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Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Avi Shlaim
Avi Shlaim
Affiliation:
University of Reading (England)
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Abstract

The principal question which this article seeks to answer is: Why was the intention of the Arabs to launch the Yom Kippur War misperceived despite the fact that Israeli Intelligence had ample and accurate information on enemy moves and dispositions? In this anatomy of the Israeli intelligence failure, extensive use is made of the report of the official commission of inquiry that investigated the events leading up to the war. The article is equally concerned with the phenomenon of strategic surprise in general, and this case study is used to explore the psychological and organizational roots of intelligence failures. Some safeguards and institutional reforms for reducing the frequency of failure are examined. However, there is no suggestion that surprise can ever be eliminated altogether. In conclusion a case is made for developing a theory of intelligence through case studies and systematic research.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 28 , Issue 3 , April 1976 , pp. 348 - 380
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1976

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References

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