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Coexistence and Cooperation in International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Richard J. Barnet
Affiliation:
Institute for Policy Studies
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Extract

The political scientist and the politician of our day both tend to be skeptical of international law. The political scientist, who is interested in studying the distribution of power, sees in the classic rules of international law neither an adequate description of the conduct of states nor an effective prescription for ordering national conduct. The politician, who is interested in the exercise of power, finds it difficult to realize what he considers vital national interests within the traditional legal framework. Both scholars and practitioners apparently feel that the older rhetoric of international law—nonintervention, peaceful settlement of disputes, the law of war—is to a great extent irrelevant to a world in turmoil. Bombings without declaration of war, illegal reprisals, campaigns of political assassination, and military intervention to crush internal revolt are accepted as part of the backdrop of world conflict. It seems increasingly clear that the classic rules of international law and the basic political and moral principles on which they rest are now used less and less by the great powers even as points of reference. Nothing sounds more old-fashioned than Secretary Stimson's remarks of less than forty years ago, in advising against the establishment of a national intelligence service, that “gentlemen don't read each other's mail.”

Type
Review Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1965

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References

1 In his memoirs President Eisenhower gives an illuminating insight into the attitude the leaders of great powers take toward legal constraints on such policy decisions. In June 1954 he was faced by a choice whether or not to support openly, by supplying the invaders with fighter-bombers, the Castillo invasion that overturned the Communist-leaning Arbenz government of Guatemala. The Assistant Secretary of State argued that this would constitute an illegal intervention, but the President decided in favor of sending the planes. In relating the incident, he quotes admiringly a comment by Allen Dulles, who had urged him to take this action. “Allen was equal to the situation. ‘Mr. President,’ he said, a grin on his face, ‘when I saw Henry [the Assistant Secretary] walking into your office with three large law books under his arm, I knew he had lost his case already.’”