Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-lnqnp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T19:05:41.487Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

From Unanimity to Consensus: An Analysis of the Negotiations at the EU's Constitutional Convention

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Thomas König  and
Jonathan B. Slapin
Thomas König
Affiliation:
German University, [email protected]
Jonathan B. Slapin
Affiliation:
University of California, [email protected]
Get access

Abstract

In spite of the recent failure of two referendums, the drafting of a constitution for the second biggest economic power in the world, the European Union (EU), remains a major event in the history of European integration. Whether the constitution or a revised version of it will come into force or not, several important questions emerge. How did an increased number of twentyfive member states reach a conclusion, whereas a lower number of fifteen had failed at previous intergovernmental attempts? In particular, how did the constitutional convention differ from previous intergovernmental conferences (iGCs) at which the EU exclusively bargained its treaty documents in the past? How can one explain the outcomes of the convention, which proposes redistribution of power and resources among twenty-five or more member states? This article uses the positions of the delegates of the EU's constitutional convention to examine bargaining in a setting with few formal rules. The authors use theoretical insights from a spatial model and new survey data to determine the implicit voting rule used at the convention. They find that the convention differed from previous IGCs because the convention was governed by consensus, whereas previous EU bargains on treaties had always required unanimous support. The level of consensus was higher than simple majority rule but lower than unanimity. Since this threshold impacted who won and who lost at the convention, the authors also examine the sources of bargaining power, such as delegates' distance to the status quo, distance to the median, population size, and domestic constraints. The results confirm several findings in the EU bargaining and two-level game literature, for example, that actors closer to the status quo hold a stronger bargaining position and that actors from larger member states are neither more likely nor less likely to win at the negotiating table than are actors from smaller states. The findings on the irrelevance of domestic constraints also indicate why the popular votes in France and the Netherlands failed.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 58 , Issue 3 , April 2006 , pp. 413 - 445
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 After the negative popular votes in France and the Netherlands, seven countries announced their ratification processes, while Latvia, Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg, and Estonia ratified the proposal. Finland signed in autumn 2006. The German presidency is expected to consider possible solutions to revive the process after the French and Dutch elections in 2007.

2 Konig, Thomas, “Measuring and Analysing Positions on European Constitution-building,” European Union Politics 6, no. 3 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Tsebelis, George, “The European Convention and the Rome and Brussels iGCs: A Veto Player Analysis,” in Komg, Thomas and Hug, Simon, eds., Policy-making Processes and the European Constitution: A Comparative Study of Member States and Accession Countries (London, New York: Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science, 2006)Google Scholar.

4 There was some formal structure, however. For example, the presidency split the process into three phases and established a system of eleven working groups, which hindered trading across issues; see Thomas Konig, Andreas Warntjen, and Simone Burkhart, “The European Convention: Consensus without Unity?” and George Tsebelis, “Agenda Setting in the EU Constitution,” both in Konig and Hug (fn. 3).

5 Konig, Thomas, “The Dynamics of the Two-Level Process of Constitution Building: Setting the Agenda by Agenda Setting,” in Puntscher-Riekmann, Sonja and Wessels, Wolfgang, eds., The Making of a European Constitution: Dynamics and Limits of the Convention Experience (Wiesbaden: VHS, 2006)Google Scholar.

6 Moravcsik, Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1998)Google Scholar.

7 König, Warntjen, and Burkhart (fn. 4); and George Tsebelis (fn. 3).

8 Moravcsik (fn. 6).

9 Schulz, Heiner and Konig, Thomas, “Institutional Reform and Decision-Making Efficiency in the European Union,” American Journal of Political Science 44, no.4 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Tsebelis, George and Garrett, Geoffrey, “Legislative Politics in the European Union,” European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Konig, Thomas and Brauninger, Thomas, “Accession and Reform of the European Union: A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Eastern Enlargement and the Constitutional Reform,” European Union Politics 5, no. 4 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 For descriptions of various IGC negotiations, see Lindberg, Leon, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif., London: Stanford University Press/Oxford University Press, 1963), 285;Google Scholar and Moravcsik (fn. 6).

13 Hug, Simon and Konig, Thomas, “In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference,” International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002)Google Scholar; Slapin, Jonathan B., “Who Is Powerful? Examining Preferences and Testing Sources of Bargaining Strength at European Intergovernmental Conferences,” European Union Politics 7, no. 1 (2006)Google Scholar.

14 For an analysis of the Nice Treaty and its effects, see Tsebelis, George and Yataganas, Xenophon, “Veto Players and Decision Making in the EU after Nice: Policy Stability and Bureaucratic/Judicial Discretion,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Konig and Brauninger (fn. 11).

16 The Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe, December 14–15, 2001, Council Presidency Conclusions SN 300/1/01.

17 Tsebelis(fn.4).

18 Praesidium meeting conclusions 26/2/2002; Norman, Peter, The Accidental Constitution: The Story of the European Convention (Brussels: Eurocomment, 2003)Google Scholar; Tsebelis (fn. 3).

19 Konig, Warntjen, and Burkhart (fn. 4).

20 Moravcsik, Andrew, “What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 47, no. 2 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tsebelis (fn. 4).

21 The average change across all issues from the status quo on our 0–1 scale was not particularly high, only 0.37. The average change on those issues that did change was 0.67; see analysis.

22 From the sixty-five reform issues at the following IGC, only five provide for more domestic competencies, while almost half of the issues propose to increase supranational competencies of the EU; Konig (fn. 2).

23 Slapin (fn. 13); Hug and König (fn. 13); König, Thomas and Slapin, Jonathan B., “Bringing Parliaments Back In: The Sources of Power in the European Treaty Negotiations,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 16, no. 3 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Moravcsik (fn. 6); Moravcsik, Andrew and Nicolaidis, Kalypso, “Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 1 (1999)Google Scholar; Magnette, Paul and Nicolaidis, Kalypso, “The European Convention: Bargaining in the Shadow of Rhetoric,” West European Politics 27, no. 3 (2004)Google Scholar.

25 Hosli, Madeleine O., “The Creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): Intergovernmental Negotiations and Two Level Games,” Journal of European Public Policy 7, no. 5 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hug and Konig (fn. 13); Slapin (fn. 13).

26 Hix, Simon, “Constitutional Agenda-Setting through Discretion in Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam,” British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 2 (2002)Google Scholar; Falkner, Gerda, “How Intergovernmental Are Intergovernmental Conferences? An Example from the Maastricht Treaty Reform,” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 1 (2002)Google Scholar.

27 Black, Duncan, Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 141Google Scholar; Banfield, Edward C., Political Influence (New York: Free Press, 1961), 331Google Scholar; Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de and Stokman, Franz, eds., European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications and Comparisons (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Thomson, Robert, Stokman, Frans, Achen, Christopher, and Konig, Thomas, eds., The European Union Decides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

28 Organski, A. F. K, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 4Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 70Google Scholar; Morgen-thau, Hans J., Politics among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 26Google Scholar.

29 Organski, A. F. K and Kugler, Jacek, “The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor,” American Political Science Review 71, no. 4 (1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Fearon, James, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994)Google Scholar; idem, , “Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994)Google Scholar; Morrow, James D., “Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining,” International Studies Quarterly 36 (1992)Google Scholar; Schultz, Kenneth A., “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999)Google Scholar.

31 Hug and Konig (fn. 13); Iida, Keisuke, “When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter: Two-Level Games with Uncertainty,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993)Google Scholar; idem, , “Involuntary Defection in Two-Level Games,” Public Choice 89 (1996)Google Scholar; Mo, Jongryn, “The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 3 (1994)Google Scholar; idem, , “Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games,” American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995)Google Scholar; Milner, Helen V. and Rosendorff, B. Peter, “Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups,” Economics and Politics 8, no. 2 (1996)Google Scholar; Milner, Helen V., Interests, Institutions, and Information (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Pahre, Robert, “Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway, and the European Union,” European Union Politics 2, no. 2 (2001)Google Scholar; Dai, Xinyuan, “Dyadic Myth and Monadic Advantage: Conceptualizing the Effect of Democratic Constraints on Trade,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 18, no. 3 (2006)Google Scholar; idem, , “Political Regimes and International Trade: The Democratic Difference Revisited,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 (2002)Google Scholar; Tarar, Ahmer, “International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (2001)Google Scholar; idem, , “Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (2005)Google Scholar.

32 Barry, Brian, “Is It Better to Be Powerful or Lucky?” in Democracy and Power (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Dowding, Keith, “Resources, Power and Systematic Luck: A Response to Barry,” Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 2, no. 3 (2003)Google Scholar.

33 Tsebelis (fn. 4).

34 Slapin (fn. 13).

35 Tsebelis and Yataganas (fn. 14).

36 On this issue delegates from small states tended to favor voting weights that gave small states more power than they were given by the Nice rules, while large states preferred a system that gave large states more power.

37 Moravcsik (fn. 6).

38 Moravcsik and Nicolaidis (fn. 24).

39 Magnette and Nicolaidis (fn. 24).

40 Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960)Google Scholar.

41 Putnam, Robert, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 See Dai (fn. 31, 2002); Iida (fn. 31, 1993, 1996); Thomas Hammond and Brandon C. Prins, “The Impact of Domestic Institutions on International Negotiations: A Taxonomy of Results for Complete-Information Spatial Models” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Ga., September 2–5,1999); Mo (fn. 31,1994,1995); Milner and Rosendorff (fn. 31); Milner, Helen and Rosendorff, B. Peter, “Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997)Google Scholar; Pahre, Robert, “Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no 1. (1997)Google Scholar; Pahre (fn. 31, 2001); Schneider, Gerald and Cederman, Lars-Erik, “The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration,” International Organization 48, no. 4 (1994)Google Scholar; Tarar (fn. 31,2001, 2005).

43 Martin, Lisa L. and Sikkink, Kathryn, “U.S. Policy and Human Rights in Argentina and Guatemala, 1973–1980,” in Evans, Peter, Jacobson, Harold and Putnam, Robert, eds., Double Edged Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Milner (fn. 31); Putnam (fn. 41).

44 Hosli (fn. 25); Hug and Konig (fn. 13); Slapin (fn. 13).

45 Falkner (fn. 26).

46 Hix (fn. 26).

47 Pollack, Mark, “Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the Treaty of Amsterdam,” European Integration Online Papers (EIOP) 3, no. 6 (1999)Google Scholar, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-006a.htm.

48 Allison, Graham T., The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Harper Collins, 1971)Google Scholar; Achen, Christopher H., “A State without Bureaucratic Politics Is Representable as a Unitary Rational Actor” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1988)Google Scholar; idem, “How Can We Tell a Unitary Rational Actor When We See One?” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1995); Cederman, Lars-Erik, “Unpacking the National Interest: An Analysis of Preference Aggregation in Ordinal Games,” in Allen, P. and Schmidt, C., eds., Game Theory and International Relations (Aldershot, U.K.: Elgar, 1994)Google Scholar; Downs, George W. and Rocke, David M., Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Hug, Simon, “Nonunitary Actors in Spatial Models: How Far Is Far in Foreign Policy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 4 (1999)Google Scholar.

49 Achen (fn. 48,1995).

50 Hug (fn. 48).

51 Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de and Stokman, Franz, eds., European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications and Comparison (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Crombez, Christophe, “Legislative Procedures in the European Community,” British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 2 (1996)Google Scholar; idem, , “Policy Making and Commission Appointment in the European Union,” Aussenwirtshaft 52, no. 1–2 (1997a)Google Scholar; idem, , “The Co-decision Procedure in the European Union,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1997b)Google Scholar; Moser, Peter, “The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter: What Are the Conditions? A Critique of Tsebelis,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996)Google Scholar; Steunenberg, Bernard, “Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European Community,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150, no. 4 (1994)Google Scholar; Tsebelis, George, “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-setter,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 1 (1994)Google Scholar; idem, , “Conditional Agenda Setting and Decision Making inside the European Parliament,” Journal of Legislative Studies 1 (1995Google Scholar); idem, , “Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit,” Aussenwirtschaft 52, no. 1-2 (1997)Google Scholar.

52 Mayer, Frederick W., “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments,” International Organization 46, no. 4 (1992)Google Scholar; Morgan, Clifton T., “A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining,” International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 4 (1984)Google Scholar; idem, , “Power, Resolve and Bargaining in International Crises: A Spatial Theory,” International Interactions 15, no. 3 (1990)Google Scholar; idem, , Untying the Knot of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Morrow, James D., “A Spatial Model of International Conflict,” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986)Google Scholar; Milner (fn. 31).

53 Black, Duncan, Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958)Google Scholar.

54 Plott, Charles, “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule,” American Economic Review 57, no. 4 (1967)Google Scholar.

55 For example, Mayer (fn. 52); Milner (fn. 31); Tsebelis (fn. 51,1995).

56 Morgan (fn. 52,1984,1990,1994); Morrow (fn. 52).

57 Hug (fn. 48).

58 For example, Schneider and Cederman (fn. 42).

59 Tsebelis (fn. 4).

60 Moravcsik (fn. 6); Moravcsik and Nicolaidis (fn. 24).

61 For a complete description of the data collection process, see Konig (fn. 2).

62 For the governments of the EU15 member states, the proportion is 88.9 percent, and for the accession country governments it is 79.5 percent. And 92.9 percent of the countries include one answer from a governmental and a parliamentarian delegate, which means that the data set contains the two institutional positions from all EU15 member states and from 84.6 percent of the accession countries. Furthermore, the data cover 50 percent of the Commission's positions and 81.2 percent of the positions of the European Parliament, including members from all political parties.

63 Construct validity of the questions has been confirmed by the scientific adviser of a German Convention member, Professor Dr. Oppermann, and the high response rate of the interviewees.

64 Even though for some issues the status quo and median are the same, the correlation between our distance to the status quo variable and distance to the median variable is not particularly high (r=0.27).

65 In addition, we run a second probit model where we code the dependent variable one if the delegate prefers change and change occurs and zero if the delegate prefers the status quo and the status quo remains. Because this model is very similar to the first probit model, we report the one model.

66 Population data obtained from Eurostat (August 7, 2002).

67 Out of 1800 possible saliencies (20 issues multiplied by 90 delegates), 106 are missing—approximately 6 percent. In these few cases, we replace the delegate's missing saliency with his or her average saliency across the remaining issues.

68 For a list of these ratification procedures by member state, see Appendix 2.

69 EB60.1 covers EU1S member states while CCEB 2003.4 asks respondents similar questions in the accession countries.

70 We have also run the OLS model with panel corrected standard errors, which produces very similar results. In addition, we have run the models including both question and delegate fixed effects, and again the results do not change.

71 Tsebelis (fn. 4).

72 Garrett, Geoffrey and Tsebelis, George, “An Institutional Critique of Inter governmentalism,” International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 Hosli (fn. 25); Hug and Konig (fn. 13); Slapin (fn. 13).

74 Hug, Simon and Schulz, Tobias, “Using Mass Survey to Infer Political Positions,” European Union Politics 6, no. 3 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.