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Why One Basic Principle?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2007

JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD
JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD*
Affiliation:
The George Washington [email protected]
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Abstract

Principle monists believe that our moral duties, such as fidelity and non-maleficence, can be justified in terms of one basic moral principle. Principle pluralists disagree, some suggesting that only an excessive taste for simplicity or a desire to mimic natural science could lead one to endorse monism. In Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000), Brad Hooker defends a monist theory, employing the method of reflective equilibrium to unify the moral duties under a version of rule consequentialism. Hooker's arguments have drawn powerful criticisms from pluralists such as Alan Thomas, Phillip Montague and Philip Stratton-Lake. Against these critics, I argue that Hooker's monism enjoys certain practical advantages associated with the simplicity of a single basic principle. These advantages are often overlooked because they appear primarily in cases of second-order deliberation, in which one must decide whether our basic moral duties support a certain derivative duty. I argue that these advantages of monism over pluralism are analogous to the advantages that generalists claim over moral particularism. Because pluralists are generalists, I conclude that they are in an awkward dialectical position to dismiss Hooker's monism for the reasons they usually offer.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , June 2007 , pp. 220 - 242
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

1 Ross, W. D., The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930)Google Scholar. Ross calls them ‘prima facie’ duties, but I prefer ‘pro tanto’ duties as more descriptive, following Shelly, Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 17Google Scholar.

2 David, McNaughton, ‘An Unconnected Heap of Duties?’, Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1996), pp. 433–47Google Scholar.

3 Sen, Amartya uses the phrase ‘principle pluralism’ this way in ‘Well-Being, Agency and Freedom’, Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985), p. 175Google Scholar. See also Hill, Thomas E. Jr ‘Kantian Pluralism’, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar and Russ, Shafer-Landau's discussion of ‘rule monism’ in ‘Moral Rules’, Ethics 107 (1997), p. 599Google Scholar.

4 See, e.g., Robert, Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

5 T. M. Scanlon is a monist at least with respect to the domain of what he calls ‘what we owe to each other’, though perhaps not with respect to all of morality. Scanlon, T. M., What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

6 Bernard, Gert, Common Morality: Deciding What to Do (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

7 See, e.g., Isaiah, Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Thomas, Nagel, ‘The Fragmentation of Value’, in Mortal Questions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

8 Brad, Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Brad, Hooker, ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism’, Morality, Rules, and Consequences, ed. Hooker, Brad, Mason, Elinor, and Miller, Dale E. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000)Google Scholar; ‘Ross-Style Pluralism versus Rule-Consequentialism’, Mind 105 (1996), pp. 531–52; ‘Rule-Consequentialism, Incoherence, Fairness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1994–95), pp. 19–35; ‘Rule-Consequentialism’, Mind 99 (1990), pp. 67–77.

9 Discussed in sects. III–IV, below.

10 Tim Mulgan writes, ‘Consequentialism derives much of its initial appeal from its apparent simplicity: it gives me the single moral project of making the world a better place’ (‘Two Conceptions of Benevolence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1997), p. 62). Alasdair Norcross writes: ‘Part of the appeal of consequentialism is its simplicity and generality’ (‘Good and Bad Actions’, The Philosophical Review 106 (1997), p. 27).

11 Susan, Wolf, ‘Two Levels of Pluralism’, Ethics 102 (1992), p. 790Google Scholar.

12 Alan, Thomas, ‘Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism’, Morality, Rules and Consequences, ed. Hooker, Brad et al. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 195.Google Scholar

13 Kupperman, Joel J., ‘Vulgar Consequentialism’, Mind 89 (1980), p. 333Google Scholar. See also Charles, Taylor, ‘The Diversity of Goods’, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

14 Jonathan, Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), p. 21Google Scholar.

15 While I have reservations about Hooker's precise formulation of rule-consequentialism, I leave these for another occasion.

16 See, e.g., Thomas, Hurka, Perfectionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993x)Google Scholar; James, Griffin, Well-being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903)Google Scholar.

17 Hooker tries to remain neutral on theories of well-being, wherever possible (Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, pp. 42–3).

18 Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, pp. 16–19.

19 Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, pp. 19–23.

20 Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, p. 32.

21 Philip Stratton-Lake, ‘Can Hooker's Rule-Consequentialist Principle Justify Ross's Prima Facie Duties?’, Mind 106 (1997), p. 753, citing Philippa, Foot, ‘Are Moral Considerations Overriding?’, in her Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978)Google Scholar.

22 There are reasons to believe that Ross himself equivocated on this. See Brummer, James J., ‘Ross and the Ambiguity of Prima Facie Duty’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (2002), pp. 401–22Google Scholar.

23 Stratton-Lake, ‘Can Hooker's Rule-Consequentialist Principle Justify Ross's Prima Facie Duties?’, p. 756.

24 Brad, Hooker, ‘Reply to Stratton-Lake’, Mind 106 (1997), pp. 759–60Google Scholar.

25 Hooker entertains a similar counterfactual in ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism’, p. 232. He neglects to use these considerations to defend himself against the charge of begging the question.

26 ‘To the claim that it would be a surprising contingency if our ethical beliefs all stemmed from a single normative principle, Hooker's reply is that it is indeed a surprising contingency’ (Thomas, ‘Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism’, p. 193).

27 Phillip, Montague, ‘Why Rule Consequentialism is not Superior to Ross-Style Pluralism’, Morality, Rules, and Consequences, ed. Hooker, Brad et al. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 203–11Google Scholar.

28 See, e.g., Thomas, ‘Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism’, p. 197.

29 Montague, ‘Why Rule Consequentialism is not Superior to Ross-Style Pluralism’, p. 209.

30 Hooker, ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism’, pp. 231–4.

31 See Michael, Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991Google Scholar), cited in Thomas, ‘Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism’, p. 201 n. 40, further discussion at p. 188.

32 Thomas, ‘Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism’, p. 194.

33 Thomas, ‘Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism’, p. 194.

34 Thomas, ‘Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism’, p. 194.

35 ‘Tracking’ appears throughout Robert, Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

36 Thomas, ‘Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism’, p. 195.

37 It would also require and prohibit the same motives, if we made our Rossian list less faithful to the historical Ross. See Charles, Sayward, ‘W. D. Ross on Acting from Motives’, Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (1988), pp. 299–306Google Scholar.

38 See Jonathan, Dancy, Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 7Google Scholar.

39 See, e.g., Dancy, Ethics without Principles, p. 7; John, McDowell, ‘Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following’, Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, ed. Holtzman (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981)Google Scholar; McNaughton, David A., Moral Vision (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988Google Scholar).

40 See, e.g., Dancy, Ethics without Principles; McNaughton, Moral Vision.

41 Dancy, Ethics without Principles, p. 133.

42 One might analogize hard cases in ethics to natural-scientific cases in which reliable observations are unavailable, owing to our contingent observational limitations. Defending scientific realism, Philip Kitcher emphasizes how odd it would be if general principles became unreliable just at the point at which our contingent observational capacities give out. Perhaps a similar point applies in the ethical domain (Philip, Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 22–3)Google Scholar.

43 Thomas, ‘Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism’, p. 195.

44 Norman Daniels, ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics’, in his Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 21–46.

45 Berys Gaut offers such arguments in ‘Rag-Bags, Disputes and Moral Pluralism’, Utilitas 11 (1999), pp. 37–48. Don Loeb has argued that certain arguments in favor of generality – arguments that share some structural similarities to mine – rely upon unwarranted inductions. Don Loeb, ‘Generality and Moral Justification’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996), pp. 90–2. As far as I can tell, however, Loeb's arguments only apply if the monist admits that her theory conflicts with our considered convictions and tries to persuade us to abandon some of the latter. This is precisely what Hooker does not try to do.

46 I presented an earlier version of this article to the International Society for Utilitarian Studies in Hanover, New Hampshire, USA, in 2005. I received useful feedback on that occasion from Alasdair Norcross, Bernard Gert, Shelly Kagan and other members of the audience. I retain responsibility for any remaining defects and errors.