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Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Eva Bellin
Eva Bellin
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Abstract

Many classic works of political economy have identified capital and labor as the champions of democratization during the first wave of transition. By contrast, this article argues for the contingent nature of capital and labor's support for democracy, especially in the context of late development. The article offers a theory of democratic contingency, proposing that a few variables, namely, state dependence, aristocratic privilege, and social fear account for much of the variation found in class support for democratization both across and within cases. Conditions associated with late development make capital and labor especially prone to diffidence about democratization. But such diffidence is subject to change, especially under the impact of international economic integration, poverty-reducing social welfare policies, and economic growth that is widely shared. Case material from Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, Zambia, Brazil, Tunisia and other countries is offered as evidence.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , January 2000 , pp. 175 - 205
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2000

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References

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26 Country Report, Indonesia, Economist Intelligence Unit (2d quarter, 1998), 19. For accounts of earlier anti-Chinese violence, see “Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia, 1959–68,” in Mackie, J. A. C., The Chinese in Indonesia (Sydney: Australia Institute of International Affairs, 1976)Google Scholar.

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39 Eckert (fn. 30, 1990), 377–79. The regime's decision to introduce competitive elections came in response to widespread popular demonstrations for democracy in 1986–87. The pending summer Olympic games, scheduled to be held in Korea in 1988, also subjected the regime to greater international scrutiny and heightened the effectiveness of popular protest. The business community was not at the vanguard of this popular movement. See Hamilton and Kim (fn. 30), 119–20.

40 Koo (fn. 30), 48.

41 See Hamilton and Kim (fn. 30), 116; Koo (fn. 30), 47.

42 Hamilton and Kim (fn. 30), 118.

43 Koo (fn. 30), 88.

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45 Koo, Hagen, “The Political Economy of Income Distribution in South Korea,” World Development 12, No. 10 (1984), 1030–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Already by 1978 absolute poverty had declined to 12 percent, down from 41 percent in 1965.

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47 This analysis draws extensively on Payne (fn. 15); Cardoso, Fernando, “Entrepreneurs and the Transition Process: The Brazilian Case,” in Guillermo O'Donnell et al., Transitionsfrom Authoritari-anism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Payne, Leigh and Bartell, Ernest, eds., Business and Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995)Google Scholar; and O'Donnell (fn. 11).

48 The Goulart regime that existed prior to the 1964 coup was perceived to be unpredictable, incompetent, and inattentive to private sector interests. See Payne (fn. 15), 13

49 Cardoso (fn. 47), 143.

50 O'Donnell (fn. 11).

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54 Beblawi, See Hazem and Luciani, Giacomo, The Rentier State (New York: Croom Helm, 1987)Google Scholar. The dependence of private sector entrepreneurs in nonindustrial ventures (e.g., commerce, real estate, construction) is even more legendary. For a colorful account, see Field, Michael, The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (New York: Overlook Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

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60 Victor Manuel Durand Ponte, “The Confederation of Mexican Workers, the Labor Congress, and the Crisis of Mexico's Social Pact,” in Middlebrook (fn. 52), 94,101–2. See also Middlebrook (fn. 52), 15; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (fn. 8), 217–19; and Middlebrook (fn. 58), 292, 311.

61 Collier (fn. 4), 59, 83; Ponte (fn. 60), 100; Lawrence Whitehead, “Mexico's Economic Prospects: Implications for State Labor Relations,” in Middlebrook (fn. 52), 73.

62 Middlebrook (fn. 52), 9; Whitehead (fn. 61), 75. ,

63 Murillo, Victoria, “A Strained Alliance: Continuity and Change in Mexico,” David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies Working Paper no. 96—3 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1996)Google Scholar; Middlebrook (fn. 58), 288.

64 Much of this structural weakness was a consequence of (or at least reinforced by) the late timing of Mexican industrialization. Late timing resulted in an immature industrial sector, still overwhelm- j ingly composed of small, geographically dispersed firms. It led to the importation of turnkey projects from industrialized countries whose capital intensity did little to absorb labor surplus. It meant industrialization in the context of global capital mobility, reducing the leverage of local labor. For more, see Middlebrook (fn. 58).

65 In 1989, 23 percent of Mexicans still lived below the poverty line and 7.3 percent lived in “extreme poverty.” Edwards, Sebastian, Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)Google Scholar.

66 In 1995 urban underemployment reached 25.9 percent and official unemployment figures for urban areas clocked in at 6 percent. See The Economist: Country Profile, Mexico (1996—97), 48.

67 In 1996 the informal sector was the source ofjobs for between 20 and 30 percent of the Mexican abor force. The Economist: Country Profile, Mexico (1996–97), 10; Country Report, Mexico, Intelligence Unit (1st quarter, 1997), 21.

68 Middlebrook (fn. 58), 221. Wage concessions won by the CTM generally translated into higher minimum wages that benefited all workers, not just union members. See also Ginneken, Wounter van, Socio-Economic Groups and Income Distribution in Mexico (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 68–69Google Scholar.

69 Ponte (fn. 60), 102.

70 A counterhypothesis suggested by an anonymous reader argues that internal trade union democ-acy, more than state dependence or aristocratic position, might be the better predictor of organized abor's support for democracy. But the fact that democratically inclined trade unions have made pacts vith authoritarianism when handicapped by structural weakness makes me skeptical; Ponte (fn. 60), 87, 100; and Enrique de la Garza Toledo, “Independent Trade Unionism in Mexico,” in Middlebrook fn. 52), 159,174. Additional research is necessary to test this counterhypothesis.

71 This analysis draws extensively on Eckert (fn. 30, 1990); Ogle (fn. 30); Koo (fn. 45); Deyo, Frederic, Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

72 For historical details, see Eckert (fn. 30, 1990), 352–56; and Hamilton and Kim (fn. 30 118–21.

73 Ogle (fn. 30), 13–16.

74 Eckert (fn. 30, 1990), 380; Lee, Jeonge Taik, “Dynamics of Labor Control and Labor Protest the Process of EO1 in South Korea,” Asian Perspective 12 (Spring 1988), 149;Google Scholar Koo (fn. 30), 39; Og (fn. 30), 116.

75 For details of this repression, see Ogle (fn. 30); Koo (fn. 30); Lee (fn. 74); and Deyo (fn. 71).

76 Koo (fn. 45), 1030; Deyo (fn. 71), 24.

77 Wage comparison was made with workers in Europe and the U.S., not Bangladesh.

78 Throughout the 1970s only 10 percent of workers in manufacturing and mining earned incomes equal to the minimum living standard set by the government. Only 50 percent made even half of that standard. Ogle (fn. 30), 76. See also Kong (fn. 44), 240. For figures on the failure of wages to keep pace with gains in productivity, see Sohn, Hak-Kyu, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1989), 234Google Scholar, n. 81. For wage differentials between industrial workers and workers in the service sector and agriculture, see Park, Young-Ki, Labor and Industrial Relations in Korea (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1979), 102Google Scholar; and Park, Young-Bum, Labor in Korea (Seoul: Korea Labor Institute, 1993), 59Google Scholar.

79 Manufacturers routinely ignored even the most basic health and safety regulations; Ogle (fn. 30), 77.

80 Manufacturing workers averaged the longest workweek in the world, officially clocking in at fifty-four hours per week (though some argue that sixty hours per week was a more common average). Ogle (fn. 30); Deyo (fn. 71), 98.

81 Kong (fn. 44), 226–37.

82 Lee (fn. 74), 144.

83 This analysis draws extensively on Mihyo, Paschal, “Against Overwhelming Odds: The Zambian Trade Union Movment,” in Thomas, Henk, ed., Globalization and Third World Trade Unions (London: Zed Books, 1995), 201–14Google Scholar.

84 Low- and middle-income workers saw their wages decline by an average of 55 percent during the 1980s. See Mihyo (fn. 83), 203.

85 Ibid., 208.

86 Ibid., 201. For more, see Rakner, L., Trade Unions in Processes of Democratization:A Study of Party Labour Relations in Zambia (Bergen: Michelsen Institute, 1992)Google Scholar.

87 This section draws extensively on Eva Bellin, “Stalled Democracy: Capitalist Industrialization and the Paradox of State Sponsorship in Tunisia, the Middle East, and Beyond” (Book manuscript), chaps. 4, 5.

88 For example, throughout the 1990s the regime intervened in national wage negotiations to bolster the position of labor and guarantee wage gains that, while not dramatic, far exceeded what labor could command on its own. For more, see Bellin (fn. 87); and Alexander, Christopher, “State, Labor, and the New Global Economy in Tunisia,” in Vandewalle, Dirk, North Africa: Development and Reform in a Changing Global Economy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996)Google Scholar.

89 For example, the UGTT has refused to publish any of the reports or declarations of Tunisia's Human Rights League (the crusading force for civil liberties in the country) in the trade union newspaper; nor has it ever publicly endorsed the league's work.

90 This analysis draws extensively on Posusney, Marsha Pripstein, Labor and the State in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Beinin, Joel and Lockman, Zachary, Workers on the Nile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Bianchi, Robert, “The Corporatization of the Egyptian Labor Movement,” Middle East Journal 40 (Summer 1986)Google Scholar; idem, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Goldberg, Ellis, “The Foundations of State-Labor Relations in Contemporary Egypt,” Comparative Politics 24 (January 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

91 These included financial subsidies to the union, prestigious political positions for union leaders, and nonwage benefits for workers such as job security, social security benefits, and generous leave policy (maternity).

92 See Bianchi (fn. 90,1986) 438; and idem (fn. 90,1989), 138.

95 See Marsha Pripstein, “Egypt's New Labor Law Removes Worker Provisions,” Middle East Re port (May-August 1995), 52–53.

94 Bianchi anticipated this development as early as the mid-1980s. See Bianchi (fn. 90,1986), 443.