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A Case Study in the Diplomacy of Social Revolution
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
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American experience with the ill-fated governments of the newer nations—most recently Turkey, South Korea, and Cuba—raises the question whether we can ever select a policy generally suited to the growth of stable, effective government among the developing nations. In all three of the cases mentioned, the United States followed the canons of conventional diplomacy while contributing substantially to monumental economic and social changes. Our commitment meant reliance on and support for the regime in office, although our own actions were gradually creating forces and sentiments favoring radical change in the internal political system. Whenever the pressures for political change were sufficient, adjustments were made with an abruptness that may well have left the United States in a worse position than if we had done little or nothing to assist long-term development.
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- Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1961
References
1 As may be apparent here, the author does not subscribe to the view that the United States is under a particular handicap by virtue of its European and, hence, colonialist associations. On the diplomatic front the Communists, both Russian and Chinese, have probably had as many setbacks as the United States. For the long run we have two distinct advantages: more surplus wealth and industrial capacity for social and economic aid, and a form of government to which nearly all new nations aspire. That we have been on the whole more interested in adapting the former rather than the latter to the needs of developing nations is, in the author's view, additional evidence that we are neglecting our most vital long-run interests.
2 To date, most survey research in developing nations has concentrated on groups of known immediate importance in the power structure and also of high levels of articulation. See, e.g., Free, Lloyd A., Six Allies and a Neutral, Glencoe, Ill., 1957Google Scholar; Callho, George V., Changing Images of America, Glencoe, Ill., 1958Google Scholar; and particularly the special issue of the Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII, No. 3 (February 1958), passim.
3 An analysis of the party organization itself appears in the author's Political Change in Morocco, Princeton, N.J., 1961. For more detail on the assessment and processing of the data, see “The Political Usage of ‘Islam’ and ‘Arab Culture,’” Public Opinion Quarterly, XXV, No. 1 (Spring 1961), pp. 106–14.
4 The same total rank-score in both judgments does not mean that the same persons gave the same preferences in both instances. By making a simple matrix, those giving the same score or different scores in the two frames of reference can be distinguished. The five-by-five matrix has been arbitrarily reduced to a two-by-two matrix so as to have only four groups. Those giving first or second preference to Turkey in both frames of reference (33) constitute the “sympathetic.” Those giving third, fourth, or fifth preference to Turkey in both frameworks (26) are labeled the “unsympathetic.” The intermediates giving high preference on the modernization ordinate and low preference on the foreign policy ordinate (31) are the “less sympathetic.” The other intermediate quadrant, high preference on foreign policy and low preference on modernization, is a “nonsense” result, which was selected by only three persons and will be omitted here.
5 “Non-dependence” is the Moroccan version of neutrality. It was originally urged by more progressive groups and has now been adopted by all shades of opinion.
6 The unemployed third consists of both those actually indicating unemployment in the occupational choices and those inserting “no” for occupation. Nearly half of all the “no” respondents were sympathetic. They may well be the only party cadre available in the more remote villages and be supported by small stipends from the Istiqlal. The occupational differentiations will be studied in more detail in subsequent analysis.
7 Many of the less sympathetic worked in the Moroccan version of the Peace Corps, called the Banaat al-lstiqlali or Builders of Independence. While participating in summer work projects, the Builders of Independence may have received indoctrination on Turkey's progress. In any event, it is entirely possible that their high approval of Turkey's material progress has carried over to produce approval in the foreign policy field, of which they may know less. This is similar to the situation of the unsympathetic, whose background suggests that their possible disapproval of Turkey's laicism may have carried over to influence their judgment of foreign policy.
8 A percentage score has been calculated for each group for each of the four arrays of five choices. First choices give five points, second choices four points, etc., providing a quotient whose divider is the highest maximum score—e.g., for 33 responses, the highest score possible would be 165. The subsequent impressions are based on both differences in rank order of preferences among the three groups and differences in magnitude of preference where rank order is alike. It should be made explicit that an arbitrary numbering system for expressing preference does not indicate the intensity or conviction with which any group holds any of the particular views expressed—i.e., the less sympathetic's third preference may represent a view held with relatively more intensity than, say, even the first choice of the same group.
9 The disinterest of the unsympathetic group is particularly noteworthy in another context. As the more traditional group, one would expect that they would give stronger support to the leader of the irredentist campaign, Allal Al-Fasi, who is a revered leader of traditional origins. The unsympathetic may be devoted to Allal, but for reasons more related to his piety than his foreign policy, while the modern elements give preference to his views on recovering former frontiers for motives related to their nationalism.
10 The findings are systematic empirical evidence for the ambivalence and rejection sometimes manifested by new nations. See, e.g., Rustow, Dankwart A., Politics and Westernization in the Near East, Princeton University, Center of International Studies, 1956, pp. 10–15.Google Scholar
11 Lest this seem too harsh a criticism of the Department of State, it should be pointed out that we had little choice in this matter so long as the development of the dependent portion of the world was under the control of European colonial powers. But while this may provide an excuse, it remains hard to approve of the ease with which we apparently made some of our concessions to colonial powers in the past.
12 Without meaning to single out any one document or agency, a person interested in following this question further would be well advised to scan A Proposed Outline for the Study of Technical Assistance to Less Developed Countries, Washington, D.C., ICA, 1960. The author of this document may have been only too well aware of the problems and obstacles involved in policy formation rather than negligent of them. Nevertheless, the carefully constructed research outline gives only the barest recognition to the over-all political impact of technical aid, and the values we wish to foster.
13 The author cannot stress too heavily the importance of co-operation from authorities in the new countries. Much could be done by means of existing organizational structures that would help maximize the new nations' chances of success and also add to their fund of knowledge. There is an unfortunate, but understandable, way in which information is power in a country where very little precise knowledge exists.