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Organizational Politics and Change in Soviet Military Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Stuart J. Kaufman
Stuart J. Kaufman
Affiliation:
University of Kentucky
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Abstract

This article uses two puzzles from the Brezhnev period to test competing models of Soviet military policy and of innovation in military “doctrine.” An organizational model of Soviet military policy offers the best explanation of both cases: why the Soviet Union's Brezhnevera military strategy contradicted the Politburo's priorities (to prevent any war from escalating to nuclear use) and why the Soviet Union agreed to the ABM treaty. The ABM case shows that civilian leaders can force change in military “doctrine” when they have a policy handle–a way of redefining the issue to remove it from the military's exclusive area of competence. When civilians lack a policy handle, as in the military strategy case, they are unable to force innovation if the military is unwilling.

The Russian government now faces the task of finding effective policy handles that will institutionalize civilian control of military policy. The fate of Russia's reforms may depend on it.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , April 1994 , pp. 355 - 382
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1994

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References

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