

94 See “Interview with Georgiy Arbatov,” VEK XX I MIR 12 (December 1989Google Scholar) (JPRS-UIA-90–007, pp. 11–14).

95 See Grimmett, Richard, Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1982–1989 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 19, 1990), 60Google Scholar.

96 See Meyer, Stephen, “The Source and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

97 See Spechler, Dina and Spechler, Martin, “The Economic Burden of the Soviet Empire: Estimates and Re-estimates,” in Menon, Rajan and Nelson, Daniel, eds., Limits to Soviet Power (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), 43–44Google Scholar.

98 See references in fn. 84.

99 Shevardnadze, “Foreign Policy and Perestroyka,” Pravda, October 24, 1989, pp. 2–4 (FBISSOV-89–204, pp. 42–54, quote at 45).

100 Snyder, , “The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?” International Security 12 (Winter 1987–1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

101 On wishful thinking, see Lebow, Richard Ned, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981Google Scholar).

102 See Aleksandr Yakovlev, “'Rakovaya Opukhol' Imperskikh Ambitsiy v Yadernyy Vek” (The cancerous tumor of imperial ambitions in the nuclear age), Mirovaya TLkpnomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya 1 (1984); and idem, “Opasnaya os ' Amerikano-Eapadoger-manskogo Militarizma” (The dangerous axis of American-West German militarism), SSHA: Ekpnomika, Politika, Ideologiya 7 (1985).

103 See Phillips, R. Hyland and Sands, Jeffrey, “Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense: A Research Note,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar). See also Akhromeyev, Marshal S. F., “Second Open Letter to V. A. Korotich, Chief Editor of the Magazine Ogonek”, Krasnaya Zvezda, April 8, 1990, pp. 2Google Scholar, 4 (FBISSOV-90–074, pp. 70–75); and idem, “Who Is Bending the Truth?” Sovetskaya Rossiya, May 12, 1990, pp. 5–6 (FBISSOV-90–095, pp. 2–6).