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Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Beverly Crawford
Beverly Crawford
Affiliation:
University of California
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Abstract

In 1991 Germany extended unilateral diplomatic recognition to Croatia and Slovenia in direct contravention of the preferences of its EC partners. In the context of Germany's postwar history of multilateralism in foreign policy, this was an unprecedented decision. As a case of defection from international cooperation, it requires explanation. This article explains how the German preference for recognition was formed and why Germany acted unilaterally when its partners had moved to adjust their policies to coordinate them with Germany's preferences. Defection from cooperation in this case is best explained as a two-level game: the source of Germany's preference for diplomatic recognition of these republics is traced to domestic political factors; its unilateral action is traced to regime weaknesses leading to negotiating failures in a changing post—cold war international environment.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 48 , Issue 4 , July 1996 , pp. 482 - 521
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1996

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References

1 See Frowein, Jochen, ”Recognition,” Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987Google Scholar).

2 Indeed, there is some evidence that consensual norms on the recognition of states have evolved in international law. A comparison of national recognition policies suggests that most states agree that recognition should not occur in the midst of a revolution or civil war. In these cases, the act of diplomatic recognition would be considered premature and would constitute a form of intervention in the conflict. Most Western states agree that diplomatic recognition should be granted only when the government to be recognized has effective control of the country or territory in question and has a reasonable expection of permanent control. If, however, the government is not in control, the recognition is generally considered to be premature. On premature recognition, see Sweeney, Joseph, Oliver, Corney, and Leech, Noyes, ”International Legal Effects of National Recognition Policies: Sketches of National Policies,” The International Legal System: Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation Press, 1981), 819Google Scholar–23; Lauterpacht, Hersch, Recognition in International Law (1947; reprint, New York: Foundation Press, 1978Google Scholar). Roland Dumas used the legal term ”premature” to describe Germany's recognition of Croatia; for his remarks and comments published in Le Monde, see Marc Fisher, ”Yugoslav Violence Puts Focus on Germany,” Washington Post, July 7,1991, p. A21.

There is, however, no real consensus on this issue. Legal scholars remind us that France recognized the United States during the Revolutionary War. The United States encouraged politicians in the Venezuelan province of Panama to secede and declare independence; the U.S. then immediately extended recognition to Panama, bringing it under its armed protection. States have also used a new government's political orientation, attitude toward foreign investment, and degree of foreign involvement in government as criteria for diplomatic recognition. See Department of State, Diplomatic Recognition: A Foreign Affairs Outline, United States Department of State Bulletin 462, August 1977Google Scholar.

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6 This is not to make the counterfactual argument that a united EC policy could have saved Yugoslavia. Debate on this issue continues. In December 1991 Lord Carrington, the EC's chief negotiator, appealed to Hans van der Broek, the Dutch foreign minister who held the EC Commission's rotating presidency, claiming that German recognition would destroy the peace conference at The Hague and common EC policy. He argued that it would prompt Serbia to leave the negotiations and cause Croatia and Slovenia to lose interest in the proceedings. David Binder, ”U.N. Fights Bonn's Embrace of Croatia,” New York Times, December 14, 1991, p. 3. On the interaction between the peace efforts and the warring parties, see Henry Wijn&endts, Joegos/avische Kronick:Juli 1991-Augustus 1991 (The Yugoslav chronicle: July 1991-August 1991) (Amsterdam: Rap, 1995).

7 I explain only Germany's preferences in this episode, not the sources of the initial EC policy from which Germany's preferences diverged.

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12 See Pierre M. Gallois, ”Vers une predominance allemande” (Toward a German predominance), Le Monde (Paris), July 16,1993, p. 2. For a more scholarly account, see Eberhard Rondholz, ”Deutsche Erblasten im jugoslawischen Buergerkrieg” (The burden of German history in the Yugoslav civil war), Blaetterfuer deutsche und Internationale Politik 37 (July 1992).

13 See Stanley Hoffman, ”International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe,” International Security 15 (Fall 1990), and Putnam, Robert and Bayne, Nickolas, Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984Google Scholar).

14 See Ruggie, John Gerard, ”Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46 (Summer 1992CrossRefGoogle Scholar), and Moravcsik, Andrew, ”Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining,” in Evans, Peter B., Jacobson, Harold K., and Putnam, Robert D., eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993Google Scholar).

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17 On the EPC as a regime, see Heinz-Juergen Axt, ”Kooperation unter Konkurrenten: Das Regime als Theorie der aussenpolitischen Zusammenarbeit der EG-Staaten” (Cooperation among competitors: Regime theory and cooperation on foreign policy among members of the European Community), Zeitschriftfuer Politik 40, (September 1993). On the evolution of the EPC and Genscher's key role, see Pryce, Roy, ed., The Dynamics of European Union (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1987Google Scholar); and MHolland, artin, ed., The Future of European Political Cooperation (London: Macmillan, 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

18 The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 provided the legal basis for the institutionalization of the EPC. The treaty calls for the Political Cooperation Secretariat to join the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers in a unified institutional structure—the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). See the ”Maastricht Treaty of 1991,” February 7, 1992, Treaty on European Union, Article J.4.1.

19 Central decision makers under diverse domestic-regime types may experience domestic gains from unilateral action. For examples, see Walt, Stephen M., ”Revolution and War,” World Politics 44 (April 1992CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

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22 For detailed studies of multilateralism as a German foreign policy norm, see Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit undEntspannung: ZurAussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1955–1982 (Security and detente: On the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1955–1982) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983); and Mueller, Harald, ”German Foreign Policy after Unification,” in Stares, Paul, ed., The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992Google Scholar).

23 Lijphart, Arend, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 21 Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 138Google Scholar–39; Dalton, Russell J., Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1988), 118Google Scholar, 199.

24 See Putnam, Robert D., ”Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Putnam's propositions are further elaborated in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam (fn. 14).

25 See Dijana Plestina, ”Politics, Economics, and War: Problems of Transition in Croatia,” Working paper, no. 5.15 (Berkeley: CGES, 1993); and Hayden, Robert, ”Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics,” Slavic Review 51 (Winter 1992CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

26 See Glenny, Misha, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin Books, 1992Google Scholar).

27 Author's interviews with EC officials, Brussels, May 18–19, 1993. On the concept of premature recognition, see fn. 2. On the view that diplomatic recognition is constitutive of statehood, that is, confers international personality on an entity purporting to be a state, see ”The Effect of Recognition on Statehood,” in Henkin, Louis et al., eds., International Law: Cases and Materials (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1980Google Scholar).

28 Claude, Inis L. Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York Random House, 1970), 53Google Scholar.

29 Emerson, Richard, ”Self-determination,” American Journal of International Law 65 (Fall 1971), 465CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 CSCE, Final Act of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereafter cited as Final Act of the CSCE), Helsinki Accords (VIII), quoted in Edmund Jan Osmanczyck, ed., Encyclopedia oftie United Nations and International Agreements (Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 333–54. The phrase ”in full freedom” was intended to preclude coercion by a government with respect to a people's choice of internal regime or policies. This was made explicit by the sponsor, The Netherlands, and by other supporting governments and was intended to support specifically the right of self-determination for people living under communist regimes. See Cassesse, Antonio, ”The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination in Human Rights,” in Buergenthal, Thomas, ed., Human Rights, International Law, and the Helsinki Accords (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun, 1977Google Scholar).

31 On the legal implications of granting collective rights, see Henkin et al. (fn. 27).

32 Authors interviews with EC officials (fn. 27).

33 Krieger, Wolfgang, ”Toward a Gaullist Germany?” World Policy Journal 11 (Spring 1994), 30Google Scholar.

34 For the CSU position, see Deutsche Press Agentur (DPA), May 19, 1991. For the CDU position, see Dr. Hans Stercken, ”Jugoslawien und die Europaeische Gemeinschaft” (Yugoslavia and the European community), Deutscbland-Union-Dienst 44 (November 20,1990), 4.

35 See Parlamentarische Protokolle der deutschen Bundestag (Protocol of the German parliament), 12/9, February 21,1991, p. 405.

36 See CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag (CDU/CSU coalition caucus in the German Parliament), press release, May 7,1991.

37 Parlamentarische Protokolle (fn. 35), 12/33, June 19,1991, p. 2690.

38 See the statement by Alfred Dregger, chair of the CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, in Deutschland Union Dienst 45 (June 27, 1991); and Heinz-Juergen Axt ”Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit? Mythen und Fakten zur Aussenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands” (Did Genscher chop Yugoslavia in half? Myths and facts of a united Germany), Europa Archiv 48 (June 25,1993).

39 See ”Slowenien stimmt dem Kompromiss von Brioni zu” (Compromise for Slovenia reached at Brioni), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 11, 1991, p. 2.

40 ”Drei Tage lang am Telefon” (Three days on the telephone), Der Spiegel 45 (July 8,1991), 128.

41 EPC, Declaration on Yugoslavia, 82nd Ministerial Meeting, The Hague, July 10,1991.

42 William Drozdiak, ”Germany Criticizes European Policy on Yugoslavia,” Washington Post, July 2, 1991, p. A16; ”Genscher will einheitliche EG-Politik” (Genscher wants a unified European Community policy), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 6,1991, p. 6.

43 ”EG-Aussenminister hoffen auf friedliche Loesung in Jugoslawien” (European foreign ministers hope for a peaceful solution in Yugoslavia), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 10,1991, p. 5.

44 Stephen Engelberg, ”Yugoslav Premier Fears Ail-Out War,” New York Times, July 29,1991, p. A3; ”Mehr beobachter nach Jugoslawien” (More observers go to Yugoslavia), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 30, 1991, p. 2.

45 For war and negotiations, see Anne McElvoy, ”Events Lead Genscher Astray,” Times (London), September 7,1991, p. 1.

46 John Tagliabue, ”Kohl Threatens Serbia Over Cease-fire Violations,” New York Times, August 8, 1991, p. A8.

47 See Paul Montgomery, ”Yugoslavs Trade Accusations as Peace Meeting Opens at The Hague,” New York Times, September 8,1991, p. 9.

48 Helmut Kohl, Tanner Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, September 13,1991.

49 The German weekly, Her Spiegel, reported that Kohl clearly recognized the danger of unilateral action. He stated that, despite mounting internal pressure, he would not recognize Croatia and Slove-nia alone because it would have negative repercussions for the unity of Europe. See ”Verheerende Fol-gen: Die selbstgewaehlte Rolle eines Friedenmaklers fuer Jugoslawien brachte die Gemeinschaft an den Rand einer Schweren Krise” (Devastating consequences: A peace-mediator's self-appointed role brings the EC to the point of severe crisis), Her Spiegel 45 (September 23,1991).

50 Krieger (fn. 33), 33.

51 Author's interview with Genscher, Bonn, May 26,1993.

52 ”Der Sonderbeauftragte der UN vermittelt Tudjman will Friedenstruppen nur bei Abzug der Armee” (UN special committee reports that Tudjman will allow UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia only when the JNA withdraws), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 3,1991, p. 4.

53 ”Wahrend Vance sondiert, schiefit die Armee” (While Vance explores the options, the army keeps shooting), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 5,1991, p. 6.

54 Heneghan, Tom, ”Ignoring Critics, Bonn to Decide Support for Croatia, Slovenia,” Reuters, December 16, 1991Google Scholar.

55 Kinzer, Stephen, ”Germans Follow Own Line on Yugoslav Republics,” New York Times, December 8, 1991, p. 18Google Scholar.

56 Tagliabue, John, ”Germany Insists It Will Recognize Yugoslav Republics' Sovereignty,” New York Times, December 15, 1991, p. 1Google Scholar.

57 Lewis, Paul, ”U.N. Yields to Plans by Germany to Recognize Yugoslav Republics,” New York Times, December 16, 1991, p. 1Google Scholar.

58 Author's interviews with EC officials (fn. 27).

59 ”Conference pour la Paix en Yougoslavie” (Conference for peace in Yugoslavia), Avis 5 (January 11,1992).

60 See ”Beschlufi der Aufienminister” (The foreign minister's decision), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 18, 1991, p. 2Google Scholar.

61 Author's interview with Genscher (fn. 51).

62 ”Bonn wird Kroatien und Slowenien am 15, Januar anerkennen” (Germany will recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 18,1991, p. 2.

63 ”Conference pour la Paix en Yougoslavie” (fn. 59).

64 Franjo Tudjman to H. E. Robert Badinter, letter, Zagreb, January 15,1992.

65 Many argued that the recognition decision signaled that Germany wished to revive its hegemony in the East and to coerce the EC to lend legitimacy to its hegemonic pretensions. See, for example, Misha Glenny, ”Germany Fans the Flames of War,” New Statesman and Society (December 20 and 27, 1991), 145; Singer, Daniel, ”Germany Muscles In,” The Nation (February 3, 1992Google Scholar); Peel, Quentin, ”Damned If It Does—and If It Doesn't,” Financial Times, January 18–19, 1992, p. 6Google Scholar.

66 German trade with Croatia was less than .02 percent of trade with the East. See Axt (fn. 38), 353.

67 On November 8, the EC imposed economic sanctions on all of the Yugoslav republics, including Croatia. See ”Chronology 1991: Western Europe and Canada,” Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1992), 226.

68 See Sandholtz, Wayne, ”Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht,” International Organization 47 (Winter 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

69 See Marshall, Tyler, ”Germany, France Shape a Model for Diplomacy,” Los Angeles Times, November 19, 1991, p. 1Google Scholar.

70 See Stan Markotich, RFE/RL Daily Report, February 7,1994.

71 Milner (fn. 5), 475.

72 See NATO Press Service, press communiques, M-l (91) 42, June 6, 1991; M-2 (91) 60, August 21,1991; and S-l (91) 86, November 8,1991.

73 FinalAct of the CSCE, quoted in Osmanczyck (fn. 30), 333–54.

74 See Rich, Roland, ”Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,” European Journal of International Law 4 (Summer 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

75 ”Der Sowjetunion untergegangen—Rufiland anerkannt” (The Soviet Union collapses—Russia is recognized), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 27,1991, p. 1.

76 Author's interview with Genscher (fn. 51).

77 Most of the scholarly arguments stressing the role of domestic politics can be found in German sources. The most prominent examples are: Axt (fn. 38); Wagner, Wolfgang, ”Acht Lehren aus dem Fall Jugoslawien” (Eight lessons from the case of Yugoslavia), Europa Archiv 47 (January 25, 1992Google Scholar); Bruno Schoch, ”Anerkennung als Ersatzhandlung: Ein kritischer Ruekblick auf die deutsche Jugo-slawienpolitik” (Recognition as a substitute for action: A critical assessment of Germany's policy toward Yugoslavia), in Schlotter, Peter, et al., eds., Der Krieg in Bosnien und das hilflose Europa (The war in Bosnia and a helpless Europe) (Frankfurt: Hessiche Stiftung Friedens-und Konflictkforsch, 1993Google Scholar); Alexander Muehlen, ”Die deutsche Rolle bei der Anerkennung der jugoslawischen Sezessionsstaaten” (The German role in the recognition of the secessional states in Yugoslavia), Liberal 34 (Spring 1992); and Heinrich, Arthur, ”Neue deutsche Aussenpolitik: Selbstversuche zwischen Zagreb und Breussel” (New German foreign policy: Attempts to maneuver between Zagreb and Brussels), Blaetterfuer deutsche und Internationale Politik 36 (December 1992Google Scholar).

78 Institut fur angewandte Sozialforschung (INFAS) (Institute for Applied Social Research), Mein-ungsreport, DPA Nachricheenabteilung/Ref. II AS, July 30,1991.

79 For a discussion of the role of the Croatian community, see Schoch (fn. 77).

80 Teltschik, Horst, 329 Tage (Berlin: Seidler, 1990), 347Google Scholar–48.

81 DPA (fn. 78), February 18,1991.

82 Ibid., May 5, 1991.

83 Parlamentarische Protokolle (fn. 35), 408B.

84 ”Folter und Mord an Polizisten Zivilisten als lebende Schutzschilde ” (Torture and murder of civilian police as living shields), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 5,1991, p. 3; Other examples include, ”Bonn handelt nicht vorzeitig” (Bonn does not negotiate in advance), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 16,1991, p. 1; and Johann Georg Reissmueller, ”Absurditaeten statt Politik” (Absurdities instead of politics), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 8,1991, p. 1.

85 Schoch (fn. 77), 41.

86 On top-down versus bottom-up perspectives on public opinion in foreign policy formation, see Risse-Kappen, Thomas, ”Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” World Politics 43 (July 1991CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

87 On the role of norms and how they set standards for behavior, see Katzenstein (fn. 21), 3–4. On the particular German interpretation of the self-determination norm, see Haftendorn (fn. 22); and Paterson, William E., ”Gulliver Unbound: The Changing Context of Foreign Policy,” in Smith, Gordon et al., eds., Developments in German Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992Google Scholar).

88 Paterson (fn. 87), 142–43.

89 Drozdiak, William, ”Germany Criticizes European Community Policy on Yugoslavia,” Washington Post, July 2, 1991, p. A16Google Scholar.

90 ”Drei Tage lang am Telefon” (fn. 40), 128–29.

91 Tito's Yugoslavia had been an ally against Hitler, and Yugoslavia had played an important role in cold war rhetoric. For details on French and British policy in the Balkans, see Nere, Jacques, The Foreign Policy of Francefrom 1914 to 1945 (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975Google Scholar). On French and British interpretations of the self-determination principle, see Lamborn, Alan C., The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France, and Germany (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991Google Scholar); and Bartlett, Christopher J., British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1989CrossRefGoogle Scholar). The best source on British policy toward the Balkans is Setton-Watson, Hugh, Eastern Europe between the Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1967Google Scholar); and the best source on early French policy is Keiger, John F. V., France and the Origins of World War (London: Macmillan, 1983CrossRefGoogle Scholar). The most important general source is Jelavich, Barbara, History of the Balkans, Twentieth Century, vol. 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983CrossRefGoogle Scholar). On French and British policies in the postwar period, see Pavlowitch, Stevan K., Yugoslavia and its Problems: 1918–1988 (London: Hurst Publishers, 1989Google Scholar).

92 Crawford, Beverly and Halfman, Jost, ”Germany's Role in Europe's Security Future,” in Crawford, Beverly, ed., The Future of European Security (Berkeley: International and Area Studies), 220Google Scholar—27.

93 See, for example, Dregger (fn. 38).

94 See Arthur Heinrich, ”Neue deutsche Aussenpolitik: Selbstversuche zwischen Zagreb und Breussel” (New German foreign policy: Attempts to maneuver between Zagreb and Brussels), Blaetter fuer deutsche und Internationale Politik 36 (December 1992), pp. 1446Google Scholar–58.

95 For the definitive study of the origin and expression of these sentiments, see Markovits, Andrei S. and Gorski, Philip S., The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995Google Scholar).

96 For details on these two campaign strategies, see Kvistad, Gregg O., ”Challenges to the Party-State in Unified Germany,” in Finszch, Norbert, ed., Comparative Reconstructions (London: Berg, 1996Google Scholar); and Markovits and Gorski (fn. 95), 235.

97 Author's interviews with SPD officials, Bonn, May 26,1993.

98 Parlamentarische Protokolk (fn. 37), 2560, 2690.

99 On the domestic influence on German foreign policy, see Thomas Risse-Kappen (fn. 86).

100 In the 1970s the SPD and CDU/CSU could collect 91.2 percent of the vote, but in 1987 their share had declined to 81.3 percent. In the 1990 elections, the share of the vote won by the SPD and CDU/CSU fell to 77.3 percent. See Gibowski, Wolfgang G. and Kaase, Max, ”Auf dem Weg zum politischen All-tag” (On the way to everyday politics), Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 11 (December 1991), 3Google Scholar.

101 For these arguments, see Kirchheimer, Otto, ”The Catch-All Party,” in Palombara, Joseph La and Wiener, Myron, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966Google Scholar); Rose, Richard, Voters Begin to Choose (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1986Google Scholar); and Dalton, Russell, Flanagan, Scott, and Beck, Paul, eds., Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984Google Scholar). On digestibility, see Ulf Mintzel, ”Grossparteien im Parteienstaat der Bundesrepublik” (The large parties in the German party-state), Aus Politik und Zeit-geschichte, 39 (March 1989).

102 A good general discussion of this phenomenon is Siegler, Bernd, Tolmein, Oliver, and Wiedemann, Charlotte, Der Pakt: Die Rechten undder Staat (The pact: The right-wing and the state) (Goettingen: Verlag die Werkstaat, 1993Google Scholar). The best source on the convergence of immigration policy is Ursula Muench, Aslpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Asylum policy in the Federal Republic of Germany) (Oplande: Leske und Budrich, 1993). On the Greens and the SPD with regard to Bosnia, see ”'Sie kneifen, Herr General': Manfred Opel (SPD) und Conny Juergens (Gruene) ueber UNO-Interventioned afu dem Balkan” ('You're chickening out General': Manfred Opel (SPD) and Conny Juergens (Greens) discuss UN intervention in the Balkans), Der Spiegel, (February 1,1993), 76.

103 In Germany there is an emerging literature on this problem. See, for example, Mintzel (fn. 101), 3–14. Mintzel argues that the small parties often play a positive role in binding ”dysfunctional forces” (fundamental opposition) to the political system, thus stabilizing the overall system by filling in niche positions. See also Haungs, Peter and Jesse, Eckhard, eds., Parteien in der Krise? In- und auslaendiscbe Perspektiven (Political parties in crisis? Foreign and domestic perspectives) (Cologne: Verlag Wis-senschaft und Politik, 1987Google Scholar); Wiesendahl, Elmar, ”Der Marsch aus den Institutionen. Zur Organisa-tionsschwaeche politischer Parteien in den achtziger Jahren” (Leaving the institutions: On the organizational weaknesses of political parties in the 1980s), Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 40 (May 1990), 3–14Google Scholar.

104 See Risse-Kappen (fn. 86), 506–7.

105 Author's interview with Genscher (fn. 51).

106 Statements to this effect can be found in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, (fn. 44); ”Bonn dringt auf Sanktionen gegen Serbien nach dem Scheitern des EG-Vermittlungsversuchs” (Bonn pressures for sanctions against Serbia after failure of EC mediation efforts), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 6,1991, p. 1.

107 ”Drei Tage lang am Telefon” (fn. 40), 128.

108 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (fn. 106, August 6, 1991).

109 ZDF Politbarometer (German Television, Channel 2, Political opinion poll), Mannheimer Forschungsgruppe, November 8,1991.

110 Krieger (fn. 33), 32.

111 Tagliabue, John, ”Bold New Germany: No Longer a Political 'Dwarf,'” New York Times, December 16, 1991, p. A12Google Scholar.

112 Marshall, Tyler, ”Germany Makes Its Presence Felt,” Los Angeles Times, December 20, 1991, p. A14Google Scholar.

113 Gedye, Robin, ”Yugoslav Crisis: Ovation for Kohl over Recognition,” Daily Telegraph, December 18, 1991, p. 8Google Scholar.

114 Riddell, Peter, ”Following the German Star,” Times (London), December 20, 1991Google Scholar.

115 Gedye (fn. 113).

116 ”Wreckognition,” Economist, January 18,1992, p. 49.

117 Opinion data on German participation in the EC comes from the Eurobarometer and is cited in Hans-Wolfgang Platzer and Walter Ruhland, Welches Deutschland in Welchem Europa? Demoskopische Analysen, politischeperspektiven, gesellschaftliche Kontrovenen (Which Germany and in which Europe? Demoscopic analyses, political perspectives and societal controversies) (Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz Verlag, 1994), 47–53. Poll data on the priority of political union is from Hans-Joachim Veen, ”National Identity and Political Priorities in Eastern and Western Germany,” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2–5,1993).

118 Author's interview with Genscher (fn. 51).

119 Ibid.

120 On epistemic communities, see Haas, Peter, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990Google Scholar); and Adler, Emanuel, ”Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and their Progress,” in Adler, Emanuel and Crawford, Beverly, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991Google Scholar).

121 For a more detailed argument along these lines, see Wolfgang Krieger, ”Germany's Place in the World,” in John Brady, Beverly Crawford, and Sarah Wilson, eds., The Post-War Transformation of Ger-many: Democracy, Prosperity, and Nationhood (forthcoming).

122 See, for example, Katzenstein, Peter, Small States and World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985Google Scholar); Milner, Helen, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988Google Scholar); and Ro-gowski, Ronald, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton: Prince ton University Press, 1989Google Scholar).

123 See Keohane, Robert, ”The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism,” in Goldthorpe, John, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 16Google Scholar.