Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), created in November 1943 and dissolved in September 1948, was in some respects unique in the history of international organization. Unlike traditional functional organizations it was not established to deal with some technical problem of common interest but of limited significance. Nor was its creation motivated as was the institution of the League and the United Nations by the hope that it might solve the vast problems of war and peace. Its scope, the management of postwar relief and the caring for displaced persons, was limited but significant. Its decision-making powers within the field of relief operations were broad when compared with the authority of both prior and subsequent functional organizations. Since national influence within the organization had operational, not simply technical orpropaganda, significance, it was not surprising that the structure of the organization should be a matter of considerable concern to its member states. Both in its creation and in its subsequent development thestructure of UNRRA reflected the conflicting interests of the constituent governments in international relief.
1 See Woodbridge, George, UNRRA, the History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 3 vols., New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, I, 7–14.Google Scholar
2 The history of the negotiation of the Agreement has been published in Woodbridge, , op.cit., 1Google Scholar, 3–32; and in Fox, Grace, “The Origins of UNRRA,” Political Science Quarterly, LXV (December 1950), 561–584.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The account here is taken chiefly from the version in the Handbook, United States Delegation (First Session of the Council), Section A, Document V and supplements (mimeographed). The Soviet proposal is contained in supplement b.
3 It was suggested, according to Miss Fox, (op. cit., p. 572)Google Scholar, that the United States was not included in the Soviet proposal because itwas prepared before the Pearl Harbor attack. However, over a month intervened between Pearl Harbor and the date of the note. Furthermore, it seems strange in this connection that the Russians sent their proposals to the United States government only after British prompting.
4 Handbook, U. S. Delegation, Section A, Document V, supplement g. The proposals were actually developed by the Inter-Allied Bureau and though not put forward by the United Kingdomas an official position were considered by it to constitute a feasible plan. It seems to have been knownto the negotiators as the “British plan.”
5 Ibid., supplement e.
6 Ibid., supplement e.
7 Ibid., supplement o.
8 Ibid., supplement o p. 2.
9 Ibid., p. 1.
10 Department of State Bulletin, VIII (June 12, 1943), 523–527.
11 Handbook, U. S. Delegation, Section A, Document V, supplements j, and k.
12 Ibid., supplements j and I.
13 Interview.
14 UNRRA Resolution 80.
15 UNRRA, Journal, Third Session, pp. 60–61.Google Scholar
16 See UNRRA, Council, IV, Documents 67, 138.Google Scholar
17 UNRRA, Council, III, Documents 163, 164Google Scholar, 186, 198.
18 UNRRA, A Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee, II, 162.Google Scholar
19 The membership of the committee at this date consisted of Australia, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippine Commonwealth, the United Kingdom, the United States andthe U.S.S.R.
20 Article I, 2, a.
21 The Administration did use its ultimate weapon—the stoppage of relief supply shipments—against two recipients, China and Albania. However, embargoes were applied in these instances only in part because of failure to handle relief distribution in accord with UNRRA policies.
22 The supplier countries did have a much more substantial control over displaced persons operations.