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Hypermobilization in Chile, 1970-1973

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Henry A. Landsberger  and
Tim McDaniel
Henry A. Landsberger
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Tim McDaniel
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
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Extract

The accelerating mobilization of Chile's working class from 1965 onward appears to support Huntington's cautious evaluation of the effects of that process rather than Deutsch's more optimistic one. Instead of resulting in more massive support for Dr. Allende's minority-based UP government (which, needing support, stimulated even further a process that had been noticeable from at least 1965), increased mobilization resulted in (a) heightened but unattainable economic demands; (b) increased support for the extreme left (a severe threat to the regime's policies and even existence, as Allende recognized); (c) increased support for the opposition Christian Democrats; (d) a general de-authorization of all institutions, including those tailored specifically to working-class needs. In some situations, mobilization may sweep away the remnants of an old regime. But where that is not possible or not the real issue, it may overwhelm rather than aid an already weak government, even if it is change-oriented.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , July 1976 , pp. 502 - 541
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1976

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References

1 Reputedly, this ominous parallel was recognized by Chilean intellectuals of the left months before the coup. Largo Caballero's role in pulling the Spanish Socialists away from a moderate stand toward left extremism, thereby helping to polarize the political situation, was played, in Chile, by Carlos Altamirano, General Secretary of the Socialist Party (PS). The unnecessary alienation of small landholding peasants in Spain (see Malefakis, Edward, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain [New Haven: Yale University Press 1970]) had a direct parallel in Chile. It also had a broader one in the sense that in Chile the entire bourgeoisie was alienated at a time when, according to Marxist analysis, the working class did not yet have enough power by itself to implement Dr. Allende's program. For a frank appraisal of the errors of “petit bourgeoisie ultra leftism,” see the analysis by Rene Castillo (the nom de plume of a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chile), “Chile: Ensenanzas y Perspectivas de la Revolución” (Prague: Editorial Internacional Paz y Socialismo 1974)Google Scholar.

2 Unidad Popular could be translated, awkwardly, as “Popular Unity.” The more graceful “Popular Front” cannot be used because in 1938, a coalition with that exact name came to power. In both 1970 and 1938 the Socialist and Communist Parties were key elements in these coalitions. But in 1938 they were overshadowed by the Radical Party, whereas in 1970 the much-diminished Radical Party was but one of several minor members of the coalition. The doctrinal position of the Socialist Party in 1970, although it covered a wide range, was on the whole distinctly to the left of the Communist Party (PC). Dr. Allende, a Socialist, was for the most part right-of-center of his party, i.e., relatively close to the Communists; he was accepted as a presidential candidate with considerable reluctance by his own party, and with much greater alacrity by the PC.

3 This phrase and others similar to it were frequently used by high officials of the government. An example may be found in Martner, Gonzalo, ed., El pensamiento del gobierno de Allende (Santiago: Editorial Universitario 1971), 119Google Scholar.

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